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ABSTRACT
Competition law is a tool first employed by countries more than a hundred years ago, to 
address issues relating to restrictions on competition conducted by private firms. 
Competition law is still predominantly an instrument to resolve national problems while 
the dominance of market based economies in the last fifty years, particularly following 
the collapse of the eastern block, in combination with improvements in transport, 
communications and technology have progressively dismantled national borders and 
internationalised trade. Trade liberalisation has in turn led to practices by firms that 
have an effect on the territories of more than one country. Attempts to address this 
paradox -  national rules to address international issues -  have appeared on several 
occasions in the last 80 years at the international, regional and lately bilateral level.
The research question that the thesis addresses is: What is the role o f  the competition 
law and policy o f  the EU in the formation o f  international competition rules (norms).
This question encompasses two main concepts: international agreements with 
competition elements, and the role of EU competition law and policy. As to the former, 
four main forms of agreements are discussed in separate chapters of the thesis: bilateral 
and tripartite enforcement cooperation agreements, bilateral trade agreements with 
competition provisions, plurilateral trade agreements, and the negotiations over a possible 
multilateral agreement on competition. As to the latter, the EU is the focus of examination 
of these agreements. In this regard, the study analyses all the relevant agreements signed 
by the EU and the socio-political environment under which these agreements are 
negotiated and (where relevant) applied in practice, as well as the influence that these 
agreements have had on the conclusion of similar agreements by other countries.
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Chapter 1: Introduction, Structure of the Thesis and Method
1.1 Introduction
Modem competition law is a tool first employed by countries more than a 
hundred years ago in order to address issues relating to restrictions of trade realised by 
private firms. As a legal instrument used to resolve national problems, competition law 
continues to be employed by countries. The dominance of market-based economies in 
the last fifty years, especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as 
improvements in transport, communications and technology, and trade liberalisation 
through the adoption of relevant agreements between states, have however 
progressively dismantled national borders and internationalised trade.
Along with trade liberalisation came practices conducted by firms that have an 
effect on the territories of more than one country. Attempts to address this paradox -  
namely, the adoption of national rules to address international issues -  have appeared on 
several occasions over the last 80 years at the international, regional and (lately) 
bilateral level. The general aim of this thesis is to observe these attempts and analyse the 
norms that have been developed: bilateral and tripartite enforcement cooperation 
agreements, bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements that include competition 
provisions, and the attempts for the adoption of a multilateral competition code.
A number of topics related to the internationalisation of competition law have 
been addressed in the relevant literature, mostly in the last 15 years, including among 
others: the types of practices that may have an effect on multiple countries;^ the 
relationship between trade law and competition law; and the debate over the possible 
inclusion of competition law within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework.^ 
Lately, a number of studies have focused on the examination of trade agreements with
1 See for instance UNCATD (2005) ‘Exclusionary Anti-competitive Practices: Their Effects on Competition and Development’ 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/4.
2 See for instance Marsden, P. (2003) A Competition Policy for the WTO (Cameron May); Petersmann, E.U. (1999) ‘Legal Economic 
and Political Objectives of National and International Competition Policies: Constitutional Functions of WTO ‘Linking Principles’ for 
Trade and Competition’ 34:1 New England Law Review, 145; UNCTAD (2003) ‘WTO Core Principles and Prohibition: Obligations 
Relating to Private Practices, National Competition Laws and Implications for a Competition Policy Framewoik’ 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2003/2; Fox, E.M. (1999) ‘Competition Law and the Millennium Round’ 2:4 Journal of International Economic 
Law, 665; Hoekman B. and P C. Mavroidis (2002) ‘Economic Development, Competition Policy and the World Trade Organisation’ 
World Bank Policy Research Working paper No 2917.
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competition elements.^ The influence of policy networks in the process of 
internationalisation of competition"^ and the relationship between preferential trade 
agreements and the attempts to conclude a multilateral agreement on competition have 
also been explored/ There are also works which have compared different domestic 
competition regimes/ Finally, recent papers have discussed the influence of the 
International Competition Network (ICN) on the internationalisation of competition 
process/ All these studies will be reviewed in the context of the discussion in 
subsequent chapters.
On the other hand there are no studies available which observe the way in which 
particular states and/or polities have reacted with regard to the adoption and application 
of international agreements on competition.* For instance, in the case of the European 
Union (EU), there are only a few recent papers that discuss the position taken by the 
polity in particular fields of international agreements with competition elements,^ while 
most of the works in this field, in the context of the discussion of international 
agreements with competition elements, make reference to the position taken by the EU. 
That said, there is no single work that discusses the EU position in all the levels of 
international cooperation on competition (i.e. unilateral, bilateral, plurilateral regional.
3 Cemat L. (2005) ‘Eager to Ink but Ready to Act? RTA Proliferation and International Cooperation on Competition Policy’, in Brusick 
P., A.M. Alvarez and L. Cemat (eds) Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains 
(UNCTAD, Geneva and New York); OECD (2006) ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements’ OECD Trade Policy 
Working Paper No 31. COM/DAF/TD(2005)3/FINAL.
4 Maher, I. (2002) ‘Competition Law in the Intemational Domain: Networks as a New Form of Govemance’ 29:1 Joumal o f Law and 
Society, 112.
5 Evenett, S.J. (2005) ‘What Can We Leam from the Competition Provisions of RTAs?’, in Brusick P., A.M. Alvarez and L. Cemat 
(eds), supra n. 3.
6 See for instance Doem, G. and S. Wilks (eds.) (1996) Comparative Competition Policy: National Institutions in a Global Market 
(Oxford University Press).
7 See Bode M., and O. Budzinski (2005) ‘Competing Toward Intemational Antitrust: The WTO vs. the ICN’, Marburg Papers on 
Economics, 03/2005.
8 Exceptions to this general observation are a number of papers which discuss the intemationalisation of competition law from the 
perspective of developing countries. For instance, see Hoekman B. (1997) ‘Competition Policy in the Global Trading System: A 
Developing Country Perspective’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 1735; Hoekman B. and P. Holmes (1999) 
‘Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO’ 22:6 The World Economy, 875. Nonetheless, these works are not focused on 
a particular developing country.
9 For instance Sepeszi has reviewed the competition provisions o f the EU trade agreements. See, Szepesi, S. (2004) ‘Comparing EU 
Free Trade Agreements: Competition Policy and State Aid’ ECDPM InBrief 6E), ECDPM, Maastricht Damro has examined the way 
that the EC Commission has reacted in the process of negotiation on competition at the WTO. Damro, C. (2006) ‘The New Trade 
Politics and EU Competition Policy: Shopping for Convergence and Co-operation’ 13:6 Joumal o f European Public Policy, 867.
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and multilateral)/^ In this regard, this work intends to fill the gap in the relevant 
literature and evaluate the role of the EU in all levels of intemational cooperation on 
competition. Hence, the main question that the thesis will attempt to address is the 
following: What is the role o f competition law and policy o f  the European Union in the 
formation o f  international competition rules.
This question encompasses two main concepts: intemational agreements with 
competition elements, and the role of EU competition law and policy in the formation of 
these agreements. As to the former, four main types of agreements will be discussed in 
separate chapters of the thesis: bilateral and tripartite enforcement cooperation 
agreements, bilateral trade agreements with competition provisions, plurilateral regional 
trade agreements, and the negotiations over a possible multilateral agreement on 
competition. As to the latter, the EU will be the focus of the examination concerning 
these agreements. The thesis attempts, first, to review the relevant agreements signed by 
the EU and, second, to observe the environment under which these agreements are 
negotiated and -  where possible - applied in practice.
1.2 Structure of the thesis
Based on these considerations, the thesis is stmctured as follows:
Chapter 2 attempts to highlight some of the aspects of national competition laws 
and policies which may have an effect on the way that competition law and policy 
operates at the intemational level. In particular, the chapter includes the historical 
development of competition law and policy and makes reference to the various 
economic theories that may have an effect on the particular application of competition 
law. The chapter also discusses the relationship between competition policies and other 
national policies that may have an effect on its application, and endeavours to observe 
the way that competition law and sectoral regulations interact in a given territory of a 
nation. Finally, the chapter provides a discussion on economic globalisation and the 
way that this particular phenomenon has had an effect on the operation of competition 
law. In doing so, the chapter includes particular business practices that may have an 
effect on the territory of more than one state. In sum, the aim of this chapter is to draw
10 An exception would be a recent paper by Ivaldi, and Bertmad, where the authors discuss the overall policy of the EU on competition 
in the intemational environment, nonetheless in much less detailed than the present study. See Ivaldi, M. and O. Bertrand (2006) 
‘European Competition Policy in Intemational Markets’, <ht^://papers.ssm.com/sol3/p^ers.cfin?abstract_id=951594> (last visited on 
21 May 2007).
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attention to the main factors that have led to the existence of intemational cooperation 
between states on competition law and policy, which, in its turn, has led to the 
negotiation and adoption of intemational agreements on competition that are discussed 
in subsequent chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 3 analyses bilateral and tripartite enforcement cooperation agreements 
in the field of competition law and policy. Mainly based on the relevant agreements 
signed between the EU and the United States of America (US), the chapter looks at the 
legal nature and the provisions of the two generations of these agreements, and also 
attempts to illustrate the debate relating to their usefulness. In the context of this 
discussion, the chapter analyses the way in which the EU has used this particular legal 
instrument.
Chapter 4 also looks at bilateral agreements. In contrast to chapter three, it 
examines bilateral trade agreements that include competition law provisions. The 
analysis is focused on relevant agreements concluded between the EU and a number of 
countries; this analysis has a dual aim: first, to discuss the way in which competition 
law co-exists with other commercial policies included in the text of these agreements; 
and second, to evaluate the EU policy regarding the use of this particular instrument.
Chapter 5 discusses plurilateral regional trade agreements which include 
competition provisions. Once more, the starting point of the analysis is the EC Treaty 
itself, which has been the most successful example of a plurilateral regional trade 
agreement. The chapter briefly introduces the main features of the EU competition 
regime and compares it with the competition regimes developed in other similar 
agreements in various parts of the world. In this context, the chapter also evaluates the 
role played by the EU in the development of competition regimes in other regional 
blocs.
Chapter 6 discusses the attempts to adopt a multilateral agreement on 
competition law and policy, and in particular, it discusses the EU as an actor in the 
context of these attempts. The discussion includes negotiations over a possible 
competition agreement in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and 
lately WTO, context, and examines also the alternative forms of multilateral 
cooperation, particularly the operation of the ICN.
Finally, chapter 7 provides the overall findings of this study with regard to the 
development of intemational norms on competition and the role of the EU in the 
formation - and where relevant -  application of these norms. The major finding with
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regard to the particular question that this thesis attempts to address is that depending on 
the particular category of agreements under examination, the role of the EU in the 
formation of such agreements varies.
1.3 Method
The analysis carried out in the context of this study is doctrinal, in the sense that 
it is focused on the discussion of legal provisions, by analysing the texts of intemational 
agreements and court decisions, where relevant. The discussion is also informed by 
various theories borrowed from political science and economics. As McCrudden notes, 
'...much traditional doctrinal legal analysis now relaxes its view o f the autonomy o f  
law, drawing on economic and socio-legal insights increasingly easily’. Competition 
law is one of the areas of law where this interaction of law and economics is clearly 
visible; hence the thesis takes into account economic theories in the context of the 
discussion of the particularities concerning the application of competition law on a 
national level. In addition, the process of creation of intemational mles encompasses 
various features and theories borrowed from the field of political and social science, and 
in this regard, the thesis also employs theories, such as policy networks, epistemic 
communities, and isomorphism, to analyse the process of negotiation and final 
formation of intemational agreements, either dedicated to, or which include, 
competition law.
Three main research tools have been employed for the analysis of the working 
question of this thesis. These include a review of the relevant literature, which is carried 
out in the context of the discussion in the chapters which follow. Another analytical 
tool employed, is that of interviews with academics, competition officials and 
practitioners, which supplement the primary literature. These discussions have been 
very informative, as they give a broad idea of what experts believe about the issues 
addressed in this thesis. This information is further expanded by practical working 
experience with the Intemational Affairs Unit of the EC Commission’s DG Competition 
and with the Greek Competition Commission, as the official in charge for intemational
13issues.
11 McCrudden, C. (2006) ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ 122 Law Quarterly Review, 632, and particularly pp 635, and 644.
12 In particular, 20 interviews were conducted, of which 11 with EU officials, 4 with UK academics, 2 with EU practitioners, 2 with US 
practitioners and 1 with business representatives.
13 The views expressed in this study are the author’s and do not represent the Greek Competition Authority.
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Chapter 2: The National and International Dimensions of Competition Law and 
Policy
Abstract
The first modem competition statute was enacted in Canada in 1889. Since then, 
and in view of the fact that competition law has been considered as one of the primary 
legal tools for the operation of market-oriented economies, the number of states that 
have adopted such laws has increased dramatically. Indeed, as of 2005, competition 
rules have been adopted by 101 different states. Nonetheless, the extent to, and the way 
in, which competition law has been applied in these countries varies. At the same time, 
due to a number of factors related to the globalisation of markets the number and types 
of anticompetitive business practices with an intemational effect have increased. 
Against this background, the aim of this chapter is threefold: first, to provide an 
introduction to the origins of competition law; second, to discuss the particular features 
of competition law which are responsible for the variation in the application of 
competition law in different countries; and third, to introduce briefly the reasons that 
have led to the need for intemational cooperation on, and/or harmonisation of, 
competition laws.
Section 1 of the chapter discusses the origins of competition law, and notes the 
increasing number of states that have adopted competition mles. Section 2 describes the 
development of the various economic theories which have played a role in the evolution 
and application of competition law, and further observes the broader issue of 
competition policy by providing an analysis of the legal, political and social factors that 
may influence the application of competition mles; it also briefly discusses the special 
case of the operation of competition law and policy in developing countries. Finally, 
Section 3 introduces the concept of economic globalisation, which has led to the 
existence of business practices with an intemational effect, which in tum has led to 
intemational cooperation on competition law and policy.
2.1. The origins of competition law
The first known restrictive trade agreement to be examined under common law 
by the English Courts was Dyer’s case in 1414*"^  where the court denied the collection 
of a bond for John Dyer’s breach of his agreement not to ^use his art o f  dyer’s craft
14 (1414) 2 Hen. 5, 5 PI. 26.
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within the town ...for half a y e a f  Since then, and throughout the next decades, a 
number of cases were decided by the English courts, and this gradual development of 
competition-related jurisprudence created an environment in which judicial principles 
were transformed into statutes. It was England once again which went even further and 
adopted statutory rules related to restrictive business practices. The Statute of 
Monopolies*^ was adopted in 1624 following the 1602 decision in the Darcy vs. Allein 
case,*^ in which the King’s Bench unanimously held as void the sole right that Queen 
Elizabeth I granted to her Groom Darcy to import playing cards into England.**
The main question the courts had to address was whether to declare as void any 
restrictive trade agreement for reasons relating to fairness of trade, or whether a 
distinction should be made between naked and ancillary (otherwise general and 
particular) restrictions to trade, where the former would be declared void de facto but 
the latter should be analysed in order to evaluate their positive and negative effects on 
the market and then make a decision as to its voidness. With the Mitchel v. Reynolds 
decision in 1711*  ^ the court upheld such ancillary restraints since these restraints were 
limited in time and restricted to a geographical place.^ **
Two further developments strengthened the domination of liberalism in England 
at that time and the consequent development of competition law. The first was the 
diffusion of the ideas of Adam Smith who invented the concept of the market 
economy.^* The second was the emergence and development of industrialisation. As 
Gerber puts it, industrialisation '...changed the unit o f  competition, replacing the 
individual artisan or group o f artisans with salaried labourers and the organised unit o f  
machine-based production It also changed the competition process itself, replacing 
quality and dependability as keys of commercial success with the rationalization of
15 Gellhom W. and W.E. Kovacic (1994) Antitrust Law and Economics in a Nutshell (West Publishing) at 4. For a more elaborate 
analysis o f  the way that common law addressed restrictive to trade agreements see Goodnow, F.J (1897) ‘Trade Combinations at 
Common Law’ 12:2 Political Science Quarterly, 212; Trebilcock M. (1986), The Common Law of Restraint of Trade, (Toronto: 
Carswell), chapter 1.
16 21 Jac. 1, C.3.
17 (1602) 11 Co. Rep. 84b.
18 Gellhom and Kovacic, supra n. 15, at 10. See also Furse M. (2004) Competition Law of the EC and the UK (Oxford University 
Press, 4th edition), at 4-5.
19 (1711) 1 P.Wms. 181. See Gellhom and Kovacic ibid, at 5
20 On the development of the “restraint of trade” doctrine, see S.B.T. (1966) ‘Petrol Solus Agreements: British Common Law of 
Restraint of Trade in a New Context’ 52:4 Virginia Law Review, 690, at 697 -  702, where the author notes that by the begirming of the 
20th century agreements were only rarely declared void by the courts on the basis o f the doctrine.
21 See section 2.2.1 below.
22 Gerber, D. (2000), Law and Competition in the Twaitieth Century: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford University Press), at 22.
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production: the main aim was to maximise production while minimising cost. A 
consequence of this phenomenon was that the size of a firm became increasingly 
important, in the sense that factories demanded increasingly larger organisations.^^
These changes in the structure of society demanded a relevant response from the 
law and thus, a number of statutes were enacted in Continental Europe to regulate 
combinations by large companies which were restrictive to trade. In France, where the 
social revolution of 1789 was built upon the notion of freedom and its protection, the 
law of June 14-17, 1791, declared as unconstitutional, hostile to liberty and void 
agreements of members of the same trade that fixed the price of an industry or its 
labour.^"  ^Two main features of the French society at the time led to the adoption of such 
a statute. The first was the belief that the political system should change in order to 
constrain the king and the government from wielding power according to their 
discretion. Those who inspired the revolution further believed that law would be the 
only way to control such power. In the same intellectual context, albeit later, the 
Austrian penal code of 1852, provided that ‘...agreements... to raise the price o f  a 
commodity...to the disadvantage o f the public... ' should be punished as misdemeanours. 
A subsequent law of April 7, 1870 abolished the penalties but still declared such 
agreements to be void.^^
Thus, the idea of excessive restriction of trade by dominant private firms and/or 
legal monopolists^^ was disseminated in some of the important trading countries of 
continental Europe throughout the 18* and 19* centuries. That said, there was no 
intemational consensus on whether business firms could restrict trade with their 
practices, or put differently, ‘privatise public i n t e r e s t In contrast with the examples 
given above, during this same period, German civil law clearly validated agreements 
between firms to raise prices.^* On the other hand, the Depression which emerged in 
1873 (the 'Panic o f  1873') following the crash of the Vienna stock market, and which 
spread throughout Europe and the United States, altered once more the conception of
23 Ibid.
24 Walker, F. (1905) ‘The Law concerning Monopolistic Combinations in Continental Europe’ 20:1 Political Science Quarterly, 13, at 
27. It has to be noted that industrial combinations were not per se prohibited. Only combinations injurious to the welfare o f the 
community were prohibited. See ibid, at 39.
25 Walker, ibid, at 22 and 38.
26 Braudel F. (1979) The Wheels of Commerce: Civilization and C£^italisml5th-18th Century (vol. 2. New York: Harper & Row), at 
445455.
27 Brady R.A. (1945) ‘The Role of Cartels in the Current Cultural Crisis’ 35:2 The American Economic Review, 312, at 314.
28 Walker, supra n. 2 4 , at 38.
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the competitive process. Managed competition came to alter perceptions about 
liberalism in general and consequently ideas of free competition. Under huge pressure 
concerning prices and profits, firms had to co-operate by forming cartels in order to 
survive. As Gerber informs us, with the exemption of Austria,^^ '[B]y the 1890s, cartels 
were considered 'natural' parts o f  the economic landscape in many parts o f  the 
Continent
2.1.1. Canada and the US: first modem competition statutes to be enacted
In contrast to continental Europe, where towards the end of the 19^ century the 
idea of competition was losing favour, Canada, enacted in 1889^  ^ what is known as the 
first competition-related legislation of modem times: The Act for the Prevention and 
Suppression o f  Combinations formed in restraint o f  Trade?^ More importantly, a year 
later, the most famous legal statute on competition law, the Sherman Act, was enacted 
in the US. The Act took its name from Senator Sherman who at the time expressed the 
opinion that the statute ‘does not announce a new principle o f  law, but applies old and 
well recognised principles o f common law The adoption of the Sherman Act was a 
reaction to the prevailing domination of tmsts. With the conclusion of the American 
Civil War, a number of changes occurred in the US market: rapid growth of the 
economy; an explosion of urban communities; the improvement of transportation and 
communications linked smaller communities; and new technologies enabled 
manufacturers to meet the increasing demands by exploiting economies of scale.^^ 
Nonetheless, in subsequent years declining economic growth and continuous entry by 
new competitors created major problems for big firms. Fixed costs were too high and, 
as it was very difficult to cease the operation of established firms in order to avoid over­
production, these firms were seeking ways to limit competition in the markets they
29 Where in the 1890s there was a lively debate as to the way that the problem of cartels should be addressed, and where relevant draft 
legislation was issued. See Gerber, supra n. 22, at 54-60.
30 Ibid, at 26
31 For an overview of the particular circumstances o f the time that led to the enactment of the law, see Bliss M. (1991) ‘The Yolk of the 
Trusts: A Comperison o f Canada’s Competitive Environment in 1889 and 1989’, in Khemani R.S., and W.T. Stanbury (eds). Historical 
Perspectives on Canadian Competition Policy (The Institute for Research on Public Policy, Halifax N.S) at 240-242; Benidickson , J. 
(1993) ‘The Combines Problem in Canadian Legal Thought’ 43:4 The University o f Toronto Law Journal, 799.
32 S.C. 1889,52 Vic., c. 41.
33 15 U.S.C., paras 1-7
34 Quoted in Gellhom and Kovacic, supra n. 15, at 21.
35 Fox E.M. and L.A. Sullivan (1987) ‘Antitrust -  Retrospective Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?’ 
62 New York University Law Review, 936, at 938.
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operated. The solution was to cooperate with rivals in order to fix output, prices, and 
market shares, initially in the form of pools, and when this proved insufficient, in the 
form of trusts.^^
The trust phenomenon first appeared in railroads, the first business to experience 
the modem type of ‘business bigness'?’^ Railroads were capital intensive. Capital 
requirements of railroad construction precluded competitive services to scarcely settled 
territories.^* Given the absence of competition, railroads were able to discriminate on 
rates imposed and services provided to clients, and to destroy competitors through 
predation. Furthermore, a consequence of big business was the creation of tmsts, which 
could become dominant in several markets. A typical example was the tmst of the 
Standard Oil company, which in the 1880s was controlling a number of markets, 
including fuel oil, sugar, lead, and whiskey.^^
This dominance in the US economy of what Rostow calls ‘a tiny group o f  
Titans^^^ led to furious complaints in the country, initially b j  farmers and subsequently 
by labourers and small entrepreneurs."*^ Given the vast number of citizens who were 
affected by these strategies of the big firms, the adoption of an Act which would attempt 
to mitigate the effects of this situation was among the priorities in the agenda of both 
major parties; hence the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890."*^  What is noteworthy is 
that instead of opting for regulation that would allow the government to extensively 
intervene in markets and change their stmcture. Congress took as an assumption that the 
competitive market itself should be the principal regulator of price and output and of 
wages, interest and profits."*^
36 Ibid, at 938-940.
37 At the time, in the US as well as in the UK railroads were privately owned. See Chadler A.D. (1977) The Visible Hand; The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business (Harvard University Press), at 89-91.
38 Gellhom and Kovacic, supra n. 15, at 15.
39 Ibid, at 16.
40 See Rostow.E. (1960) ‘British and American Experience With Legislation Against Restraints o f Competition’ 23:5 The Modem Law 
Review, 477, at 481-2.
41 Ibid.
42 For a detailed historical analysis o f the events that led to the enactment of Sherman Act, see Peritz R.J.R (1996) Competition Policy 
in America, 1888-1992: History, Rhetoric, Law (New York: Oxford University Press).
43 See Rostow, supra n. 40, at 482.
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The Sherman Act, itself also influenced by the common law restraint of trade 
doctrine,contains two main prohibitions. Section 1 declares illegal 'Every contract, in 
the form o f trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint o f  trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations... ’ Section 2 prohibits monopolies or attempts 
to monopolise, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolise, any part of interstate or 
foreign trade. In the next twenty years, and amid considerable reactions by the business 
side that questioned the ability of Sherman Act to follow the evolution of 'modern 
business \  courts started shaping the terms of the Act.^^
Furthermore, in 1914, the Clayton Act was enacted, with specific provisions 
prohibiting exclusive dealing agreements, particular tying agreements and interlocking 
directorates, and mergers achieved by purchasing stock."^  ^ Since then, competition law, 
or antitrust law as it is termed in the US, has developed enormously, becoming a central 
feature in the development of the US economy and society and going through several 
stages of legislative interpretation in the process."^^
By reviewing the origins and socio-political and economic values behind the 
development of US competition law and policy, Peritz argues that the enforcement of 
competition law in the US has been built around two (sometime conflicting) notions of 
competition, the first being the expression of individual liberty, free of government 
intervention, and the other reflecting rough equality in the context of a competitive 
environment free of excessive economic power, and based on arguments of fair
44 According to the former Chairman of the Senate judiciary Committee, G. Hoar, ‘We have affirmed the old doctrine o f the common 
law in regard to all interstate and intemational commercial transactions’. Quoted in Dana, W. F. (1902) ‘The Supreme Court and the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act’ 16:3 Harvard Law Review, 178, at 180.
45 For an early analysis of the provisions of Sherman Act, see Morawetz V. (1910) ‘The Sherman Anti-trust Act’ 11:1 American 
Economic Association Quarterly, 321.
46 Kovacic W.E. and C. Shapiro (2000) ‘Antitrust Policy: A Century o f Economic and Legal Thinking’ 14:1 Joumal of Economic 
Perspectives, 43.
47 See 15 U.S.C. para 13.
48 For instance, Kovacic and Shapiro have identified the following five distinct periods in the development of US competition law. The 
first, 1890- 1914, was where the courts slowly started ^plying the provisions of Sherman Act without a consistent economic analysis. 
The second period identified was the period fi"om 1915 to 1936, where a mle-of-reason analysis was fi'equently used by the courts in 
competition cases. That said, this period was characterised by lack of competition enforcement. The third period, 1936- 1972, was 
dominated by the Stmcture-Conduct- Performance paradigm of the Harvard School. From 1973 to 1991, the enforcement of antitrust 
mles was based on the efficiency explanation for a number o f phenomena, as the theories o f the Chicago School were dominant in US 
government and courts. Finally, fi-om 1992 to date, the authors argue that economic analysis in competition cases has been focused on 
game theory models. In addition antitrust enforcement has also been focused on innovation issues. See Kovacic and Shapiro supra n.46. 
For a brief presentation on the main elements o f the various economic theories which have dominated American antitrust thought for 
certain periods, see Appendix I.
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competition.'^^ In either case, what characterises the application of US competition law - 
at least in the last 70 years - is the use of various economic theories which, depending 
on the particular preference of the US governments, have been used to support the 
particular enforcement agenda of US antitrust. Due mainly to this characteristic, along 
with its longevity and extended application by US courts and authorities, US antitrust is 
considered probably the most influential single national competition legislation in the 
world.
2.1.2. Competition in the 20^ Centurv in Europe
Back in Europe, ideas about competition which lost favour towards the end of
the 19* century were once more considered in the interwar period, leading to the 
enactment of the first anti-cartel law in Germany in 1923, and later such laws in Sweden 
(in 1925) and in Norway (in 1926).^  ^Nonetheless, the Great Depression of 1929 and the 
Second World War led to the disappearance of competition law in Europe.
Following the Second World War (WWII), the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Germany were the first European countries to adopt competition laws. Both countries 
adopted such laws under the pressure of the US, nevertheless it has been documented 
that the extent to which such pressure was the most important factor leading to the 
adoption of these rules varies. In particular, while in the case of the UK the adoption of 
competition law was a response to the need of the country to secure as much US aid as 
possible, in Germany, the need for competition legislation was debated since the 
1920s, with the development of ordoliberalism, and this development, along with 
pressures by the allies, equally contributed to the enactment of the German competition 
law in 1958.^^
On a regional level, following WWII, and in particular in 1951, six European 
countries (France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and Germany), signed 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) agreement, whose main aim was to
49 Peritz, supra n. 42, at 301.
50 Maher, I. (2004) ‘Regulating Competition’ in Parker, C., C. Scott, N. Lacey, and P. Braithwhaite (eds.) Regulating Law, (Oxford 
University Press), 187, at 194.
51 Gerber, supra n. 22, at 115, and 155-158. The author also notes that in die 1930s a number of countries, including Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Yugoslavia and Denmark, adopted some sort of competition law, which was nevertheless not used in practice, or its application 
was little known outside the borders of these countries. Ibid, at 163.
52 Ibid, at 214.
53 Ibid. at 268, where the author notes that by 1947 both the US and the UK had in place occupation laws which aimed at breaking up 
the German industrial ‘giants’.
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prevent Germany from re-establishing its dominance in the production of coal and steel. 
Only ten years previously this domination contributed to the well-known detrimental 
effects of WWII/"
Competition law was included in the list of issues that the signing countries 
attempted to address with the conclusion of ECSC. In particular, Article 65 banned 
cartels, while Article 66 included a provision on concentrations (i.e. mergers), and 
another on the abuse of a dominant position by firms. As Gerber argues, while the US 
did not officially take part in the negotiations - since the negotiators wanted to avoid the 
danger that the project would be seen as US-controlled - it played at least a limited role, 
as it provided the drafters of the Treaty with basic ideas, with which nevertheless, and 
with the exception of the merger-related provisions, they were already acquainted.^^
The most important element of the ECSC competition rules is that it was the 
first time in the relatively short history of competition law and policy when such rules 
were included in a plurilateral regional agreement. To this end, and despite the fact that 
the impact of the actual enforcement of the ECSC competition rules on the development 
of European competition law was limited,^^ the ECSC introduced the "Trans-European" 
model of competition law^  ^ and led to the inclusion a few years later of competition 
rules in the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community 
(EEC).
2.1.3. The Treatv of Rome
The Treaty of Rome was signed in March of 1957,^* and in terms of competition 
it included a general provision which set the enactment of a competition law as one of 
the focal aims of the Community. Article 3(g) reads: "the institution o f  a system 
ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted’. Two other provisions 
were devoted to private anticompetitive practices. Article 85 prohibited anticompetitive 
agreements (but also provided a limited exemption: Article 85 (3)) and Article 86 
prohibited the abuse of a dominant position. Furthermore, and due to the fact that EC 
competition law was to be applied to the various EU Member States, two articles of the
54 Bebr G. (1953) ‘The European Coal and Steel Community: A Political and Legal Innovation’ 63 Yale Law Journal, 1.
55 See Gerber, supra n. 22, at 342.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, at 335.
58 See Treaty establishing the European Community as Amended by Subsequent Treaties. Rome, 25 March 1957, 
<htq);//europa.eu.int/eur-Iex/Iex/en/treaties/dat/I2002E/pdf/I2002E_EN.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
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Treaty were devoted to practices conducted by Governments, but which could have a 
substantial effect on competition in the region: Article 90 of the Rome Treaty included 
provisions on public undertakings and Article 92 included provisions concerning state 
aids. Provisions relating to the control of mergers were not included in the Treaty, due 
to the failure of the founding members of the Community to find a consensus on this 
issue.
The system of competition in the EU is discussed in some more detail in Chapter 
5, in the context of the examination of plurilateral trade agreements which include 
competition, and the EU (international) competition policy will be the focal point of 
subsequent analysis of this study, in view of the main question that this thesis attempts 
to address, which is the role of the EU competition law and policy in the formation of 
international agreements on competition.^^
2.2. The expansion of competition law and policy worldwide, and factors that lead 
to varied application of competition law at the national level
In recent years, one after the other, a number of states embarked on the 
establishment of competition rules, as competition law and policy have been considered 
one of the most important mechanisms for the successful implementation of liberal 
national policies, while, as Chapters 4 and 5 argue, in some cases, and particularly with 
regard to a number of developing countries, competition rules have been adopted in the 
context of the participation of these countries in bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements 
which include competition provisions. A compilation of the databases created by the 
University of Halle^® and the International Bar Association (IBA)^^ which include the 
national statutes on competition enacted by 2005 with the database of the World Bank 
that includes all the countries with a population exceeding 80000 people, and the level 
of the income of such countries,^^ provides us with useful statistics regarding the 
expansion of competition rules, and noteworthy observations as to the identity of
59 See Chapter 5, section 5.2
60 This work has been carried out by Franz Kronthaler and Johannes Stephan, in the context of the EU 6th Framework Programme 
STREP project ‘Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform, and Sustainable Development’ 
<http://www.iwh-halle.de/prqjects/competition_policy/db/index.asp> (Last visited on 21 May 2007).
61 <www.globalcompetitionforum.org> (Last visited on 21 May 2007).
62<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATlST[CS/0„contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64 
133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html> (Last visited on 21 May 2007).
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countries that have adopted such rules. By 2005, 101 countries, accounting for 49% of 
countries with a population exceeding 80000 people, had competition rules in place.^^
Table 2.1: Adoption of competition rules by decade
1920*^-
1930
Period 1889-
1900
1900-
1910
1910-
1920
1930-
1940
1940-
1950
1950-
1960
1960-
1970
1970-
1980
1980-
1990
1990-
2000
2000 -
2005
TOTAL
No of 
countries 
that 
adopted 
competition
60 15 101
As Table 2.1 illustrates, 75 of these 101 countries adopted their competition law 
in the last 15 years. The collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the expansion of the 
EU, has definitely had an impact on the increase in the number of countries adopting 
competition r u l e s . O n  the other hand, only 16 out of the 101 countries with 
competition rules had these rules in place 30 years ago. This list includes the US, 
Canada, Australia, Germany and the UK,^  ^ and some other EU Member States. It also 
includes India, Pakistan, and Chile, where nevertheless competition rules have 
practically only recently been used. In any case, these statistics may safely lead us to the 
conclusion that in most of the countries which have adopted competition legislation 
courts have not had the time to review many competition cases, relevant academia has 
not had the time to examine and develop competition related principles, and agencies 
have not had much time to apply competition policy widely.
Consequently, current development of competition law and policy, both in terms 
of academic literature and in terms of their practical application, has to a great extent 
taken place in large industrialized countries, which, with greater resources, expertise 
and longevity, remain an influence and model for new regimes. On the other hand the
63 While another 13 were in the process of adopting such law.
64 As noted above, Gennany and Sweden adopted some sort of competition rules in the 1920s and another four countries in the 1930, 
nonetheless these laws was of little use and therefore the table takes into account the date of the adoption of “modem” competition 
legislation by these countries.
65 This argument is based on the discussion carried out in chapter 4 of the thesis where it is shown that following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the EU signed a number of agreements with former Soviet Union States and countries which had until then communist 
regimes in place. In this context such countries adopted competition rules.
66 Which nevertheless adopted a prohibition model only in 1998 with the enactment of the Competition Act. See Morris, D. (2003) 
‘Dominant Firm Behaviour under UK Competition Law’ Paper presented to the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Thirtieth Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, New York City 23-24 October 2003, <http://www.competition- 
commission.org.uk/our_peop/members/chair_speeches/pdf/fordham2003.pdf> (Last visited on 21 May 2007), at 3-8.
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development of competition law and policy even in these countries has shown that there 
is diversity in the way that competition law has been applied on a national level.
This is not to say that there is total disagreement as to the proper content and 
function of competition law, since most of the industrialised countries accept that 
provisions on cartels, abuse of dominance and some sort of merger control should be 
included in their national legislation. Nevertheless, as the next section argues, on several 
occasions the understanding about the proper evaluation of particular practices varies, 
and moreover there is no universal agreement as to the scope of competition law, in 
view of the fact that several sectors of national economies are regulated by sector- 
specific regulations and not competition.
With the increase in the number of anticompetitive practices, discussed in 
Section 3, that may have an effect on multiple national markets, this variety in the 
application of national competition rules may lead to conflicts in cases where more than 
one national authority claim jurisdiction over a practice and apply different standards on 
the evaluation of this particular practice.^^ From a more theoretical perspective, in the 
context of internationalisation of competition the discussion over the factors that lead to 
diverse application of competition rules is of significant importance, and this 
importance derives from the fact that, as the section notes, competition law and policy 
operate in complex economic, socio-political and legal environments of a given country. 
Accordingly, negotiations at the international level are rarely exclusively dedicated to 
competition law. In fact, only bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, discussed 
in Chapter 3 are solely focused on competition matters. In all other forms of agreements 
and prospective agreements, competition is only one of the subjects under negotiation. 
Throughout the next chapters, this observation vrill become more obvious, both with 
regard to the examination of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements which include 
competition provisions and -mainly- with regard to the negotiations of a multilateral 
competition law. Hence, the way and extent to which competition law and policy 
operates on a national level is indicative of whether it is considered as a priority by 
particular states when they negotiate an international trade related agreement which 
includes competition provisions.
On the other hand, this diversity in approaches regarding the proper application 
of competition law may also be seen as a process in which the various ideas about the
67 See for instance below, the brief refeience to the GE/Honeywell case, at.p. 53.
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nature and aims of competition law and policy are exchanged, and the economic, social, 
legal and political standards according to which national competition laws apply are 
observed. While it is not intended here to review in detail the different aspects of this 
process, the chapter identifies four main factors which lead to such a varied application 
of competition, which in turn become the subject matter of discourse at the international 
level.
The first one relates to economics and to the fact that a number of sometimes 
divergent theories have been used to apply the competition-related rules. The second 
one relates to the fact that certain sectors of national economies are regulated by sectoral 
regulation and not competition, and such sectors vary from country to country. The third 
factor is political and has to do with the relationship between competition law and 
policy and other national policies which sometimes may have a scope divergent to that 
of competition law and policy. Finally, the fourth factor is cultural and relates to the 
social structure and traditions of particular national societies that have an effect on the 
way that competition law is applied in these countries.
2.2.1. The influence of economics in the application of national competition rules
Probably the most important feature in the application of competition law and 
policy, at least with regard to industrialised countries such as the US and the EU, is the 
role of economics in the evaluation of particular business behaviour and its effect on the 
market. Competition has been very much the work of economists (Adam Smith being 
the intellectual leader), and economic analysis has been of major influence in the 
application of competition rules ever since.^^ The particular role of economics in 
competition law is to define the market in which a practice under examination has taken 
place, as well as the possible effects that this practice may have on this market.^^
This is not always an easy task, especially with regard to the evaluation of the 
effect that alleged anticompetitive practices may have on the market. The main 
difficulty vvith the application of economic theories in the field of competition law is
68 The first antimonopoly legal instrument, which received the attention by economists, was the 1824 repeal of the Combination Acts of 
1799 and 1800, which forbade either employers or employees to join influence the wage bargain. Informed by the theories developed by 
Adam Smith, J.R. McCulloch wrote in strong support o f the repeal of the act, stressing the necessity o f  an active antimonopoly program. 
See Stigler G. (1982) ‘The Economists and the Problem of Monopoly’ 72:2 The American Economic Review, 1, at 2.
69 See Maher (2004), supra n. 50, at 196, where the author also notes that the inadequacy of economics to answer whether a particular 
conduct is anticompetitive stems fi-om the fact that in such a situation '. . . competition law is not purely technocratic in nature but raises 
political issues such as the balancing of public and private (economic) power where competition law acts as a bridge’. In this respect, 
competition law encompasses legal, economic and political elements.
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that they cannot define ex ante the ability of firms to compete with their competitors in 
a given market. What economic theories are able to do is to provide us with tools to 
define, measure and evaluate ex post the effects of a particular market structure or the 
effects of a particular practice or strategy by a firm related to prices, outputs, profits and 
efficiency.^® Economic theories and models are based on and around assumptions. 
These assumptions by definition do not cover (all) real world situations. Additionally, 
when the assumptions are changed the outcomes of the models may look strikingly 
different, changing for example the price from a monopoly level to a competitive price 
level.^  ^ Hence, by definition, economic thinking and economic models are not always 
perfect guides as to what will be the future effect of a practice (vertical restraint, merger 
etc) under examination on the markets.
Furthermore, different economic theories may lead to different outcomes when 
evaluating whether a practice is anticompetitive or not. In this regard Appendix I briefly 
reviews the main economic schools and theories that have been used in the analysis of 
competition cases. It shows that economic theories change over time; therefore the 
approach to law changes within a system and the way that competition law has been 
applied even in the biggest economies with commitment to competition is diverse. For 
instance, as noted above,^^ even in the US, which is the country with the most mature 
competition law in the world, five distinct periods of application of competition law 
may be identified, while at least the last three of them have been influenced by different 
schools of economic thought.^^
In fact, in the field of competition law and policy, and more generally, in the 
field of broader economic policy, the choice of one economic theory or the other as 
more appropriate also relates to an extent to the ideology one holds about society. As
70 Nicolaides, P. (2000) ‘An Essay on Economics and the Competition Law of the European Community’ 27 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, 7, at 10
71 This inability of economics to provide valuable predictions as to the way that markets will operate (i.e. whether a practise by a firm 
will distract the competitive process) has generated criticism in the relevant literature. It is indicative that as early as 1912, it was 
expressed by scholars that ‘The fundamental reason vsiiy nothing has been done..., with reference to improving the antitrust situation, is 
that there has never been any consistent or satisfactory course which seemed available. On most subjects, at least two distinct policies 
are contending for supremacy”. See Parker Willis, H. (I9I2) ‘Political Obstacles to Anti-Trust Legislation’ 20:6 The Journal of Political 
Economy, 588, at 588. Along the same lines, and somewhat 87 years later Hughes argued that; I f  economics is a science, then 
economic behaviour must be predictable. All individuals, whatever their background or idiosyncrasies, must respond in the same way to 
the same economic stimuli. If  we know the factors that tiiey must take into account, then we will be able to predict their actions with 
certainty’. Hughes, E.J. (1999) ‘The Left Side of Antitrust. What Fairness Means and Why it Matters’ 77 Marquette Law Review, 265, 
at 280.
72 Kovacic and Shapiro, supra n.46.
73 Harvard School, Chicago School, and game theory. See Kowacic and Shapiro, ibid., and Appendix I.
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Page notes "^  ^ there are two competing ideologies that have an effect to the formation of 
economic policy in general and subsequently competition policy: the evolutionary and 
the intentional visions. These two ideologies have dominated western culture since the 
18* century and have an important effect on the economic theories that have been 
applied to competition law and policy.
According to the evolutionary vision, the individual is intellectually limited, 
motivated by self-interest, or the interest of his household, rather than the interest of the 
society in general.^^ In social contexts, like the market, individuals form voluntary 
relationships and contracts based on their self-interest. Thus the pattern of these 
relationships is not the result of anyone’s plan but the outcome of countless such 
relationships. Accordingly markets reflect the accumulated preferences of producers and 
consumers, and thus only the most preferred and most effective patterns will succeed. It 
follows, that a monopoly situation can only occur if government has intervened and 
created it, since on the one hand it is not possible the single will of an individual can 
create it, and even if that happens, then the market will create self-correcting 
mechanisms, which would break down this monopoly.
Given the limited intellectual ability of individuals (including those who 
govern), it is not possible to understand the reasons that led to a specific contract pattern 
or in a market situation in general. Thus, according to the evolutionary vision, the role 
of the government should be negative: to protect the process of mutual exchange by 
setting rules of general application to prevent the use of force and fraud and make sure 
that the agreements are applied. With regard to monopolies, governments should only 
remove governmental impediments to entry, such as tariffs and exclusive licenses.^^
In contrast, according to the intentional vision, individuals are not motivated by 
self-interest nor intellectually limited. They will normally act to benefit others. 
Nonetheless either corrupted individuals with great power, or disparities in access to 
information and decisional errors may prevent markets from revealing the true 
preferences of societies.^^ It follows that according to the intentional view, governments 
have to intervene in such anomalies (like monopolies) in order to correct false outcomes 
by restructuring the society in accordance with the rational plan.
74 Page, W.H. (1991) ‘Ideological Conflict and die Origins o f Antitrust Policy’ 66 Tulane Law Review, 3.
75 Coase, R.H. (1979) ‘Adam’s Smith View o f Man’ 19 Journal of Law and Economics, 529, at 534.
76 Page, supra n. 74, at 12-14.
77 Ibid, at 13.
31
This analysis just validates the assumption that as regards economic, political 
and social sciences there are almost always two or more theories providing one with 
alternative options as to the proper analysis of a particular issue. In the context of the 
discussion about competing economic theories that may have an influence on the 
application of competition law and policy, it has been shown that these theories provide 
one with guidance as to when the state has to intervene in the market and correct 
possible anomalies, but that they also create inconsistencies as they may lead to 
different outcomes concerning the examination of similar, or even identical, practices.
The impact of economics on the particular and sometimes varied application of 
national competition rules may be also observed in the well-documented divergence as 
to the way the EU competition rules have been applied compared to the US rules. This 
divergence has mainly occurred because of the influence of ordoliberalism on the 
enforcement of the EU competition law, and the market integration goal, which has 
been the primary economic goal of the European Union.
In particular, as is noted in Appendix 1, according to the ordoliberal school of 
thought, analysis of restrictive to business practices should be focused on whether such 
practices may reduce the opportunity of other competitors to compete (put differently 
reduce their economic and political freedom). In this regard, as opposed to the US 
competition law enforcement,^^ the extent to which these practices have an effect on 
overall societal efficiency has been on many occasions of secondary importance in the
This trend has been observed in the application of competition rules in the EU 
on vertical restraints, where the EC Commission has been allegedly over-focused on the 
protection of competitors, rather the protection of competition and efficiency. It 
should also be mentioned, nevertheless, that the stricter approach followed by the EU in 
the field of vertical restraints has to a significant extent been attributed to the 
accomplishment of the single market, which has been one of the major objectives of the 
Union.*^ In particular, vertical agreements that offer absolute territorial protection to the 
distributors have been treated by EC competition law as restricting competition by
78 At least following the dominance of the Chicago School.
79 See UNCTAD (2005) supra n.l, at 100-102; Fox, E.M. (2003) ‘Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and 
Sideways’ 75 New York University Law Review, 1781, at 1785.
80 Hawk, B. (1995) ‘System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law’ 32 Common Market Law Review, 973; Commanor, 
W. and P. Rey (1997) ‘Competition Policy Towards Vertical Restraints in Europe and the United States’ 24 Empirica, 37.
81 Article 2 o f the Treaty EC.
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object/^ since such restrictions could isolate national markets and therefore erect 
barriers to trade between the Member States.*^ That said, the divergence seems to be 
decreasing in recent years, with the adoption of the 1999 block exemption*"  ^and the far 
more rigorous enforcement by the EC Commission on cartel cases.
Likewise, in the last five years there has been convergence in the area of 
mergers, where, as shown below, serious conflicts arose between the EU and the US in 
recent years.*^ Such convergence was impelled to a certain extent by the Court of First 
Instance (CFI), which first questioned the depth of economic analysis by the 
Commission on three mergers and annulled the relevant Commission’s decisions.*^ In 
response, the EC Merger Regulation was amended and requires one, in the context of 
the examination of a merger, to examine whether this commercial deal 'would 
significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or a substantial part 
o f it' and therefore evaluate whether a particular merger may have an anticompetitive 
effect on the market, in addition to the ‘dominance test ', which was exclusively applied 
until the amendment of the Regulation. It is considered that the amendment of the 
Merger Regulation and the introduction of the new test was a move by the Commission 
towards a more economic-based analysis in merger cases, and closer to the policy 
followed by the US.**
In a broader context, the introduction of more robust economic analysis in the 
examination of competition cases has been one of the primary aims of former 
Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti, an economist, and economic analysis now
82 See Cases 56 and 58/64, Etablissements Consten SA & Grundig-Veikaufs-GmbH v. Commission [1966] ECR 299.
83 Jones, A. and B. Sufrin (2004) EC Competition Law; Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press), at 618-619.
84 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices [1999] O.J. L336/21. On the reform of the EU policy on vertical restraints, see Subbioto, R. 
and F. Amato (2002) ‘Reform o f the European Competition Policy Concerning Vertical Restraints’ 69:1 Antitrust Law Journal, 147; 
Dobson, P. (2005) ‘Vertical Restraints Policy Reform in the European Union and United Kingdom’ Loughborough University Research 
Series, Paper 2005:2.
85 Kroes, N. (2005) ‘The First Hundred Days’. Speech delivered at the 40th Anniversary of the Studienvereinigung Kartellrecht 1965- 
2005, International Forum on European Competition Law, Brussels, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? 
reference=SPEECH/05/205&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (last visited on 21 May 2007)
86 See Cases Boeing/MDD and GE/Honeywell discussed in section 2.2.1 below.
87 See Case T-310 Schneider Electric SA v Commission of the European Communities, [2002] ECR 11-04071; Case T-342/99 Airtours 
pic V. Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR 11-02585; Case T-5/02, Tetra Laval BV v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [2002] ECR 11-04381.
88 See Akbar, Y and G. Suder (2006) ‘The New EU Merger Regulation: Implications for EU-U.S. Merger Strategies’ 48:5 Thunderbird 
International Business Review, 667, in particular at 673-675. In addition the Commission issued more economic based guidelines on 
horizontal mergers. Commission (EC) Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control 
of concentrations between undertakings, [2004] O.J. C 31/5.
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plays a much more important role in the application of competition rules in the EU. The 
appointment of a Chief Economist at the Commission is also a strong indication that 
economic analysis is becoming more influential in Brussels/^ and in this regard, it has 
been noted that the EU law has converged with the relevant US law.
That said, such convergence has not been achieved in the area of unilateral 
conduct, called abuse of a dominant position by a firm (in the EU), or monopolisation 
(in the US).^® In the US, the relevant case law takes the view that only rarely should 
section 2 of the Sherman Act apply, since, on the basis of the principles developed by 
the Chicago School,^^ what a dominant firm does is almost always rational and good for 
the market, while even in cases where the dominant firm acts irrationally, the market 
itself has the inherent ability to correct any anomalies and therefore the role of the 
enforcement agencies should be minimal.^^
In the EU, Commissioner Kroes has recently stated that '[AJrticle 82 
enforcement should focus on real competition problems: In other words, behaviour that 
has actual or likely restrictive effects on the market opening therefore the road for 
more robust application of economic analysis in Article 82 cases, something which is 
also noted in the recent Discussion Paper on the application of article 82, which notes 
that '[T]he essential objective o f  Article 82 when analysing exclusionary conduct is the 
protection o f  competition on the market as a means o f  enhancing consumer welfare and
89 Monti, M. (2004) ‘A reformed Competition Policy: Achievements and Challenges for the Future’ Speech delivered at the Center for 
European Reform, Brussels, 28 October 2004, <http://www.cer.org.uk/pdC'speech_monti_oct04.pdfi> (last visited on 21 May 2007); 
Levy, N. (2005) ‘Mario Monti’s Legacy in EC Merger Control’ 1:1 Competition Policy Intemational, 99.
90 Pate, H. (2004) ‘Antitrust in a Transatlantic Context- From the Cicada’s Perspective’. Speech presented at “Antitrust in a 
Transatlantic Context” Conference, Brussels, Belgium, June 7, 2004, <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203973.pdf> (last 
visited on 21 May 2007); Vickers, J. (2005) ‘Abuse of Market Power’ 115 The Economic Journal, 244; Motta, M. and A. De Streel 
(2003) ‘Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive Prices in EU Law’ in Elerman C-D and 1. Atanasiu, European Competition Law 
Annual 2003: What Is an Abuse o f a Dominant Position? (Hart Publishing); Kallaugher, J. and B. Sher (2004) ‘Rebates Revisited: Anti­
competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse Under Article 82’ 25:5 European Competition Law Review, 263, and particularly pp 268- 
272 where the authors discuss ordoliberalism and its influence on EU policy.
91 See Appendix 1.
92 See Fox, E (2006) ‘Monopolization, Abuse o f Dominance and the Indeterminacy o f Economics: The US/EU Divide’ Utah Law 
Review 725, at 728. See also Rosch J.T. (2007) ‘I Say Monopoly, You say Dominance: The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of 
Dominant Firms, is it the Economics?’ Speech Delivered at the at the Intemational Bar Association Antitrust Section Conference 
Florence, Italy September 8,2007, <htÿ://www.Ac.gov/speeches/rosch/070908isaymonopolyiba.pdf> (last visited on 1 October 2007) at 
5-10.
93 See Kroes, N. (2005) ‘Preliminary Thought of Policy Review on Article 82’ Speech delivered at the Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute, 23 Sptember 2005, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do? reference=SPEECH/05/537&format=HTML&aged= 
0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en’> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 2.
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o f ensuring an efficient allocation o f resources'?^ Nevertheless, in contrast to its 
position under US law, according to the relevant case law of the Commission itself and 
the EU Courts on abuse of dominance cases, the dominant firm has a special 
responsibility to ensure that its conduct does not weaken competition in the common 
market, and therefore EC competition law, as evolved in the last 50 years, also looks at 
the structure and openness of the market when it reviews relevant cases.^^ To this end, 
the application of EC competition law in abuse of dominance cases differs from the 
relevant US practice,^^ and in simple terms, it means that the Commission may continue 
being more aggressive in the enforcement of competition law on practices conducted by 
dominant firms than the US authorities and courts.
2.2.2. The legal aspect of competition law: competition law vs. sectoral regulation
While the previous subsection has attempted to highlight the extent to which
different economic analyses may have an effect on the particular application of
competition law, this one briefly introduces the debate over the relationship between
competition law and sectoral regulation, with the aim of describing the extent to which
competition law regulates national markets. Put differently, the aim of this brief analysis
is to highlight the fact that competition law is only one of the legal tools employed by
countries to regulate their internal trade conducted by private firms. On the other hand,
several sectors of the economy of industrialised countries vAth mature competition
systems are even exempted from the application of competition rules and are regulated
by sectoral regulation, instead of competition law. A recent Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) study explored such sectors in a number of
OECD Member States and found that sectoral regulation is common in industrialised
countries (Members of the OECD) in sectors like media, services, infrastructure,
transport, and energy. Even more rigid regulation, which sometimes excludes the
94 Commission (EC) (2005) ‘Discussion P ^ r  on the Application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses’, Public 
consultation document, <http:// ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ antitrust/others/discpaper2005.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), 
para 53.
95 See Fox, supra n. 92 at 728; See also Mertikopoulou, V. (2007) ‘DG Competition’s Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses: ‘The Proposed Economic Reform From a Legal Point o f View’ 28:4 European 
Competition Law Review, 241. Both authors argue that despite the fact that the Discussion Vapet introduces a more economic based 
approach regarding the ^plication of Article 82, the relevant case law of the Courts should and will continue taking into account the 
openness and structure o f the market factors.
96 See also Rosch, supra n.92.
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operation of competition law, is usually applied in sectors such as agriculture, health, 
and employment.^^
On the theoretical side, the main difference between competition law and 
sectoral regulation is the following: Competition law is based on the presumption that 
markets generally work well and the operational decisions should be left to the firms 
involved in the markets. It is therefore concerned with the dispersal and decentralization 
of public and private power. On the opposite side, regulation follows the assumption 
that that there is a need for direct or indirect government supervision on the markets; 
this argument is based on a number of alternative and sometimes overlapping 
theoretical and practical justifications.^*
A first such justification is the concept of market failure, a situation where 
markets may not work due to a number of reasons that cannot be addressed by 
competition law in its narrow sense. For instance, with regard to public goods, such as 
national defence, public education, or lighthouses, the government must assume 
responsibility for the production of the goods and recover its expenses through the tax 
base.^^ Another example of market failure is that of natural monopolies, i.e. a situation 
where due to economies of scale or scope, only one firm can survive. Market failure 
could also occur in cases where asymmetries of information may enable incumbent 
suppliers to exploit consumers, either by using these asymmetries to persuade 
consumers to buy at excessive prices or by creating too high barriers to entry and thus 
putting themselves in a dominant position in the market. These issues are addressed by
97 OECD (2004) ‘Regulating Market Activities by Public Sector’, OECD Competition Committee, DAF/COMP(2004)36.
98 For instance Prosser argues that there can be ‘no single model or objective for utilities regulation’. In other words he suggests that 
competition cannot replace a whole web o f acts and initiatives the sectoral regulator exercise. Prosser, T. (1997) Law and The 
Regulators (Oxford University Press, New York), at 4; On the role of regulation in general see Baldwin, R. and M. Cave (1999) 
Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (Oxford University Press, New York). On the role o f regulation on various 
sectors of the economy, see Amato, G. and L. Laudati (eds) (2001) The Anticompetitive Impact o f Regulation (Edward Elgar 
Publishing); On energy see Albers, M. (2002) ‘Energy Liberalisation and EC Competition Law’ 25 Fordham Intemational Law Journal, 
909; on postal services, see OECD (2001) ‘Promoting Competition in Postal Services’ 3:1 OECD Journal of Competition Law and 
Policy, 7 ; on pharmaceuticals, see Danzon P. and Li-Wei Chao (2000) ‘Does Regulation Drive out Competition in Pharmaceutical 
Markets?’ XLlll Journal of Law and Economics, 311; on Air Transport, see Abeyratne, R. (2001) ‘Competition and Liberalisation in Air 
Transport’ 24:4 World Competition, 607. It should be pointed out nevertheless that the dichotomy between regulation and competition 
has been questioned in recent years, on the basis of the fact that competition law itself may be considered as a form of regulation. See 
Maher (2004), supra n. 50, at 288-289.
99 Crampton, P S. and B.A. Facey, (2002) ‘Revisiting Regulation and Deregulation Through the Lens of Competition Policy’, 25:1 
World Competition, 25, at 32.
100 Typical examples of natural monopolies were telecommunications, water, and natural gas. Nonetheless with the improvements in 
technology and the globalisation of markets traditional natural monopolies (like telecommunications or electricity production and 
retailing) have been opened up to competition in a number of countries.
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consumer protection rules such as labelling, product liability, product safety, and 
deceptive marketing laws.^ ®* Finally, market failure could occur due to externalities, 
that is situations where 'the costs and benefits o f producing and consuming certain 
products, are not fully considered or internalized in the production and consumption 
calculus.
A second justification for the use of regulation instead of competition law is the 
special interest-based regulation, which occurs in occasions where special interest 
groups manage to influence the government and secure the adoption of legislation 
harmful for the average consumer and detrimental for the economy in general. 
Crampton and Facey provide us with a number of examples of such regulations: supply 
management schemes (broadly used in agriculture), labour codes, investment and 
procurement laws, licensing regimes, and foreign ownership restrictions.*®"^
Discussing the relationship between competition and regulation, Baldwin and 
Cave divide competition transition into three phases: The first phase, called the pre­
competition phase, refers to those markets where competition has not been used or is 
just emerging and regulation is used in order to prohibit monopolistic activities by 
dominant firms. The second phase is that of emerging competitive markets, where 
regulation (i.e. price regulation) can still exist for the settlement of the remaining 
monopolistic firms and at the same time competition policy can be used for the 
competitive parts of the market. Finally in phase three, fully competitive markets will 
not need economic regulation and general rules of competition policy can completely 
control the market.*®  ^According to this idea, each market should be regulated (by using 
sectoral regulation, the combination of the former with competition policy or, finally, 
just competition rules) depending on which phase of transition it is. *®^
101 Crampton and Facey, supra n. 99 , at 33; Particularly on the EU, see Weatherill, S. (2005) EU Consumer Law and Policy (Edward 
Elgar Publishing).
102 Crampton and Facey, ibid. at 33-34. A typical example o f such a situation is environmental legislation. Another example is supply 
network externalities, that is a situation where the cost o f providing services to additional consumers, reduces the total cost of the 
network. The dominance of Microsoft Windows operating system over the one provided by i^p le  is a typical example.
103 Stigler, G. (1971) ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ 2:1 Bell Journal of Economics and Management, 1.
104 Crampton and Facey supra n. 99, at 35.
105 See for instance the Greek experience in, OECD (2002) ‘Regulatory Reform for Greece’ 3:4 OECD Journal of Competition Law 
and Policy, 7.
106 Nevertheless, this distinction is not always an absolute one in practice, since in terms o f competition law the enforcement role of 
competition agencies includes the element of public interference. See Maher, supra n.50, at 204-205.
107 Baldwin, R. and M. Cave (1999) supra n. 98, at 222-223; See also Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (2004) ‘The Politics of Regulation 
in the age o f Govemance’, in Jordana, J. and D. Levi-Faur (eds) The Policy o f Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the
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The figures of Table 2.1 clearly show that half of the countries with a population 
exceeding 80000 people have not yet adopted competition rules and consequently their 
markets are in a pre-competitive phase. In addition competition law has been adopted by 
75% of the countries with such law in the last 15 years. Thus at least three quarters of 
the countries with a competition regime are either in phase one (pre-competitive phase) 
or in phase two (emerging competitive markets). These observations lead us to two 
main conclusions. Firstly, that on a national level economic activity is regulated much 
more by sectoral regulation rather than by competition law. Secondly, and most 
importantly, at the intemational level differences in national sector specific regulations 
can have an effect on the ability of foreign firms to enter a market.
It could be argued that there is a mounting perception that national economic 
regulations should be framed in such a way so as to allow as much market competition 
as is politically and socially acceptable. Still, the adoption of common regulatory 
standards on several sectors of the economy (such as telecommunications, energy, 
pharmaceuticals and agriculture) has been a priority in the agenda of nations when they 
negotiate at the intemational organisations, and more relevantly to the present 
discussion, there is an ongoing discourse at the intemational level as to the role of 
competition policy in the adoption and application of sectoral regulation.
2.2.3. The political aspect of competition law: competition policv vs. other national 
policies
Another important aspect of competition law that has to be examined in the 
context of the influence of such law on a national socio-political and legal system is the 
political aspect of competition law, that is, competition policy. It is important to define 
this concept, which is admittedly a very difficult task. Competition policy has been 
defined by the WTO working group on the interaction between trade and
Age of Govemance (Edward Elgar Publishing), chapter 1 ; Moschel, W. (2002) ‘The Relationship between Competition Authorities 
and Sector Specific Regulators’, in D. Tzouganatos (eds.) EU Competition Law and Policy: Developments and Priorities, Proceedings 
from Athens Conference, April 19th 2002 (Nomiki Vivliothiki SA), p. 19.
108 Ostry, S. (1995) ‘New Dimensions for Market Access: Challenges for the Trading System’, in OECD, New Dimensions in Market 
Access in a Globalising World Economy (OECD, Paris) 25, at 26.
109 Jenny, F. (2001) ‘Globalisation, Competition and Trade Policy: Convergence, Divergence and Cooperation’, in Yang-Ching Chao, 
Gee San, Chang Fa Lo and Jiming Ho (eds) Intemational and Comparative Competition Law and Policies (Kluwer Law Intemational), 
at 34-35.
110 For instance, in the case of telecommunications, the relationship between competition policy and sector-specific regulation is an 
issue discussed under the auspices of the ICN, the OECD and the WTO, while the General Agreements on Trade in Services and the 
‘Reference Paper’ which complements the WTO Telecommunications Agreement include competition provisions.
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competition/** as the policies which ‘comprise the fu ll range o f  measures that may he 
used to promote competitive market structures and behaviour, including but not limited 
to a comprehensive competition law dealing with anti-competitive practices o f  
enterprises’}^^ Similarly, Doem defines competition policy, as the policy which 
'consists o f  those policies and actions o f the state intended to prevent certain restraints 
o f trade by private firms. Stated more positively, it is a policy intended to promote 
rivalry among firms, buyers and sellers through actions in areas o f activity such as 
mergers, abuse o f  dominance cartels,..., misleading advertising, and related criminal 
and economic offences that are held to be anti-competitive %**^
Research conducted in the context of this study through interviews of 
competition officials, academics and practitioners has proved this argument, as there is 
great variation on the opinions of the interviewees on what competition policy really is. 
The only standard characteristic of competition policy as opposed to competition law 
that the discussants pointed out is that competition policy is a wider circle around 
competition law. Competition policy encompasses competition law as well as a number 
of other elements, such as the institutions that enforce competition law, competition 
advocacy, and industrial policy concerns. Recent research by the OECD demonstrates 
that even more objectives may be included in the concept of competition policy: de­
centralisation of economic decision-making; promotion of small business; fairness and 
equity; and other socio-political values.**"* By the same token. Sir Leon Brittan, former 
Commissioner in charge of competition, once stated that, '[I]ndeed, it can be said that 
positive competition policy should not be determined in isolation; it must be related to 
and integrated with economic, industrial and also social policy
The problem with discussing these various (related to public interest) objectives 
which lie beneath the broad concept of competition law and policy is that these 
objectives vary across different countries or regions. That said, a general introduction to
111 On the establishment and work of the WTO working group, see below, chapter 6.
112 WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (1999) ‘The fundamental principles of competition 
policy’ WT/WGTCPAV/127, at paragraph 2.
113 Doem, B. (1996) ‘Comparative Competition Policy: Boundaries and Levels of Political Analysis’ in Bruce Doem and Stephen 
Wilks (eds), supra n. 6, at 7.
114 OECD Global Forum on Competition (2003) ‘The Objectives of Competition Law and Policy’ OECD Secretariat Note, 
CCNM/GF/COMP(2003)3, at paragraphs 3 and 22.
115 Quoted in Willimsky S.M. (1997) ‘The Concept(s) o f Competition’ 18:1 European Competition Law Review, 53, at 54; In a 
similar vein, Barry Rodger noted the ‘. . .Competition law or policy has no fixed content and is dependent to a great extent upon the 
particular political and social emphases o f the legal system in which it operates.’ See Rodger, B. (2000) ‘Competition Policy, 
Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective’ 6 Columbia Journal o f  European Law, 289, at 304.
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some of these indirect objectives of competition policy would be important in the 
context of our attempt to highlight specificities of national competition regimes that 
may have an effect on the process of internationalisation of competition law.
As noted above, the notion of public interest has been used to justify the 
application of sector specific regulations. In a broader context, public interest 
justifications also allow governments to exempt various practices of private firms from 
strictly economic approaches and thus minimise the reach of competition law and 
policy. This is clearly indicated by the OECD study, which points out that all policies 
taken into consideration in the context of application of competition law are based on 
the concept of public interest. In this context, public interest is used in a much 
broader sense. It justifies the exemption of particular practices (and not whole sectors as 
in the case of sectoral regulation) from the realm of competition rules in accordance 
with the specific public policy of a government. In some cases, the basis of such 
exemptions is clearly drafted vdthin the text of the competition laws. In other cases, it 
cannot be found in the competition related rules, but derives from the general powers of 
a government.
Using the competition policy of the EU as an example of the former, Giorgio 
Monti* has reviewed a number of cases that have been exempted from the application 
of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty, which prohibits anticompetitive agreements between 
firms. On the basis of Article 81(3), the EC Commission has exempted a number of 
anticompetitive agreements based on arguments that these agreements would have a 
beneficial effect on the EC employment, industrial, and environmental policy.*** As to 
the latter, it has been documented that a number of Commission decisions to clear 
mergers in the 1990s have been based on industrial policy concerns and/or political 
pressure by particular Member States.**^
116 Supra n. 114.
117 Monti, G. (2002) ‘Article 81 and EC Public Policy’ 39 Common Market Law Review, 1057.
118 Monti, ibid refers to the following cases: On employment policy. Case 26/76, Metro v. Commission (Nol), [1977] ECR 1875, para 
43; Case 42/84, Remia and others v. Commission, [1985] ECR 2545, para 42; Stichting Baksteen, [1994] O.J. L 131/15 paras. 27-28; 
Synthetic Fibres, [1984] O.J. L 207/17, para 37. On industrial policy, BPCL/ICI, [1984] O.J. L 212/1, para 37; ENI/Montedison, [1987] 
O.J. L 5/13, para 31; Olivetti/Canon, [1988] O.J. L 52/60, para 54; GEC-Siemens/Plessey, [1990] O.J. C 239/2. On environmental 
policy, Exxon-Shell, [1994] O.J. L 144/21, paras 67 and 68; Philips-Osram, [1994] O.J. L 378/37, para 25.
119 Schmidt, A. (2001) ‘Non-Competition Factors in the European Competition Policy: The Necessity o f Institutional Reforms’ Centre 
for Globalisation and Europeanisation of the Economy, Discussion Paper No 13, <http://www.cege.wiso.uni- 
goettingen.de/Dokumente/Diskussion/discuss_13.pdf > (last visited on 21 May 2007). The author refers to Nestle/Perrier, [1992] O.J. L 
356/1, Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva, [1994] O.J. L 192/15, Kali&Salz/MdK/Treuhand, [1994] O.J. L I86/38, and Mercedes 
Benz/Kassbohrer, [1995] O.J. L211/1.
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2.2.4. Cultural factors that may have an effect on the adoption and/or application of 
competition rules
A relevant, but to a great extent separate, issue that has to be addressed is the 
influence of a culture of a particular country concerning the operation of markets in 
general and the reach of application of competition rules. This does not necessarily have 
to do with pure strategic political decisions as seen in the previous section, but mostly 
with the traditions and patterns of a particular society with regard to markets and trade 
in general, or with regard to a particular sector of the society.
Historians, anthropologists and sociologists have examined the relationship 
between geopolitical characteristics of a society and the particular perceptions of these 
societies on the nature and operation of the markets. With regard to competition law 
and policy, Fikentscher has expressed accurately the relationship between cultural 
factors and competition law and policy:
‘Americans are inclined to think that in these days the free market system is on 
its way to pervade the whole world, and many Europeans share this view. Maybe this is 
so, and should even be welcomed as a step to world-wide democracy and equal chances 
for every one. But there is also evidence that other cultures are afraid o f  this. The 
Muslim World cannot agree to explicit advertising, the Siberians in their great majority 
fear democracy more than anything else because it leads to the economic destruction o f  
their habitat. North-American Indians wonder at the “frenzy ” (panicking as they call it) 
that comes with the economy-oriented lifestyle o f  the “Anglos”, and many traditional 
societies fear exploitation and assimilation
Along the same lines, and on a more specific basis, the OECD has documented a 
number of situations where for cultural reasons various practices in different countries 
are exempted from the application of competition rules. What the OECD calls 
‘historical relics’ include examples such as the exemption in Norway concerning 
municipal monopolies of movie theatres, a leftover of a century ago when movie 
theatres were considered a novelty. In Korea, territorial constraints on rice wine (a
120 For an elaborate review o f such studies, see Lie, J. (1997) ‘Sociology o f Markets’ 23 Annual Review o f Sociology, 341.
121 Fikentscher, W. (2001) ‘Market Anthropology and Global Trade’ 1:1 The Gruter Institute Working Papers on Law, Economics, and 
Evolutionary Biology, 1, atl2.
122 OECD Global Forum on Competition (2004) ‘Regulatory reform: stock-taking of erqrerience with reviews o f competition law and 
policy in OECD countries and the relevance of such experience for developing countries’ CCNM/GF/COMP(2004), at 21.
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national specialty) are allowed, in conformity with long-lasting national policies on this 
matter/
The most illustrative example with regard to this phenomenon is Japan. As a 
recent study indicates, in Japan policies that promote product market competition have 
long been compromised by ministerial guidance and explicit exemptions from 
competition law.*^ "^  One of the most important reasons which have led to this direction 
is the traditional Japanese practice of ‘Keiretsu’, which refers to long term closely 
interconnected relationships among Japanese companies through formal and/or informal
relations, and hampers foreign investors from entering the Japanese market. 125
2.2.5. Competition law in developing and small countries
Almost the whole of the discussion that has been developed until now refers to 
industrialised countries and polities with mature competition regimes, mainly the EU. 
Another important question regarding the operation of competition law and policy on a 
national level relates to the adoption and application of competition rules by developing 
and small countries. Statistics of Table 2.2 may provide us with some indications as to 
the type of countries that have adopted competition legislation.
Table 2.2; Level of income'^^ and competition law
Low income Lower middle 
income
Lower upper 
income
Hi
income/non
OCED
member
High income 
/OECD 
member
TOTAL
Countries 59 54 40 31 24 208
Countries
with 21 25 24 7 24 101
123 Ibid.
124 Hoj, J. and M. Wise, (2004) ‘Product Market Competition and Economic Performance in Japan’, OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper No 387, ECOAVKP (2004), at 10.
125 Keiretsu’ was the practice that urged the American Company Kodak to go to the WTO Dispute Settlement against the Japanese 
Company Fuji. Case: Japan - Measure affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R; For a comment of the case, see 
Furse, M. (1999) ‘Competition Law and the WTO Report: “Japan- Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper’” 20:1 
European Competition Law Review, 9. See also below, chapter 6, section 6.4.
126 According to the World Bank, low income includes countries with a Gross National Income (GNI) of 905 US Dollars, or less; lower 
middle income, 906 - 3,595 US Dollars; upper middle income, 3,596 - 11,115 US Dollars; and high income, 11,116 US Dollars or more. 
See the Website of the World Bank, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSlTE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATlSTICS/0„contentMDK: 
20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:6413315O~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html> (last visited in 21 May 2007).
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competition 
law 
% o f  
countries with 
competition
36% 46% 60% 23% 100%' 49%
With the exception of countries with high income which are not OECD 
members, there is a direct link between the level of development of a country and 
whether this particular country has adopted competition legislation. As the table shows, 
the higher the income of a country the more probable that this country has a competition 
regime in p l a c e . F o r  instance, only 36% of countries with a low income have 
competition rules in place. On the opposite side of the spectrum, all the OECD members 
have adopted such rules. What are therefore the reasons for which developing countries 
seem reluctant to adopt competition rules?
A first obvious reason is that competition law may seem a luxury to countries 
with very low income. As an EC Commission official interviewee noted, ‘[If] you do 
not have something to eat you should look for a piece o f bread and leave competition 
law a s i d e In a recent paper, Emmert et al, have identified many other possible 
reasons. These include import substitution policy arguments, according to which 
developing countries attempt to change the structure and composition of imports in 
order to develop specialised domestic industries, and, similarly infant industry 
strategies, through which they attempt to support national industries and/or particular 
companies (national champions) in order to make them stronger and capable of 
competing in the intemational market s .Another  point raised by the authors is that 
developing countries fear that the opening of their market through competition may be
127 Another six countries with an upper middle income participate in the OECD: Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, Slovak 
Republic and Turkey. All these countries have adopted competition rules, thus the total percentage of OECD members with a 
competition legislation remains absolute (100%).
128 The only exception to this rule is countries with high income, which are not OECD members. Only 23% of such countries have 
adopted competition law. Most of these high-income countries without competition law are very small in terms of population. 
Specifically, the countries of this kind that have not adopted competition rules are following: Andorra, Arruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, 
Bermuda, Brunei, Vayman Islands, Channel Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Honk Kong China, Isle of Man, Kuwait, Macao -  China, 
Monaco, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Puerto Rico, Qatar, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Virgin 
Islands.
129 Interview with EC Commission official, Brussels 15/7/2003.
130See Emmert, P., F. Kronthaler and J. Stephan, (2005) ‘Analysis of Statements Made in Favour of and Against the Adoption of 
Competition Law in Developing and Transition Economies’. Paper presented in Brussels 19 and 20 April 2005, in the context of the EU 
financed project: Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform, and Sustainable Development (hereinafter 
Emmert at al ).
131 Ibid., at 31. It has to be noted that such policies have been used by industrialised countries in the past. See Chang, H.J. (2002) 
Kicking away the ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem Press, London), chapter I .
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detrimental to their companies, as multinational companies would dominate their 
markets/
On the other hand, recent research has shown that intemational cartels may have 
a substantial negative impact on both consumers and producers of developing 
countries, and the need for adoption of competition mles has been stressed and 
supported by various intemational organisations, like the WTO, the World Bank and the 
Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF)/^"^ In any case, this issue (competition law in 
developing countries) will be further explored throughout the remaining chapters of this 
thesis in the context of the examination of the various types of agreements which 
include competition mles, and especially in relation to the negotiations over a possible 
competition agreement in the WTO context, where developing countries have 
consistently opposed the proposal of the EU for the conclusion of such an agreement.
2.3. The international aspects of competition law and policy
To this point, the chapter has dealt with the national dimension of competition 
law and policy, and more specifically, with the economic, legal and socio-political 
factors that may have an influence on the application of competition mles in different 
nation states. As noted in the context of the analysis, these factors vary from country to 
country, and create differences in the application of national competition laws. On the 
other hand, as this section attempts to expose, a number of factors gradually added 
intemational features to competition law and policy. A mixture of economic, socio- 
legal, and political developments have played an important role in this process.
2.3.1. Economic globalisation, and the appearance of anticompetitive business practices 
with an intemational effect
Competition law and policy, along with other forms of commercial law, has 
acquired intemational features due to the emergence of economic globalisation. By
132 Emmert et al., ibid, at 38.
133 Levenstein, M. and V. Y. Susiow (2004) ‘Contemporary Intemational Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and 
Implications for Competition Policy’ 71 Antitrust Law Journal, 801.
134 See for instance, UNCTAD, (2005) ‘Review of Recent Experiences in the Formulation and Implementation of Competition Law 
and Policy in Selected Developing Countries’ UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2005/2, at 2, where it is noted that in the case of Thailand, ‘...the 
Intemational Monetary Fund imposed this [adoption of competition law] upon the Thai government as one of the conditions under the 
stand-by arrangement during the economic crisis (1997-2001)’.
135 Economists would rather use the terms ‘international economic integration’, referring to the extent to which intemational economic 
activity has integrated markets. These are probably over-simplified definitions, in view of the debate regarding the meaning, or even the
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the terms 'economic globalisation', we mean here improvements in technology and 
communications/^^ liberalisation of intemational trade/^^ and the subsequent increase 
of economic flows through the operation of multilateral firms that has appeared at least 
in the last decades/^* that have weakened the distinction between the domestic and the 
intemational on several fields of economic activity/
With regard to competition law and policy in particular, in view of the 
liberalisation of intemational trade through the provisions of the GATT and more 
recently the WTO, which to a great extent opened up national boarders to multinational 
firms, and given the fact that in the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of previously 
communist states started adopting liberal policies, as well as the vast increase in the 
number of countries which adopted competition legislation,^"^® there have been voices 
which stress that trade negotiations should not be limited to the regulation of policies 
applied on the border but should also include issues relating to domestic policies, such 
as subsidies and sector-specific regulations which may have an effect on intemational 
trade/"^*
Competition law and policy has been considered one of these domestic 
policies/"^^ The core idea behind such an argument is that ineffective domestic 
competition policies could be a substantial obstacle in the process of trade
existence of globalisation. See Held, D., D. Golblatt, A.G. McGrew, and J. Perraton (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, 
Economics and Culture (Stanford University Press), at 2-10, where the authors provide a number of alternative definitions on 
globalisation; See also, Piccioto, S. (1998) ‘Globalisation, Liberalisation, Regulation’ Paper delivered at he Conference on 
‘Globalisation, the Nation-Sate and Violence’, Sussex University, 16 April 1998, <htQ):/Avww.lancs.ac.uk/staflD1wasp/glibreg.pdC> (last 
visited on 21 May 2007).
136 Rodrik, D. (1999) ‘How Far will Intemational Economic Integration Go?’ 14:1 The Journal o f Economic Perspectives, 177; 
Archibugi, D. and C. Pietrobelli, (2002) ‘The Globalisation of Technology and its Implications for Developing Countries. Windows of 
Opportunity or Further Burdens?’ 70:9 Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 861, where the authors identify in page 864 three 
main categories o f (economic) globalisation: the intemational exploitation of nationally produced technology, the global generation of 
innovation, and global technological co-operations.
137 Which has occurred through the abolition of legal barriers on the border and been supported by trade economists. These arguments 
will be dealt with in some depth in this thesis, first in this cheqjter, and more elaborately during the discussion about WTO and 
competition in C huter 6, below.
138 Nonetheless, there has been argument in the relevant literature that the first signs of economic globalisation occurred in the 15th or 
16tii century, and became obvious in the beginning of the 19th century. See O’Rourke, K.H. and G. Williamson, (2004), ‘Once more: 
When Did Globalisation Begin?’ 8 Journal of European Economic History, 109.
139 Jayasuriya, K. (2001) ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty, and the Rule of Law: From Political to Economic Constitutionalism?’ 8:4 
Constellations, 443, at 446.
140 It is noted that 60% of countries with a competition law adopted such law in the nineties. See Table 2.1.
141 With regard to these arguments from a critical perspective see Krugman, P. (1997) ‘What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate 
About?’ 35:1 Joumal of Economic Literature, 113, at 114.
142 Howse, R. (2002) ‘From Politics to Technocracy-and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime’ 96:1 American 
Joumal of Intemational Law, 94, at 96.
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liberalisation,^'*^ an argument mainly based on the assessment that whereas trade 
policies and intemational reforms aim to open up the markets and allow as much 
competition as possible, the role of competition policy is to prevent private firms from 
distorting this competitive environment/'*'*
Along the same lines, it has been observed that efficiency gains from a trade 
perspective were pursued through the realisation of comparative advantage, whereas 
competition policy should be used to secure these gains through the elimination of 
losses created by a single seller who has monopolised the market or by a group of 
sellers who act in a collusive way.*'*^  On the other hand, through the opening up of 
national markets with the limitation of tariffs and other boarder barriers, the ability of 
multilateral firms to operate in multiple national markets has also been increased. This 
assumption may be confirmed by the dramatic increase of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in the last few decades.
As figures compiled by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) show, in the last thirty years foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has been multiplied by almost 30 times. In particular, these figures show that with 
regard to inward flows the global FDI in 1975 was 27314 million US Dollars (USD), 
while in 2005 these flows reached 916277 million USD. The relevant numbers 
concerning outward FDI was 28702 million USD in 1975, and 778725 million USD in 
2005.*'*  ^ The impact of this increase in the number and influence of multinational firms 
has become palpable on a number of legal and political fields,*'*  ^ competition policy 
being one of them.
These developments have also been reflected in trade economics, which by the 
early 1990s was dominated by the classical and neoclassical trade theories that take for 
granted that labour and capital moving from country to country are immobile and that
143 OECD (2001) ‘Trade and Competition Policies- Options for a Greater Coherence’ (OECD, Paris).
144 Jenny, (2001), supra n .l09, at 37.
145 Graham, E. (2002) ‘The Relationship Between Intemational Trade Policy and Competition Policy’, in Z. Drabek (eds). 
Globalization Under Threat: The Stability of Trade Policy and Multilateral Agreements (Edward Elgar Publishing), p 225, at 228.
146 See the UNCTAD database on FDI, <http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewei/tableView.aspx> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
147 This statement does not take into consideration the debate over the possible negative effects of multinational companies, a debate 
that has been developed especially among developing countries. See for instance Jacoby, N.H. (1975) ‘Multinational Corporations and 
National Sovereignty’, in P.M. Boarman and H. Schollhammer (eds.) Multinational Corporations and Governments. Business- 
Government Relations in an Intemational Context (Praeger Publishers, New York), at 6-7. It also has to be pointed out that this thesis 
only deals with competition related issues to business practices. Hence, it will not touch upon, unless it becomes relevant, other legal 
disciplines such as (not exclusively) intellectual property, corporate govemance, money laundering, telecommunications, energy, 
environmental, transport, tax, and banking regulations which may also deal with business practices.
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the comparative advantage is static, and base their results only on the exchanged final 
products. Another strand of academic literature, also known as New Intemational 
Trade Theory came to point out that several other factors have an effect on intemational 
trade. According to this line of argument, factors such as research and development, the 
product lifecycle, oligopoly and economies of scale also have an influence on the 
creation of each country’s comparative advantage.
Thus the focus is shifted from inter-industry trade, that is trade between 
industries which belong to different domestic markets, to intra-industry,inter-firm,^^^ 
and intra-firm trade. These new theories are mainly based on the argument that not 
only the final products but also intermediate goods as well as technological knowledge 
are exchanged. The most striking element of these theories is that the analytical tools 
used for the examination of the intemational trading system (such as oligopoly and 
economies of scale) are the same as the ones used for the analysis of competition law 
and policy issues. In other words, industrial organisation aspects have been 
introduced in the analysis of intemational trade.
It was against this background that a number of scholars started looking at the 
relationship between competition law and policy and intemational trade. The relevant 
research agenda includes the examination of both private practices that may have an 
intemational effect, and hybrid public-private practices that may have the same effect. 
These two types of anticompetitive practices are discussed briefly in the following 
section.
148 Gilpin, R. (1987) The Political Economy of Intemational Relations (Princeton University Press) at 177.
149 These concepts were first introduced by Dixit and Stiglitz in 1977. See Dixit, A. and J.E. Stiglitz (1977) ‘Monopolistic Competition 
and Product Diversity’ 67:3 The American Economic Review, 297; See also Krugman, P. (1983) ‘New Theories of Trade Among 
Industrial Countries’ 73:2 The American Economic Review, 343, at 343-344; Dixit, A (1984) ‘International Trade Policies for 
Oligopolistic Competition’ 94, The Economic Joumal, 1.
1 SO For example it has been shown that in trade between developed countries some countries import some automobile models while 
exporting other models. See Gilpin, supra n. 148, at 176.
151 That is the trade between firms, irrespective of governmental intervention. These theories are based on the phenomenon of 
oligopolistic multinational firms and the internationalisation of production in the second half of the twentieth century. See Gilpin ibid.
152 This is a consequence of the creation of multilateral enterprises which are involved through subsidiaries and joint ventures on 
various levels of production and in several countries.
153 Gilpin, supra n. 148, at 177.
154 For a brief analysis of these factors, see Scherer, F.M. and R.S. Balous, (1994) ‘Unfinished Tasks: The New Intemational Trade 
Theory and Post Uruguay Round Challenges’, Research Paper, British-North American Committee, Issues Paper No. 3. at 9-15.
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2.3.2 Anticompetitive practices that have an intemational effect
With the increase of multilateral firms, came practices that have an effect on the 
territory of multiple national markets. Of these practices, the most directly linked to 
intemational trade are anticompetitive practices that have an exclusionary effect, thus 
hindering the entrance and expansion of foreign firms in the markets where the 
anticompetitive practices take p l a c e . T h i s  discussion lies at the heart of the debate 
regarding the intemational aspects on competition as, apart from more general political 
concems and particularities of different free trade settings, the need for intemational 
cooperation on competition law, and/or the harmonisation of competition mles exists 
because of the existence of such practices. The following section reviews three types of 
anticompetitive agreements that may have an effect on trade: cartels, vertical restraints, 
and cross-border mergers.
i. Intemational cartels
There is grooving consensus among academics and politicians in the last 40 years 
that cartels are the most blatant of anticompetitive practices, and prohibition of hard 
core cartels, which may be defined as agreements between firms to allocate shares in 
intemational markets, increase prices and reduce i m p o r t s , i s  included in any modem 
competition law, as there is wide spread recognition that their effects can be very 
harmful to consumers.
According to the OECD, cartels produce overcharges at a level of 10% and they 
cause overall harm amounting to 20% of the affected commerce. To give a more 
specific example, in two recent cartel cases, the lysine and citric acid cartels, 
investigated by the US Department of Justice it was calculated that prices were raised 
by 70% and 30% respectively, and this is obviously a price difference that may have 
a substantial effect on consumers. Recent research also indicates that anti-cartel
155 Marsden, P. (2003) A Competition Policy for the WTO (Cameron May), Chapter 3, and especially pp. 91-108.
156 The list of these practices is not exhaustive, as it may also encompass the abuse o f the dominant position by a firm, which may use 
such position in a national market to limit the ability of foreign firms to enter this market
157 This definition does not include export cartels, )^ ich  are similar to hard core cartels agreements between firms that are authorised 
by states, or exempted fi-om national competition rules. See Evenett S.J. M.C. Levenstein and V. Y. Susiow (2001) ‘International Cartel 
Enforcement Lessons fi-om the 1990s’ 24:9 World Economy, 1221, at 1223. These types o f cartels will be fiirther explored in the 
context of the negotiations for a multilateral agreement at the WTO, in Chapter 6 of the thesis.
158 OECD (2002) Fighting Hard-Core Cartels: Harm, Effective Sanctions and Leniency Programme (OECD Paris), at 77.
159 Klein, J.I. (1999) ‘Luncheon Address’ delivered at the Anti-Cartel Enforcement Conference, Westin Grand Hotel, Washington, 
D C. September 30,1999, <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3727.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
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enforcement is active in a number of countries, like the US, Canada, the EU and its 
Member States, Australia, Israel, Japan, and Korea/
In parallel, the number of cartels which have an effect on the markets of multiple 
countries has substantially increased too. During the 1990s, over forty cartels with an 
international effect have been prosecuted in the EU and the U S . A s  far as the EU is 
concerned, among the 28 cartels whose members were fined by the Commission 
between the years 1986 and 2002, fifteen (accounting for 58%) were caught in 
cooperation with the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice and the 
Canadian Bureau of competition, and one of them was caught in cooperation with the 
Japanese authorities.*^^
International cartels have also detrimental effects on developing countries. As 
Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald have showed, in 1997, developing countries imported 
$54.7 billion of goods from a sub-sample of 19 industries that had seen a price-fixing 
conspiracy during the 1990s. These imports represented 5.2% of total imports and 1.2% 
of gross domestic product (GDP) in developing countries. These cartels were active 
in the markets of steel, vitamins, fax paper, sugar, cement - therefore they were products 
used by a great proportion of world population.
On the other hand, as another recent OECD report suggests, at least one out of 
three (hard-core) international cartels remain undetected,*^"* and various reasons may be 
playing a role here. One of them is that the more sophisticated the enforcement against 
cartels becomes the more sophisticated these agreements between firms become too, 
making detection more difficult. OECD suggests that there have been cases where the 
parties in a cartel agreement have established mechanisms of prevention and 
punishment of cheating. *^ ^
It follows that some sort of coordination is needed between different states in 
order to address the problems caused by international cartels. In view of these
160 OECD (2005) ‘Hard Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation o f the 1998 Recommendation’ (OECD, Paris).
161 See Evenett, Levenstein and Suslow, supra n. 157, at 1225.
162 Commission (EC) (2006) ‘The Fight Against Cartels’, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/citizen/cartel_stats.html> (last 
visited 21 March 2007). Such cooperation has been informal, while competition authorities have not been yet able to overcome 
problems relating to the exchange of confidential information, which would increase effectiveness. See Chapter 3 below.
163 Levenstein, M., V. Suslow and L. Oswald, (2003) ‘International Price Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: A Discussion of 
Effects and Policy Remedies’, William Davidson Working P^er, No 538, at 1.
164 Other estimations indicate that one out of seven cartels remain undeterred. See OECD (2002), supra n. 158, at 73.
165 Ibid, p. 79; See also Griffin, J.M. (2000) ‘An Inside Look At A Cartel At Work: Common Characteristics of International Cartels’, 
Presented the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law 48th Annual Spring Meeting, Washington D C. April 6, 2000, 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4489.htm> (Last visited on 21 May 2007).
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observations, and, as shown throughout the thesis, at least officially, enforcement of 
competition rules in cartel cases is probably the most important aim of any international 
agreement devoted to competition law and policy, and cartel deterrence is included in 
the agenda of any international organisation (such as the WTO, OECD and the ICN) 
which works on competition law and policy.
ii. Vertical restraints
Another business practice that could have an effect on the markets of more than 
one country is vertical restraints. Vertical restraints may be defined as agreements or 
concerted practices entered into between two or more undertakings each of which 
operates, for the purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the production or 
distribution chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, 
sell or resell certain goods or s e r v i c e s . I n  view of the expansion of multinational 
firms, the impact of such agreements may be significant on an international level.
An indicative example is the automobile industry. The automobile market is 
global, in the sense that a limited number of manufacturers dominate the sales of motor 
vehicles internationally. These manufacturers have organised dealership networks, 
which at least in industrialised nations is the only way of promoting and selling their 
p r o d u c t s . A  consequence of the existence of global distribution systems is the fact 
that manufacturers have to face different rules relating to dealerships in different 
nations. In addition, it can be observed that the planning and operation of its 
distribution network by a manufacturer may have an effect on all the countries where its 
product is finally sold.
A separate issue, with regard to the international effect of vertical restraints, may 
arise because of the existence of exclusive distribution agreements in the territory of one 
country, for instance between firms A and B, which may make it impossible for another 
foreign firm C to enter the market where A and B operate. A notable example here 
could be vertical Keiretsu in Japan, which according to US firms prevent the foreign
166 Commission (EC) (2003) ‘Glossary o f Terms Used in Competition Related Matters’, 
<http://ee.europa.eu/comm/competition/general_info/g]ossary_en.html#aV> (last visited on 21May 2007).
167 Maxton, G.P. and J. Wormland (2004), Time for a Model Change: Re-engineering the Global Automotive Industry (Cambridge 
University Press), at 164.
168 As Maxton and Woimald have shown in the case of the automotive industry, the relevant laws vary considerably in the US, the EU 
and Japan. See ibid, at 168
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investors from entering the Japanese market. In fact, a similar situation is also faced 
in the EU, where, for instance, exclusive distribution agreements between car 
manufacturers and dealers in various Member States make it difficult or even 
impossible for dealers from other Member States to penetrate the markets of the 
Member States where such agreements take place.
iii. Multiiurisdictional mergers
A third business practice that may have an effect on the international market 
place is cross-border mergers and acquisitions. With the expansion of multinational 
firms, the number of such mergers has increased dramatically. As Gugler et al. have 
calculated, 21.7% of all mergers and acquisitions with a value of at least 1 million US 
dollars that were concluded internationally until 1998 involved firms registered and 
operating in different c o u n t r i e s . I t  follows, that these transactions had an effect on the 
economic environment of more than one jurisdiction and therefore in many instances 
more than one jurisdiction were interested in reviewing them. With regard to the 
operation of competition law, there are two sets of problems relating to this issue: one 
procedural and one substantive.
The procedural problem is related to the different notification procedures (in 
terms of deadlines to notify the merger and provide the required information) that apply 
in different states where the mergers have to be notified, which may cause both 
additional costs and legal unpredictability to the undertakings involved in the 
transaction. A notable example is the 1989 Gillette/Wilkinson transaction, which was 
notified in 14 jurisdictions.*^^ Another characteristic example is the one given by 
McDavid and Marshall regarding the attempts of a Canadian firm (Alcan Inc.) to merge 
with a rival firm. Alcan had to hire competition lawyers from 35 different firms and file
169 Noted above, in section 2.2.4.
170 See for instance SEP et autres/Peugeot SA, EC Commission Decision, of 5/10/2005, Cases F-2/36.623/36.820/37.275.
171 Gugler, K., D C. Muller, B. B. Yurtoglu, and C. Zulehner (2003) ‘The Effects o f Mergers: An International Comparison’ 21 
International Journal of Industrial Organisation, 625, at 632-633.
172See generally, OECD (1994) ‘Merger Cases in the Real World: A Study o f Merger Control Procedures’ (OECD, Paris). It has to be 
pointed out though, that this merger occurred before the entrance into force of the EU merger regulation, and thus the number of 
authorities that had to be notified is probably greater than it would be today where the ‘one-stop-shop’ principle o f the regulation greatly 
reduces the number of notifications.
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sixteen competition notifications in eight different languages, all with different 
deadlines, information requirements and processes for approval.
On the substantive side, the problem relates to the different standards that two 
jurisdictions may apply in the review of the same transaction. Notable examples 
regarding this issue include the conflict that occurred between the EU and the US in 
relation to the mergers between Boeing/MDD and GE/Honeywell.
The Boeing/MDD case related to the attempt by two American companies 
(Boeing and McDonnell Douglas) to merge in December of 1996. This merger would 
have created the largest aerospace company in the world^ "^ .^ The US Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) cleared the merger without conditions on 1 July 1997.^^  ^ However 
this was not the case with the European Commission. Basing its jurisdiction on the 
financial thresholds of the ‘Community dimension’ clause of the Merger Regulation, 
according to which no physical presence in the EC is required, it made clear that it 
would block the merger. At this point, the American government intervened and 
threatened the EU that, if  the Commission blocked the merger, the US would wage a 
commercial war against the EC by going to the WTO or by imposing trade sanctions.
A more serious conflict was finally avoided, as the Commission decided to clear the 
merger on 30 July 1997 subject to some commitments that Boeing offered.*^*
On the other hand, the GE/Honeywell case concerned the merger between GE 
(the leading aircraft engine maker) and Honeywell (the leading avionics/non-avionics 
manufacturer). The merger would have created or strengthened a dominant position in 
different relevant markets where the two companies were involved. Despite the fact that 
during the merger review the US and EU agencies cooperated very closely, they did not 
come up with the same decision. While the Antitrust Division of the US Department of 
Justice reached an agreement with GE and Honeywell regarding the Division’s antitrust
173 McDavid, J.L., and L. K. Marshall, (2001) ‘Antitrust Law: Global Review Regimes’. The National Law Journal, < 
http://www.hhlaw.com/publications/pdfiMcDavidMarshall_NLJ_sep25_01.pdf> (last visited 21 March 2007).
174 For an analysis of the facts of the case see Boeder T.L, and G. J. Dorman (2000), ‘The Boeing /Me Donnell Douglas Merger: The 
Economics, Antitrust Law and Politics of the Aerospace Industry’ 1 : XLV Antitrust Bulletin, 119.
175 See ‘Letter to Marc G. Schildkraut, Esquire and Benjamin S. Sharp, Esquire Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation by The Boeing Company’ available at the FTC website: <htq)://www.Ac.gov/os/caselist/9710051 .htm> (last 
visited on 21 May 2007).
176 Griffin, J. P. (1994), ‘EC and US Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation’ 17 Fordham International Law Journal, 353, at 360.
177 Kaczorowska, A. (2000), ‘International Competition Law in the Context of Global C^italism ’ 21:2 European Competition Law 
Review, 117.
178 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas [1997], O.J. L336/16.
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concerns related to the proposed m e r g e r / t h e  European Commission blocked the 
mer ge r / p r omp t in g  strong reactions from the other side of the A t l a n t i c / T h e  
divergence with respect to this specific case is related to the correctness of the ‘portfolio 
effect theory’, a variety of different means by which a merger may allegedly create or 
strengthen a dominant position in non-overlap markets/^^
These cases highlight two of the observations made in the previous section of 
the chapter: first, that the understanding of the operation of competition law and policy 
may vary in different countries; and second, that in cases where very crucial policy 
issues are involved (namely, in both cases, economic and employment policy in the very 
sensitive field of the aviation sector) and different national regulators claim jurisdiction, 
political considerations, such as the need to create and/or protect national champions, 
may have an obvious effect on the particular application of the rules by these regulators.
With the expansion of multinational enterprises the opinion could be expressed 
that mergers have already been a problem for international trade since the relevant 
market in the assessment of some mergers has already been identified as the ‘global 
market’ and furthermore as we saw in the analysis of the Boeing/MDD case reasons 
mostly related to the industrial policy of different countries in important sectors of their 
economies could lead to very serious conflicts between national governments.^*^
2.3.3 Governmental and hvbrid practices
The discussion developed in the context of this section has highlighted the fact 
that a number of business practices that have traditionally been considered as falling 
under the realm of competition law may have a significant effect on multiple national 
markets. Apart from those practices, there are also competition-related governmental 
practices that may also have an influence on the operation international trade. These 
may include industrial policy considerations, which may imply the lack of law.
179 US DoJ ‘Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Merger between General Electric and Honeywell’ press release of 2 May 
2001
180 Commission (EC) ‘The Commission Prohibits GE’s Acquisition on Honeywell’, press release of 3 July 2001, lP/01/939
181 US DoJ ‘Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James on the EU’s Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell 
Acquisition’ press release of 3 July 2001.
182 Giotakos, D., L. Petit, G. Gamier, and P. De Luyck (2001) ‘General Electric Honeywell- An insight into the Commission’s 
investigation and decision’ 3 Competition Policy Newsletter, 5; Patterson, D. E, and C. Shapiro (2001) ‘Trans-Atlantic Divergence in 
GE/Honeywell, Causes and Lessons’ <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/divergence.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
183 This argument was also expressed at the first ICN conference See ICN (2003) ‘A Report on the First Annual Conference of The 
International Competition Network’, Naples, 28-29 September 2002, at 4.
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exemptions and exclusions from the application of competition rules or lack of 
enforcement or strategic enforcement of law, with the aim of strengthening particular 
firms, and creating national champions that would be able to compete at the 
international level.
This type of discretionary application of competition law in favour of particular 
firms is an aspect that has been already discussed in the context of the application of 
competition rules on a national level; nonetheless it may also have an effect on the 
ability of foreign firms to compete in national markets where such policies are 
applied. This argument is relevant, for example, to the complaints raised mainly by 
the US that the entry or expansion of US firms in the Japanese markets was hindered 
due to exclusionary anticompetitive practices conducted by Japanese firms, sometimes 
with the support of the Japanese government. It has been documented that such 
situations have occurred in the auto industry, the flat glass market, the paper industry, 
the soda ash industry, the electronic equipment market, and the film market.
These policies may also be incorporated in the various regulations adopted by 
countries on particular sectors of the economies. On an international level, it has been 
argued that sector specific regulation may have an effect both on the ability of foreign 
firms to enter a market and on consumer welfare. As will be briefly exposed in 
Chapter 6 the relationship between competition law and sectoral regulation is an issue 
included in the agendas of both the WTO and the ICN. In addition, a number of sector 
specific WTO agreements, such as the Reference Paper on Telecommunications and the 
Agreement on Services, include competition related provisions.
2.3.4. The need for international cooperation on competition
As observed in the second section, variety of national policies which influence
the particular application of national competition rules, along with the 
internationalisation of economic activity and the consequent appearance of business
184 See International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (2000), ‘ICPAC Final Report to the Attorney General and the Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust’, (hereinafter ICPAC report) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreporthtm> (last visited on 21May 
2007), at 206.
185 Ibid., at 211-215
186 See for instance Anderson, R.D., and P. Holmes (2002) ‘Competition Policy and the Future of the Multilateral Trading System’ 5:2 
Journal of International Economic Law, 531, at 539-540 and ICN(2005) ‘Report of the Working Group on Antitrust Enforcement in 
Regulated Sectors to the fourth ICN Annual Conference’, Bonne, June 2005,
<http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwoik.org/media/library/conference_4th_bonn_2005/lnterrelations_Between_Antitrust_and_Re 
gulation.pdf > (last visited on 21 May 2007)
187 See below, chapter 6, section 6.4.
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practices that have an effect on multiple markets, have a major impact on the 
international legal system. This assumption stems from the fact that on the one hand 
there are varied national competition laws and -  more importantly - policies, and on the 
other there are competition law related international problems which have to be solved 
through cooperation of the affected states. As the thesis argues, in the field of 
competition, as in every field of international cooperation, such cooperation may take 
two main forms: first formal cooperation through the adoption of international 
agreements, and second informal, through the exchange of ideas and information 
between competition officials. This section discusses the elements which lead to this 
broad classification, and further introduces the working question that the thesis attempts 
to address, i.e. the role o f  competition law and policy o f  the EU in the formation o f 
international agreements on competition.
i. Sovereignty and its implications for the internationalisation of competition law
International political order is based on the concept of state sovereignty.^** State 
sovereignty emerged with the peace of Westphalia in 1648, which marked the 
abandonment of the idea of the hierarchical structure of the society, on the top of which 
was the Pope and the Emperor, and was characterised by the coexistence of a variety of 
states, each sovereign within its territory and free fi’om any external authority or 
organisation. It reflected a conception of the international political order that gradually 
extended itself from its European roots to encompass most of the world. It was a 
conception built around the central importance of a particular type of political actor: the 
territorial sovereign state.**  ^ The model mostly stems fi’om the presumption that 'the 
coherence o f society has to be provided through the unitary power o f  the state. Since the 
split o f multitudes o f individuals and the disorder o f  society cannot create collective 
reason, it is the homogeneity and unity ‘o f the state ' and its sovereign power, which 
forges and represents the quasi-transcendental destiny o f  society '.
From a legal perspective, the main consequence of such a system is that 
sovereign states are solely responsible for the regulation of any matter that arises within
188 Burley, A.-M. (1992) ‘Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine’ 92:8 Columbia Law 
Review, 1907, at 1923-1926; Dabbah, M. (2003) The Internationalisation of Antitrust policy (Cambridge University Press), at 141-142.
189 March, J.G. and J.P. Olsen (1998) ‘The Institutional Dynamics o f International Political Orders’ 52:4 International Organization, 
943, at 944.
190 Preub, U. (1999) ‘Political Order and Democracy: Carl Schmitt and his Influence’ in Ch. Moufife, (ed ). The Challenge o f Carl 
Schmitt (New York: Verso), 167. Cited by Jayasuriya, supra n. 139, at 445.
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their t e r r i t o r y , a n d  that they are the primary subjects of international law.'^^ Both 
these assumptions have a major impact on the process of internationalisation of 
competition law, and in fact are the basis for the two sets of solutions put forward with 
regard to practices conducted by business firms, as well as hybrid practices that have an 
effect on the territories of multiple states.
The former assumption leads to unilateral solutions, which in the field of 
competition law and policy take the form of extraterritorial application of national 
competition laws. As argued in the follo^ving chapters, in the field of competition law, a 
number of countries, the US being the prime example, have used their national laws to 
address problems caused by anticompetitive practices that have an international 
effect. The latter assumption, the fact that sovereign states are the primary subjects of 
international law, is the basis for the conclusion of international agreements with which 
contracting parties state that they agree on particular competition law related 
commitments; such agreements are the focal point of subsequent discussion in the 
thesis.
ii. Tvpes of formal international cooperation: classification of international agreements, 
and introduction of the working question
In the field of competition law, attempts to reach a multilateral agreement go 
back to the first half of the previous century; nevertheless, while they are still active, no 
consensus has been reached on a binding relevant agreement. In this absence of a 
central international legislative and judicial body, alternative forms of formal 
cooperation have been developed. As the thesis argues, there are three distinct types of 
agreements which are devoted to or contain competition provisions, something that 
validates the argument that international law has been increasingly fragmented with the 
conclusion of various types of agreements, some of which also establish dispute 
settlement mechanisms. These categories include bilateral enforcement cooperation
191 Philpott, D. (1995) ‘Sovereignty; An Introduction and BriefHistory’, 48 Journal o f International Affairs, 353, at 356-357.
192 Shaw, M. (2004) International Law (Cambridge University Press, 5th edition), at 175- 223.
193 On the concept of extraterritoriality, see below, chapter 3, section 3.2.4.
194 And in this regard, international agreements have been considered to be equivalent of a contract. Guzman, A.T. (2005) ‘The Design 
of International Agreements’ 16:4 European Journal of International Law, 579, at 585.
195 See the discussion in Chapter 6.
196Koskenniemi, M. and P. Leino (2002) ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’ 15 Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 553, at 556; See also UNCTAD (2006) Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
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agreements, bilateral trade agreements which include competition provisions and 
plurilateral-regional trade agreements which include competition rules. These 
agreements, along with the negotiations over the possible adoption of a multilateral 
competition agreement, are the focal point of further discussion.
In reviewing these agreements, the aim of the thesis is twofold. First, it attempts 
to identify the types of norms that have been included in the agreements, both 
substantive and procedural, and this exercise is mainly a textual one. In the same 
context nevertheless, the thesis also discusses the role of the particular categories of 
agreements in the creation of international competition norms. Furthermore, the 
thesis examines the legal status of the agreements, i.e. whether the agreements oblige 
the signing parties to apply the agreed clauses (hard law) or whether the parties just 
express an intention to cooperate (soft law). Another issue addressed is the extent to 
which the provisions found in these agreements harmonise the competition laws of the 
contracting parties, or whether they simply provide mechanisms for enforcement 
cooperation. Finally, most of the agreements discussed in the thesis are trade 
agreements which include a chapter on competition law and policy, and therefore the 
role of competition law and policy in the broader group of issues addressed by these 
agreements is also discussed.
The second and main aim of the thesis is to evaluate the role of the EU in the 
formation of such agreements. Instead of reviewing the influence of the EU in the 
development of international competition norms as a whole, the thesis evaluates the 
policy of the EU with regard to the various distinct types of international agreements 
which are dedicated to competition, or include competition provisions. While the textual 
analysis is of major relevance here too, since it can on certain occasions lead to the 
assessment of the extent to which the EU has succeeded in imposing its competition law 
on its co-signing countries by including competition provisions similar to EU law, this 
discussion is also political.
This assumption is based on the argument that the international system is based 
both on international law and the balance of power, which operate between, rather than
Diversification and Expansion of Internationa] Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A/CN.4/L.682, in 
particular at 10-17.
197 The analysis of the various forms of cooperation shows that at least to date, while competition law has been included in bilateral and 
regional-plurilateral agreements, it has not survived the more complicated multilateral negotiations.
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above sovereign states. To this end, various international relations theories have been 
developed with the aim of describing -  and to a certain extent predicting - the way in, 
and extent to, which countries cooperate. Some of these theories, such as policy 
networks, epistemic communities, isomorphism and realism, are employed in different 
parts of the study in the context of the discussion about the negotiations on or provisions 
of the agreements. Such policy considerations are more clearly taken into account in the 
context of the discussion about the role of the EU in the formation of multilateral 
competition rules, where, in the absence of a binding international agreement on 
competition, the relevant discussion is devoted to the analysis of the position taken by 
the EU and the relevant positions of a number of countries, and therefore the political 
factor is prevalent.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to outline some of the main features of competition 
law and policy both on a national and an international level. It did so by first 
introducing the historical origins of competition law, from the development of the 
relevant case law in England in the 15* century on restrictive trade practices to the 
proliferation of competition law in most of the countries of the world, in the last 15 
years.
The chapter noted that economic theories may have a significant effect on the 
particular application of national competition rules, and argued that various sectors of 
national economies are exempted from the application of competition laws, and these 
sectors may vary depending on the particular country under examination. The socio­
cultural factors that have an effect on the particular application of competition rules in 
different countries have also been briefly reviewed. It has been shown that such factors 
are used as a basis for case-specific exemptions from the application of competition 
rules. In this regard, it has been argued that a number of issues that are not related to 
competition policies are taken into account in the context of the examination of a 
particular anticompetitive practice. Finally, on a national level, the chapter has exposed
198 Gross, L. (1948) ‘The Peace o f Westphalia, 1648-1948’ 42:1 The American Journal o f International Law, 20, at 28-29; In its 
extreme version, as Shaw notes, ‘[W]here survival is involved international law may take second place’. Shaw, M. (2004) supra n. 192, 
at 8.
199. See Slaughter, A-M. (1993) ‘International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda’ 87 American Journal of 
International Law, 205.
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some of the arguments that have been raised in the relevant literature for and against the 
adoption of competition rules by developing countries.
By exposing all of these particularities of competition law, the chapter has not 
questioned the validity of competition rules. In contrast, the statistics provided here 
reveal that a very large number of countries have adopted competition rules, and this, by 
itself, is a clear indication that competition law and policy is considered to be a key part 
of liberal political systems. The aim of the analysis of the variant and sometimes 
divergent aspects of national competition rules has been to highlight the fact that 
competition law is still a relatively new legal instrument and that there is a long way to 
go before consensuses reached as to its optimum application.
On the other hand, the chapter has also stressed that due to economic 
globalisation the number of multinational firms has been increased, and this in turn has 
increased the number of anticompetitive practices conducted by such firms that have an 
effect on multiple national markets. Three types of relevant practices have been briefly 
reviewed: hard core cartels; vertical restraints; and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. As also noted, a number of hybrid practices which include anticompetitive 
practices supported by governments or allowed by them through the exemptions from 
the application of competition rules may have an effect on international trade.
In view of the existence of such practices that should be dealt with by 
competition rules, it has been noted that there are two possible solutions. The first is 
unilateral, extraterritorial application of competition rules. Nonetheless, as argued, it is 
taken as an assumption in this thesis that international problems need international 
solutions and in this regard, international agreements, which provide for cooperation 
and/or harmonisation of competition rules, have been employed to address the 
anticompetitive practices by firms that have an international effect. These agreements 
will be the focal point of subsequent analysis in this study, and this analysis will be 
carried out from the perspective of the EU, in order to evaluate the role of the EU 
competition law and policy in the formation and application of these agreements.
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Chapter 3: Bilateral Enforcement Cooperation Agreements^^^
Abstract
This chapter looks at self-standing bilateral (and tripartite) enforcement 
cooperation agreements in the field of competition law and policy. Section 1 follows the 
development of these agreements and attempts to identify some of their common 
characteristics. Section 2 explores the content and impact of the first generation of 
agreements, and is based primarily on the enforcement cooperation agreements signed 
by the EU and the US. Section 3 focuses on the limitations of the first generation of 
agreements. Section 4 discusses second generation agreements which allow the 
exchange of confidential information between the cooperating parties, as well as other 
forms of formal cooperation recently used in bilateral enforcement cooperation on 
competition, and in particular Mutual Legal Assistance (MLATs) and extradition 
Treaties. The chapter concludes by summarising the most important features of
200 An earlier version of this chapter has been published, under the title ‘Enforcement cooperation agreements’ in Marsden, P. (ed) 
(2007) Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust (Edward Elgar Publishing).
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enforcement cooperation agreements and by evaluating the role of the EU in the 
formation and development of this particular instrument.
3.1 Common characteristics of enforcement cooperation agreements
3.1.1 Enforcement cooperation as a substitute for harmonisation of competition laws
Bilateral (and tripartite) enforcement cooperation agreements are agreements 
that do not harmonize the competition laws of the contracting parties. These agreements 
provide for mechanisms of enforcement cooperation. In the field of competition law 
enforcement cooperation has been used as an alternative for the harmonisation of 
national competition laws. Since no agreement on a multilateral code on restrictive 
business practices could be achieved in the last century, a number of countries with 
active international trade (through multinational firms) and a developed competition law 
cooperated on enforcement of their competition laws in order to face up to the 
consequences of the increasing number of restrictive business practices with an 
international effect.
Thus, as early as the late 1950s when a conflict arose between the Governments 
of Canada and the United States on a case relating to a US investigation of a patent pool 
among Canadian radio and television makers designed to exclude US manufactured 
products from the Canadian market, the Governments of US and Canada entered into 
negotiations in order to coordinate their enforcement activities and avoid similar 
conflicts. The outcome of this conflict and the subsequent negotiations was the Fulton- 
Rodgers understanding of 1959,^°  ^with which the two governments agreed to construct 
a channel of communication regarding antitrust matters, through notification and 
consultation.^®^
Furthermore, by 1967 enforcement cooperation between competition agencies, 
had become an issue of interest at the OECD, which adopted its first recommendation^®^ 
encouraging its member countries to co-operate in enforcement on antitrust issues. This 
first recommendation of 1967 has been modified several times, most recently, in
201 Named after the Canadian Minister of Justice and the US Attorney General at that time. See Finckenstein, K. von (2001), 
'International Antitrust Cooperation: Bilateralism or Multilateralism?’, Speech delivered in Vancouver, 31 May 2001, 
<ht^://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Canada/Policy/la.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
202 Stark, C. (2000) ‘Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation’, Speech delivered in Washington D C., 23 June 2000, at 2, 
<ht^:/Avvvw.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/5075.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
203 OECD Recommendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices 
Affecting International Trade of 5 October 1967 [C(567)53(Final)].
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1995?^"* Taking as a model the most recent (recommendation of 1995), member 
countries are encouraged to:
(i) Notify other members when the latter’s ‘important interests’ are affected by 
an investigation or enforcement action;^®^
(ii) Co-ordinate parallel investigations where appropriate and practicable;^®^
(iii) Disclose information concerning an investigation or proceeding which is 
being conducted in one member country but that may affect important interests 
of another member country, in order to permit the member country whose 
interests are affected to comment and consult with the proceeding member;^®^
(iv) Exchange information which is related to anticompetitive practices in 
international trade (with the reservation of the rules concerning confidentiality 
and unless such a disclosure of information would be contrary to significant 
national interests of a country);^®* and
(v) Request the competition authorities of another member country to take 
action if it considers that one or more undertakings situated in that country are 
or have been engaged in anticompetitive practices that are substantially and 
adversely affecting its interests/®^ Moreover, in the preamble,^^® the member 
countries are required to take into consideration the principle of international 
comity (‘traditional’ or ‘negative’ comity).
As can be seen, the provisions of the OECD recommendation are relatively 
vague, and the content of the agreements following the OECD recommendations has 
been expanded; however the basic structure of all these agreements follows to a greater 
or lesser extent the OECD recommendation. The recommendation is entirely voluntary; 
nevertheless it is still an important step since the OECD is the first institution that 
encouraged its Member States to be involved in mechanisms of cooperation on
204 OECD Recommendation of the Council of 27th and 28th July of 1995 [C (95) 130 (Final)].
205 Ibid. in Article I. A. 1.
206 Ibid. in Article I. A. 2.
207 Ibid. in Article I.B.4.a).
208 Ibid. in Article I.A.3.
209 Ibid. in Article I.B.5.a) in conjunction with Article I.B.5.C). The provision relating to positive comity was added to the 
recommendation by the amendment of 1973.
210 Ibid. in recital 7
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competition enforcement and consequently to create a framework of cooperation,^*^ and 
it has been to date particularly active in this field?*^
3.1.2 Basic structure of the agreements
As is obvious from Table 3.1, enforcement cooperation agreements in the field 
of competition law follow the basic structure of the OECD recommendations. 
Nonetheless, the level of cooperation provided varies. For instance the Brazil-Russia 
agreement is modest, providing for a general undertaking by the parties to cooperate and 
consult each other on cases of mutual interest. On the other hand, the US-Australia 
agreement and the Denmark-Iceland-Norway tripartite agreement are the first to provide 
for exchange of confidential information and are the first legally binding enforcement 
cooperation agreements, called the second generation agreements^ discussed in Section 
4 of the chapter. All the other -  first generation - agreements are soft law agreements 
and therefore include limitations on the ability of the competition agencies to share 
confidential information (the so-called confidentiality clause and the limitation by the 
existing laws - both discussed below). Almost all of these agreements provide for a 
basic procedure of cooperation, that is to say notification of cases of mutual interest, 
exchange of information, cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities, and 
negative comity. These mechanisms are also analysed below.
211 Monti, M. (2000) ‘Cooperation Between Competition Authorities - A Vision for the Future’ Speech delivered at the Japan 
Foundation Conference, Washington DC, 23 June 2000, <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh7p_action.gettxt 
=gt&doc=SPEECH/00/234|0|RAPlD&lg=EN> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
212 See ICN (2007) ‘Cooperation Between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations’, Cartels Working Group Report, Presented 
at the ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, <http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_ 
6th_moscow_2007/19ReportonCooperationbetweencompetitionagenciesincarteIinvestigations.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 5.
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Table 3.1. Bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements
• -  ^Ratification 
AGREEMENT  ^ C
Exchange
of
information
Enforcement
cooperation
Coordination Consultations Meetings
between
officials
Technical
assistance
Comity Positive
comity
m
Predominance 
of Existing 
laws of the 
Parties
Right to 
share
confidential
information
U8/Germany(1976) / V V V V V
US-Anstralia(1982)  ^ V V V V V V
EU-US (1991) ' V V V V V V V V
U8-Canada (1995) / - V/ ' .  V V V V V V V V V
Australia-Taipei (1996) V V V V V V V
N. Zealand- Taipei (1996) V V V V V V
EU-US on pos. com. (1998) _ V V V
U8/Australia (1999)  ^ -#v
. .....' ..ywSr,'
V V V V
EU-Canada (1999) ^  : V V V V V V V V V
US-Japan (1999) V V V V V V V
US-Brazil (1999) ^  V V V V V V V V
Australia- Papua New Guinea (19^) : ^ V V V V V V V
us - Israel (1999) V V V V V V V V V
US-Mexico (2000) ^ 3 ^ . V V V V V V V V V
Canada-C h ü e (2 0 0 ï)4 ^ ^ ^ ^ (^ ^  V V V V V V V
Russia-Brazil (2001) V V V V
Canada -Mexico (2001) ^ V V V V V V V V V
Austr^-Fiji MpU C^ 002) V V V V V V V
Australia-Korea (8ept 2002) _ ^  S i f i  V V V V V V V V V
Canada-UK (200ÿi;^:^' V V V V V V V
EU-Japan (2003)  ^ V V V V V V V V V
U8- Canada pos. com? (2004) ::J\ V V V
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3.1.3 Bilateral agreements as a wav to contextualise international cooperation in other 
fields of commercial law
Bilateral agreements have also been extensively used in other fields of 
commercial law, namely investment and taxation. In particular, since the 1950s and 
until 2000, more than 1300 bilateral investment treaties were signed.^^^ The main goal 
of these agreements is to encourage and create favourable conditions for investors from 
the signing party, whereas some of them, for example the treaties signed by the US and 
Canada, also include a Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause.^ "^  ^More than 1500 double 
taxation treaties have also been signed between various states, with the aim of 
mitigating the effects of double taxation by allocating taxation rights between source 
and residence countries and providing for cooperation, exchange of information and 
dispute settlement.^
3.1.4 Enforcement cooperation where there are trade flows
Another observation to be made regarding enforcement cooperation agreements 
is that all these agreements have been concluded between countries with significant 
trade flows. This justifies to an extent the fact that most of these agreements have been 
concluded among industrialised countries (such as the EU, the US, Canada, Japan, and 
Australia). In this regard, the EU has signed such agreements only with its three most 
important partners, namely the US, Canada, and Japan, while it currently considering 
the adoption of a relevant agreement with Korea.
Nonetheless, the fact that in the last five years or so a number of less developed 
countries have been involved in bilateral enforcement agreements should not be 
overlooked and considerable trade flows between the contracting parties is one of the 
main incentives for the conclusion of most of these agreements. For example, Papua- 
New Guinea has signed an agreement with Australia, and this is justified by the fact that 
Australia is the country with which Papua New Guinea has the most developed trade 
relations. Statistically, in the year 2000, Australia was the destination of 29.1% of Papua 
New Guinea exports and 21.2% of Papua New Guinea’s imports came from Australia.
213 WTO Working Group on Trade and Investment (1998) ‘Bilateral, Regional, Plurilateral, and Multilateral Agreements’ 
WTAVGTIAV/22, a t4
214 Ibid, at 6.
215 Ibid at 10.
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Moreover according to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
the agreement is a way to achieve greater access to Papua New Guinea’s market for 
Australian exporters through proper utilisation of competition law in this market?^^ It 
is logical to assume that ‘proper utilisation of competition law’ aims for the creation of 
an environment of safe investment for Australian firms.
3.1.5 Enforcement cooperation agreements (of first generation) in the form of soft law
A major characteristic of the first generation of agreements is that they are 
considered as soft law, which in turn has been used as an alternative to hard law in the 
"legalisation of international relations. Hard law refers to legally binding obligations 
that are precise (or can be made precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed 
regulations) and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law. Each 
of these characteristics of law (obligations, precision and delegation) may be present in 
varying degrees along a continuum, and each can vary independently of the others.^^* 
Accordingly, soft law is chosen once legal arrangements are weakened along one or 
more of the dimensions of obligations, precision, and delegation. Put differently, soft 
law stands between hard law and purely political arrangements where legalisation is 
largely ab sen t,^and  includes elements from both these situations (that is, it includes 
legal provisions -  an element of hard law - but these provisions are not legally 
enforceable - an element of purely political arrangements).
This indistinctness between law and policy has led some international lawyers to 
condemn soft law as vague and inadequate to regulate international economic relations. 
Weil for instance has argued that the increasing use of soft law can destabilise the whole 
international normative system into an instrument inadequate to serve its purpose.^^® In 
fact these arguments to an extent can be applied in the case of this first generation of 
bilateral and tripartite competition enforcement cooperation agreements. The lack of
216 See the ACCC website <http://www.accc.gov.au/intemational/intemational.htm>.
217 By ‘legalisation’ it is meant here the formalisation of intemational relations in the form of law (intemational agreements).
218 Abbott, K., R. Keohane, A. Moravcsik, A- M Slaughter, and D. Snidal (2000), ‘The Concept o f Legalisation’, 54:3 Intemational 
Organisation, 401 (hereinafter Abbott et al.)
219 Abbott, K. W, and D. Snidal (2000), ‘Hard and Soft Law in Intemational Govemance’ 54:3 Intemational Organisation, 421, at 422. 
For a critique on this analysis, see Finnemore, M. and S. J. (2001) ‘Altematives to “Legalization”: Risher Views of Law and Politics’ 
55:1 Intemational Organization, 743, where the authors hold that the distinction made by Abbott and Snidal has certain limitations, as it 
does not take into account other important ingredients o f law, such as the features and effects of legitimacy, including the need for a 
certain link between law and underlying social practice.
220 Weil, P. (1983), ‘Towards Relative Normativity in Intemational Law?’ 77 American Joumal of Intemational Law, 413, at 423.
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legally binding obligations, along with the confidentiality clause, give in reality absolute 
discretion to the contracting parties to overlook the agreements in cases where they 
consider that their important interests would be impeded if they had to follow the 
provisions of these agreements, and this is a significant drawback of the agreements, in 
view of discussion carried out in Chapter 2 with regard to the different understandings 
about the nature and proper enforcement of competition law.
So what exactly are the factors that have led to the choice of soft law instead of 
hard law in the process of legalisation of intemational economic relations? Soft law 
bilateral agreements have not only been used in the field of competition law but also in 
other areas of intemational law, such as taxation, investment and securities.^^^ The 
reason for this choice, as a number of scholars have pointed out, is that soft law can 
overcome deadlocks in the relation of states that result from economic or political 
differences among them, when efforts at firmer solutions have been unsuccessfiil.^^^ 
This general assumption can be applied in the process of intemationalisation of 
competition law where the lack of success in concluding a multilateral agreement has 
obviously led countries to opt for altemative solutions, including bilateral (and in fact 
voluntary) enforcement cooperation agreements. This form of cooperation is definitely 
more flexible than traditional intemational agreements vdth binding provisions and as 
Chinkin puts it, "thanks to soft law we still have people channeling efforts toward law 
and toward trying to achieve objectives through legal mechanism, rather than going 
ahead and doing it in other fashions'
Furthermore a substantial amount of soft law can be attributed to differences in 
the economic stmctures and economic interests of different states.^ "^^  This argument is 
also relevant in the case of competition law, which, as argued in Chapter 2, may include 
different aims depending on the interests of different countries, with variant objectives 
and cultures. Supportive of this hypothesis are provisions for deceptive marketing 
practices included in the Canada-Australia-New Zealand^^^ and the US-Canada^^^
221 Slaughter, A-M (2000) ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’ in Byers, M. (ed.) The Role o f Law in 
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and Intemational Law (Oxford University Press), 1077.
222 Reismann (1991), ‘A Hard look at Soft Law; Panel Report’ 82 American Society of Intemational Law, 371, at 427.
223 Quoted in Reisman, ibid., at 377.
224 Ibid. at 375.
225 See Canada- Australia -New Zealand Agreement Art 12.
226 See US - Canada Agreement Art VII.
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agreements, which thus incorporate consumer protection law/^^ What soft law 
contributes to this situation is that it creates channels of communication. As the next 
section argues, cooperation between competition officials supports the development of 
common understandings among them in relation to the nature and proper operation of 
competition law. To this end, when such a common understanding has been achieved, it 
could be argued that cooperation through soft law instruments may lead to stronger 
forms of cooperation.^^^
3.1.6 Bilateral enforcement cooperation as a strategv of strong states
It also becomes obvious fi’om Table 3.1 that enforcement cooperation has taken 
the form of bilateral (and only lately tripartite) agreements. Why however bilateral and 
not for example multi- or pluri- lateral enforcement cooperation agreements? This 
question has to be answered especially in view of the fact that enforcement cooperation 
agreements have to a great extent been fi-amed in accordance with the OECD 
recommendation, which itself does not speak about bilateral cooperation.
A number of scholars and politicians attribute bilateralism in the field of 
competition enforcement cooperation to the US policy on intemational competition law 
in the post-World War II period. The US historically resisted participation in 
intemational institutional arrangements; they were perceived as jeopardising its political 
a u t o n o m y a  phenomenon also illustrated in the process of intemationalisation of 
competition law, where the US has consistently been the most prominent opponent of 
the development of the idea of a multilateral agreement on competition. Instead, US 
officials have advocated that extraterritorial application of US competition law as the 
most appropriate way to address problems created by restrictive business practices with 
an intemational effect, even in cases where US laws have to be applied in an 
extraterritorial manner.^^°
Furthermore, US officials have used bilateral agreements as a complementary 
strategy to unilateralism. As Braithwaite and Drahos claim, in intemational trade
227 According to Canadian officials the main aim of these provisions is to solve problems relating to deceptive telemariceting, that is, 
person-to-person telephone calls used to make false or misleading representations in promoting the supply of a product or business 
interest See: Murphy, G. (2001), ‘Canada, Australia and New Zealand Competition Authorities Sign Cooperation Arrangement’ 22:8 
European Competition Law Review, 322, at 322.
228 See below, section 3.4.2 which discusses the cooperation between US and UK, and US and Canada, on criminal cases.
229 See Abbott et al, at 401.
230 See the discussion carried out in chapter 6 of the thesis, section 6.3.1.
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generally, the most fimdamental US strategy is to act tough on bilateral negotiations to 
set frameworks for subsequent multilateral negotiation?^^ This strategy has been 
observed in the area of intellectual property law, where it finally led to the adoption of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),^^^ 
and can also be observed in the field of competition law, where the US is the most 
frequent user of bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, both in the form of soft 
law, through first generation agreements, and lately hard law, through the conclusion of 
a second generation agreement with Australia, and the use of Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaties and Extradition Treaties with regard to the investigation of competition
233cases.
Waller further argues that cooperation on enforcement agreements is currently in 
vogue because it increases national power.^ "^  ^ It is definitely easier for politically and 
economically strong states to cope with negotiations and cooperation on a bilateral 
rather than on a multilateral basis. With the absence of a judicial body to decide on 
cases where a conflict arises it is very much the political and economic power of the 
contracting parties that will decide the outcome of the conflict. Officials and academics 
of smaller countries have often expressed this concern. For instance a Swiss official has 
stated that the possible conclusion of a multilateral competition agreement would be the 
best solution with respect to the problems stemming from restrictive business practices 
conducted by multinational enterprises, since, parties with relatively little bargaining 
power will be able to join forces with similar countries to safeguard their interests, 
leading to a more balanced agreement' an argument tested and practically validated 
in the context of the discussion regarding the negotiations over a possible WTO 
agreement.^^^
231 Braithwaite, J. and P. Drahos (2000) Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press), at 198.
232 Ibid.
233 See section 3.4.2 below.
234 Waller, S.W. (1997), ‘Internationalisation of Antitrust Enforcement’ 77 Boston University Law Review, 343, at 378.
235 Zach, R. (1998), ‘International Cooperation Between Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: A View fkim a Small Country’ in Ulrich, H. 
(ed.) Comparative Competition Law: Approaching an Intemational System of Antitrust Law (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden- 
Baden), at 261.
236 See chapter 6, section 6.3.2. where it is noted that developing countries, which would be normally in a disadvantaged position in 
bilateral talks, have combined their forces and have had a major impact at the multilateral level.
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3.1.7. The policy of the EU towards the adoption of first generation bilateral 
enforcement cooperation agreements
All these arguments about bilateralism and the increase of national power are 
also reflected lately by the EU, but not in the field of agreements on enforcement 
cooperation. Having concluded enforcement cooperation agreements only with the US, 
Canada and Japan, the EU has not been as active as the US in the adoption of this 
particular legal tool, and two main arguments may be put forward with regard to this 
observation. First, the EU throughout the 1990s and until the collapse of the WTO talks 
on competition formally supported the adoption of a possible WTO multilateral 
agreement, and therefore considered to a certain extent soft law bilateral agreements to 
be of secondary importance.^^^ Second, given the voluntary nature of the agreements, it 
was considered by the Commission that the use of such agreements is rather limited, 
since cooperation could be carried out anyway, irrespective of the existence of such 
agreements.^^^ This second assumption is also supported by the fact that the EU has 
formally developed bilateral relations with Korea and China, both important business 
partners, yet in the case of China there is no official agreement adopted, while in the 
case of Korea, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2003 in which the 
signing parties express their willingness to cooperate, and develop a dialogue through 
annual meeting of officials, without adopting a ‘formal’ agreement.^^^
On the other hand, the EU has been the most prominent user of bilateral trade 
agreements which include competition provisions and, as observed in Chapter 4, to a 
certain extent it obliges its co-signing states to adopt legislation similar to the EU. In 
addition, as argued in Section 4 it has lately been interested in concluding second 
generation bilateral agreements, but attempts have not been fruitful to date.
237 See Chapter 6, section 6.2.
238 This position has been expressed by Stephen Ryan, of the European commission at a CEPR meeting in Paris, December 2005.
239 See Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Between the Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of Korea and die 
Competition Directorate s General of the European Commission (2004), <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ 
intemational/bilateral/kr2_en.pdC» (last visited on 21 May 2007), where the parties note in para. 6 that they ‘will do their best to 
establish a bilateral agreement as soon as the Member States of the European Union will agree to initiate negotiations leading to the 
adoption of a formal bilateral agreement on competition’.
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3.2. The content of the first generation agreements
3.2.1 First agreements of this generation: reactive rather than proactive
The basic characteristic of the early agreements of the first generation is that 
their objective was to resolve conflicts that had already occurred and were relevant to 
the extraterritorial application of the US antitrust rules, rather than to avoid future 
conflicts. In this regard the agreements were reactive rather than pro-active. For 
example, the exchange of information is dealt with in much more detail in the US- 
Australia agreement and in the US-Canada Memorandum of Understanding^"^® due to 
the fact that they were concluded after the confrontation in the Uranium case. During 
the 1970s in the Uranium Cartel case a US court held that it was justified in exercising 
jurisdiction against nine non-US uranium producers.^"^* This decision created very 
serious friction and led a number of countries to adopt blocking statutes and/or claw 
back statutes. The former prevent or limit the ability of the United States to obtain 
information located in countries with such statutes. The latter allow citizens to seek 
compensatory damages paid to plaintiffs that have prevailed in US litigation.^"*  ^ This 
confrontation was the reason for the adoption of the bilateral enforcement cooperation 
agreements between the United States of America and Australia in 1982 and Canada in 
1985 respectively.
3.2.2 The agreement between the US and the EU
The first pro-active agreement is the agreement concluded between the EU and 
the US in 1991.^ "^  ^In  examining the content and impact of the first generation of 
bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, the chapter concentrates mainly on the 
agreement between the EU and the US, and various reasons may be put forward in
240 Ham, A. D. (1993) ‘International Cooperation in the Anti-trust Field and in Particular the Agreement between the United States of 
America and the Commission of the European Communities' 30 Common Market Law Review, 571, at 576.
241 Walker, W. K (1992) ‘Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The Effect o f the European Community- United States 
Agreement’ 33 Harvard Intemational Law Joumal, 583, at 586.
242 Pitofeky provides as an example the UK, which introduced such clauses with the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, Chapter 
I I ,  as amended by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982, Chapter 27, and Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1993, Chapter 50, Sch. 
1, pt XIV. He also, notes that relevant laws have been adopted by Canada, France, Australia and South Africa. See Pitofski, R. (1999) 
‘Competition Policy in a Global Economy- Today and Tomorrow’ 2:3 Joumal o f Intemational Economic Law, 403, at 408.
243 The agreement finally entered into force in 1995 due to an action brought by the Government of France against the Commission 
successfully challenging the competence o f the European Commission to conclude this kind of agreements. The problem was finally 
solved with the approval of the agreement by the European Council. See Riley, A. (1995) ‘The Jellyfish Nailed? The Announcement of 
the EC/US Competition Co-operation Agreement’ 16:3 European Competition Law Review, 185.
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relation to this approach. This agreement is arguably the most important considering the 
impact of first generation agreements as it relates to two major ‘players’ in intemational 
trade with mature competition systems, and most importantly, it has been tested for 
more than ten years and to a great extent is the only agreement that can give us practical 
examples of situations where this kind of agreement has proven effective or ineffective. 
In addition, this agreement has also been the model for all the other similar agreements 
signed by the EU and the US. More relevantly to the research question that the thesis 
attempts to address, the analysis of the EU-US agreement may provide one with insights 
as to the way that the EU has reacted with regard to the use of this type of intemational 
agreement.
3.2.3 Negative comity (avoidance of conflicts)
First generation agreements primarily aim at the avoidance of conflicts between 
the cooperating parties, and this aim is incorporated into the text of the agreements in 
the form of the principle of comity. Comity, or more correctly negative comity - the 
term ‘negative’ has been given in order to distinguish it from positive comity - 
developed in the Netherlands in the last quarter of the seventeenth century^ "*"* and was 
especially influenced by the work of Ulrich Huber, who based his analysis on three 
axioms: i) that each state had sovereignty in its territory (that is, the laws of its states 
bind all its subjects in the boundaries of this state but not beyond); ii) that every person 
who is found within the state is considered to be a subject of this state irrespective of 
whether he/she resides there permanently or temporarily; and iii) that states mlers 
should ensure (through the concept of comity) that the laws of other states be enforced 
within its boundaries in order to maintain validity and impartiality to other states’ laws 
and citizens. According to Huber, comity was based on the existence of a jus gentium, 
i.e. a form of common law, which applying to conflicts of laws is law since the general 
utility of nations causes common practice giving effect to foreign laws and judgements 
to be held everywhere as laws. In contrast other theorists claimed that comity was a 
matter of discretion for each sovereign state.^ "^ ^
244 Yntema, H. (1966), ‘The Comity Doctrine’ 65:1 Michigan Law Review, 9.
245 Ibid. at 26.
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This latter argument has prevailed in international law literature. Even though 
the notion of comity is not entirely clear in the public international law literature, 
comity (as it is meant in general terms) is a situation where extraterritorial 
determinations are often grounded in considerations of politeness or respect; it is '‘a 
willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter o f  right, but out o f  deference and good 
wiir^^^ in order to avoid conflicts relating to jurisdiction. Specifically 'with reference to 
competition law the principle of comity encourages the parties to take into account, 
during the enforcement of their competition laws, the important interests of the other 
party so as to avoid the creation of conflicts during their enforcement activity. In 
considering the other party’s important interests the enforcing party applies the comity 
clause within the framework of its laws and to the extent compatible with its important 
interests.^ "^ *
Negative comity has been included in the OECD recommendations (as described 
above) and has also formed part of almost every bilateral enforcement agreement. In the 
EU/US agreement the provision for comity is laid down in Article VI; it is based on 
three principles. First, there is recognition that the important interests of a Party would 
normally be reflected in laws, decisions or statements of policy by its competent 
authorities. A second principle is the recognition that that as a general mater the 
potential for adverse impact on one Party's important interests arising from enforcement 
activity by the other Party is less at the investigative stage and greater at the stage at 
which conduct is prohibited or penalised, or at which other forms of remedial orders are 
imposed. The third principle and actually the novelty introduced in this agreement is a 
list of six situations where the important interests of a Party may be affected. These 
include: (a) the relative significance to the anticompetitive activities involved of 
conduct within the enforcing Party's territory as compared to conduct within the other 
Party's territory; (b) the presence or absence of a purpose on the part of those engaged in 
the anticompetitive activities to affect consumers, suppliers, or competitors within the 
enforcing Party's territory; (c) the relative significance of the effects of the 
anticompetitive activities on the enforcing Party's interests as compared to the effects on
246 Joel Paul gives sixteen alternative meanings of the principle, found in various scientific articles that deal with comity: Paul, J. R. 
(1991) ‘Comity in International Law’ 32:1 Harvard International Law Journal, 2, at 3-4.
247 Himelfarb, A. J. (1996) ‘The International Language of Convergence: Reviving the Antitrust Dialogue between The United States 
of America and the European Union with a Uniform Understanding of Extraterritoriality’ 17:3 University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
International Economic Law, 909, at 914.
248 Ehlermann, C-D. (1994) ‘The International Dimension of Competition’ Policy’ 17 Fordham International Law Journal, 833, at 836.
74
the other Party's interests; (d) the existence or absence of reasonable expectations that 
would be furthered or defeated by the enforcement activities; (e) the degree of conflict 
or consistency between the enforcement activities and the other Party's laws or 
articulated economic policies; and (f) the extent to which enforcement activities of the 
other Party with respect to the same persons, including judgments or undertakings 
resulting from such activities, may be affected.
As is obvious, the wording of the comity-related provision of the agreement is 
quite detailed. This reflects the intention of the contracting Parties to limit the 
possibilities of jurisdictional conflicts. Having said that, the following analysis shows 
that in both the US and the EU extraterritorial application of competition law is the 
guiding principle, and comity has been seen as a principle to be applied in exceptional 
circumstances.
3.2.4 Extraterritorial application of competition rules
In the last sixty years the US the courts have consistently applied US antitrust 
rules in an extraterritorial manner.^"^  ^ Nonetheless the extent to which comity 
considerations may be taken into account in competition cases varies, depending on the 
particular case under examination.
The ‘effects doctrine’ was first introduced in the 1945 Alcoa case.^^° According 
to this doctrine, the US courts have the competence to apply US antitrust law to conduct 
that has occurred wholly or partly in a foreign state that is intended to affect the United 
States and has in fact such an effect. In its 1976 Timberlane decision,^^^ the Ninth 
Circuit mitigated the effects test by taking into account a consideration of comity for 
foreign defendants, creating thus a rule-of-reason comity analysis, which was codified 
in the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA).^^^ Here it is 
provided that the challenged conduct must have a ‘direct, substantial and reasonable 
foreseeable effect’ on US commerce or on the trade of a US citizen/company engaged in 
export commerce. The aim of the FTAIA was to provide clear guidance with regard to
249 See generally Barnet, S. E. (2004), ‘Conflicts o f Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust’, 18 Emory 
Intemational Law Review, 555.
250 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
251 Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America, 549F.2d 597 (9th Cir 1976).
252 15 u  s  e  s 6a (1994).
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the extraterritorial application of US competition rules; nonetheless it is widely 
acknowledged that it has failed to do so?^^
In the 1993 Hartford decision^ "^* the Supreme Court held, in justifying the 
extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act, that in terms of comity, the exercise of 
US jurisdiction would be limited to exceptional occasions and only if there were a ‘true 
conflict’, and it was therefore to be applied only in exceptional cases. This statement 
was confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Nippon Paper case, where it held that 
comity is ‘more an aspiration’ than an established rule, confirming in the process that 
the growth of comity in competition matters was stunted by Hartford Fire?^^
Lately, the Supreme Court once more examined the effects test in its Empagran 
decision,^^^ where it held that foreign purchasers of vitamins based outside the US did 
not have the right to bring a claim for treble damages in a US court for conduct that had 
taken place solely outside the US market, even where it was part of a wider cartel which 
did affect US market. On remand from the Supreme Court,^^^ the Court of Appeals held 
that, in order to obtain relief, plaintiffs must show that there is a ‘direct casual 
relationship’ between the effect that the anticompetitive practices have in the US market 
and the injuries they have suffered. The Court found that the appellants could not show 
such a ‘proximate causation’ and thus they did not have the right to bring an action 
against the appellees.^^* Hence, even though US approach to comity has changed over 
time, comity considerations apply rarely in the US jurisprudence, while extraterritorial 
application of US competition rules is the norm, and this assumption is also validated by 
the fact that, at least with regard to cartel enforcement, the US has been very active in 
recent years in seeking extradition of foreign nationals who participate in cartels.
Similarly, as far as the European Union is concerned there has been in the last 
twenty years or so a continuous effort from the European Commission to establish the 
effects doctrine in Europe, with the aim of extending the scope of extraterritorial
253 Springman, C. (2005) ‘Fix Prices Globally, Get Sued Locally? US Jurisdiction Over Intemational Cartels’ 72 University of Chicago 
Law Review, 265, at 271-273.
254 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
255 United States of America v. Nippon Pqier Industries Co. LTD et Al., 109 F.3 d (1st Cire. 1997), p.9.
256 Hoffinan La Roche vs. Empagran, SA 124 2359 (2004). See Reinker, K. S. (2004) ‘Case Comment: Roche vs. Empagran’ 28 
Harvard Journal o f Law and Public Policy, 297.
257 See Empagran S.A. v. Hoffinan La Roche LTD. ET AL, Opinion of the Court of Appeals, No 01-7115c (2005).
258 Ibid.
259 As Watson -  Doig notes, in the period between 2000 and 2005, of the 80 individuals serving jail sentences in the US for cartel 
activity, 18 were foreign nationals. See Watson-Doig, N. (2007) ‘Crime and Competition’, Competition Law Insight o f 10.4.2007,8, at 
9. See also the discussion on the Ian Norris case,ection 3.4.2.
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application of EC competition law. In the W^ood Pulp case^^° the Commission found that 
36 out of 42 suppliers of wood pulp were violating European competition law 
(Art.81(l)). Forty out of these forty-two undertakings were not resident within the 
European Union. On appeal the ECJ ruled that an agreement concluded by undertakings 
that are not within the borders of the European Union would be an infringement of 
European competition law, if the agreement is ‘implemented’ within the EU.^^  ^ In 
taking this decision, the ECJ refrained from relying on the effects doctrine despite the 
fact that the Commission argued for the effects test. Instead, it used the implementation 
doctrine, according to which EU competition law can be applied when a mere sale 
vdthin the Community occurs. Thus the validity of the application of the effects 
doctrine in competition cases in Europe is still not clear, or at least not the same as the
us?“
However, this is not the case in mergers. In the Gencor case, Commission 
blocked a merger that was cleared by the South African competition authorities, despite 
the fact that both the companies involved in the merger were registered in South Africa, 
but which fell within the EU turnover thresholds which determine jurisdiction.^^"* 
Judging on the ceise the Court of First Instance (CFI) declared that ^the application o f  
the [Merger] Regulation is justified under public international law when it is 
foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an immediate and substantial ejfect 
in the C o m m u n i ty 'Furthermore, commentating on this case, former Commissioner 
Mario Monti expressed his opinion that:
‘7 am confident, however, that this uncertainty is now behind us: the European 
Court o f  First Instance ... clearly states that the Community’s exercise ofjurisdiction 
over a merger taking place wholly outside o f the Community is compatible with the
260 Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125-129/85 Ahlstrom and Others v. E.G. Commission (Re Wood Pulp Cartel) [1998] 
E.C.R.5193.
261 The decision reads: ‘[A]n infringement of Article 8 5 ... [is] made up of two elements, the formation of the agreement, decision or 
concerted practice, and the implementation thereof. See, ibid, para, 16.
262 Banks, J.D. (1998) ‘The Development of the Concept of Extraterritoriality under European Merger Law and its Effectiveness under 
the Merger Regulation following the Boeing/Mc Donnell Douglas Decision 1997’ 19:5 European Competition Law Review, 306, at 
308.
263 Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd v Commission, [1999] ECR11-0753.
264 Ibid., paras 78-88.
265 Ibid. at para 90.
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principles o f  public international law, where the merger produces direct substantial and 
foreseeable effects within the E l f .
It follows that despite the inclusion of a comity provision in the agreement, the 
main aim of competition officials in the EU is to establish the effects test (and the 
unilateral application of EU competition law) rather than take into account comity 
considerations/^^ On the other hand, with the exception of the recent Empagram case, it 
has been observed that very little room for comity considerations has been left in the US 
and, up to the present moment, comity itself has not had any substantial impact on 
competition cases. Hence, we can observe that at least in the case of EU/US cooperation 
on competition the principle of comity has had a minimum effect.
Finally, it should be noted that the tendency to apply national competition rules 
on an extraterritorial basis has in recent years found more supporters. For instance, in 
2004, Korea for the first time applied its competition rules in an extraterritorial manner 
by imposing fines of US $ 8.5 million on 6 graphite electrode manufacturers, including 
four Japanese firms, one German company, and one US company.
3.2.5 Procedures of positive cooperation provided for bv first generation agreements
Apart from the avoidance of conflicts, the first generation of enforcement 
cooperation agreements also provide for a mechanism of positive cooperation. This 
mechanism includes notification, exchange of information between officials, 
cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities, consultations, and finally, 
positive comity.
i. Notification, cooperation and coordination
There is a provision for notification (i.e. the exchange of basic information) in 
every competition enforcement cooperation agreement that has been concluded so far. 
Notification is in fact the mechanism which triggers the process of cooperation between 
competition agencies. The basic content of a notification provision is that the parties 
have to notify one another whenever their competition authorities become aware that 
their enforcement activities may affect important interests o f  the other party. This
266 Monti, M (2000), supra n. 211.
267 Nevertheless, it should be also pointed out that Woodpulp predates the conclusion of the agreement, and was probably among the 
factors that led to its adoption.
268 See OECD, (2005) supra n. 160, at 13.
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provision has been included in cooperation agreements since the first agreement 
between the United States and Germany (1976). In the first agreements there are no 
indications of when the important interests of a contracting party may be affected. 
Hence, the test looks very general and it is actually left to the absolute discretion of the 
parties when to notify the other contracting party.
However this changed with the conclusion of the US-EU agreement of 1991 (as 
revised), which was the first agreement to specify particular situations where the 
important interests of ‘the other party’ may be affected.^^^ These include cases: that are 
relevant to enforcement activities of the other party; that involve anticompetitive 
activities other than mergers and acquisitions which are carried out in significant part in 
the other party’s territory; that involve mergers or acquisitions which one or more 
parties to the transaction, or a company controlling one or more of the parties of the 
transactions, is a company incorporated or organised under the laws of the other party or 
its states; where the anticompetitive practice involves conduct that is encouraged or 
approved by the other party; or that involve remedies that would require or prohibit 
conduct in the other party’s territory.
This list includes almost any possible enforcement activity which could have an 
effect on the other party’s important interests, and according to the European 
Commission the mechanism of notification is the clearest obligation stemming from the 
agreement.^^® The notification of the case to the other party should contain adequate 
information so that the other party’s competition authority will be able to evaluate any 
effects on its interests. Moreover, the notification should be made to the other party far 
enough in advance in order to enable the other party’s views to be taken into account 
before a final decision is adopted.^^* Hence, for example in a merger case where the 
European Commission decides to scrutinise the transaction, and according to the above 
mentioned provisions its involvement in the case may affect important interests of the
269 See EU/US Agreement, Art. II.
270 Commission (EC) (1998), ‘EC Commission report to the Council and the European Parliament on the Application of the Agreement 
between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America regarding the application of their competition 
laws, I January to 31 December 1997’. Brussels, 11 May 1998, at 3.
271 See EU/US Agreement, Art. II.3 (a)(iii) and II.3 (b)(iii).
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u s ,  it must inform either the US Department of Justice or the US Fair Trade 
Commission (depending on the case) as soon as it initiates proceedings?^^
Furthermore, with regard to coordination, the agreement stipulates in Article IV 
that where contracting parties have an interest in pursuing enforcement activities with 
regard to related situations, they agree that it is in their mutual interest to coordinate 
their enforcement activities. When considering if such coordination should be 
developed the parties shall take into account a number of factors.
ii. Exchange of information - meetings between officials
Exchange of information is the cornerstone of intemational cooperation and the 
main aim of these agreements. It is in fact the factor on which the effectiveness of these 
agreements depends. The exchange of information - according to the way that these 
agreements have been framed - has a dual function. Firstly, it offers the chance for 
cooperating competition authorities to inform each other of, and on, cases of mutual 
interest. Notification, enforcement cooperation and coordination, consultation and 
positive comity are in one way or another based on exchange of information. However, 
the ability of competition authorities to exchange information is subject to the 
limitations imposed by the existing laws of the parties and the confidentiality clause, as 
discussed below.
Secondly, exchange of information can also be a process through which officials 
from different competition authorities can exchange their opinions on economic and 
political issues that are related to competition law enforcement. Perhaps the most 
important element of these agreements is that they provide for a mechanism through 
which officials of different national authorities are able to come into contact with one 
another and share their views on issues of mutual interest, thus developing a common 
understanding on the function of competition law and policy.^ "^  ^ It has to be stressed 
here again that competition law is a relatively recent legal instrument, especially for 
countries which have only recently embarked on the process of creating an environment
272 Successive notifications may occur in the same case. For example, in a merger case the Commission may notify at the outset of the 
case; then, when appropriate, when the Commission decides to initiate proceedings; and, eventually, ‘far enough in advance ...to enable 
the other Party’s views to be taken into account’, before a final decision is adopted: Commission (EC) (1998), supra n. 270., at 3.
273 For instance, in the EU/US agreement, these factors include the relative ability of the parties’ competition authorities to obtain the 
information necessary to conduct enforcement activity, or the effect of such coordination on each party’s ability to achieve its objectives.
274 It is interesting to note that lately (after the conclusion of the US/EU agreement) almost all o f these agreements include a provision 
for meetings o f officials, either on an annual, semi annual or periodic basis.
80
for competition in their internal markets; the existence of these agreements and the 
exchange of opinions and experience between officials regarding competition law and 
policy is a positive process towards the creation of a sound and effective framework for 
competition law.
Intemational relations and politics literature give two alternative explanations 
for this phenomenon of internationalisation of competition law through the exchange of 
views between officials. First it is related to the literature that discusses elite learning 
and according to which decision makers incorporate new values and interests due to the 
regular contact with decision makers from other countries.^^^ An alternative explanation 
for this process is that given by the supporters of institutional isomorphism, who claim 
that diffusion of interests, values and norms occurs through the homogenisation of 
institutional stmctures.^^^
The result of this process is the creation of what political scientists call a policy, 
or government network. According to legal and political scholars, transgovemmetalism, 
which is the outcome of the creation of these networks, is a new vision of global 
governance. The idea of transgovemmentalism starts from the assumption that the 
primary state actors in the intemational realm are no longer foreign ministers or head of 
states, but the same government institutions that dominate domestic policies, that is, 
administrative agencies, courts and legislators.^^^ It then moves onto the conclusion that 
through different mechanisms of cooperation (among which are included bilateral 
enforcement cooperation agreements and memoranda of understandings) these groups 
of officials and domestic institutions are in fact the most important actors in the 
govemance of global economy. Hence, according to this theory, global govemance is 
horizontal rather than vertical, decentralised rather that centralised, and composed of 
national government officials rather than a supranational bureaucracy.^^*
Bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements create mechanisms for diffusion 
of information about technical aspects of competition law and different state interests. 
The outcome of the creation of this web is twofold. First, competition officials of one 
country will become familiar with the concerns of competition officials from another 
country regarding the function of competition policy and the enforcement of
275 See Kurzer, P (2001) Markets and Moral Regulation: Qiltural Change in the European Union (Cambridge University Press).
276 See: Meyer, J. W., J. Boli, G. M. Thomas, and F. 0 . Ramirez (1997) ‘World Society and the Nation State’ 103:1 American 
Journal o f Sociology, 144.
277 Slaughter (2000), supra n. 221, at 1078-79.
278 Ibid. at 1093.
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competition law. Second, and with reference to the policy network idea, this web 
reinforces the role of competition officials in intemational govemance.
Regarding specifically the EU/US agreement, this exchange of information 
through meetings of competition officials happens through administrative 
‘Arrangements of Attendance’, which include reciprocal attendance at a certain stage of 
individual cases involving the implementation of their respective competition rules.
iii. Positive Comitv
Positive comity could be characterised as the most revolutionary form of 
cooperation that some of the first generation of agreements provide for, even though as 
a practice it is not a new one. This mechanism of cooperation has been included in the 
US-Germany Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty of 1954^^  ^ and 
subsequently in a number of bilateral Treaties between the US and Greece, Denmark, 
Japan, Italy and France.^*® It had been used between the US and Japan as a mechanism 
of cooperation in the past, even before its inclusion in bilateral enforcement cooperation 
agreements.^** Despite the fact that it has been included in the OECD recommendations 
on cooperation since the amendment of 1973, positive comity has not yet been defined 
in a multilateral context.^*^
Nonetheless, since it was first included in the agreement between the US and the 
EU the provision for positive comity has been almost identical in every other agreement 
of this kind. According to the standard provision in bilateral agreements where positive 
comity is included, when a contracting party (Party A) believes that its important 
interests are affected by an anti-competitive practice that has been put into effect within 
the territories of the other contracting party (Party B) and for which Party A does not 
have the competence to initiate enforcement proceedings, then Party A is able to request 
Party B to take action relating to this anti-competitive practice on behalf of Party A. 
Thus rather than avoiding conflicts, positive comity requires the parties to conduct acts 
of positive co-operation.
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The US/EU Agreement on Positive Comitv of 1998
The agreement between the US and the EU on positive comity expands the
notion of positive comity even further than the first agreement between EU and US/^^ It 
states that the competition authorities of a requesting party may petition the competition 
authorities of a requested party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy 
anticompetitive activities in accordance with the requested party's competition laws. 
Such a request may be made even if the activities do not violate the requesting party's 
competition laws, and regardless of whether the competition authorities of the 
requesting party have commenced or contemplate taking enforcement activities under 
their own competition laws.
It also provides for suspension of enforcement activities by the requesting party 
aimed at anticompetitive activities in the other party’s territory (that is, the 
extraterritorial application of its competition law) in favour of a positive comity referral 
to the other party in two kinds of cases: (i) where the foreign anticompetitive activities 
do not directly harm the requesting party’s consumers (for example, a cartel on one side 
that limits exports from the other); and (ii) where the foreign anticompetitive activities 
occur principally in and are directed principally towards the other party’s territory, but 
incidentally harm the requesting party’s consumers.
Nevertheless, it excludes mergers^^"  ^ from its application (even though cross- 
border mergers are the most frequent object for cooperation) due to different deadlines 
that the EU and the US laws contain for the adoption of decisions.^*^ It was also due to 
the fact that under the EC Merger Regulation the Commission has no discretionary 
power to examine mergers; in effect, it can only review mergers that have a ‘community 
dimension’. Hence, in the case of a request by the US to the Commission to review a 
merger the European Commission would not have the competence to review the merger 
if it does not have a Community dimension.^*^
Positive comitv: can it work?
There are a number of factors that determine whether positive comity can apply
upon a request of a contracting party. Firstly, the anticompetitive conduct has to be
283 A similar agreement was signed between the US and Canada in 2004.
284 EU/US Agreement on Positive Comity, Article II (4).
285 Parisi, J. J. (1999) ‘Enforcement Co-operation among Antitrust Authorities’, 20:3 European Competition Law Review, 133, at 136.
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prohibited not only by the competition law of the requesting party, but also by the 
competition law of the requested party. An example would be that an export activity 
permitted under the laws of the requested party is not covered by the positive comity 
mechanism even if it adversely affects an important interest of the other party. Another 
example would be different theoretical approaches regarding the same practice.^*^
Secondly and given the voluntary nature of these ‘soft agreements’ the 
application of positive comity as a tool for cooperation depends to a great extent upon 
the goodwill of the parties. It also requires great transparency during the enforcement 
procedures. It has been pointed out above, during the discussion on negative comity, 
that where important political and economic interests are involved, it would be an 
illusion to expect such goodwill in order to provide radical solutions based on the 
positive comity provisions. In 1992 Atwood^** predicted that, "We are dealing here not 
just with the laws o f  competition but also with the laws o f  human nature....We should 
not expect the principle o f  positive comity... to impact dramatically on the proposition 
that laws are written and enforced to protect national interests \
Atwood’s assumption seems to have been proven correct. In fact in the context 
of the US/EU agreement this particular mechanism of cooperation has been used only a 
few times, and only once officially.^*^ Informally, positive comity is -  at least publicly 
- known to have been used on 3 occasions. The first involved a referral by the US 
Federal Trade Commission to the Italian competition authority regarding 
anticompetitive practices by Italian ham exporters, which were harming US consumers 
with supra-competitive prices.^^° The second case involved a complaint by Marathon 
Oil to the European Commission in relation to anticompetitive practices conducted by 
European firms and which had great negative effects on the US-based company 
Finally, the most publicised informal referral based on the procedure that positive 
comity calls for involved A.C. Nielsen, a company involved in the intemational market
287 See the discussion carried out in Chapter 2.
288 Atwood, J. R. (1993), ‘Positive Comity: Is it a Positive Step?’ in Barry Hawk (ed.) 1992 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham 
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for retail tracking services (gathering of information regarding prices, sales, and 
relevant data sold by manufacturers and retailers in the form of market reports). 
Following complaints by IRI, a rival firm, both the European Commission and the US 
Department of Justice initiated investigations with respect to Nielsen’s tying practices in 
countries where the company was in a dominant position, which were employed in 
order to achieve the conclusion of deals in countries where the company faced 
substantial competition. The US Department of Justice allowed the European 
Commission to lead the enforcement activities since most of the alleged conduct 
occurred in Europe. The outcome of this cooperation was an undertaking by A.C. 
Nielsen to change its practices, which satisfied both the European Commission and the 
US Department of Justice.^^^
Furthermore, the only formal positive comity referral was made in the 
Sabre/Amadeus case, where the US authorities asked the European Commission to 
investigate specific allegations of discrimination in relation to a computerised system 
(Amadeus) set up by the airlines Lufthansa, Air France and Iberia. The Commission 
investigated the case in co-operation with the US Department of Justice, and the 
outcome was the Commission’s decision to open a procedure against Air France for 
possible abuse of its dominant position.^^^ The investigation was finally closed 
following a private settlement agreement between Sabre and Air France.^^"^
These are the only occasions where positive comity was used as a cooperative 
mechanism. Since then it has been included in every agreement in which the EU and 
the US have been contracting parties; however it has failed to justify the enthusiasm that 
it generated in (mainly) US competition officials when it was first introduced. 
Evidently, the Intemational Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC)^^^ 
admitted that ‘after nine years and the experience derived from both formal and 
informal applications, the public officials appear to have tempered their enthusiasm
292 Rill, J. F. and C. C. Wilson (2000) ‘The A.C. Nielsen Case’ in Evenett, Simon J, Alexander Lehman and Benn Steil (eds) Antitrust 
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3.3 Limitations of first generation bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements
As mentioned above, all the previously discussed mechanisms for cooperation 
are w^eakened by the fact that most of these agreements are soft law instruments (that is, 
they do not create legally binding obligations for the contracting parties)?^^ The 
agreements of this generation are not treaties. According to the European Commission 
they are ‘administrative arrangements’; similarly, the US authorities regard the 
agreements as ‘executive agreements’.T h e r e fo r e ,  the provisions of these agreements 
do not override the existing laws of the parties, and this has become a standard 
provision in every agreement of the first generation.
3.3.1 The confidentialitv clause
The lack of legally binding obligations is reflected in the provision relating to 
the so-called ‘confidentiality clause’ contained in these agreements. Exchange of 
confidential information is one of the most sensitive issues relating to enforcement 
cooperation in the field of competition law. This is due to the fact that there are two 
groups of opposing interests underlying the exchange of confidential information. On 
the one hand, there is the interest of the competition authorities to receive as much 
information as possible regarding a practise under scrutiny. On the other side, there are 
important corporate interests that need to be taken into account. First, the information 
exchanged which relates to business goals and marketing strategy of the firms will not 
be made known to the competitors of the firm. Second, the information exchanged by 
the agencies in relation to a case will only be used for the particular reason that it is 
given to the other authority. This point is particularly sensitive in relation to cases where 
information could be used in cases related to the criminal liability of the firm’s board.^^*
According to the ‘confidentiality’ provision, the parties can refuse disclosure of 
any information if the law of the party that possesses the information prohibits it or if
296 Furthermore they include a provision according to >\liich contracting parties have the discretion to terminate the application of these 
agreements at any time (this provision for discretional termination of the agreements is included even in the two agreements that are not 
administrative arrangements but treaties).
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this would be incompatible with the possessing party’s important interests?^^ Put 
differently, and given the extent of discretion that the confidentiality clause leaves to the 
parties, in the case of these agreements it is more a matter of policy than a matter of law 
which finally determines the outcome of cooperation between competition authorities. 
Or, as Wood has pointed out, it is confirmation that nations believe that sovereignty 
privileges are much more important than any added benefits for competition law 
enforcement; in her own words, it also demonstrates that intemational companies ‘are 
content to live in a world in which enforcement agencies must operate with one hand 
tied behind their back'
With respect to the EU, a distinction is made between confidential agency 
information and confidential business information. The former relates to information 
gathered in the context of an investigation by the Commission, such as the identity of 
the undertakings being investigated and procedural aspects of the investigation. Such 
information may be given by Commission to the other authorities vdthout the prior 
consent of the parties affected. The latter relates to business or trade secrets obtained as 
a result of the investigation. The Commission needs the consent of the affected parties 
in order to disclose such information to the US authorities.^®^
Respectively, provisions that are included in the Antitmst Civil Process Act. 
(ACPA), the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) and the Clayton Act restrict the 
US authorities from sharing confidential information. The ACPA states that no 
documentary material, answers to interrogatories or oral testimony shall be made 
available for examination without permission by the person who produced that 
material.^®  ^ A similar provision can be found in the Clayton Act^ ®^  and the FTCA,^ ®"^  
which in addition extends the protection of confidentiality by stating that the FTC does 
not have the authority to make public any confidential financial information or trade 
secret, except that which the Commission may dispose to any law enforcement 
agencies, and can only be used for official law enforcement purposes.^®^
299 See for instance EU-US agreement (A it VIII); the EU/Canada agreement (Art X); US/Canada agreement (Art X); and tiie. 
us/Japan agreement (Art IX(5)).
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When these restrictions due to confidentiality apply, the competition authorities 
of the contracting parties can share information only if they can receive a waiver of 
confidentiality from the party involved in the practice under examination. As is the case, 
these kind of waivers mostly occur in merger cases where the companies involved 
usually allow the sharing of confidential information in order to get a quick clearance 
for their proposed merger, especially if the competition agencies challenge the merger 
(due to lack of sufficient information) and, if the case goes to court, the companies are 
likely to abandon the transaction rather than to litigate the case. It should be 
remembered in this context that the decision of the courts usually takes up to two years 
or more.^°^ Another incentive for parties to mergers to forego confidentiality is probably 
in order to have symmetrical remedies imposed by the antitrust authorities. Hence it is 
not a surprise that up to now in almost all instances where there has been successful 
cooperation between competition authorities it involves merger cases. According to US 
and EU officials, some notable examples regarding the EU/US cooperation include the 
merger cases WorldCom/MCI,^^^ Guinness/ Grand Metropolitan, 
Dresser/Halliburton^^^ Exxon/Mobil and Alcoa/Reynolds?^^
As opposed to mergers, parties involved in abuse of dominance or cartels cases 
are not eager to allow competition authorities of different countries to exchange 
information which without a waiver of confidentiality from the parties involved would 
be impossible to share. The experience of EU/US cooperation reveals that in only one 
case relating to abuse of a dominant position did a company offer a waiver of 
confidentiality, and this case was before the European Council approved the agreement. 
In the 1994 Microsoft case, the US Department of Justice and the European 
Commission co-operated closely in their investigations of Microsoft’s activities after 
the consent of Microsoft to the exchange of confidential information, which otherwise
306 See Monti, M. (2001) ‘The Future for Competition Policy in the European Union’ Speech delivered at Merchant Taylor Hall, 
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would not be possible to share.^^° The case was finally settled with a trilateral 
negotiation between the two enforcement authorities together and Microsoft, and was 
undoubtedly an impetus for the final approval of the agreement.^
In the same period there is not even one (publicly known) waiver of 
confidentiality with respect to a cartel case. This is not to say that there is no informal 
cooperation on such cases;^^^ nevertheless, it has been suggested by competition 
officials that the effectiveness of cooperation in cartel cases depends greatly upon the 
ability of the agencies involved to share confidential information.^*^ More importantly, 
the lack of binding provisions seems to be leading to a situation where actual 
cooperation occurs between agencies which have built up a working relationship of trust 
over time,^ *"* irrespective of whether these agencies have signed a first generation 
agreement. As noted above, this assumption is probably the most important reason 
behind the relatively limited activity of the EU, at least in comparison to the US, in 
adopting such (first generation) agreements.
3.3.2 The inability of the first generation of agreements to address some important cases
Having discussed the mechanisms of cooperation and their impact, we can now 
return to the issue mentioned at the beginning of this section, that is, the inability of the 
agreements of this generation (i.e. soft law agreements) to deal with cases when 
important interests of both contracting parties are affected. The conflicts that arose 
between the US and the EU competition authorities, mainly on the Boeing/MDD and 
GE/Honeywell cases, reviewed in Chapter 2, made it clear that in cases like these where 
both regulators claim jurisdiction,^*^ and very crucial policy issues are involved
310 Microsoft agreed to negotiate identical consent decrees with the Commission and the DoJ in order to resolve the allegations of 
anticompetitive practices made by Novell, Microsoft’s main competitor in the software application market. See Himelfarb, A. J. (1996), 
supran. 247, a t910-11.
311 See Commission (EC) ‘Following an Undertaking by Microsoft to Change its Licensing Practices, the European Commission 
Suspends its Action for Breach of the Competition Rules’ Press Release of 17 July 1994, IP/94/653
312 See See ICN (2007) ‘Cooperation Between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations’, Cartels Working Group Report, 
Presented at the ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, May 2007, <http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ 
media/library/conference_6th_moscow_2007/19ReportonCo-operationbetweencompetitionagenciesincartelinvestigations.pd£> (last 
visited on 21 May 2007)
313 Kiriazis, supra n. 301, at 1.
314 See ICN (2007), supra n. 312, at 24.
315 It should be noted that the decision of EU to take jurisdiction was actually disputed by some conunentators. For instance see 
Bavasso, A. F. (1998) ‘Boeing /McDonnell Douglas: Did the Commission Fly Too High?’ 19:4 European Competition Law Review, 
243. However see also Van Miert, K. (1998) ‘International Cooperation in the Field of Competition: A View From the EC’, in Barry 
Hawk (ed.) 1997 Fordham Corporate Law Institute Intemational Antitrust Law and Policy Conference, (New York: Fordham Corporate
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(namely, in both cases, economic and employment policy in the very sensitive field of 
the aviation sector), bilateral competition agreements, at least in the form that they are 
concluded at present, seem to be incapable of offering viable solutions. Given the fast 
moving globalisation of the markets on the one hand and the attempts of states to create 
national champions in order to participate with good ‘players’ in the world markets on 
the other, it is not difficult to predict that such conflicts may occur in the future.
In fact divergences have more recently arisen to a lesser extent with regard to 
the Commission’s decision to impose a fine of about 497 million US Dollars on 
Microsoft and to oblige the company to disclose particular source code and supply a 
version of its Windows operating system without the company’s Media Player 
obviously disappointed US officials, especially in view of the fact that in the USA 
Microsoft reached a settlement with the US Department of Justice more than two years 
before the EC Commission issued its decision.^
In sum, since contracting parties to these enforcement cooperation agreements 
are not bound by the provisions of these agreements, and furthermore these agreements 
do not provide for a mechanism for resolving conflicts, such as provisions for the 
specification of the competent court or the dispute settlement body in the case where a 
conflict arises, it is very much the case that the political power of the contracting parties 
will determine the outcome of such a conflict.
This would not cause any major impact in cases where a conflict arises between 
two states of equal political and economic strength. In fact the conflicts on the two 
merger cases between the US and the EU led to the negotiation and adoption of another 
soft law instrument, that is best practices on cooperation in merger cases,^^^ where they 
express their commitment to effective cooperation, which is nevertheless limited by the 
impossibility of exchanging confidential information in cases where there is no waiver 
of confidentiality by the parties involved in the transaction under investigation.
The problems with regard to the controversies that may arise in the context of 
enforcement cooperation would definitely have a major impact in cases where one of
Law Institute), 13, at 18, where the former Commissioner claimed that in Nippon Paper in terms of jurisdiction the US authorities went 
beyond wliat the Commission did in Boeing/MDD.
316 The Decision of the EC Commission was recently upheld by the CFI, (see Microsoft v. Commission Case T-201/04, Judgment 
o f  17 September 2007). On the settelement between Microsoft and the US aurhorities,, see US DoJ ‘Department of Justice and 
Microsoft Corporation Reach Effective Settlement on Antitrust Lawsuit’ Press Release o f 2 November 2001. See also, Burnside A., 
and H. Crossley (2005) ‘Cooperation in Competition: A New Era’ 30:2 European Law Review, 234, at 254-255.
317 US -  EU (2002), Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger Investigations, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ 
mergers/others/eu_us.pdC> (Last visited on 21 May 2007).
90
the states involved in the conflict would be much stronger than the other. For instance, 
if we assume that such a conflict occurred between the US and Brazil, the Brazilian 
authorities would have been quite vulnerable to the threat of economic measures that the 
US could impose. Bilateralism, and as it has been shown here, soft law, increase 
national power. Or as an author from a developing country has put it, bilateral 
agreements, at least in the form of soft law, cannot overcome the test of hegemony and 
ethnocentricism.^ ^ *
3.4 So what’s next? Wider soft law cooperation and closer bilateral cooperation
Given the certain limitations of the agreements discussed in the previous section, 
alternative options of enforcement cooperation are discussed both at the bilateral and 
multilateral levels. As to the latter, discussions on enforcement cooperation have 
focused on cartels and have lately taken place at the ICN, where a sub-working group 
has been devoted to cooperation on cartels cases.^^^In parallel, the OECD, in the 
context of its Recommendation on Hard Core Cartels^^® that includes definitions of the 
terms hard-core cartels and provides that Member States and non- Member States 
should cooperate on cartel cases, also works in this particular field, and has already 
published three reports on the application of the Recommendation;^^^ it has also issued 
best practices on the exchange of non confidential information on cartel cases, where 
provisions similar to the ones provided by the first generation of agreements are 
included.^^^ It seems therefore that in the context of soft law, enforcement co-operation 
has seen a shift in the last five years towards multilateral channels of communication, 
discussed in Chapter 6 of the thesis.^^^
That said, there have also been developments in the field of enforcement 
cooperation at the bilateral level, and such developments have to do mainly with the 
debate over the necessity of second generation agreements, i.e. binding agreements
318 De Noronha Goyos, D. (1997) ‘The Globalisation of Competition Law: A Latin American Perspective’ 3(1) Intemational Trade 
Law Review, 20, at 21.
319 See ICN (2007) supra n. 312, and the discussion in Chapter 6.
320 See OECD Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 25 March 1998 -  [C (98)35 
(Final)].
321 See for instance OECD (2005), supra n. 160.
322 See OECD (2005) Best Practices for the Formal Exchange o f Information Between Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel 
Investigations, DAF/COMP(2005)25/FINAL.
323 The issue has also been addressed by the WTO Working Group on the Relationship on Trade and Competition. See below. Chapter 
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which would make possible the exchange of confidential information and provide for 
compulsory process on behalf of the other party. Even though no such agreement has 
been signed by the EU to date, it seems that the EC Commission is looking in this 
direction. Commissioner Kroes has recently stated that EU and US officials are 
currently exploring the possibility of signing a second generation agreement which 
would allow for the exchange of confidential information.^^"^
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the adoption of such an agreement 
would be feasible since on the basis of Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003 any exchange 
of information between the Commission and the Member States cannot be used by the 
receiving authority to impose custodial sanctions. The Regulation therefore prevents 
particular Member States which have penalised cartels (such as the UK and Ireland) 
from using information received by the Commission or other Member States in order to 
impose custodial sanctions. In this regard, if the Commission enters a second generation 
agreement which allows for exchange of confidential information with the US, where 
cartels are a criminal offence, it would practically discriminate against certain other 
Member States which can only use such relevant information to a limited extent.
Hence in order to achieve the conclusion of a second generation agreement, 
there are two options. The first is that the EU signs an agreement which explicitly 
contains a clause similar to Article 12(3) of Regulation 1, according to which the 
information exchanged may be not used with regard to custodial sanctions. While 
theoretically this would be possible, as far as the Commission gets a mandate to 
negotiate an agreement like this from the Council,^^^ nevertheless it is practically 
unrealistic to expect the US, which has the imposition of custodial sanctions to 
members of cartels at the top of its enforcement agenda in recent years, to accept such a 
clause in a second generation bilateral enforcement cooperation agreement. The second 
option would entail an amendment of Regulation 1/2003, so as it would clearly allow 
for the exchange of information both between the Commission and Member States and 
between the Commission and third countries in cases which lead to custodial sanctions.
On the other hand, as in the case of first generation agreements, the US is the 
country which first moved towards the adoption of a second generation enforcement 
cooperation agreement on competition, while as the next subsection notes, it has
324 Kroes, (2005), supra n. 85, at 5.
325 Something which itself may be difficult, as even such a partial ability to exchange confidential information would definitely raise 
concerns by a number of Member States and business associations.
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recently also used other types of bilateral hard law agreements, such as Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Extradition Treaties, for the purposes of antitrust 
enforcement.
3.4.1 Second generation agreements: The US-Australia Agreement on Mutual Antitrust 
Enforcement Assistance, and the Denmark-Norwav-Ireland Agreement
The US adopted in 1994 the Intemational Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act 
(lAEAA)^^^ to overcome constraints on the exchange of confidential information, by 
allowing the DoJ and FTC to share such information with cooperating states; however 
constraints were not completely overcome. Due to business interests pressures^^^ the 
materials obtained during the Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-merger notifications are protected 
by the lAEAA and cannot be shared with other competition authorities.^^* Following the 
adoption of the lAEAA the US entered in 1999 into a mutual antitrust enforcement 
agreement with Australia - which had legislation in place which was similar to the 
lAEAA^^^ - paving the way for the second generation of agreements. The US/Australia 
agreement is not an executive agreement of a voluntary nature but a binding treaty. 
According to Article II.G this agreement complements the 1982 US/Australia 
Agreement on Enforcement Cooperation and thus the combination of these agreements 
makes the US/Australia cooperation on antitrust enforcement the most sophisticated of 
all, at least in terms of the capability to exchange official documents.
The parties have agreed to cooperate on a reciprocal basis in providing or 
obtaining evidence^^® related to enforcement of the other state’s competition law. They 
also agree to disclose, provide, exchange or discuss antitrust evidence.^^* Moreover, the 
agreement provides that following a request - the type of which is described in great 
detail in Article III of the agreement - a party may obtain antitrust evidence from the 
other party. This evidence may include: taking the testimony or statements from 
persons; obtaining documents, or other forms of documentary evidence; locating or
326 Intemational Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994,15 U.S.C. ss 6201-6212
327 These were related to the fact that such materials include highly sensitive information regarding business strategies of US firms. See 
Freeman, L. N. (1995) ‘U.S. -  Canadian Information Sharing and The Intemational Antitrust Enforcement Assistant Act of 1994’ 84 
Gewgetown Law Joumal, 339, at 358-59.
328 U.S.C. 6204 (1)
329 Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992 and the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987.
330 See US/Australia Mutual Antitmst Enforcement Treaty, Art 1, A
331 Ibid. Art 111.
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identifying persons or things; executing searches and seizures; and disclosing, 
providing, exchanging, or discussing such evidence.
The information exchanged according to the provision of this agreement can be 
used solely for enforcing antitrust laws.^^  ^There is however a place in this agreement 
for refusal to share information. Article IV of the agreement provides that a Party may 
deny assistance in the case where such assistance would not be permitted by the law of 
the requested party (which shows that there are still laws that do not permit the sharing 
of information) or when information sharing that would be against the requested party’s 
public interest. However, it is provided that the party which refuses to provide the 
requested information must offer an explanation for the basis of denial.
Following a similar pattern, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland, which have 
adopted legislation which allows the exchange of such information,^^^ signed in 2001 an 
agreement which provides for the exchange of confidential information. In 2003 
Sweden also entered the agreement.^^"  ^ The agreement follows the usual procedure of 
notification in cases where ‘one Authority becomes aware of the fact that its 
enforcement measures could have a bearing on significant competitive interests that 
come under the competence of another A u t h o r i t y T h e  mechanism for cooperation 
in this process of sharing confidential information is not described in detail like it is in 
the US/Australia agreement. Article IV of this agreement just provides that the Parties 
agree that it is in their common interest to exchange confidential information, subject to 
a duty of confidentiality by the authorities which receive the information, and a 
commitment that they will use the confidential information only for the purposes 
stipulated in the agreement.
As a broad assumption, it may be argued that these agreements are a positive 
step for enforcement cooperation since they provide for clear legal obligations for the 
parties and they also provide competition agencies with the capability to exchange 
important information regarding enforcement against anticompetitive practices. 
Nonetheless, given the fact that reciprocal commitment from the contracting parties is
332 Art. VII. I - with the exception of information that has become publicly known: Art VII.D; and o f the existence of a written consent 
by the party which provided the information: Art VII. C.
333 See Consolidate Danish Competition Act No 687 of 12 July 2000, Section 18 a; see Norwegian Competition Act (Act No.65 o f 11 
June 1993 ) Section 1-8, as amended by Act No. 35 of 5 May 2000; see Icelandic Competition Act (Act No8 of 5 February 1993), 
Chapter XII, section 50a, as amended by the Act No 107 o f2000.
334 See Danish Competition Authority (2004) ‘Wider Nordic antitrust cooperation’. Press Release of 02.03.2004, 
<http://www.ks.dk/english/news/press-releases/2004/wider-nordic-antitrust-cooperation/> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
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needed in order for an agreement like this to be concluded, at the present time we 
cannot be over-optimistic about the conclusion of many more agreements like the one 
between the US and Australia, since there are very few countries with similar legislation 
to the lAEAA. Burnside and Botteman argue that in fact the US has been unsuccessful 
in its attempts to promote the adoption of agreements of this kind,^^^ and particularly in 
cases where competition law has not been criminalised.
In addition, and even though these agreements contain provisions that oblige the 
parties to exchange confidential information, the US/Australia agreement contains 
exceptions to this obligation for reasons related to public policy. This may give a lot of 
room to the contracting parties to avoid exchange of confidential information in some 
cases, especially under the pressure that competition officials of the contracting parties 
may face from business organisations.
Finally, neither of the competition agencies involved in the implementation of 
these agreements (the US Department of Justice and the FTC and the ACCC in the case 
of the US/Australia agreement, and the Danish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish 
competition authorities in the case of the Nordic agreement) has issued any documents 
on the implementation of the agreements of the second generation. Hence we cannot 
make safe conclusions yet on their impact on intemational enforcement cooperation.
3.4.2 The use of MLATs and extradition treaties in competition cases
What nevertheless has become obvious in the last five years is that there is a
trend, at least with regard to industrialised countries, towards closer cooperation on 
competition matters, in the form of exchange of confidential information and procedural 
cooperation, which may even include extradition of natural persons who have 
participated in cartels. As to the former, such exchange of information is provided by 
Mutual Legal Antitmst Treaties in Criminal Matters (MLATs). The US is the most 
prominent user of such agreements, as it is a party to 50 of them. These agreements 
cover practices that constitute violations of criminal law in general and thus are useful
336 Burnside, A. and Y. Botteman (2004) ‘Networking Amongst Competition Agencies’ 10:1 Intemational Trade Law & Regulation, 1, 
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in cases where both contracting parties have criminalized their competition rules. Such 
examples of MLATs that may be used on competition cases are the agreements between 
US-Canada and US-UK/^^ and as the OECD has noted, the US-Canada MEAT has 
been recently used in a number of cartel cases.^^*
As to the latter -  extradition of individuals on the basis of a competition 
infringement (cartel) - major debate has developed lately among competition experts in 
relation to the recent decision of the UK Home Secretary to order extradition to the US 
of Ian Norris, a UK citizen, and former CEO of a company that was found to be part of 
a price fixing conspiracy for a period between 1999 and 2000 in the market for carbon 
products. In particular, Norris’ extradition was ordered on the basis of his participation 
in a cartel and further attempts to obstruct justice in the context of the US grand jury 
investigation.^^^ The decision was issued following a request of the US Government on 
the basis of the 2003 UK Extradition Act,^ "^ ® which ratified the relevant extradition 
treaty between the two states,^ "^  ^ with which they have agreed to extradite natural 
persons in cases of criminal offences. While the initial aim of the Treaty was to support 
the effort of signing parties to fight terrorism, at least half of the extradition requests by 
US prosecutors relate to white collar crimes, including price fixing, as in the case of 
Norris.^ "^ ^
This case has been highly controversial, in view of the fact that the extradition 
treaty requires dual criminality, while Norris is to be extradited on the basis of a 
practice (price-fixing) which was criminalised in the UK in 2002, and therefore after the 
infringement came to an end.^ "^  ^The High Court rejected Norris’ appeal and opined that
337 See Holmes, P., A. Papadopoulos, O. Kayali, and A. Sydorak (2005) ‘Trade and Competition in Regional Trade Agreements: A 
Lost Opportunity?’ in Brusick, Alvarez and Cemat (eds) Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure 
Development Gains (UNCTAD, Geneva and New York). That said, Zanettin argues that the US-Italy and the US-Spain MLATs may be 
used in competition cases, since they do not make dual criminality a prerequisite for assistance. Zanettin, B. (2002) Cooperation 
Between Antitrust Agencies at the Intemational Level (Hart Publishing), at 149.
338 SeeOECD(2005) supran. 160,a t38.
339 See Hammond, S. (2006) ‘Charting New Waters in Intemational Cartel Prosecution’, Speech presented at the Twentieth Annual 
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the price fixing conspiracy should be regarded as dishonest and prejudicial to others, 
and therefore it constitutes a conspiracy to defraud, irrespective of the fact that price- 
fixing had not been criminalised when the case under examination took place/" "^  ^While 
Norris has appealed before the House of Lords, and therefore the case is not yet 
completed, it still is a very strong indication that in cases where countries have reached 
a common understanding as to the proper treatment of an anticompetitive practice, in 
conjunction with the existence of a legal framework of cooperation, enforcement 
cooperation may be maximised. That said, at least at the present point, it seems that 
only in particular occasions this may happen, and in fact only in cartel cases, and solely 
between countries that have criminalised this anticompetitive practice.^"^^
3.5 Conclusion
The theme of this chapter is that first generation enforcement cooperation 
agreements have proven to be effective in relation to a number of problems concerning 
restrictive business practices with an intemational impact; however, they also have 
limitations.
Their most positive effect is that they create the mechanism through which 
officials of different national authorities are able to come into contact and have the 
opportunity to share their views on issues of mutual interest. The provisions for 
meetings between competition officials and the provisions for technical assistance are 
evidence of this. Given that competition law, having only been adopted by most 
countries recently, is a relatively new legal tool, the frequent communication among 
competition authorities is definitely beneficial in terms of the creation of a competition 
culture around the world, and at a more advanced level, such cooperation may 
contribute to harmonisation of national competition laws, through the achievement of 
common understandings about the proper function of competition.
In addition, facts revealed primarily from the operation of the EU/US agreement 
highlight that on the whole the agreement has offered useful mechanisms for 
cooperation in a number of cases, particularly relating to mergers, where the consent of 
the parties to give a waiver of confidentiality is something quite common. The increase
344 See Watson-Doig, supra n. 259, at 8.
345 These countries include among others the US, the UK, Ireland, Estonia, Germany, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Israel. See 
Hammond, supra n. 339, at 3.
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in the number of notifications also shows that the everyday cooperation among 
competition officials is becoming stronger.
However, as mentioned above, it is indisputable that enforcement agreements 
have certain limitations. First, most of these agreements include a ‘confidentiality 
clause’ making them impractical in cartel cases and cases regarding abuse of dominant 
position. The two agreements between the US and Australia and the agreement between 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway (and Sweden) are undoubtedly very positive steps, since 
they provide the agencies of the contracting parties with the opportunity to exchange 
confidential information. Nevertheless at the moment we cannot evaluate the effect of 
these agreements given that there is no available data as to their application. On the 
other hand, recent developments have shown that bilateral cooperation may be far- 
reaching in cartel cases, through the use of MLATs and Extradition Treaties; however, 
such agreements may only be used by states which have criminalised cartels, and 
therefore, for instance, competition systems such as the EU cannot be benefited from 
such cooperation.
Second, even in merger cases - where the cooperation has been proven to be 
effective - the US/EU agreement failed to provide the authorities with adequate legal 
tools in cases like Boeing/MDD and GE/Honeywell where very sensitive interests of the 
contracting parties were affected. This is a reflection of the voluntary nature of the 
agreements of the first generation, and to a certain extent on the problems that may arise 
from the relationship between, and co-existence of, competition law and policy with 
other national policies.
Third, bilateral and tripartite enforcement cooperation agreements are by 
definition insufficient to face situations where interests of more than two or three 
nations are affected. A very illustrative example is that of the multiple notifications in 
the case of multijurisdictional mergers. For instance, the Exxon/Mobil transaction was 
notified in 20 jurisdictions.^'^^ Obviously bilateral or tripartite agreements could not 
provide for any adequate mechanisms of cooperation in such cases. The only possibility 
for resolving problems like this, based on provisions of bilateral or tripartite 
agreements, would be in the case where all the nations with a competition regime have 
concluded this kind of agreement. Apparently, that would be extremely complicated 
given that if we take into account only the OECD countries we would need 435 bilateral
346 Griffin, J. P. (1999) ‘What Business People Want From A World Antitrust Code’ 34:1 New England Law Review, 3 9 , at 39.
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agreements in order to face the problems of international competition enforcement 
effectively.
All these considerations stress the fact that even though they are useful, 
enforcement cooperation agreements in the field of competition law are by no means 
adequate in themselves to provide for radical solutions with respect to the problems 
caused by restrictive business practices with an international effect. It is also noteworthy 
that two of the most recent enforcement agreements discussed in the chapter are 
tripartite and this illustrates the need for expansion of the number of contracting parties. 
The substantial work that has been carried out by the ICN, and the OECD further 
highlights the fact that even in the field of voluntary enforcement cooperation, 
international problems need international solutions. Even US officials who, as has been 
illustrated above, have been traditionally opposed to a possible international 
harmonisation of competition law and have supported the proposition that bilateral 
cooperation will be adequate to solve problems relating to restrictive business practices 
with an international effect seem to have changed their opinion. Characteristically, 
Charles James^ "^  ^ admitted that, ‘.. .there have been days when we thought (or hoped) 
that such (bilateral) cooperation itself would eventually minimize or resolve even the 
most serious areas of antitrust divergence. More recently, however, we have come to 
understand that cooperation alone will not resolve some significant areas of divergence 
among antitrust regimes that must be addressed if we are to maintain the integrity of 
antitrust on a global stage’.
A reflection of this argument may be traced in the development of the policy of 
the EU with regard to the formation and application of soft-law enforcement 
cooperation agreements. As the chapter has shown, the policy of the EU in the field of 
bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements has been rather neutral, in the sense that 
the EU has signed agreements only with its most important trade partners (members of 
the QUAD: the US, Canada, and Japan), and has set up a more informal channel of 
cooperation with the agencies of another two important trade partners, Korea and China. 
The agreement with the US has been probably the most influential and important of the 
various agreements of this kind; however, as opposed to the US, which has been the 
more extensive user of such agreements, the EU has not seemed interested in offering 
such semi-formal cooperation to more commercial partners. It could be therefore argued
347 James, C. (2001) ‘International Antitrust in the Bush Administration’, Canadian Bar Association on Competition Law, Ottawa, 
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that, to a certain extent, the formation of such agreements has not been on the top of the 
priorities list in Brussels. On the other hand, while the EU has been interested in the last 
couple of years in the possibility of adopting second generation agreements, these 
attempts have not been successful yet, and therefore, no safe conclusions may be drawn 
at this point.
As the following chapters show, the efforts of the EU have been rather devoted 
to other forms of cooperation such as bilateral trade agreements, which include a 
chapter on competition, and the negotiations on a multilateral agreement on competition 
law and policy. Besides, the main aim of the EU has been further development of its 
own competition policy, which as shown in Chapter five is the most successful regime 
of a plurilateral regional agreement, and has been used as a model for the creation of 
various other relevant regional regimes around the world.
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Chapter 4: Bilateral Trade Agreements Which Include Competition Provisions^^  ^
Abstract
It is estimated that by 2005 more than 250 bilateral trade agreements were in 
force and 115 of them included competition related rules/"^^ The EU has been a 
prominent player in this field. It has used bilateral agreements (not in force any more) as 
a vehicle for the accession of the 12 new Member States, and has also signed bilateral 
trade agreements with a number of neighbouring countries and selected trade partners. 
Currently, there are 23 such EU agreements in force which include competition 
provisions.
In view of these figures, two main hypotheses may be developed; first, that 
bilateral trade agreements have an influence on the development of international norms 
on competition; second, and more relevant for this study which examines the role of the 
EU on the formation of international norms on competition, these agreements have been 
used and are still being used by the EU as a tool for the exportation of its competition 
policy. This chapter primarily examines the latter hypothesis, and finds that the EU has 
to a certain extent successfully exported its competition rules through such agreements, 
and that furthermore, it has played a significant role in the formation of international 
competition rules primarily in the form of provisions found in bilateral trade 
agreements.
Section 1 includes a historical development of trade agreements in general, and 
an introduction to the EU agreements reviewed here. Section 2 discusses the substantive 
competition provisions included in the EU bilateral trade agreements. It is observed that 
these agreements include provisions both relating to anticompetitive practices, and 
following the EU competition model, on state aid and public undertakings. Section 3 of 
the chapter examines the provisions on cooperation in competition included in these 
agreements, and Section 4 discusses the extent to which these agreements can be 
described as hard or soft law.
348 An earlier version o f this chapter, has been a part o f the paper written with P. Holmes, H. Muller and A. Sydorak, under the title 
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4.1 Historical review of trade agreements
The formation of the first trade agreements goes back to the beginning of the 
18* century, when the first trade agreements appeared in Europe. In 1707, England and 
Scotland signed the Act of Union, thus creating a bilateral customs union, that is an 
agreement which provides for internal elimination of tariffs and a unified external tariff. 
Similarly, in France the various internal tolls and tariffs in force since 1600 were 
abolished in 1790 after the French Revolution. Prussia also started considering an 
economic union in 1808, and this led to the establishment of the Zollverein in 1834 - 
historically considered to be the first plurilateral regional trade agreement - when most 
German states adopted the Prussian external tariff, thus operating as a fully fledged 
customs union.^^°
In the mid- 19* century England was the first nation to unilaterally open its 
national barriers to foreign trade, with the repeal of Com Laws in 1846, which was 
followed by a number of unilateral reductions or even removal of tariffs.^^^ At the same 
time and until the end of the 19* century, a number of bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs) were signed between European countries, the most important agreement of 
which was the Commercial Treaty signed between England and France in 1860.^^  ^
According to this Treaty, France reduced its tariffs initially to 30% and after 1865 to 
20%, and England decreased dutiable goods from 419 to 48 and also reduced wine 
tariffs.
Following the adoption of this agreement a number of bilateral treaties were 
signed between European countries. These treaties were based on the MEN principle, 
according to which countries agreed that when a party to these agreements decided to 
negotiate and offer favourable trade concessions to a third country, it would have to 
offer the same concessions to the other party to the agreement.^^^ By the 1860s the 
MFN clause was applied to all British, German, Belgian, and Dutch colonies, while the
350 Irwin, D. (1993) ‘Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: An Historical Perspective’ in De 
Melo, J. and A. Panagariya (eds.) New Dimensions h  Regional Integration (New York: Cambridge University Press), 90, at 92.
351 Clough SB . and C.W. Cole (1941) Economic Histoiy o f Europe (Boston MA, D C . Heath), at 469-475.
352 Accominotti, O., and M. Flandreau (2005) ‘Does Bilateralism Promote Trade? Nineteenth Century Liberalisation Revisited’ 
CEPR Discussion Papers 5423, where the authors provide an examination of the actual increase in trade following the conclusion of 
the Anglo-Franco agreement.
353 Kenwood, A.G. and A.L. Lougheed, (1971) The Growth o f International Economy (London, Allen & Unwin), at 75-78.
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French colonies adopted the same tariff code as France, thus creating a customs 
union/^ "^
A second period of proliferation of such agreements is the period between the 
two World Wars, when these agreements became the main strategy of the US, which 
signed 32 of them with selected trade partners. In the aftermath of the 2"  ^World War, 
bilateral free trade agreements lost favour once more, as at the international level the 
creation of a multilateral trading system under the auspices of GATT and subsequently 
the WTO became the main target.
Nonetheless, in the last twenty years or so, the conclusion of such agreements 
has been very much in vogue, and many of them include competition provisions. In 
particular, by the year 2005, 317 trade agreements were notified to the WTO, and more 
than 80% of these agreements were concluded since the 1990s.^^  ^As Cemat has shown, 
recent trade agreements tend to encompass partners that are economically and 
geographically diverse.^^^ He notes in particular, that a quarter of trade agreements are 
inter-continental (i.e. they are concluded by countries situated in different continents) 
and 65% of those agreements are signed by countries which are at different stages of 
development.^^^
The EU has been a major user of this type of agreement. The US has also 
concluded a number of bilateral free trade agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Singapore. Nonetheless, it is notable that most of the US’s 
bilateral FT As do not include competition provisions, though three recent US bilaterals 
do so, namely US-Singapore (2004) US-Australia (2005) US-Morocco (2005). 
Furthermore, Canada has also used this instrument by signing agreements with Chile, 
Costa Rica, and Israel. Australia has similar agreements with Singapore, Thailand, the 
US, and New Zealand.^^* In total, as noted above, 115 bilateral trade agreements include 
provisions relevant to competition law. The subsequent analysis in this chapter is based 
on the agreements signed by the EU.
354 Irwin, supra n. 350, at 98.
355 Estimation based on Cemat, supra n. 3, at 7.
356 Ibid, at 2.
357 Ibid.
358 See Holmes at al. (2005), supra n. 337.at 68-69.
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4.1.1 Bilateral agreements of the EU
Bilateral trade agreements have been in the last 15 years at the heart of the EU 
external policy. As has been documented, the EU is the prominent example of a polity 
that has used bilateral trade agreements as a tool to export its trade policy, including 
competition policy, as it has used its negotiating power to export or in certain cases 
impose its acquis communautaire, which is the legal framework that regulates the 
relations of its Member States.^^^ This policy has been criticised by commentators, who 
have argued that the EU is not eager to cooperate, but only interested in imposing its 
competition laws on other states. In particular, it has been argued that in the context of 
their accession, candidate countries had to ^swallow all 80,000 pages o f  European laws 
and adapt their own legislation to accommodate them\ and this whole process has been 
closely reviewed by EU officials.^^®
From this perspective, the assumption examined in Chapter 3 that bilateralism is 
a strategy used by economically strong states in order to increase their power over their 
weaker co-signing parties becomes of relevance here. In this regard, Trebilcock and 
Howse, argue ‘...deep economic integration among nation states is typically predicated 
either on the existence o f  a hegemonic power with the ability to impress its will on other 
smaller and weaker states [. . .] or on the willingness o f member states to cede 
substantial aspects o f  their domestic political sovereignty...
The nexus of bilateral agreements of the EU substantiates this presumption, 
since, as the chapter shows, the EU has been involved in agreements with a large 
number of countries which surround it geographically. In particular, three broad 
categories of EU trade agreements, all of which include competition provisions, may be 
distinguished. First, the agreements with candidate countries, which have been the main 
EU strategic and legal tool with regard to the process of its enlargement. Second, the 
agreements with Southern Mediterranean and the agreements with former Soviet Union 
states, that have been adopted in the attempts of the EU to strengthen its overall 
cooperation with its neighbour countries. Most of these countries have been included in 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Finally, the EU has extended its network
359 See Maur, J-M. (2005) ‘Exporting Europe’s Trade Policy’ 28:11 World Economy, 1565.
360 Leonard, M. (2005) Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century? (Fourth Estate), at 45. On the way that the EU monitors the 
adoption and implementaticm o f the Acquis, see the EC Commission website at 
http://ec.europaeu/enlargement/enlaigement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_countryJoin_the_eu/negotiations_croatia_tur 
key/index_enhtm#acquis (last visited on 21 May 2007).
361 See Trebilcock M. and R. Howse (1999) The Regulation o f International Trade (Routledge, 2nd edition), at 129-134.
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of bilateral agreements that include competition provisions to certain selected trade 
partners around the world. Table 4.1 includes all the relevant EU bilateral agreements.
Table 4.1; Bilateral Trade Agreements discussed in chapter 4
EU Title^of agreement status of Eu's^o signing countiy
Bulgaria Europe Agreement (EA) 1993 1993 (no longer in force) EU Member
Croatia
Stabilisation and 
Association agreement 
(SAA)
2001 2004 Candidate for accession
FYROM SAA 2001 2004 Candidate for accession
Romania EA 1993 1993(no longer in force) EU Member
Turkey Customs Union 1995 1996 Candidate for accession
Algeria
Euro-
Mediterranean Association 
Agreement (EMAA)
2002 1/9 /2 0 0 5 ENP
Egypt EMAA 2001 1/6 /2004 ENP
Israel EMAA 1995 1 /6 /2000 ENP
Jordan EMAA 1997 1 /5 /2002 ENP
Lebanon EMAA 2002 In ratification process ENP
Morocco EMAA 1996 1 /3 /2 0 0 0 ENP
PA Interim EMAA 1997 1997 ENP
Tunisia
................... .
EMAA 1995 1/3 /1998 ENP
Armenia
Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA)
1996 1 /7 /1999 ENP
Azerbaijan PCA 1996 1 /7 /1999 ENP
Georgia PCA 1996 1 /7 /1999 ENP
Kazakhstan PCA 1995 1 /7 /1999 -
Kyrgyzstan PCA 1995 1/7 /1999 -
Moldova ^ PCA 1994 1 /7 /1 9 9 8 ENP
Russia ^ PCA 1994 1/12 /1997 -
Ukraine PCA 1994 1 /3 /1998 ENP
Uzbekistan PCA 1996 1 /7 /1999 -
Chile AA 2002 1 /3 /2005 -
Global Agreement 1997 1/10 /2000 -
S.Africa "
Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement 
(TDCA)
1999 2 6 /4 /2 0 0 4 -
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i. Agreements with candidate countries
Agreements with candidate countries is a group of agreements that the EU has 
concluded with countries pursuing EU accession. Following the accession of ten Member 
States in May 2004/^^ and another two (Bulgaria and Romania) in 2007, the current 
official candidates to join the EU are Croatia, Turkey, and Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM).^^^ The EU-Croatia Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) was signed in 2001 and came into effect on 1 February 2005, but the trade 
provisions together with competition policy provisions were implemented in 2002. The 
SAA with FYROM was signed in 2001 and entered into force in 2004. As with the 
Europe Agreements, the SAAs with Croatia and FYROM provide for political dialogue, 
cooperation in all areas of EU policies, approximation of the candidate countries’ 
regulation to that of the EU, and the four freedoms of the internal market. The aim is entry 
of Croatia and FYROM into the EU. The relationship between EU and Turkey is ruled by 
the Customs Union, signed in 1995 and in operation since January 1996.^ "^^  In the context 
of this study, these three agreements are reviewed in this chapter. In addition, where 
relevant, the chapter also discusses the agreements that governed the relationship between 
the EU and its two newest Member States -  i.e. Bulgaria and Romania.^^^
ii. The European Neighbourhood Policv
Following the accession of 10 members states in 2004, the EU launched the so- 
called European Neighbourhood Policy which aims to establish closer cooperation with 
its neighbouring countries and to strengthen the prosperity, stability and security in the
362 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia. For an evaluation o f the 
effect o f the Europe agreements on competition law and policy of the countries that entered the EU in 2004, see Holscher, J. and J. 
Stephan (2004) ‘Competition Policy in Central Eastern Europe in the Light o f EU Accession’ 42:2 Journal o f  Common Market 
Studies, 321.
363 While accession negotiations were launched with Croatia and Turkey in October 2005, accession negotiations have not yet 
started with FYROM. See the website o f the Commission, < ht^://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/index_en.htm> (last visited 
on 21 May 2007).
364 See the EC Commission website, at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/turkey/ index_eahtm (last visited on 21 
May 2007).
365 As with most o f the countries which entered the EU in 2004, the relationship o f Bulgaria and Romania with the EU was 
governed by the so-called ‘Europe Agreements’, signed in the 1990s. These agreements included provisions on all fields related to 
the EU internal market (trade liberalisaticai, free movement o f services, payments and capital in respect o f trade and investments, 
and the free movement o f workers), according to which candidate countries committed themselves to approximating their legislation 
to the EU acquis communautaire.
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neighbourhood.^^^ The ENP is based on a number of bilateral partnership or association 
agreements signed with two groups of countries: Southern Mediterranean countries, with 
which the EU has signed the so-called Euro-Mediterranean agreements, and East 
European and Central Asian Countries, with which the EU has concluded partnership and 
cooperation agreements.
11.1. Euro-Mediterranean agreements is the group of agreements concluded 
between the EU and nine Mediterranean countries^^^ in the context of the Barcelona 
declaration,^^* which provided for political dialogue, respect for human rights and 
democracy, establishment by 2010 of a (WTO compatible) free trade area, and 
economic, financial, social and cultural cooperation. The agreements also include 
provisions relating to intellectual property, services, public procurement, competition 
rules, state aids and monopolies, cooperation relating to social affairs and migration 
(including re-admission of illegal immigrants) and cultural cooperation between the EU 
and the countries of the Mediterranean.^^^ All the Euro-Mediterranean countries are 
included in the European Neighbourhood policy.
11.2. Partnershiv and cooperation asreements were signed with a number of 
Eastern European and Central Asian countries.^^^ These ten-year bilateral treaties 
provide the legal framework upon which the cooperation of the EU with these countries 
is built. They express the contracting parties’ respect for democratic principles and 
human rights, and they further provide for political dialogue on issues relating to 
security and stability. The agreements also include provisions relating to economic and
366 ENP was first outlined in a 2003 Commission Communication. Commission (EC) (2003) ‘Wider Europe— Neighbouihood: A 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, Brussels 11 March 2003, COM (2003) 104 final, which 
was followed by a more detailed Communication in 2004: Commission EC (2004) ‘Communication from the Commission, 
European Neighbourhood Policy; Strategy Paper’ Brussels, 12 May 2004, COM (2004) 373 final.
367 See Table 4.1.
368 See the ‘Barcelona Declaration’ adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27 and 28 November 1995, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comtn/extemal_relations/eurome<M)d.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
369 See EC Commission website at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_ relationsi'euromed/med_ass_agreemntsJitm.> (last visited 
on 21 May 2007). On the basis of these agreements and in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Union 
has issued specific action plans for particular countries (namely Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and the EU-Palestinian Authority 
Joint Committee). These action plans set out specific measures for the fulfilment o f the obligations set out by the Euro-Med 
Agreements. See Council (EC) ‘2640th Council Meeting, General Affairs and External Relations’ Press Release o f 21 February 
2005,6419/0521.
370 See Table 4.1. These Partnership and Cooperation agreements replaced the Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA) 
concluded between the European Community and the Soviet Union in 1989.
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trade relationship between the contracting parties; nonetheless, contrary to contractual 
relations with all the EU’s other neighbouring countries, the partnership and 
cooperation agreements grant neither preferential treatment for trade, nor a timetable for 
regulatory approximation/^^ On the other hand, with the exception of Russia (with 
which the EU cooperates independently of the ENP),^^^ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan, all of the other countries of the region that have concluded partnership 
agreements ^vith the EU are included in the ENP.
iii. Agreements with selected trade partners
Finally, three other agreements signed by the EU with selected trade partners are 
reviewed in this chapter. The first is the Global Agreement with Mexico^^^ which 
provides for political dialogue on a number of issues, such as democracy, human rights, 
poverty, terrorism, migration and regional development. The agreement further provides 
for the creation of a WTO compatible free trade area in goods and services, the 
liberalisation of capital movements and payments, mutual openings of the procurement 
markets and adoption of disciplines in the fields of competition and intellectual property 
rights. Based on this agreement, the EU-Mexico Joint Council adopted in 2000 a 
decision which (among other issues) creates a legal framework for cooperation between 
the parties on competition related issues.^ "^  ^ The second is the Association Agreement 
between the EU and Chile, signed in November 2002. The competition provisions of 
this agreement have been provisionally applied since 1 February of 2003. The 
agreement replaced the earlier Framework Cooperation Agreement (signed in 1996) 
which provided for political and economic association between Chile and the EU. This 
later agreement is very detailed^^^ and provides for thorough cooperation on political 
and trade matters. Finally, the EU has signed a Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement (TDCA) with South Africa. The agreement includes provisions on trade
371 See EC Commission website at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal_relations/ceeca/pca/index.htm> (last visited on 21 May 
2007). See EC Communication on Wider Europe, supra n 366, at 5.
372 In fact it has been documented that Russia excluded itself from the ENP, preferring to cooperate with the EU on an equal basis. 
See Smith, K.E. (2005) ‘The Outsiders: The European Neiglbourhood Policy’ 81:4 International Affairs, 757, at 759.
373 Signed in 1997 and entered into force on 1st October 2000.
374 See Annex XV o f DECISION No 2/2000 OF THE EC-MEXICO JOINT COUNCIL o f 23 March 2000 (OJ L 157, 30/6/2000,
p. 10).
375 Probably, the Association agreement with Chile is the most detailed of all the bilateral free trade agreements signed by the EU. 
Former Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, has characterised the agreement as ‘...a  XXI century model o f trade relations.’ See 
Commission (EC) “EU-Chile Association Agreement to be signed today in Brussels” Press Release o f 18 November 2002, 
IP/02/1696.
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related issues, economic cooperation, social and cultural cooperation and political 
dialogue, financial assistance and development cooperation/^^
4.1.2 The role of competition in trade agreements and the wav that the EU has used 
such provisions
Competition provisions are included in bilateral trade agreements in the context 
of a much broader and diverse legal framework, which contains rules relating to 
political dialogue, trade liberalisation, and commitment of the signing parties to respect 
human rights and democratic principles, and (most of them) approximation of the 
contracting parties’ laws.^^  ^ Hence, commercial, political and cultural issues are all 
addressed by these agreements.
Nonetheless, the common denominator and starting point for further cooperation 
are rules relating to trade liberalisation. Tariff reduction and the gradual creation of a 
free trade area is the obvious goal of most of these agreements.^^* Accordingly, the main 
role for competition law is to reduce, and if possible, to eliminate practices conducted 
by private undertakings that may have an affect on trade between the contracting 
parties. This function of competition law as a tool to secure and strengthen market 
integration has been successfully tested in the context of the EU’s own integration 
project, and the need for adoption and effective application of competition rules is most 
evident in the case of the agreements with candidate countries which aim at EU 
accession.
On the other hand, with its recently launched Neighbourhood Policy, the EU 
opted for the creation of closer political and economic relationship with its 
neighbouring countries. In this regard, the Commission has stated that, ‘[T]he European 
Neighbourhood Policy's vision involves a ring o f  countries, sharing the EU’s 
fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going 
beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure o f  economic and political
376 The agreement was signed in 1999 and has not yet been ratified. Nevertheless, it has been provisionally and partially applied 
since 1 January 2000. See EC Commission website at
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/deveiopment/body/country/country_home_en.cfm7cid =za&lng=en&status=new> (last visited on 21 
May 2007).
377 On the diversity o f the reasons that have led to the conclusion o f these agreements, see Pelkmans, J. and P. Brenton (1999) 
‘Free Trade with the EU: Driving Forces and the Effects’ in O. Memedovic, A Kuyvenhoven and W. Molle (eds.) Multilateralism 
and Regionalism in the Post-Uruguay Round Era: What Role for the EU? (Kluwer, Boston).
378 In particular this goal is explicitly expressed in agreements with candidate and accession countries, in the Euro-Med 
agreements, and in the agreements signed witfi Chile, South Africa and Mexico.
109
integration... expresses the opinion that in the context of the proposed
regulatory and legislative approximation, ‘[CJonvergence towards comparable 
approaches and definitions, legislative approximation on anti-trust as well as State aid 
regulations, will eventually he needed for partners to advance towards convergence 
with the Internal Market.
Convergence on competition rules is therefore, at least from the perspective of 
the EU, a way to achieve market integration with its co-signing parties, and in this 
regard its attempts, at least with regard to candidate countries and countries that have 
been included in the ENP, are dedicated to the approximation of competition rules of 
these countries to the competition model of the EU. As a recent OECD study which 
compares the competition provisions found in 47 trade agreements indicates, in terms of 
competition law and policy, one may distinguish two “families” of trade agreements. 
The first, the EU-style agreements mainly contain substantive competition provisions,
i.e. provisions that aim to address anticompetitive behaviour. The second group of 
agreements, agreements where either the US^*  ^ or Canada^*^ is a signing party, do not 
contain substantive competition law provisions, but provisions dedicated to cooperation 
and coordination of enforcement activities.^®^
As the chapter shows, this distinction cannot be an absolute one, since there are 
agreements signed by the EU which apart from the substantive competition law 
provisions also include provisions on cooperation with the other contracting parties.^*"  ^
Nonetheless, the distinction used by the OECD offers some indications as to the way 
that the EU policy in this field can be differentiated when compared with the policies 
followed by the US and Canada. Whereas the US and Canada, use both enforcement 
cooperation agreements on competition and bilateral trade agreements to put into 
context issues of cooperation on competition law, the EU through bilateral trade 
agreements imposes the application of EU compatible competition rules regarding 
practices that affect common trade and in certain cases it obliges contracting parties to
379 EC Commission ENP Strategy Paper (2004), supra n. 366, at 5.
380 Ibid at 16.
381 The u s  has concluded a number o f bilateral free trade agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and 
Sing^ore. Nonetheless, it is notable that most o f the US’s bilateral trade agreements do not include competition provisions, though 
three recent US bilateral agreements do so, namely US-Singapore (2004), US-Australia (2005), and US-Morocco (2005).
382 Canada has signed agreements with Chile, Costa Rica, and Israel. Furthermore, Australia has similar agreements with 
Singapore, Thailand, the US, and New Zealand. See Holmes at al. (2005), supra n. 337, at 68-69.
383 OECD. (2005), ‘Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agieements’,supra n. 3.
384 See section 4.3. below.
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adopt legislation identical to its competition law. The next two sections of the chapter 
test this hypothesis as they analytically review the substantive competition provisions, 
as well as the rules providing for cooperation that are found in the EU bilateral 
agreements.
4.2 Substantive competition provisions in the EU bilateral agreements
In an attempt to observe the substantive competition provisions found in these 
agreements, the first distinction to be made is the one between antitrust rules, i.e. rules 
that aim to regulate anticompetitive practices conducted by private firms, on the one 
hand, and state aid rules and rules regulating state monopolies of a commercial 
character and public undertakings granted exclusive rights on the other, which refer to 
the regulation of state actions, and fall within the realm of EC competition law.
It may be observed that, depending on the particular category of the agreements, 
the wording of the competition-related provisions is very similar, or even identical, and 
this may attributed to two main reasons. First, by using identical provisions as a 
standard starting point of negotiations, such negotiations may be faster. One cannot 
overlook the fact that the resources of the EC Commission which negotiates bilateral 
trade agreements are limited, while the number of the agreements is increasing in a very 
rapid way. In addition, with regard to competition law, it is interesting to note that the 
chapters on competition of most of these agreements have been negotiated by officials 
who work for the Directorate General for Trade (DO Trade) and not the Directorate 
General for Competition (DG Competition). This is partly because DG Trade is 
responsible for the negotiation of these agreements and partly because DG Competition 
lacks adequate resources in order to get actively involved in the negotiations.^*^
4.2.1 Provisions relating to private undertakings
A further distinction should be made with regard to the antitrust provisions 
included in these agreements, as two groups of relevant provisions may be identified. 
The first includes provisions which require the EU’s co-signing parties to approximate 
their competition laws to that of the EU. The second group of provisions includes 
provisions that prohibit particular anticompetitive practices conducted by private firms
385 Less than 10 officials work for the International Affairs Unit o f DG Competition, which is the Unit responsible for all bilateral 
agreements, and the work carried out in international organisations. This point was raised by an interviewee from the European 
Commission, Brussels, 15/11/2007.
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and have an effect on the common trade. This section reviews both groups of provisions 
relating to the regulation of anticompetitive practices of private firms.
Table 4.2 Provisions relating to anticompetitive business practices
E U
Obligation to 
harmonize 
national 
antitrust rules
Best effort to 
approximate laws
General statement that 
approximation of 
competition law would 
strengthen economic the 
parties ectmomic links
Prohibition of anticomp, 
agreements that affect 
common trade
^Prohibition of abuse 
of dominance that 
affect common trade
B u lg a r ia V V V
C r o a t i a V V V
FY R O M V V V
Romania V V V
T u r k e y V V V
A lg e r ia V V V
E g y p t V V V
I s r a e l V V V
J o r d a n V V V
L e b a n o n V V
M o ro c c o V V V
PA V V V
T u n is ia V V V
A r m e n ia V
A z e r b a i ja n V
G e o rg ia V
K a za k h s ta n V
K yrgyzstan V
M o ld o v a V
R u s s ia V
U k r a in e V
U z b ek is tan
C h ile V V
M e x ico V V
S .A fr ic a V V
i. Agreements with acceding anc candidate countries
A standard provision included in all the agreements concluded between the EU 
and candidate countries declares incompatible with their proper functioning, ‘(...) all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations o f undertakings and 
concerted practices between undertakings which have as their object or effect the
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prevention, restriction or distortion o f  competition as is a provision stating that the 
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position in the territories of the 
European Community or of the contracting Party as a whole or in a substantial part 
thereof.^^^ The agreements also state that the assessment of relevant cases will be on the 
basis of EC law.
It may be observed that the aforementioned provisions are copied from the EC 
Treaty (articles 81 and 82) and apply to cases where the intraregional trade is affected. 
On the other hand, being in the process of accession, candidate countries clearly have 
the obligation to approximate their existing and future competition legislation to that of 
the EU.^** It follows that while EU compatible law is to be applied when an 
anticompetitive practice affects common trade, from the date of the adoption of the 
agreements, the EU co-signing countries also have to go a step further and align their 
legislation to that of the EU.
In practice, the process of the approximation of laws is closely scrutinised by the 
EC Commission, and in terms of competition, DG Competition monitors this process. 
Once the accession negotiations are launched, the Commission works together with 
representatives of candidate countries and issues screening reports, with which it 
expresses its opinion as to the development of the adopted competition legislation and 
the enforcement of such legislation. In the case, for instance, of Bulgaria, such reports 
were annual until the accession of the country to the EU. Screening reports have been 
also recently published regarding the two candidate countries with which accession 
negotiations have been launched, i.e. Croatia and Turkey.
On the other hand, this obligation of candidate countries to have and enforce EU 
compatible competition rules also includes an obligation to have in place institutions
386 EU-Bulgariaart64.1.i, E U -C roatia  art 70.l.i, E U -FY R O M  69.1.i EU-Romania art 64.1.1 EU-Turkey art 32. The EU-Turkey 
Customs Union is the most comprehensive of all the agreements discussed in this section as it includes specific examples of 
agreements that fall within the scope of the relevant article.
387 EU-Bulgaria Art 64.1 .ii, EU -  Croatia Art 70.1 .ii, EU -  FYROM 69. l.ii, EU- Romania Art 64.1 ii, and EU-Turkey Art 33.
388 EU-Bulgaria Art 69, EU Romania Art 69, EU-Croatia Art 69. The EU-Turkey Customs Union provides that in areas o f direct 
relevance to the operation o f the customs union, Turkey will harmonise its legislation with that o f the EU. Furthermore, 
approximation o f laws is provided in the area of competition law and policy (Art 32, and Art 39). With regard to FYROM, the SAA 
provides in Art. 68 that approximation will take place in two stages and also states that approximation on competition law should be 
carried out in stage 1. In addition, all these agreements provide that anticompetitive practices will be assessed in the context o f  the 
EU’s competition rules.
389 On Bulgaria for instance, the Commission published nine such aimual reports from 1997 to 2005, when the Commission 
expressed its estimation that Bulgaria was ready to access the EU and apply the acquis upon accession. See the website o f the EU, < 
http://europaeu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/el2101.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007). On Croatia and Tuikey, see below, foomote 426.
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with the competence to apply the rules. This obligation is documented in the text of the 
EU bilateral trade agreements either directly, in the form of a clear obligation of the 
EU’s co-signing parties to set up a competition authority, or indirectly, in two ways: by 
leaving this issue to be addressed with later decisions by the Association or Stabilisation 
Councils, which are established by the agreements and consist of government 
representatives of the parties, or by including a general statement by the signing 
countries that they will have and enforce competition laws.
In particular, the Customs Union with Turkey,^^® and Stabilisation and 
Association agreement with Croatia^^^ clearly provide that the Parties should ensure that 
an operationally independent public body is entrusted with the powers necessary for the 
full application of the competition related rules.^^^ Europe Agreements with Romania 
and Bulgaria state that the Association Council will adopt within three years the 
necessary rules for the implementation of the competition rules.^^^ Even though the 
provision does not directly require the creation of an authority to apply the competition 
rules, both in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, these authorities were created before 
the adoption of the implementing rules.^ "^*
ii.l Euro-Mediterranean agreements
Two provisions similar to Articles 81 and 82 EC provisions are also included in 
the agreements with Mediterranean countries, and are to be applied in cases where the 
common trade is affected.^^^
390 Article 39.a.
391 Article 70.3.
392 The agreement with FYROM does not include a similar provision, nevertheless as it is noted below, the obligation to have in 
place a competition authority is implied.
393 On the basis o f this article, the EU-Bulgaria Association Council has adopted decisions No 2/97 on the implementation of 
competition rules, and Decision No 2/2001 o f the EU-Bulgaria Association Council o f 23 May 2001 adopting the implementing 
rules for the application o f the provisions on State aid. Similarly, the EU-Romania Joint Council has adopted decision no 2/1999 on 
the implementation o f competition rules, and Decision No 4/2000 o f the EU-Romania Association Council o f 10 April 2001 
adopting the implementing rules for the application o f the provisions on State aid referred to in Articles M(l)(iii) and (2) pursuant to 
Article 64(3) o f the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of 
the one part, and Romania, o f the other part, and in Article 9(l)(iii) and (2) o f Protocol 2 on European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) products to that Agreement (2001/390/EC)
394 Hence, the implementing rules refer to these authorities. On Romania, see Art 1(2) o f the implementing rules, and on Bulgaria, 
Art. 1(2) o f the implementing rules.
395 Regarding the prohibition o f anticompetitive agreements that have an effect on common trade, see EU-Algeria Art 41.1.a, EU- 
Egypt Art 34.l.i, EU-Israel Art 36.1.i, EU-Jordan art 53.1a, EU-Lebanon interim agreement art 27.1.a, EU-Morocco art 36.1.a, EU- 
Palestinian Authority interim agreemait art 30.1, and EU- Tunisia Art 36.1.a. With regard to the prohibition o f abuse o f dominance.
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Some of the agreements^^^ also provide that the cooperation shall be aimed to 
assist the Mediterranean countries to approximate their legislation to that of the EU, on 
fields covered by the agreement (including competition). In agreements concluded with 
Egypt, Israel and Jordan, the wording is slightly different, as it is provided that the 
Parties agree to make best efforts to approximate their laws in order to facilitate the 
application of the agreement.^^^
It is therefore clear, that as opposed to the agreements signed vdth acceding and 
candidate countries, which have the obligation to adopt EU-style competition rules, in 
the case of the Mediterranean Partners, such commitment is looser. Priority is given to 
the application of EC-compatible rules on practices that affect intra-regional trade, and 
accordingly in most of these agreements the Parties agree that practices that have an 
intra-regional effect contrary to the competition related provisions will be assessed in 
accordance with Articles 81, 82 and 87 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Communities, including secondary legislation.^^*
On the other hand, this clause highlights the fact that despite the fact that there is 
no clear obligation regarding the adoption of competition rules firom the co-signing 
countries, it is important for the EU, as far as the intraregional trade is concerned, to 
impose the application of its own rules. The extent to which this goal has been achieved 
to date is a debatable issue however. Geradin and Petit for instance note that the Euro- 
Mediterranean agreements are of limited value and this is mostly because, in contrast to 
the provisions found in most of the agreements stating that the Association Council will 
adopt the necessary rules implementing the competition provisions of the agreements, 
such rules have only been adopted in the case of the agreements with Algeria and 
Morocco.^ ^^
see EU-Algeria Art 4 I.l.b , EU-Egypt Art 34.1.Ü, EU-Israel Art 36.1.ii, EU-Jordan Art 53.1.b, EU-Lebanon interim agreement Art 
27.1 b, EU-Morocco Art 36.1 b, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 30.1 b, £md EU-Tunisia Art 36.1 b.
396 EU-Algeria Art 56, and similarly EU-Morocco Art 52, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 41, and EU-Tunisia Art 
52.
397 EU- Egypt Art 48, EU-Israel Art 55, EU-Jordan Art 69.
398 EU- Jordan Art 53.2, EU- Morocco Art 36.2, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 30.2, EU-Tunisia Art 36.2. 
Furthermore, in the case o f  the EU -  Egypt agreement, there is not a similar joint-statement by the contracting Parties. The EU 
rather declares this position. (EU-Egypt Art 34 and Declaration of the EC on Art 34). Finally, the agreements with Algeria, Israel, 
and the interim agreement with Lebanon, do not contain a similar provision.
399 See Geradin, D. and N. Petit (2004) ‘Competition Policy in South Mediterranean Countries’ 3:1 Review o f Network 
Economics, 65, at 73 and 78. Most o f the Euro-Mediterranean agreements also provide that in a period from three to five years 
(depending on each particular agreement) the Association Council will adopt the necessary rules for the application o f  the 
competition related provisions. Nevertheless, as noted above, such rules have only been adopted in the case o f Algeria and Morocco.
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This claim is to a certain extent confirmed by the Commission in its recent 
reports on the Mediterranean countries, published in the context of the ENP. The 
Commission notes that while E g y p t , a n d  Lebanon"*®^  are in the process of drafting 
competition rules, Jordan"^ ®^  and Tunisia have recently adopted such rules (in 2004 and 
2005 respectively). Of these countries the Commission expresses that actual 
development has been achieved only in the case of Tunisia."^ ®^  Algeria has also adopted 
competition rules based on the EU model.
ii.2 Agreements with Eastern European and Central Asian Countries
The agreements signed with Eastern European and Central Asian Countries 
only include a general statement that the parties recognise that an important condition 
for strengthening the economic links between EU and the co-signing party, is the 
approximation of the co-signing party’s existing and future legislation to that of the 
Community, and includes competition in the extensive list of the relevant fields that 
have to be approximated."^®^
The agreements between the EU and Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine further 
include a general commitment for the contracting parties to have and to enforce laws 
addressing restrictions of competition by enterprises within their jurisdiction. The terms 
‘restrictions of competition’ are not further defined by these agreements."^®  ^ The 
remaining agreements between the EU, and Eastern European and Central Asian 
Countries include a general commitment that the Parties will examine ways to apply 
their respective competition laws on a concerted basis in the case where trade between
In the case o f Algeria, the rules have entered into force as part o f the agreement’s Annex S (a relevant annex - Annex 8 - is also 
included in the agreement with Syria, which nevertheless has not been ratified yet). With regard to Morocco, these rules were 
adopted in the form o f a Council decision. See Council Decision No 1/2004 o f the EU Morocco Association Council o f 19 April 
2004 adopting the necessary rules for the implementation o f the competition rules’. OJ L 165/10, o f 25/6/2005. The implementing 
rules include provisions relating to the cooperation of the competition authorities o f the countries. This provisions are further 
discussed in section 4.3 below.
400 Commission (EC) (2005) ‘Country Report: Egypt’ Brussels, 2 March 2005 SEC(2005) 287/3, at 18.
401 Commission (EC) (2005) ‘Country Report: Lebanon’ Brussels, 2 March 2005 SEC(2005) 289/3, at 19.
402 Commission (EC) (2006) ‘ENP Progress Report: Jordan’ Brussels, 4 December 2006, SEC(2006) 1508/2, at 8
403 Commission (EC) (2006) ‘ENP Progress Report: Tunisia’ Brussels, 4 December 2006, SEC(2006) 1510 at 6.
404 See OECD Global Forum on Competition (2004) ‘Challenges/obstacles Faced by Competition Authorities in Achieving Greater 
Economic Development Through fie Promotion o f Competition: Contribution from Algeria’ CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2004)21, at 4.
405 EU- Azerbaijan Art 43.2, EU-Armenia Art 43.2, EU- Georgia Art 43.2, EU-Kazakhstan Art 43, EU-Kyrgyzstan Art 44.2, EU 
Moldova Art 50.2, EU Russia Art 55.2, EU- Ukraine Art 51.2, and EU-Uzbekistan Art 42.2.
406 EU -  Moldova Art 482.1, EU -  Russia Art 53.2.1, and EU -  Ukraine Art 49.2.1.
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them is affected by particular practices conducted by firms/^^ without any further 
specification of practice that are prohibited.
Hence the commitments undertaken by Eastern European and Central Asian 
Countries are looser both in relation to those undertaken by candidate countries and in 
relation to those undertaken by the Mediterranean ones. That said, as in the case of the 
Mediterranean countries, the development of competition-related legislation of the 
former Soviet Union states that have been included in the ENP is being followed by the 
Commission. In recent Commission reports, it is noted that competition law was 
adopted in Armenia in 2000, and an EU-financed project currently provides support to 
the authority on developing implementing regulations, to supplement the competition 
Act adopted in 2000."^ °* Azerbaijan and Georgia both have competition laws in place 
that cover anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance and mergers."*®^
In addition, much of the EU attention naturally falls to Russia, which is the most 
important strategic partner of the EU in the region. Informally, the Commission has 
been very interested in the development of competition rules in Russia,"^ ^® which has 
adopted a competition law that includes prohibitions of anticompetitive agreements and 
abuse of dominance, as well as merger control. Nonetheless, as a recent OECD study 
notes, though relatively complete in terms of its areas of coverage, the competition law 
does not contain effective sanctions and fails to provide the Russian competition 
authority with sufficient investigative powers.
iii. Agreements with selected trade partners
Finally, the agreement concluded between the EU and Chile, and EU and 
Mexico require no substantive changes in partners’ laws. The Parties agree to apply 
their -  already in place - competition regimes, in a manner consistent with the 
agreement. In contrast, even though South Africa had a competition law in place when
407 EU-Azerbaijan Art 43.4, EU-Armenia Art 43.4, EU-Georgia Art 44.2, EU- Kazakhstan Art 43.4, and EU-Uzbekistan Art 42.4. 
Only the EU-Georgia agreement further defines the terms ‘competition laws’ and provides that the EU will provide Georgia with 
technical assistance on the formulation and implementation o f competition law, and in particular: agreements and associations 
between undertakings and concerted practices which may have the effect o f preventing, restricting or distorting competition, abuse 
by undertakings o f a dominant position in the market, state aids which have the effect o f  distorting competition, state monopolies of 
a commercial character, and public undertakings with special or exclusive rights.
408 Commission (EC) (2005) Country Report: Armenia’ Brussels, 2 March 2005 SEC(2005) 285/3, at 17.
409 See EC Commission (2005) ‘Country Report: Azerbaijan’ Brussels, 2 March 2005 SEC(2005) 286/3, at 19; EC Commission 
(2005) ‘Country Report: Georgia’ Brussels, 2 March 2005 SEC(2005) 288/3, at 19.
410 Interview with EU official, Brussels, 15/11/2007.
411 OECD (2004) ‘Competition Law and Policy in Russia: An OECD Peer Review’ (OECD, Paris).
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the EU-South Africa agreement was signed, the agreement provides in Article 36 that if 
at the entry into force of the agreement the contracting parties do not have the necessary 
laws and regulations for the implementation of the competition-related provisions of the 
agreement, they would have to do so within a period of three years.'**  ^ In addition EU 
compatible provisions on anticompetitive agreements"^^  ^ and abuse of dominance are 
included in the agreement with South Africa, and are to be applied in cases where 
common trade is affected.
On the other hand, among the agreements explored here, only the agreement 
with Chile includes specific provisions relating to mergers. The parties declare that their 
merger regulations are included in the scope of competition law, as this is defined by 
the agreement."^*"  ^ That said, in view of the fact that the agreements with candidate 
countries and most of the Euro-Med agreements provide that anticompetitive practices 
will be assessed in accordance with Articles 81, 82 and 87 of the EC Treaty including 
secondary legislation, it could be argued that mergers are also covered by these 
agreements.
4.2.2 Rules relating to state actions and public undertakings
While the inclusion of competition provisions relating to private undertakings in 
the bilateral trade agreements of the EU reveals to an extent the attempt of the polity to 
export its competition law model, of equal or even greater importance are the rules 
relating to state aids and public undertakings. As noted in the context of the analysis 
carried out in Chapter state aid rules and rules on public undertakings, even though 
traditionally not considered to fall within the realm of competition law, have been 
treated as competition issues in the EU, as the relevant rules are enforced by the EU’s 
central competition authority -  the EC Commission. Hence, the inclusion of such 
provisions is an indication of the actual influence of the EU model on the development 
of international competition rules.
412 It has to be noted that Annex VIII of the agreement clearly states that anticompetitive practices will be assessed in the case of 
the EU on the basis o f articles 81 and 82 o f the EC Treaty, while with regard to South Africa will be assessed on the basis o f South 
African competition law. Thus there is no obligation created for South Africa to approximate its competition laws to those o f the 
EU. See Szepesi supra n. 9. This differentiation in the case o f the EU/South Africa agreement, may be attributed to the fact that 
South Africa has special competition rules to deal with the apartheid legacy, by sipporting traditionally discriminated individuals.
413 EU-South Africa Art 35.a. Nonetheless it has to be stressed that the agreement declares incompatible with its proper functioning 
such practices, '(. . .) unless the firms can demonstrate that the anti-competitive effects are outweighed by pro-competitive ones’.
414 EU- Chile art 172.2. With regard to the EU the (later amended) Regulation 4064/89 o f the EEC is mentioned.
415 See below, chapter 5, section 5.2.
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On the other hand, the inclusion of state aid rules and rules on public 
undertakings is of major importance, as most of the EU’s associated states are countries 
which for decades were governed by communist regimes and until the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, there was no market-based economy, and market activity was functioning 
in the context of a large administrative hierarchy/^^
Table 4.3 State Aid Provisions
E U  ‘ ^
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harmonise 
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S’- aid rules
X  -■*
>
Prohibition
of.
state/public
aid
Abolition of..$/ 
countervailing % 
duties in so far as 
signing countries 
have state aid rules 
t  in place
j»* 1 ! ^ ’ 
Obligation^ 
to ^ p ly  
state aid 
rules in a 
transparent 
way
Obligation to 
provide the 
other p&y 
with 
information on 
state aid
Obligation to 
harmonise 
national law 
on St. 
monopolies 
and p. 
undertakings 
with exclusive 
r i^ t s
'
discrimination 
in the actions 
o f state 
monopolies 
#
B u lg a r i a V V V V V V V
C r o a t i a V V V V V V V
FY R O M V V V V V V V
R o m a n ia V V V V V V V
T u r k e y V V V V V V V
A lg e r ia V V
E g y p t V V V V V
I s r a e l V V V V V ■
J o r d a n V V V V V
L e b a n o n V V
M o ro c c o V V V V V
PA V V V V V
T u n i s i a V V V V V
A r m e n ia
A z e r b a i j a n ^
G e o r g i a
K a z a k h s ta n
K yrgyzstan
M o ld o v a  * V V
R u s s i a V V
U k r a in e V V
• U z b ek is ta n
V V
V V V
416 Litwack, J.M. (1992) ‘Legality and Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies’ 5:4 The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 77, 
at 79-83.
119
i. Agreements with candidate countries
As in the case of rules relating to private undertakings, the provisions relating to 
state aids and public undertakings may be divided into two broad categories. First, in 
the context of their general obligation to align their legislation with the EU legislative 
framework, candidate countries are obliged to adopt state aid rules and rules on public 
undertakings, compatible with those of the EU. Second, the agreements also include 
particular provisions on the application of state aid and public undertakings on cases 
that affect intraregional trade.
State Aid. There is a common provision included in the agreements of the EU 
with candidate countries declaring incompatible with their proper functioning, Y - J  
public aid which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production o f certain goods. Similarly with the other 
competition provisions, it is provided that the assessment of relevant cases will be on 
the basis of the EU law. The parties also ensure transparency in the application of their 
state aid rules, and express their commitment to provide information on state aid 
schemes and individual state aids, upon request of the other party."***
A consequence of the inclusion of state aid rules in the context of competition 
legislation, and the subsequent obligation of the countries to have and enforce state aid 
rules, is that the agreements signed with candidate countries provide that subsidies are 
regulated by the provisions relating to state aids. In this respect, countervailing 
measures"**  ^are abolished in so far as candidate countries have state aid laws in place."*^ ® 
In addition, all the agreements provide that these countries will be considered for 
a (renewable with a later agreement) period of five years, as areas identical to those
417 EU-Bulgaria Art 64.1.iii, EU-Croatia Art 70.1.iii; EU-Romania Art 64.1.iii. Similarly EU-Turkey, Art 34. With regard to Euro- 
Med agreements see EU- Egypt Art 34.2, EU-lsrael Art 36.2, EU-Morocco Art 36.3, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement 
Art 30.3, and EU-Tunisia Art 36.3.
418 EU-Bulgaria Art 64.4.b; EU-Croatia Art 70.5; and EU-Romania Art 64.4.b. There is no such provision in the CU with Turkey,
and this is due to the fact that there is as o f yet no authority in Turkey to review state aids.
419 Countervailing measures are extra duties (‘countervailing duties’) that may be charged by countries on subsidised imports that
are found to be hurting domestic producers. See the WTO website <http;/Avww.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safegje/safeg_e.htm> (last 
visited on 21 May 2007).
420 In the case o f the EU Turkey customs union it is provided in Article 44.1 that the Association Council is the competent body to 
suspend the application of trade defence measures; this has not yet been implemented however. Furthermore Article 70.9 o f the 
SAA with Croatia agreement provides thrt ‘Nothing in this Article shall prejudice or affect in any way the taking, by either Party, of 
antidumping or countervailing measures in accordance with the relevant Articles o f GATT 1994 and WTO Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures or related internal legislation.’, while in the case o f  the agreement with FYROM (Art. 69(5)) it is 
stated that any measures regarding lack of application o f the state aid rules have to be taken in accordance with the procedures and 
under the conditions laid down thereby or the relevant Community internal legislation.
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areas of the EU where the standard of living is abnormally low or any state monopolies 
there is serious underemployment, as described in Article 92(3)(a) (currently 87(3)(a)) 
of the Treaty establishing the European Communi ty ,o f fe r ing  practically those 
countries the opportunity to be exempted from the application of the state aid rules for 
the given period.
Hence the agreements with candidate countries include a provision that prohibits 
state aid which affects common trade; they do not however include further clarifications 
as to the way that these provisions have to be applied. Cremona has identified a number 
of problems raised in view of this generality of the state aid provisions. She notes that in 
the case of the Europe Agreements with the current new Member States, more specific 
provisions were laid down in the rules implementing the state aid provisions of the 
agreements, and these rules provided that surveillance of state aid rules would be 
enforced by a national candidate country authority in cooperation with the EC 
Commission."*^^
In contrast to the Europe Agreements, the agreements with Croatia and with 
FYROM do not provide for the adoption of implementing rules, but have incorporated 
some of the implementing rules in the agreements themselves. In the case of Croatia for 
instance, it is provided that Croatia has to set up an independent authority with the 
competence to review state aids in the country.'*^  ^ In the case of FYROM, no such 
obligation is explicitly stated in the agreement, nonetheless the fact that FYROM 
undertakes the commitment to apply state aid rules within five years from the entry into 
force of the agreement, implies that the country has to establish a body to enforce the 
law.«^
As with the provisions relating to private undertakings, in practice, as soon as 
accession negotiations are launched, the state aid schemes of the candidate countries are 
put under the microscope by the Commission, which reviews the type and amount of the
421 EU-Bulgaria Art 64.4 a; EU-Croatia Art 70.7.a; and EU-Romania Art 64.4.a. In the case o f Bulgaria and Romania, this period 
was extended by the Association Council for another five years. For Bulgaria, see Decision No 1/2000 o f the EU-Bulgaria 
Association Council. For Romania, see Decision No 2/2000 o f the EU-Romania Association Council o f 17 July 2000 (OJ L 230, 
12/9/2000, p. 13).
422 See Cremona, M. (2003) ‘State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation 
Association Agreements’, 9:3 European Law Journal 265, at 267-269.
423 EU-Croatia SAA Art. 70(4).
424 See Cremona, supra n. 422, at 269.
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aid granted by the governments of candidate conntries/^^ For instance, in its recent 
screening reports on Croatia and Turkey, the Commission notes that neither the 
legislative framework nor the enforcement level are satisfactory in these countries/^^
State monopolies of a commercial character and public undertakings granted 
exclusive rights: the Europe agreements with Romania and Bulgaria, as well as the 
SAAs Avith Croatia and FYROM, and customs union with Turkey provide that the 
Member States and the candidate country undertake the commitment to progressively 
adjust any state monopolies of a commercial character so as to ensure that, by the end of 
the fifth year following the entry into force of the respective agreements, no 
discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed 
exists between nationals of the Member States and of the candidate c o u n t r y I t  is 
therefore made clear in the agreements that upon entry into force, any state monopolies 
in the candidate countries have to compete on equal terms with firms registered in the 
EU.
In relation to public undertakings, or undertakings granted exclusive rights, the 
Europe Agreements with Romania and Bulgaria"^^* state that with regard to such 
undertakings, the Association Council shall ensure that, as from the third year from the 
date of entry into force of the Agreement, the Parties have to align their legislation to 
that of the EU, i.e. Article 90 of the EC T r e a t y a n d  the principles adopted by the 
concluding document of the April 1990 Bonn meeting of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (notably entrepreneurs' freedom of decision). While a 
similar provision is included in the agreement with Turkey and FYROM,"*^  ^ in the case
425 This is secured in practice with the creation o f inventories o f state aid where the candidate and acceding countries notify any aid 
granted in their territory. See Cremona (2003) supra n. 422, at 280.
426 See Commission (EC) (2006) ‘Screening Report: Turkey -  Chapter 8, Competition 
Policy’,<http;//ec.europa.eu/eniargement/pdC'turkey/screening_reports/screening_report_08_trJntemet>en.pdf> (last visited, 21 
May 2007), where the Commission, in pp. 10-13 expresses the opinion that the Turkish regime on state aids is not satisfactory, both 
with regard to the legal framework and the institutional set up o f Turkey in these fields. Similar problems have been identified by 
the Commission with regard to Croatia; see Commission (EC) (2006) ‘Screening Report: Croatia -  C h u ter 8, Competition Policy’, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/croatia/screening_reports/screening_ report_08_hr_intemet_en.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 
2007).
427 EU-Bulgaria Art. 30; EU-Romania Art. 30; EU- Croatia Art. 40; EU-Turkey Art. 42. The EU- Croatia SAA agreement further 
provides tfiat the Stabilisation and Association Council will be informed ofthe measures adopted to implement this objective.
428 Article 66 in both agreements.
429 Now Article 86 o f the EC Treaty.
430 EU-Turkey Art 41. The difference in the EU-Turkey agreement is that Turkey will ensure alignment o f its legislation to that of 
the EU by the end o f the first year following the entry into force of he agreement, EU-FYROM, Art. 70.
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of the EU-Croatia SAA, the only reference in relation to public undertakings is made in 
Article 70.3, in the context of the creation of an independent body to apply competition 
provisions. On the basis of this provision, in conjunction with the country’s obligation 
to align its competition rules to those of the EU, it may safely be assumed that the 
relevant rules applied by the Croatian institution have to be aligned with the EU law. In 
any case the development in the fields of state monopolies and public undertakings are 
also reviewed by the Commission in the context of the accession negotiations of 
candidate countries, and accession is only completed as long as these countries have 
reached satisfactory levels of approximation of their relevant regimes to EU law.
ii. Euro -Mediterranean agreements and agreements with former Soviet Union states
State aid: 2a) With the exceptions of the EU-Algeria agreement and the interim 
agreement between EU and Lebanon, all the Euro-Mediterranean agreements are 
identical to the agreements with candidate and acceding countries as they include a 
provision on state aids providing that public aids that distort or threaten to distort 
competition are incompatible with the proper functioning of the agreements."^^* The 
agreements also include a dual commitment by the signing parties to apply state aid 
rules in a transparent way and to submit any information required by the other party on 
state aid schemes and individual aid."^ ^^  Some of them also state that the Mediterranean 
countries will be considered for a period of five years as areas where the standard of 
living is abnormally low as described in Article 92(3)(a) of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community."^^  ^As in the case of the agreements with candidate countries, the 
Euro-Mediterranean agreements contain provisions according to which the WTO rules 
on subsidies and countervailing measures will apply only for a period of 3-5 years 
(depending on each particular agreement) until the adoption of the relevant state (or 
public) aid rules.'*^ '*
431 EU- Egypt Art 34.2, EU-Israel Art 36.2, EU-Morocco Art 36.3, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 30.3, and EU- 
Tunisia Art 36.3.
432 EU-Egypt Art 34.2, EU-Israel Art 36.3, EU-Jordan Art 53.4.b, EU-Morocco Art 36.4.b, EU-Palestinian Authority interim 
agreement Art 30.5, and EU-Tunisia Art 36.4.b.
433 EU- Jordan Art 53.4.a, EU-Morocco Art 36.4.a, EU-Tunisia Art 36.4.a, and EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art
30.4. The wording o f the interim agreement between EU and the Palestinian Authority is different. The parties agree that for a 
period o f 5 years public aid to the Palestinian Authority is allowed to grant public aid ‘to undertakings as an instrument to tackle its 
specific development problems’.
434 EU-Egypt Art 34,2, EU-Israel Art 36.2, EU-Jordan Art 53.3, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 30.3, and EU -  
Tunisia Art 36.3.
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Hence, in terms of the legal text, the state aid related provisions found in the 
Euro-med agreements are very similar -  or even identical to the provisions included in 
the agreements with candidate countries. That said, the major difference between these 
two groups of agreements is that while candidate countries have undertaken the 
commitment to align their rules to those of the EU, and their regimes are scrutinised by 
the Commission in the context of the accession process, the Southern Mediterranean 
countries only express that they will do their best to align their legislation with the EU 
legislation. In view of this fact, in combination with the absence of rules implementing 
the state aid provisions, and the fact that such provisions are more directly intervening 
in the public policies of Mediterranean countries, it comes as no surprise that to date 
none of the these countries have adopted EU compatible state aid rules."^ ^^
2b) As opposed to the agreements with Mediterranean countries, the agreements 
with former Soviet Union States do not include detailed state aid rules. In fact only 
three of them, namely the agreements that the EU has concluded with Moldova, Ukraine 
and Russia, state that the parties agree to refrain from granting state aid favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of products other than primary goods as defined 
in the GATT. They also agree to provide, upon request by the contracting Party, 
information on their state aid schemes or individual state aid."^ ^^
On the other hand, all the agreements with former Soviet Union states include a 
‘best effort clause’ according to which the Parties will cooperate in subsidies 
investigations and will do ‘their outmost’ to find a constructive solution to the problem. 
Furthermore all these agreements clearly state that the provisions on competition law 
will not affect a Party’s right to apply countervailing measures."*^  ^Hence, the wording 
of the agreements with former Soviet Union States is largely based on the relevant 
WTO instruments, and not on the EU state aid model, an indication that at least in terms
435 Interview with EU official (Brussels 15/11/2007). This argument is also seconded by the Commission in its recent ENP reports, 
where it is noted that there has been no progress with regard to the surveillance o f state aid rules in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, and Tunisia.
436 EU-Ukraine Art 49.2.2 and 49.2.3, EU-Moldova Art 38.2.2 and 48.2.3. In the case o f  EU-Russia agreement the wording o f the 
provision is a little different than the other relevant provisions. Article 53.2.2 makes reference to “export aid” (as opposed to state or 
public aid in the other agreements). EU and Russia agree that for a transitional period o f 5 years, Russia is able to adopt measures 
inconsistent with this provision (Annex 9).
437 EU-Armenia Art 14.6, EU-Azerbaijan Art 14.6, EU-Georgia Art 14.6, EU-Kazakhstan Art 13.6, EU-Kyrgyzstan Art 13.6, EU- 
Moldova Art 18 in conjunction with Art 48.5, EU-Russia Art 18 in conjunction with Art 53.5, EU- Ukraine Art 19 in conjunction 
with Art 49.5, and EU-Uzbekistan Art 13.6.
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of the text of the agreements, state aid rules are not included in the competition 
framework set out by the signing countries.
That said, at least in two cases there have been developments in this field in this 
group of countries which might indicate that certain former Soviet Union states tend to 
be moving towards the adoption of EU compatible state aid rules. In particular, in 2004 
the Ukrainian Antimonopoly Committee submitted a draft state aid law which was 
closely modelled on the acquis; the law was rejected however by the Ukrainian 
Parliament. According to the Commission, the Ukrainian agency intends to shortly 
submit an amended version of the Ukrainian competition Act, in order to introduce state 
aid elements."^^* Similarly, in the case of Armenia, even though there is no particular 
provision on state aid in its agreement with the EU, it has recently amended its 
competition rules, in which it has inserted state aid rules."*^  ^ In both countries, these 
developments have occurred in the context of projects of technical assistance provided 
by the EU,"^ "^ ° something that highlights two issues. First, that these agreements are the 
starting point for cooperation and in practice the cooperation may go further than it is 
provided in their articles. Second, technical assistance offered by the EU may facilitate 
such closer cooperation. The various technical assistance tools used by the EU are 
discussed in some more detail below.
State Monopolies of a commercial character: With regard to state monopolies of 
a commercial character, the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, as well as the agreements 
with Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, include a standard provision, similar to the one 
included in the agreements with candidate countries, according to which the parties 
undertake a commitment to progressively adjust any state monopolies of a commercial 
character so as to ensure that, by the end of the fifth year following the entry into force 
of the respective agreements, no discrimination regarding the conditions under which
438 See Commission (EC) (2006) ‘ENP Progress Report: Ukraine’ Brussels, 4 December 2006, SEC(2006) 1505/2, at 10-11.
439 See AEPLAC (2007)‘Assessment of Institutional Standing in the Fields o f Competition and State Aid’, report presented in the 
context o f the EU funded TACIS programme, <http://vvww.aeplac.am/pdf/2007/Compet/Competpdft> (last visited on 3 August 
2007), at 25-28. These provisions have not yet been applied.
440 On Armenia, see AEPLAC, ibid. The relevant project in Ukraine took place from 2001 to 2006, and the EU offered 2.5 million 
euros to assist the Ukrainian authority to ‘to facilitate improvement o f business climate in Ukraine through adjustment of 
competition rules and competition law enforcement in Ukraine, making it compatible with the international standards, and in 
particular, with the provisions of Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and requirements o f the WTO’. See the website o f  the EU 
delegation in Ukraine, < http://www.delukr.ec.europa.ei/page38038.html> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
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goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals of the Member States and of 
the candidate country.
This provision could be of major importance in view of the fact that most of the 
EU’s co-signing countries are economies in transition and the role of state monopolies 
are consequently considerable. Nevertheless, in the case of agreements where the 
obligations of the parties are limited to the expression of goodwill by the signing parties 
that they will do their best to approximate their legislations; the expected effects of this 
provision may not be overestimated.
Public undertakings granted exclusive rights: With regard to public 
undertakings, and undertakings granted exclusive rights, in the Euro-Mediterranean 
agreements, and the agreements with Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, the Parties agree 
that within 5 years from the adoption of the agreement, the Association Council will 
ensure that there is neither enacted nor maintained any measure distorting the Parties’ 
common trade to an extent contrary to their respective interests. The Parties further 
declare that '(...) This provision shall not obstruct the performance, in law or fact, o f  
the particular tasks assigned to such undertakings
The wording therefore of these agreements on public undertakings granted 
exclusive rights differs from the wording of the agreements with candidate countries. 
On the one hand, the Mediterranean and former Soviet Union states do not have to align 
their legislation with the relevant EU rules, and on the other hand they withhold the 
discretion in practice to take measures which are probably incompatible with the EU 
competition rules, as they state that only measures that are contrary to their respective 
interests are not allowed, without further indication as to how these interests may be 
determined.
441 With regard to the Euro-Med agreements see EU-Algeria Art 42, EU- Egypt Art 35, EU- Israel Art 37, EU-Jordan Art 54, EU 
Lebanon interim agreement Art 28, EU- Morocco Art 37,EU- Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 31, EU- Tunisia Art 37. 
There is a transitional period o f 5 years for the Parties to adjust their legislation to this provision; this is however without prejudice 
to their commitments to GATT. See also EU-Moldova Art 48.2.4, EU-Russia Art 53.2.4, EU-Ukraine Art 49.2.4. It has to be noted 
that depending on each particular agreement the parties have to adjust their relevant legislation in a period between 3 and 5 years, 
which may be further extended by a new agreement between the parties (EU-Moldova Art 48.2.6, EU-Russia Art 53.2.5, and EU- 
Ukraine Art 49.2.6).
442 EU-Algeria Art 43, EU-Egypt Art 36 EU-lsrael Art 38, EU-Jordan Art 55, EU-Lebanon interim agreement Art 29, EU-Morocco 
Art 38, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 32, EU-Tunisia Art 38. See also EU-Moldova Art 48.2.5, EU-Russia Art
53.2.4, and EU-Ukraine Art 49.2,5 It has to be noted that the transitional period provided for by these agreements varies from 3 to 4 
years from the adoption o f the agreements. The parties have also agreed th i  they may extend this period with a new agreement.
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iii. Agreements with selected trade partners
State aid: Of the three agreements with selected partners (Mexico, Chile and 
South Africa), only the former does not make reference to public or state aids. The EU- 
Chile agreement does not define the terms public or state aid, nonetheless in Article
177.3 the parties agree to provide the other party with information on state aid on an 
annual basis, including the overall amount of aid and, if possible, by sector. Each party 
may request information on individual cases affecting trade between the parties. The 
requested party will use its best efforts to provide non-confidential information. Despite 
the fact that the wording of the agreement on state aids resembles to a certain extent the 
wording of the agreements with candidate and Mediterranean states, as opposed to the 
agreements with these countries the Chile agreement makes clear that the parties may 
take countervailing measures, in accordance vdth the WTO rules."^ "*^
The EU-SA agreement is the most comprehensive of the three on this particular 
issue. Section E of the EU-SA agreement is devoted to the regulation of public aid."^ "^  
Article 41.1 of the agreement provides that public aid which favours certain firms or the 
production of certain goods, and which does not support a specific public policy 
objective or objectives of either party, is incompatible with the proper fimctioning of the 
a g r e e m en t , . T h e  parties also agree to ensure that public aid is granted in a fair, 
equitable and transparent manner,"^^ and they express their commitment to transparency 
in the field of public aid."^ "^  ^ In addition, the parties agree to provide upon request of the 
other party, information regarding their aid schemes, or individual cases of public aid. 
The parties also agree that exchange of information shall take into account the 
limitations imposed by laws relating to business or professional s e c recyS i mi la r ly  to 
the agreements 'svith candidate and Mediterranean countries, the agreement with South 
Africa also provides in Annex IX that the WTO rules on subsidies and countervailing 
measures Avill be applied as long as rules on public aid are not adopted.
443 EU- Chile Art 78.
444 It has to be noted that the provisions on public aid are included in a separate section o f the agreement (Section E) and not in the 
competition related section (Section D)
445 ANNEX IX o f the agreement specifies a number o f relevant public policy objectives: regional development, industrial 
restructuring and development, promotion o f the micro enterprises and SMEs, advancement o f previously disadvantaged persons, 
affirmative action programmes, employment, environmental protection, rescue and restructure o f firms in difficulty, R&D, support 
to firms in deprived urban areas, training.
446 EU-SA agreement Art 412.
447 Ibid. in Art 43.
448 Ibid.
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State monopolies of a commercial character: With regard to public monopolies 
of a commercial character, of the three agreements only the EU-Chile agreement 
includes relevant provisions.' '^^  ^ Specifically, it is provided that nothing in the 
competition related title prevents a party from designating or maintaining public or 
private monopolies according to their respective laws.
Undertakings granted exclusive rights: With regard to public undertakings or 
undertakings granted exclusive rights, the agreement between the EU and South Africa 
explicitly excludes public undertakings from the application of the rules relating to 
public aid"^ ®^ (ANNEX IX). There is no other particular reference made on this matter. 
In contrast, the EU and Chile in their agreement (Art 179.1) have included a similar 
provision to that in the Euro-Mediterranean agreements."^^^
4.3 Provisions on cooperation in competition
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, bilateral EU agreements primarily contain 
substantive competition law provisions. As this section observes, a number of these 
agreements also include provisions on cooperation on competition; the level of 
cooperation provided however varies considerably. For instance, supplementary 
agreements (rules implementing the competition provisions) have been signed with 
some candidate countries Avith the aim of strengthening and formalising cooperation on 
competition issues. Of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, similar implementing rules 
have been adopted in the case of Algeria and Morocco, and include provisions on a 
number of cooperative instruments. In contrast to these agreements, the agreements 
signed with the former Soviet Union states include looser provisions on enforcement 
cooperation. On the other hand, the EU-Chile agreement and the EU-Mexico Joint 
Council decision 2/2000, which supplements the agreement between EU and Mexico, 
are the most detailed on cooperation issues, as they include (non-binding) provisions 
which are very similar to those included in competition enforcement cooperation 
agreements, discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis.
More generally, it may be pointed out that in certain cases the actual level of 
cooperation depends on the political and economic closeness of the EU’s co-signing
449 Article 179.1.
450 See Annex IX of the agreement.
451 The difference in the case o f this agreement is that no transitional period is provided The provision will be applied as soon as 
the agreement enters into force.
128
party with the EU. In this regard, and irrespective of the content of the agreements, the 
level of cooperation with candidate countries is usually very high, in view of the 
scrutiny that these countries have to go through in the context of their aim to enter the 
EU. This section discusses in some more detail the relevant cooperative tools provided 
by the EU bilateral agreements.
Table 4.4: Provisions on cooperation
E U
Î'
Notification 
o f cases
. IT.
Consultation in 
the context of 
dispute 
settlement
•
*. - 
Consultation 
as a % 
cooperative 
instrument
Exchange of 
non % 
confidential 4, 
information
% Positive 
Comity
«■
Provision on 
technical, 
assistance on 
competition
General TA 
provision in 
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context of |  
eqîproximation 
of laws
B u lg a r i a V V V V
C r o a t i a V V V
FY R O M V V V V
R o m a n ia V V V V
T u r k e y V V V V
A lg e ria V V V V V
E g y p t V V V
I s r a e l V V
J o r d a n V V
L e b a n o n V
M o ro c c o V V V V V
PA V V
T u n is ia V V
A r m e n ia V
A z e r b a i ja n V
G e o r g ia  f V
K a z a k h s ta n V
K yrgyzstan V
M o ld o v a V
R u s s i a
U k r a in e V
U zb ek is tan V
C h ile V V V V
M e x ico • V V V
S .A fr ic a  1 V V V V V V
4.3.1 Notification of cases
As noted in the context of the analysis carried out in Chapter 3, notification is
the starting point for cooperation in cases where two countries have an interest in the
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same competition case. A number of the agreements reviewed in this chapter provide 
for notification of cases.
i. Agreements with candidate countries
Such notification is obligatory in the case of the agreements with candidate 
countries, in view of the scrutiny the regimes of these countries have to go through in 
the pre-accession process. Based on this information, the EC Commission is able to 
review and express its opinion on the development of competition law and policy in 
these countries and on the extent to which they have aligned their rules to those of the 
EU. In the case of the EU agreements, the notification provision was included in the 
rules implementing the competition-related provisions of these agreements.
Hence, the relevant rules regarding Bulgaria and Romania make clear that the 
competition authorities of the contracting parties have to notify the authorities of the 
other contracting party of an enforcement activity, in case such activity may have an 
effect to the other party’s interests or relates to an anticompetitive practice that has been 
principally carried out in the territory of the other p a r t y T h u s ,  these provisions lie 
between negative and positive comity, as they describe cases which are not exactly 
negative comity (obligation to take into consideration the interest of the other party 
when enforcing competition law), nor positive comity (request of enforcement action by 
the other party on practices that are conducted in the territory of the other party and 
have effects on the requesting party). While both negative and positive comity require 
some sort of action, or avoidance of action, the provisions discussed here only require 
notification of cases of mutual interest, and therefore may be rather a starting point for 
further cooperation on such cases.
A similar provision is included in the agreement between the EU and Turkey 
With regard to Croatia, and to FYROM, while no particular provision on case 
notification is included in the relevant agreements, the screening of the Commission of
452 Decision No 2/1999 o f the Association Council between the European Communities and their Member States, o f the one part, 
and Romania, o f  the other part of 16 March 1999 adopting the necessary rules for the implementation o f Article 64(1 )(i) and (ii) and 
Article 64(2) o f  the Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, o f the one 
part, and Romania, o f the other part, article 2.1. (OJ L 096/22, 10/04/1999), and Decision No 2/1999 o f the Association Council 
between the European Communities and their Member States, o f the one part, and Bulgaria, o f the other part o f 7 October 1997 
adopting the necessary rules for the implementation o f Article 64(l)(i) and (ii) and Article 64(2) o f the Agreement establishing an 
association between the European Communities and their Member States, o f  the one part, and Bulgaria, o f the other part. Article 
2 . 1.
453 EU-Turkey, art. 43.
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the development of the competition regimes of these countries indicates that these 
parties are in practice obliged to notify the Commission of any case of mutual interest.
ii. Euro -  Mediterranean agreements and agreements with former Soviet Union states
As for the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, provisions on notification are 
included only in the rules implementing the competition-related articles of the 
agreements with Algeria and Morocco. The rules provide that the parties have the 
obligation to notify the other party, in initial stages of an investigation of a practice that: 
(a) the notifying party considers them relevant to enforcement activities of the other 
party; (b) they may significantly affect important interests of the other party; (c) they 
relate to restrictions on competition which may directly and substantially affect the 
territory of the other party; (d) they involve anti-competitive activities carried out 
mainly in the territory of the other Party; (e) they condition or prohibit action in the 
territory of the other party. The provisions are similar to the provisions included in the 
bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements of the EU, and describe a broad group of 
activities. Nevertheless their effect cannot be evaluated, since there have been no reports 
as to their implementation.
On the other hand, there are no particular notification provisions included in the 
agreements vrith former Soviet Union states.
iii. Agreements with selected trade partners
In contrast to these agreements, a detailed provision on notification of cases is 
included in the agreements concluded with Chile and Mexico. The provision states that 
each party will notify the authorities of the other party of an enforcement activity, in 
cases similar to those described in the implementing decisions of the agreements with 
Bulgaria and Romania."^ "^^  As with Algeria and Morocco, there are no publicly available 
documents regarding the implementation of these provisions.
454 EU-Chile Art 174 , EU Mexico, Art. 3 o f Annex XV.
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4.3.2. Exchange of Information
With the exception of the agreements with former Soviet Union states/^^ all the 
other agreements provide for some sort of information exchange on competition 
matters, which is subject to confidentiality clauses similar to those discussed in Chapter 
3. For example, the agreements with candidate countries provide that the contracting 
Parties 'will ensure administrative cooperation in the implementation of their respective 
competition legislations and exchange information taking into account the limitations 
imposed by the requirements of professional and business secrecy.^^^ A similar 
provision is also included in the Euro-Mediterranean agreements,'^^^ and the agreement 
with South Africa."^^* Finally, the agreements with Chile and Mexico'^^  ^ contain a 
detailed provision on exchange of non-confidential information.
4.3.3. Consultations
Two distinct forms of consultations can be observed in the text of the 
agreements discussed in this section. The first is the consultation mechanism in the 
context of a party’s decision to take action against a particular anticompetitive practice. 
The second is a part of the general cooperative framework provided by the agreements.
As to the former, the agreements with candidate and Euro-Mediterranean 
countries provide for consultations within the Association Committee, in case one of the
455 Even thougji there are no formal documents explaining this non-inclusion o f an information exchange provision, it may be 
suggested that this omission reflects to a certain extent the lack of confidence, at least on the part o f the EU, regarding the prospect 
o f the adoption and more importantly the application o f competition rules by these countries. It may also be linked to the fact that 
only the agreements with Moldova, Russia and Ukraine include a clear commitment that the parties will have and enforce 
competition law, and even those agreements include no further clarifications as to the description o f particular anticompetitive 
practices.
456 EU-Bulgaria Art 64.7, and EU-Romania Art 64.7. It has to be stated that the parties further declare in the joint declaration 
concerning Article 64 that they “(■. .) shall not make an improper use o f provisions on professional secrecy to prevent the disclosure 
o f information in the field o f competition." The agreement with Croatia makes no specific reference to exchange o f information on 
competition matters, nonetheless extensive exchange o f information is provided with regard to economic and political cooperation. 
Finally the EU-Turkey Customs Union (Article 36) provides for exchange o f information subject to the limitations imposed by laws 
relating to professional and business secrecy.
457 EU-Algeria Art 41.2, similarly EU-Egypt Art 34.6, EU-Israel Art 36.6, EU-Jordan Art 53.7, EU-Lebanon interim agreement Ait 
27.2457, EU-Morocco Art 36.7, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 30.8, EU-Tunisia Art 36.7. Subject to the same 
limitations regarding professional and business secrecy, the EU-Algeria agreement further provides that the Parties shall ensure 
administrative cooperation in the implementation of their respective competition legislations.
458 EU-South Afiica Art 40.
459 EU-Chile Art 177, EU Mexico Annex XV of the Joint Decision, Art. 4.
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parties considers that a particular practice of a private firm is incompatible with the 
relevant provisions on competition. The parties may take action against this particular 
practice after consulting with the other party, or in any case after 30 working days 
following referral for such consultation.'*^^ A similar consultation process is provided by 
the EU- South Africa agreement in Article 37. Hence, this form of consultation may be 
launched when the parties intend to take action against a practice which affects common 
trade, and is applied in the context of the Association Committee, i.e. at the 
intergovernmental level.
The second type of consultation refers to consultation as a cooperative 
instrument, in the sense that it is applied by the competition authorities of the parties. 
For instance, the EU-South Africa agreement also provides in Article 38.4 that in case a 
competition authority decides to conduct an investigation or intends to take any action 
which may have an effect on the interests of the other contracting Party, the parties 
should consult at the request of either party and try to find a mutually acceptable 
solution in the light (among others) of comity considerations. A similar provision is 
included in Article 176 of the EU-Chile agreement, as well as the rules implementing 
the agreements with Algeria and Morocco.'*^*
4.3.4 Positive comity
Of the EU bilateral agreements, only the one with South Africa contains a 
provisions regarding positive comity. In particular. Article 38.4 of the agreement 
provides that: ‘'The Parties agree that, whenever the Commission or the South African 
Competition Authority has reason to believe that anti-competitive practices, defined 
under Article 35, are taking place within the territory o f the other authority and are 
substantially affecting important interests o f  the Parties, it may request the other Party’s 
competition authority to take appropriate remedial action in terms o f  that authority's 
rules governing competition.
460 EU-Bulgaria Art 64.6, EU-Croatia Art 70.9; EU-Romania Art 64.6. Similarly EU-Turkey Art. 38. With regard to Euro-Med 
agreements see EU-Algeria Art 41.3, EU- Egypt Art 34.5, EU-Israel Art 36.5, EU-Jordan Art 53.3 EU-Lebanon interim agreement 
Art 27.3, EU-Morocco Art 36.6, EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement Art 30.7, and EU-Tunisia Art 36.6.
461 See EU-Algeria, Annex 5, Art. 6.1 and Council decision implementing the competition provisions o f the EU-Morocco 
agreement, supra n.399. Article 6.1.
462 Similar provisions are included in the EU-Bulgaria and EU-Romania Association Council Decisions supra n. 393.
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4.3.5 Technical assistance
Almost all the agreements analysed in this section are concluded between the 
EU and developing or in-transition countries, and in this regard the offer of technical 
assistance is a very important condition for the adoption and application of competition 
rules in these countries."*^  ^A general (not specific to competition matters) provision on 
technical assistance is included in most of the EU bilateral agreements. On the other 
hand, some of the agreements also include provisions which require the grant of 
technical assistance specifically in the context of the cooperation of the signing 
countries on competition.
i. Agreements with candidate countries
In particular, in the framework of the obligation of Bulgaria and Romania to 
approximate their laws to those of the EU, the EU clearly takes responsibility to provide 
these countries with technical assistance, which may include among other things, the 
exchange of experts, the organisation of seminars, training activities, and aid for the 
translation of Community legislation in the relevant sectors."^ "^^  Similarly, the SAAs with 
Croatia and FYROM state that in the context of their regional cooperation, the EU will 
support projects having a regional or cross-border dimension through its technical 
assistance programmes."^^^
ii. Euro -  Mediterranean agreements and agreements with former Soviet Union states
Technical assistance provisions are also included in the rules implementing the 
competition provisions of the agreements vdth Algeria and Morocco. In particular, it is 
provided that technical cooperation shall include training of officials, seminars for civil 
servants and studies of competition laws and policies."^^  ^Furthermore, in the case of the 
EU-Egypt agreement there is a clear commitment (in Article 72) undertaken by the EU 
side to make a financial cooperation package available to Egypt, with the aim (among 
others) of establishing and implementing competition legislation.
463 The importance o f technical assistance with regard to the development o f competition law in developing countries is in some 
detail discussed in chapter six o f the thesis, which observes the development of the competition debate at the WTO. See particularly 
section 6.3.2.
464 EU-Bulgaria Art 71, EU-Romania Art 71.
465 EU-Croatia Art 11, EU FYROM, Art 11. Such a provision is absent from the EU-Turkey Customs Union, nonetheless 
substantial technical assistance has been and is being provided to these countries too.
466 See EU-Algeria, Annex 5, Art. 7, and EU-Morocco implementing rules. Art. 7.
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Furthermore, in the context of their legislative cooperation, the EU undertakes a 
commitment to provide a number of the former Soviet Union States with technical 
assistance."^^  ^ Some of these agreements specifically provide for technical assistance on 
competition matters. In particular, the agreements with Moldova and Ukraine provide 
that The Parties agree that they will provide upon request of the other party and within 
available resources, technical assistance for the development and operation of 
competition rules."^ ^^
iii. Agreements with selected trade partners
Finally, the agreement with SA provides that the EU will provide South Africa 
with technical assistance in the context of the restructuring of its competition law and 
policy. The assistance will include the exchange of experts, training activities and the 
organisation of seminars. Article 178 of the EU-Chile agreement provides that ‘the 
Parties may provide each other technical assistance in order to take advantage o f  their 
respective experience and to strengthen the implementation o f  their competition laws 
and policies
iv. Application of technical assistance provisions
With regard to the application of the technical assistance provisions, the EU has 
established different projects to provide its partners with such assistance in the various 
fields that are covered by the agreements.'^^^ It is not quite clear what part of these 
available funds is dedicated to competition law and policy, as there is no single database 
published by the Commission which details the competition-related assistance.
467 EU-Azerbaijan Art 43.3, EU-Armenia Art 43.3, EU-Georgia Art 43.3, EU-Kazakhstan Art 43.3, EU-Kyrgyzstan Art 44.3, EU- 
Uzbekistan Art 42.3.
468 EU-Moldova Art 48.4, EU-Ukraine Art 49.4.
469 For instance, the EU has offered and still offers extensive financial assistance to candidate and accession countries through the 
PHARE (mainly), SAPARD, and ISPA programmes. The EU has also funded the Western Balkan States (Albania, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic o f Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro) through the CARDS programme. 
As of 01/01/2007, the main instrument for technical assistance to candidate and potential candidate countries is the Instrument for 
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). See the EU Commission’s website at
<.http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/financial_assistance/ipa/index_en.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007). Cooperation with 
Mediterranean Countries has been funded through the EU MEDA programme, and with Eastern European and Central Asian 
Countries, through the TACIS programme. See, Commission (EC) (2004), ‘European Neighbourhood Policy: STRATEGY 
PAPER’, COM (2004) 373 final, at 30; See the EC Commission’s website,
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/fmancial_assistance/cards/index_en.htm>. (last visited on 21 May 2007).
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It could be argued that the screening of competition policy in candidate and 
acceding countries during the process of accession definitely includes elements of 
sharing of expertise, in the sense that the Commission uses its expertise to supervise the 
process of alignment of these countries’ competition law and policy to that of the EU. It 
could be equally argued however that given that candidate countries are obliged to 
approximate their competition laws and policies to the EU regime, this sort of 
supervision is mostly embedded assistance and less a voluntary form of cooperation.
That said there are also projects which the EU’s co-signing parties voluntarily 
accept. This is the case for instance vdth the so-called twining programmes, in which, 
by using EU funding, EU member states’ competition authorities assist governments of 
EU’s co-signing countries in their attempt to adopt EU compatible competition laws and 
establish the authorities that would apply the laws. For instance, the Romanian 
competition authority has been assisted by the Italian competition authority on issues of 
enforcement of competition law, in the context of the so-called twinning projects that 
have been financed by the EU."*^  ^A similar project is carried out in Croatia, where the 
competition authority is assisted by the relevant authorities of Germany and Croatia in 
the field of state aid."^ ^^  At the moment, such twinning projects are underway in 
Morocco (with the German competition authority),"^^  ^ Tunisia, and Ukraine (both with 
the French competition authority)."*^^
Another type of technical assistance provided by the EU involves the 
organisation of training programmes for officials of the EU’s co-signing countries. Such 
training programmes are mainly financed by the Technical Assistance and Information 
Exchange programme (TAIEX), and take the form of short-term workshops. As has 
been recently documented, such workshops have been organised on a number of issues.
470 UNCTAD (2007) ‘Criteria for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition Authorities’ Submission by Romania to the Inter­
governmental Group of experts < http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige8pl5Romania_en.pdf> (last visited on 21 
July 2007), at 4-5, where it is also noted that Romania also received technical assistance by the US in the drafting of its competition 
legislation.
471 Croatian Competition Agency (2006) ‘Annual Report of the Croatian Competition Agency for 2005) < 
http://www.aztn.hr/eng/pdfizvjesca/ANNUAL%20REPORT%20aztn%202005%20eng.pdft> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 36.
472 See Commission (EC) (2006) ‘Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the Communication fi-om the Commission to 
the Council and the European Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy; ENP Progress Report, Morocco’, 
COM (2006) final, at 13, where it is also noted nevertheless that a competition directorate is not yet established in Morocco, and the 
Commission prepares an action plan with the aim o f strengthening the role and capacity o f the existing Competition Council and the 
other authorities which apply competition law in Morocco. It is also staed that Morocco’s state aid regime lacks transparency.
473 With regard to Tunisia, see UNCTAD (2006) .‘Voluntary Peer Review o f Competition Policy: Tunisia’ 
(UNCTAD/DlTC/CLP/2006/2), at 26.
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both relating to antitrust and state aid."^ "^^  Finally, technical assistance may take the form 
of internships of competition officials of one country, at the EC Commission. Turkey 
has been a beneficiary of this form of technical assistance.'^^^
4.4 Dispute settlement and the extent to which EU bilateral agreements are 
considered hard law
Having reviewed the substantive and cooperation provisions included in the EU 
bilateral agreements, a final issue to be examined is whether these agreements provide 
for the establishment of a decision body to review cases where a conflict has arisen 
relating to competition. The answer to this question is affirmative, as with the exception 
of Chile,"*^  ^ all the EU agreements include a provision relating to the creation of a 
dispute settlement mechanism that would decide on conflicts that may arise from their 
application.
Specifically, the agreements provide that the parties may refer to the Association 
Council,"^^  ^which consists of government representatives, any dispute arising from the 
application of the agreement. The Council will settle such disputes by means of 
decision, according to most of the agreements."^^* In the case of the agreements with 
Eastern European and Central Asian Countries, with which as noted above the 
cooperation of the EU has been looser, the relevant Council is entitled to settle disputes 
by issuing a recommendation. In addition, with the exception of the agreements with 
candidate countries and the one with the Palestinian Authority, the EU bilateral 
agreements provide for an arbitration procedure, if the Council cannot reach a decision 
on the dispute."^^^
As noted in Chapter 3, the delegation of powers to interpret and implement the 
provisions is one of the elements that determine whether a norm may be considered as 
hard law. Thus, the inclusion of a dispute settlement procedure, not found in bilateral
474 UNCTAD (2005) ‘Communication Submitted by Turkey to the Fifth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the 
Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control o f Restrictive Business Practices’ 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/ tdrbpconf6p043_en.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 6.
475 Ibid.
476 Which explicitly excludes disputes relating to the competition provisions from the dispute settlement provision. EU-Chile Art 
180.
477 Or the Stabilisation and Cooperation Council in the case o f the EU-Croatia Agreement, and the Cooperation Council in the case 
o f the agreement signed with Central Asian and Eastern European countries.
478 All the agreements with Candidate Countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and also flie agreement with South Africa.
479 Such an arbitration procedure is not applied in the agreement concluded between the EU and its candidate countries, and the 
EU-Palestinian Authority interim agreement.
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enforcement cooperation agreements, raises the issue regarding whether such 
agreements may be classified as hard law or soft law. In the case of candidate countries, 
where the operation of the conflict resolution procedure is definitely influenced by the 
commitment of these countries to approximate their laws to those of the EU, and 
consequently the fact that the EU has a substantially extended bargaining power over 
candidate countries, it could be expected that the decisions of the Association Council 
would be binding.
On the other hand, as Szepesi notes, even though the agreements with Euro- 
Mediterranean countries and those with Mexico and South Africa include similar 
dispute settlement provisions, the expected effect of such provisions varies."**® The 
author notes that the agreements with Mexico and South Africa include much more 
detailed rules on Dispute Settlement than the agreements with Mediterranean countries, 
and in particular, as opposed to the latter, they include specific time limits within which 
a decision must be reached. In addition, both the Euro-Mediterranean agreements and 
the agreement with South Afnca include no provisions as to the actions that a 
complaining party may take in case the other party does not comply with the Councils’ 
decision, elements that make their likely effects of limited value. On the other hand, the 
agreement with Mexico is much more elaborate in terms of procedures, time limits and 
actions that the complaining party may take in case of non-compliance.
Apart from delegation of powers, two further components have to be taken into 
consideration in the attempt to evaluate whether the EU bilateral agreements can be 
considered as hard law. These elements are precision of the rules, and obligations 
created by them.
With regard to the former, and at least in terms of substantive competition 
provisions, it may be argued that the extent of activities covered by these agreements 
also varies. For instance, the Europe agreements with Romania and Bulgaria, the SAA 
with Croatia, the Customs Union with Turkey, as well as the Euro-Med agreements and 
the EU-Chile and EU-South Afnca agreements include specific provisions prohibiting 
anticompetitive practices, i.e. agreement between undertakings, and abuse of 
dominance, that have an effect on the trade between the signing countries. The 
agreements with candidate and Mediterranean countries also include provisions on state 
aids. It has been observed that Articles 81, 82, and 87 of the EU Treaty are copied into
480 See Szepesi, (2004), supra n. 9.
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the text of these agreements, and from this perspective, the rules included in these 
agreements are quite precise. On the other hand, the obligation of the candidate 
countries to adopt EU compatible competition rules, an obligation not included in the 
other EU agreements, make the agreements signed with candidate countries far more 
precise than the rest.
In contrast to these agreements, the agreements with the former Soviet Union 
states include no particular substantive competition provisions other than general 
statements that the parties will make their best efforts to resolve problems that arise 
from anticompetitive practices that effect common trade, and therefore the element of 
precision is entirely absent.
With regard to the obligations created by the agreements, it has to be noted that 
every single agreement discussed in this section includes a “catch all" exemption 
clause, similar to Article 30 EC, that reads: "Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude 
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds 
o f public morality, public policy or public security; the protection o f  health and life o f  
humans, animals or plants; the protection o f  national treasures possessing artistic, 
historic or archaeological value; or the protection o f  intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property or regulations concerning, gold and silver. Such prohibitions or 
restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means o f  arbitrary discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.
Furthermore all the agreements include a national security clause which exempts 
the application of competition rules on issues relating to national security of the Parties. 
Another sector exempted from the application of competition law in most of the 
agreements discussed in this section is agriculture. Finally, the Parties may terminate 
these agreements any time subject to six months prior notification.
Despite the wide list of exceptions and the ability to terminate the agreements at 
any time, as suggested in various parts of the chapter, the extent to which EU’s co­
signing countries are obliged to apply the provisions of the agreements depends upon its 
economic and political closeness with the other state. In this respect it has been noted 
that only candidate countries are in practice obliged to apply the rules contained in the
481 EU-Croatia Art 42, EU Bulgaria Art 36, EU-Romania Art 36, EU-Turkey Art?, EU-Algeria Art 27, EU-Egypt Art 26, EU- 
lsrael Art 27, EU-Jordan Art 27, EU Lebanon interim agreement Art 23, EU-Morocco Art 28, EU-Palestinian Authority interim 
agreement Art 24, EU-Tunisia Art 28, U-Armenia Art 16, EU-Azerbaijan Art 16, EU-Georgia Art 16, EU-Kazakhstan Art 15, EU- 
Kyrgyzstan Art 15, EU-Moldova Art 19, EU-Russia Art 19, EU-Ukraine Art 20, and EU-Uzbekistan Art 15.
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agreements, since their application is a non-negotiable requirement for their access in 
the EU. Neither the agreements with Mediterranean countries nor the agreements with 
former Soviet Union states and selected trade partners entail such a commitment and 
therefore the extent to which such agreements could be classified as hard law or soft law 
is a matter mostly determined by the extent to which the signing states aim to cooperate. 
As observed, in the case of the EU agreements, the level of cooperation and 
commitment in the case of Europe agreements, is much higher than the agreements 
signed with Mediterranean and former Soviet Union states, as well as the agreements 
signed with South Africa, Chile and Mexico. This assumption also substantiates the 
argument that in the field of international law in general, and more particularly in that of 
trade agreements, one may observe a lack of clear hierarchy between general 
international law and treaties, and more generally, between any two rules of 
international law, as the rights and obligations that arise from international agreements 
derive from the will or consent of states."^ *^
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that being the strongest economic player in the 
region, the EU has used bilateral trade agreements to put into context its political and 
trade relations with a number of countries. The 23 agreements reviewed here in addition 
to the - no longer in force - 10 agreements signed with the countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 make the EU the most extensive user of this particular instrument in the field of 
international relations."**  ^ Three broad categories of such agreements have been 
identified. The first includes candidates wishing to join the EU countries. The second 
encompasses countries that have been included in the European Neighbourhood policy.
482 Pauwelyn, J. (2001) ‘The Role o f Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ 95:3 The American Journal of 
International Law, 534, at 536.
483 In fact this nexus o f bilateral agreements will be further expanded soon with the conclusion o f a number of Economic 
Partnership agreements between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, in the context of the Cotonou Agreement. See 
Hurt, S.R. (2003) ‘Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End 
of the Lome' Conventiai’ 24:1 Third World Quarterly, 161. It is noteworthy that this argument has been recently confirmed by a 
senior EC Commission official who noted that “ ...we are just starting negotiations on a new generation of market access driven Free 
Trade Agreements (FTA), which should have a strong competition dimension, ensuring that the positive changes induced by 
globalisation are not jeopardised by private anticompetitive practices or State induced distortions. Given that competition matters are off 
the agenda of the multilateral negotiations for now, we would try to move on competition issues bilaterally in the context of the new 
generation of market-access driven Free Trade Agreements (FTA).’ See Galindo -  Rodriguez B. (2007) ‘European Competition Policy, 
development, and protectionism’ Speech delivered at the Sixth Armual ICN Conference, Moscow, 
<htQ)://www.intemational competitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference_6th_moscow_2007/34SpeechofBlancaRodriguezGalindoE 
uropeanCommissiononCompetitionandDevelopment.pdf^. (last visited 21 May 2007).
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a project launched by the EU after the completion of the 2004 enlargement, and is based 
on two groups of agreements: agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries and 
agreements with former Soviet Union states. Finally, the EU has also been involved in 
agreements with selected trade partners, which is a third category of EU agreements 
reviewed in this chapter.
All these agreements include competition law provisions. While it has been 
suggested that, depending on the particular category of the agreement, the wording of 
the agreements are similar or at times identical, the chapter has shown that there are 
variations not just across but within categories. This has made the attempt to review 
such a large number of agreements difficult; nevertheless, it is also a departure from the 
relevant literature on this issue, which tends to view EU bilateral agreements as 
homogenous in terms of provisions on competition.
On the other hand, a common element of these agreements is that they include 
competition law provisions, in the attempt of the signing parties to secure that 
liberalisation of intraregional trade will not be distorted by anticompetitive practices. 
Hence competition law, at least conceptually, is to be used in the way that the EU itself 
has used competition law and policy, i.e. both as a way to secure competitive conditions 
in the market, and as an additional tool for the achievement of market integration with 
its trade partners. This argument leads to a number of consequences, identified in the 
chapter.
First the agreements include competition provisions to be applied to practices 
which have an effect on the intraregional market. In this respect, the agreements with 
candidate and Euro-Mediterranean countries, as well as those with Chile, Mexico and 
South Africa, provide that anticompetitive practices and abuse of dominance which 
have an effect on the common market are prohibited. Following the EU model, most of 
the agreements also provide for rules relating to state aids, state monopolies of a 
commercial character and public undertakings, and this is a clear indication that through 
these agreements the EU has, at least in terms of the text of the agreements, successfully 
exported its competition model to its trade partners.
Second, the agreements require that the signing countries have in place domestic 
competition rules and authorities to apply the rules, an assumption that is in certain 
cases explicitly referred to in the agreements, while in other agreements the parties 
leave this issue to be addressed with later decisions by the Association or Stabilisation
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Councils, or they undertake a general commitment to have and enforce competition 
laws.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the actual application of the 
agreements to a major extent depends on the political and economic closeness of the EU 
with its co-signing countries. For example, the competition provisions found in the 
agreements with candidate countries have been most rigorously applied in the context of 
those countries’ aim to access the EU, on the basis of which these countries undertook 
enormous non-negotiable, uniformly applied and closely enforced commitments.'^*'^ 
Upon accession, candidate countries have to fully apply the competition rules of the EU, 
and therefore the Commission closely reviews the development of their competition 
regimes. At the opposite side and concerning the provisions included in the agreements 
with former Soviet Union states, the competition provisions are looser and include only 
general statements from the parties that they will have competition rules in place.
A further observation made in the chapter is that while the EU bilateral 
agreements mostly include substantive competition provisions, some of them also 
provide for cooperation on competition law and policy, which includes notification of 
cases, exchange of information and consultations on cases of mutual interest. Given that 
most of the EU co-signing states are in-transition economies, and therefore have no 
experience on the operation of competition law and policy, probably the most important 
cooperation provision is the one relating to technical assistance. The chapter has argued 
that while the EU has established separate funding instruments for the different groups 
of countries with which it has adopted bilateral agreements, it is not really clear what 
part of these funds have been used to finance technical assistance projects on 
competition. That said it has been also identified that technical assistance has been 
granted to a number of countries, and takes various forms such as twinning projects, the 
organisation of seminars, and internships at the EC Commission.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the provisions on cooperation 
represent only a starting point for real cooperation, as the extent to which actual 
cooperation is carried out in the field of competition law and policy is mostly a matter 
of the parties’ broader economic and political relations. This argument is not much
484 Vachudova, M.A. (2002) ‘The Leverage of the European Union on the Reform in Post Communist Europe’, paper presented at 
the workshop ‘Enlargement and European Governance’ ECPR Joint Session Workshops, Turin, 22-27 March 2002, 
<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/turin/ws4/Vachudova.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 10; 
Glenn, J.K. (2004) ‘From Nation-States to Member States: Accession Negotiations as an Instrument o f Europeanization’ 2 
Comparative European Politics, 3.
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different than the one made in the case of bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, 
and despite the fact that the bilateral EU trade agreements are much closer to hard law 
than enforcement cooperation agreements, as they are more precise than the latter and 
also provide for a dispute settlement procedure with the aim of resolving conflicts that 
would arise from their application. That said, even though bilateral trade agreements 
provide for a higher degree of obligations for the signing parties, the level of such 
obligations varies in accordance with the group of countries under examination. In this 
respect, cooperation with candidate countries, which undertake the obligation to 
approximate their rules to those of the EU and aim to enter the EU is fierce, while 
cooperation with the EU’s other partners varies.
Returning to the main question that the thesis attempts to address, i.e. the role of 
EC competition law and policy in the formation of international agreements on 
competition, and based on the analysis carried out in this chapter, it could be argued that 
the EU has played a significant role in the development of international rules in the field 
of bilateral trade agreements. The EU has in practice used these agreements to export its 
competition model to a large number of neighbouring countries, some of which are 
already candidates for accession countries and selected trade partners.
Irrespective of whether the EU model is appropriate for these countries, a 
difficult issue that the thesis does not touch upon, the inclusion of competition elements 
in such a large number of international agreements makes by itself the role of the EU on 
the formation of international competition rules significant. On the other hand, the 
extent to which these agreements have been implemented in practice varies. The closer 
the political and economic relations of the co-signing party with the EU, the more 
rigorous the implementation of the agreement. In addition, in view of the fact that most 
of these agreements have been adopted in the last five to ten years, and that, as noted in 
Chapter 2, it takes time for countries with little or no competition culture to develop 
competition regimes, it would be unrealistic to expect that such a large number of 
agreements could be equally applied in a short period. That said, the provisions found in 
these agreements are definitely a starting point for the adoption and, more importantly, 
the application of effective competition rules, which is an assumption that may only be 
tested in the future.
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Chapter 5: Plurilateral Regional Agreements Which Include Competition Provisions
Abstract
This chapter discusses plurilateral regional agreements, i.e. agreements signed 
by three or more neighbouring countries. Hence, the chapter looks at agreements similar 
to the EU. The aim of the chapter is twofold. The first is to review the competition 
regimes of such agreements and the second is to identify features of these regimes that 
may be attributed to the EU, which itself is the prominent example of a plurilateral 
regional agreement which has developed sophisticated competition law and policy.
Section 1 of the chapter includes a historical review of the formation of 
plurilateral regional agreements in various parts of the world, and introduces the 
agreements whose competition regimes are further reviewed in this study. It also briefly 
reviews the reasons which lead to the adoption of such agreements and discusses the 
role of competition law and policy in the context of plurilateral regional agreements. 
Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of the EU competition regime, and section three 
discusses the relevant regimes found in other plurilateral regional agreements around 
the world. Section 4 reads comparatively the provisions discussed in Sections 2 and 3, 
and attempts to explain the different models of the various competition regimes of 
plurilateral regional agreements, both in terms of substance and institutional set up. 
Finally Section 5 attempts to evaluate the role of the EU in the formation of competition 
rules in the context of plurilateral regional agreements.
5.1. History of plurilateral regional agreements, reasons that led to their adoption 
and the role of competition law and policy
5.1.1 Historical development of plurilateral regional agreements, and agreements 
reviewed in this chapter
i. Europe
While there is an overarching tendency of states in the last 20 years to get 
involved in plurilateral regional trade agreements, the origins of the creation of such 
agreements in various parts of the world go back to earlier centuries. For instance in 
Europe, which is the continent where regionalism has been more developed than 
anywhere else in the world, the ideas about unification of European countries originate
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back in medieval times."^ ®^  As seen in the previous chapter, a number of bilateral trade 
agreements were concluded between these countries in the 19^ century, and the 
Prussian Zollverein established in 1834 was considered the first regional-plurilateral 
agreement is the world. These agreements lost favour in the first half of the 20^ century, 
as nationalistic policies dominated the region and led to two destructive World Wars."^ *^  
Nevertheless, following the WWII, a wide network of agreements was created in 
Europe,"^*  ^ including the European Economic Community - which later became the 
European Union and which has been to date the most comprehensive and successful 
relevant initiative in the history - as well as the European Free Trade Association and 
The European Economic Area."*^ ^
ii. Latin America
This tendency for the creation of plurilateral regional agreements also appeared 
as early as the 18* and 19^ centuries in certain other parts of the world, such as South 
America and Africa. In particular, in Latin America in the 19* century, Simon de 
Bolivar succeeded in uniting the territories of what are now Ecuador, Colombia, 
Venezuela and Panama into what he termed ‘Nueva Granada’ Following WWII, 
ideas concerning régionalisation were once more widespread in Latin America. With the 
EEC being the model, two major agreements were concluded in the 1960s, namely the
485 See Kalijarvi, T.V. (1963) ‘Obstacles to European Unification’ 348 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, The New Europe: Implications for the United States, 46.
486 That said, in the interwar period there were voices in many Western European Couitries that supported the creation of a Federal 
State in the region. See Dinan, D. (2004) Europe Recast: A History of the European Union (Lynne Rienner), at pp. 2-6.
487 Sapir, A. (2000) ‘Trade Regionalism in Europe: Towards an Integrated Approach’ 38 Journal o f Common Market Studies, 151.
488 For a brief overview o f the historical development o f the EU, see Appendix II.
489 Both EFTA and the EEA have adopted substantive competition rules identical to those o f the EU, while in terms o f institutional 
set up, both agreements include detailed rules. The chapter focuses on the examination o f the EU competition law and policy 
system, which has been the model on which EFTA and the EEA have been both based. The EEA competition provisions are 
applicable whenever an anticompetitive practice has an influence on the territory o f one or more EU Member States and one or more 
EFTA Member States, and where a practice has an effect on the trade between EFTA Member States. As to the former, concurrent 
jurisdiction is granted to the EC Commission and the EFTA Surveillance Authority to apply competition law. As to the later, the 
EFTA Surveillance Authority has the competence to review the case, and its decision is subject to an appeal before the EFTA Court 
o f Justice. In relation to mergers that fall within the realm o f the EC Merger Regulation, the EC Commission has the exclusive 
competence in the EEA to review mergers with a Community dimension. See the website o f the EU at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ intemational/multilateral/eea.html> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
490 Vervaele, J. AE (2005) ‘MERCOSUR and Regional Integration in Latin America’ 54 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 387, at 389.
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Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA/^^ and the Central America Common 
Market (CACM)/^^ with the aim of promoting economic cooperation between the 
signing states, and a certain extent, of countering balance the hegemony of the US in the 
north part of the continent/^^ In subsequent years, two other major plurilateral regional 
blocs were set up in the region, namely the Andean Community in 1969 and 
MERCOSUR in 1989, both presently in operation and whose competition systems are 
further discussed in this chapter/^"^
iii. Africa
In Africa, the debate over regional integration and cooperation goes back to 
colonial times and became much more active following the WWII and especially 
following the independence of the majority of African countries in the late 1950s.'^^  ^ In 
1963, the Organisation of African Union was established with the Treaty of Addis 
Ababa, which stressed the importance of the participating states’ sovereignty, in the 
sense of non-interference with these states’ internal affairs."^^  ^ Hence the organisation 
was in fact a plurilateral conference of heads of governments, and the organising
491 LAFTA included all South America countries plus Mexico. High barriers to external trade were maintained, and in general 
Member States sought to regulate economic activity by legal agreements rather than by opening up the markets. Thus in general it 
has been observed that the agreement served mostly political rather than economic purposes, and it was finally replaced in 1980 by 
the Latin American Integration Association, which consists o f 12 countries, (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), and is mainly structured around bilateral trade preferences. For a brief 
review o f this regional arrangement see the IMF Directory o f Economic, Commodity and Development Organizations, 
<http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/decdo/laia.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
492 CACM was established in 1960 by four countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, while in 1963 Costa Rica 
joined the agreement. The agreement included provisions related not only to commercial policy, but also to financial, fiscal, 
monetary, and industrial policies. In the first years o f its operation the agreement was a major success, nonetfieless, it collapsed in 
1969, due to the war between Honduras and El Salvador. CACM was revived in 1991 when the five central American Countries 
plus Panama signed the Protocol o f Tegucigalpa with the aim o f  facilitating economic and political integration in the region. 
Despite the ambitious goals, such as the gradual creation o f a customs union, a central customs authority and eventually the 
achievement o f free movement of labour, capital, and the establishment o f a monetary Union, the agreement has not been a success, 
as Panama has not ratifred the Treaty and Costa Rica has opposed the creation o f a monetary Union and more generally it has 
abstained from the attempts for political integration. See Wionczek, M S. (1970) ‘The Rise and Decline o f Latin American 
Economic Integration’ 9:1 Journal o f Common Market Studies, 49, at 56-58.
493 Hufbauer, G.C. and B. Kotschwar (1998) ‘The Future o f Regional Trading Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere’, Paper 
prepared for the Michigan State University 10th Anniversary Conference. Institute o f  International Economics Paper, 
<http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfrn? ResearchID=3I8>, (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 1.
494 On the main aims and institutional set up of these two agreements, see Appendix II.
495 See Adedeji, A. (2002) ‘History and Prospects for Regional Integration in Africa’ Speech presented at the Third Meeting of the 
African Development Forum, Addis Abeba, 5 March 2002, <http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/S^eeches/2002_speeches/ 
030502adebayo.htm.> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
496 See Gottschalk, K. and S. Schmidt (2004) ‘The African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development: Strong 
Institutions for Weak States?’ 4 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 138.
146
principles were intergovernmental, as consensus was required to adopt decisions, while 
the role and powers of its supranational secretariat were limited/^^ Despite some 
attempts to strengthen the political and economic cooperation and integration in the 
region,"^^* a number of problems mainly relating to the political instability in the 
Member States, and most importantly the absence of sufficient institutions to carry out 
these demanding tasks, made the operation of the organisation problematic, and led to 
the adoption of the Treaty of Lome in 2000, which created the new African Union."^ ^^
The African Union is the most inclusive regional organisation on the African 
continent, as 53 different African States participate in it. Under the umbrella of the 
Union,^ ®® there are currently 14 plurilateral regional agreements in force in Africa, vydth 
overlapping membership,^®^ and varying structures, levels of integration, and 
objectives.^®  ^ According to a recent IMF study, these agreements usually have 
ambitious goals, for example the five major agreements in the region^®  ^aim to establish 
a customs union, and therefore require strong political commitment by the contracting 
parties. Nonetheless such a commitment has not proved strong in the past, as there have 
been long delays in the application of the agreements, and policy reversals by the 
Member States governments.^®"  ^ Second, these agreements are primarily focused on 
intraregional tariff reduction, and include variant and detailed rules of origin. Third, 
despite the attempts to reduce intraregional tariffs, external trade barriers remain
497 According to Article III of the Treaty, ‘The Member States, in pursuit o f the purposes stated in Article II solemnly affirm and 
declare their adherence to the following principles: I. The sovereign equality o f all Member States. 2. Non-interference in the 
internal affairs o f States... ’
498 Mainly through the establishment o f an economic community in 34 years (in accordance with Article 6(1) o f the Abuja Treaty 
o f 1991, which established the African Economic Community, <http://www.africa- 
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/Text/AEC_Treaty_l 991 .pdfr>.
499See African Union (2007) ‘African Union in a Nutshell’, <http://www.africa-union.org/ root/au/AboutAu/au_in_a_nutshell 
_en.htm> (last visited in 21 May 2007).
500 One o f whose aims is to harmonise the rules provided by tie various regional agreements in the continent See ibid.
501 This overlapping membership sometimes causes major problems with regard to the operation o f particular agreements. For 
instance, Kenya and Uganda are members of both the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Afnca. The EAC already operates as a Customs Union, applying an external tariff o f  of 0, 10, and 25% (with the exemption o f 
particular sensitive products). On the other hand, COMESA was prepared to launch a common external tariff o f 0, 5, 15, and 30 
percent. Given that Kenya and Uganda are bound by the EAC common external tariff, the initiation o f the COMESA tariff, 
scheduled for November 2004, were posqioned, and this problem has not yet been solved. See Khandelwal, P. (2004) ‘COMESA 
and SADC: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Trade Integration’ IMF Working Paper, WP/04/227, at 10.
502 See Nyirabu, M. (2004) ‘Appraising Regional Integration in Southern Africa’ 13:1 African Security Review, 21.
503 (ECOWAS, WAEMU, COMESA CEMAC and SADC).
504 See Yang, Y. and S. Gupta (2005) ‘Regional Trade Arrangements in Africa: Past Performance and the Way Foreword’, IMF 
Working Paper, WP/05/36, at 12-15.
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high/^^ Of these agreements, six are reviewed in this chapter: the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU); the East African Cooperation (EAC); the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA); the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)/^^
iv. North America and Carribean
In contrast to Europe, Latin America, and Africa, in North America regionalism 
has occurred only in the last 15 years, and this shift towards régionalisation is mostly a 
consequence of the decision by the US Government in the mid 1980s to adopt a two- 
track approach regarding international trade liberalisation by adding the adoption of 
preferential trading agreements to its traditional encouragement of multilateral trade 
liberalisation.^®^ The outcome of this policy was the adoption of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the negotiations over a possible wide ranging Free 
Trade Agreements of the Americas (FTAA). The competition provisions of these 
agreements, along with the relevant regimes of the Central America Free Trade 
Agreement plus Dominican Republic (CAFTA- DR), and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), a plurilateral agreement formed by Caribbean countries, are briefly 
discussed in this chapter.
V. Asia
Finally, among the regions discussed in this thesis, Asia has been the last one to 
embark on the establishment of plurilateral regional trade agreements. Even to date, the 
major powers of the region, such as Japan, South Korea and China, prefer to get 
involved in bilateral free trade agreements with selected trade partners and not 
plurilateral trading schemes.^®* The main exception to this general observation is the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which along with the Asia-Pacific 
Community (APEC), a cross-regional organisation that includes members from four 
continents, is further reviewed in this chapter.
505 Ibid.
506 These agreements, along with the Economic Community for Central African states (ECCAS), are the agreements with the most 
significant economic impact in the region. See Yang, andOupta ibid, at 10.
507 Krueger, A O. (2000) ‘NAFTA’s Effects: A Preliminary Assessment’ 23:6 The World Economy, 761, at 761-763.
508 See Hufbauer, G.C., and Y. Wong (2005) ‘Prospects for Regional Free Trade in Asia’, HE Working P ^ er, WP 05-12.
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Table 5.1. Plurilateral agreements reviewed in Chapter 5 (For an overview of the
AGREEMENT Formed
(Year) Type of Agreement
Current Status of the 
Bloc Continent
Number
of
Member
/Negoti­
ating
States
EU 1957
CU-Common 
Market- Monetary 
Union
CU-Common Market- 
Monetary Union Europe 27
ANDEAN
COMMUNITY 1969 Free Trade Area Free Trade Area
Latin
America 4
MERCOSUR 1989 CU Partial CU (on 90% of products)
Latin
America 4
NAFTA 1994 Free Trade Area Free Trade Area by 2008
North
America 3
FTAA - Under negotiations (stagnant) -
North and 
Latin 
America
34
CAFTA-DR 2005 Free Trade Agreement
Immediate Free Trade 
Area on 80% of 
products and eventual 
full FTA in 10 years 
from adoption
North-
Central
America
7
CARICOM 1973 Single Market Partial single Market Caribbean 15
WAEMU 1994
CU-Common 
Market- Monetary 
Union
Monetary Union -  
partial CU and 
Common Market
Africa 7
EAC
1967 - 
collapsed in 
1977- 
Revived in 
1999
CU (aim: Common 
Market and 
Monetary Union)
CU Africa 3
COMESA 1993 CU
FTA for 11 Member 
States, PTA for 9 and 
aim: CU by 2008
Africa 20
SACU
fc'
1910 
(Amended 
1969 and 
2002)
CU CU Africa 5
SADC 1992 FTA
FTA for all Member 
States except Angola 
and D.R. Congo -  aim: 
CU by 2010, Common 
Market by 2015 and a 
monetary union by 
2018
Africa 15
ECOWAS
1975-
amended
1993
Aim: Economic and 
Monetary Union
Aim non accomplished, 
economic integration 
very slow
Africa 15
ASEAN
1 9 7 7 -
amended
1995
FTA
Aim: Full FTA for 5 
members in 2010, for 
all Members in 2015. 
Economic Union by 
2020
Asia 9
APEC 1989
Informal forum 
promoting economic 
liberalisation
-
cross-
regional 21
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5.1.2. Factors that lead to the creation of plurilateral-regional agreements
In an attempt to review briefly the factors that lead to the establishment of 
plurilateral regional agreements, an initial observation is that, with the exception of 
APEC, all the agreements discussed in this chapter share a significant common 
characteristic: they are regional blocs, i.e. they are formed by neighbouring countries. 
The assumption that people living in geographically close countries develop a certain 
community of political and economic interests, and this leads to the creation of formal 
international norms, was first tested in 1943, when a paper published in the American 
Political Science Review attempted to identify the characteristics of regionalism and 
universalism.^®^ Geographic proximity remains probably the most important factor that 
leads to the conclusion of such agreements, since it is believed that neighbouring 
countries are ‘natural’ trading partners,^*® and on the basis of this assumption a number 
of scholars have suggested that FTAs among regional groupings would usually have 
positive effects.^
Other factors that have been identified as significant in the decision of countries 
to establish regional agreements include the belief that the creation of larger (regional) 
markets would enable participating states to exploit economies of scale, increase 
domestic competition, and thus raise returns on investment and attract more foreign 
direct investm ent.^In  addition, it has been argued that the formation of plurilateral 
regional blocs is linked to the attempt of certain neighbouring states to achieve peace 
and security in the region, as well as the attempt of particular groups of neighbouring 
countries to counterbalance the negotiating powers of other (existing) regional blocs. As 
to the former, it has been argued that the formation of the European Union was a way to 
ensure that France and Germany would not repeat the wars they fought during the 
preceding hundred years. The same arguments regarding democracy, peace and 
economic stability were raised in the negotiations with three more recent Member 
States, that is Greece, Spain and Portugal, which suffered from dictatorships a few years
509 Potter, P.B. (1943) ‘Universalism Versus Regionalism in International Organisation’ 37:5 The American Political Science 
Review, 850, at 852. See also pp 853 onwards for a critique on the arguments developed pro and against regional integration.
510 Despite the fact that in the last 10 years or so both the EU and the US have concluded agreements with countries that are not 
geographically close to them. For instance EU has signed trade agreements with Mexico, Chile and South Africa, and the US with 
Singapore and Jordan.
511 Krugman, P. (1991) ‘The Move to Free Trade Zones’ in Policy Implications o f Trade and Currency Zones (Federal Reserve 
Bank o f Kansas City, Kansas City), pp. 7-42.
512Yang, Y. and S. Gupta (2005), supra n. 504, at 9.
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before their accession to the C o m m u n i t y / A s  to the latter (counter-balancing of 
negotiating powers of other regional blocs)^ '^* it has been argued that both MERCOSUR 
and the ANDEAN Community have been considered as a response to the establishment 
of NAFTA and the launch of negotiations for an FTAA/^^ Similarly, as Young and 
Gupta argue, the creation of plurilateral trade agreements in Africa is, inter alia, an 
expression of the assumption that regional trade agreements increase the bargaining 
power of the participating states in international trade negotiations, especially in Africa, 
which consists of a large number of poor states/^^ This debate directly refers to political 
realism, as it indicates that the main motive behind the conclusion of plurilateral trade 
agreements is the will of particular groups of countries to increase their power over 
other groupings/*^
5.1.3 EU strategv regarding the formation and operation of plurilateral regional 
agreements
A final (relevant) point concerning the broader issue under discussion is the 
overall strategy of the EU in the formation of other plurilateral agreements. As Bilal 
notes, the EU supports other regional initiatives in various forms.^^* First, the support is 
expressed by a general political support to these initiatives, which includes sharing of 
the EU’s experience in the development of its own regional system. Such support for 
the operation of other regional agreements is evident for instance in the position taken 
by the EC Commission with relation to the negotiation of Economic Partnership
513 See Eichengreen, B. and J. A. Frankel (1995) ‘Economic Regionalism: Evidence from Two 20th Century Episode’ 6:2 The 
North American Journal o f Economics and Finance, 89, at p. 103, where the authors argue that the motives behind the negotiations 
with former Members o f the Soviet Union was also the promotion o f peace, democracy and eventual stability in the region. 
Similarly, as noted in Appendix II, among the main reasons that led to the creation o f MERCOSUR, was to avoid possible hostilities 
between the two stronger states in the region, i.e. Brazil and Argentina. The authors argue that the motives behind the negotiations 
with former Members o f the Soviet Lhion was also die promotion o f peace, democracy and eventual stability in the region.
514 See Mansfield, E.D. and E. Reinhardt (2003) ‘Multilateral Determinants o f Regionalism: The Effects o f  GATT/WTO on the 
Formation o f Preferential Trading Agreements’ 57 International Organization, 829.
515 Brown, O., F. Haq Shaheen, S. Rafi Khan, and M. Yusuf (2005) ‘Regional Trade Agreements: Promoting Conflict or Building 
Peace?’ International Institute for Sustainable Development Working Paper, at 6.
516 Yang and Gupta, supra n.504, at 25. The authors note that while Africa has 12% of the world’s population, it produces only 2 
percent o f the world’s output, because o f low productivity.
517 Chapter 6 examines the process o f negotiations for a multilateral competition agreement and argues that various developing 
countries have coordinated their actions, and through their regional blocks have consistently expressed their disagreement to the 
possible adoption o f a multilateral %reement on competition under the auspices o f the WTO.
518 Bilal, S. (2004) ‘Can the EU Be a Model and a Driving Force for Regional Integration in Developing Countries?’ Paper 
presented at the Second Annual Conference o f the Euro-Latin Study Network on Integration and Trade, Florence, Italy, October 29- 
30, 2004, <http://www.ecdpm.orgAVeb_BCDPMAVeb/Content/DownloadJisf/0/22194B4795A077D5C1256F9E0053FC38/$FILE/ 
Bilal%20-%20EU%20model%20of%20RI%20Draft%20rev.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at p. 9.
151
Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACPs) countries. The 
Commission notes that regional integration in these regions is among the focal aims of 
the negotiations, along with partnership, development, and compliance with the WTO 
provisions. As the Commission states, ‘Regional integration is a powerful means o f  
fostering integration into the world economy. The EU itself has built its strength on 
regional integration. The recent progress made in regional integration within the ACP 
reflects the political decision o f  the ACP States to base their own integration into the 
world economy on regional economic integration. EPAs will therefore be based on 
regional integration initiatives existing in the ACP. They will keep step with the 
integration process within the ACP, as provided for in the Constitutive Act o f  the 
African Union or as agreed among the ACP States as a whole.
Besides providing political support and experience sharing, the EU has also 
committed a substantial share of its development aid and technical assistance to the 
support of regional initiatives, which is one of the six priority areas of its development 
assistance. In the framework of its partnership with the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
states (Cotonou Partnership Agreement), and as noted in chapter 4 the Mediterranean 
countries (MEDA), the EU has jointly carried out regional indicative programmes in 
parallel with aid granted to particular states.^^®
On the other hand, the EU is in the process of formalising its relationship with 
other plurilateral regional agreements through the negotiation of association agreements 
with regional blocs such as the ANDEAN Community, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN, as 
well as in the context of the Cotonou Agreement with African, Caribbean and Pacific 
c o u n t r i e s . A s  Meunier and Nicolaidis argue, the EU sees itself as a role model for 
other regional agreements, and through the negotiation of such inter-regional
519 See the website of the Commission, at <htQ)://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/aq)/ nepa_en.htm> (last visited on 21 
May 2007). In a similar vein, the Commission has also stated on another occasion that the opinion that regional integration can 
‘enhance efficiency, increase competition between peers in development, enable economies o f scale, increase attractiveness to 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and secure greater bargaining power.... [and that] regional integration can contribute to the 
consolidation o f peace and security’. In addition, the Commission notes that ‘...regional integration is enhanced when co-operation 
goes beyond border measures and is extended to deeper integration, including the convergence o f domestic policies such as 
investment and competition policies...’. See Commission (EC) (2002) Communication to the Council and the European Parliament 
‘Trade and Development: Assisting Developing Countries to Benefit from Trade’, 18 September 2002, COM(2002) 513 final, at p. 
13.
520 See B ila l, supra n. 518, at 9.
521 See in detail the website o f the Commission, at <http://ec.europa.eu/extemal_relations/search /regions.htm> (last visited on 21 
May 2007).
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agreements it aims to exploit economies of scale through market a c c e s s . T h e  authors 
also argue that by these agreements, as in the case of bilateral agreements discussed in 
chapter 4, the EU attempts to export its single market rules, and therefore includes in the 
agreements areas which include the environment, competition or intellectual property 
standards.^^^ While it would be difficult to evaluate these argument - given that none of 
the inter-regional agreements have been concluded - these assumptions will be revisited 
in section 5 of the chapter, in the context of the evaluation of the role of the EU and its 
laws in the formation of competition regimes in various other plurilateral regional 
agreements.^^"*
5.1.4 The role of competition law and policv in plurilateral regional agreements, and the 
role of plurilateral regional agreements in the development of international competition 
norms
A s in the case of bilateral trade agreements. Appendix II shows that competition 
law is only one of the legal tools adopted in the context of these agreements, and at least 
in theory, its role is to ensure that trade liberalisation on the borders of these blocs’ 
Member States is not hampered by anticompetitive practices conducted by private 
firms. In this regard, it could be argued that the more advanced the level of economic 
integration, the more vigorous the intraregional activity of private companies and, in 
consequence, the more demanding the need for effective competition regimes. This 
argument is substantiated by the fact that the EU has been the plurilateral regional 
agreement with both the deepest level of economic integration and the most developed 
competition regime in the world. At the opposite side, of equal significance is the role 
that competition law may play in the achievement of market integration, and this is a 
hypothesis also verified in the development of the EU, where, as was noted, competition 
law and policy has been used to facilitate market integration.
From a different perspective, it may be also argued that the inclusion of 
competition law and policy in such agreements is an important factor influencing the 
development of international competition norms. It could be argued, in particular, that 
the competition regimes provided by these agreements, some of which include a wide
522 Meunier, S. and K. Nicolaidis (2006) ‘The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power’ 13:6 Journal o f European Public 
Policy, 906, at 91 land 915. See also Elgstrom, O. (2007) ‘Outsiders’ Perceptions o f the European Union in International Trade 
Negotiations’, 45 Journal of Common Market Studies, 949, at 955 -  956.
523 Ibid at 914.
524 See section 5.5. below.
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number of Member States, ma y be considered as a miniature of a possible future 
multilateral agreement on competition, and this hypothesis is based on the fact that as 
opposed to bilateral agreements, where in practice the stronger state on many occasions 
imposes the adoption of regulatory measures on weaker ones, plurilateral agreements 
are characterised by a more balanced distribution of national influence, and therefore 
they simulate to a certain extent the possible operation of competition law and policy at 
the multilateral level.
In addition, if all of these agreements have the success of the EU, the 
proliferation of such agreements may in the future lead to a situation where a handful of 
representatives from these regional blocs negotiate at the international level on behalf of 
the Member States. Such a hypothesis, which could be of major significance with regard 
to competition law and policy, is to a certain extent validated in the next chapter, where 
it is observed that on particular trade issues under negotiations at the WTO not only 
does the EU negotiate on behalf its Member States, but in practice the members of more 
regional blocs such as the African Union and CARICOM express a common unified 
approach at this level.^^^
On the other hand, it also has to be noted that with the exception of the EU, 
whose competition regime has been widely researched, only very recently have the 
competition systems of plurilateral regional agreements been discussed in the relevant 
literature;^^^ the motives behind the inclusion of competition rules in plurilateral 
regional agreements in general are equally under-researched. Besides, as shown in 
Section 3, which reviews the competition regimes of various plurilateral regional 
agreements, with the exception of WAEMU, regional competition rules have not been 
applied to date for a number of reasons. In this regard, it is not possible to assess the 
actual effect of competition rules in these agreements, unless detailed analysis of the
525 See below, chapter 6, section 6.3.2.
526 Exceptions to this general observation are papers written by Beilis and Hoekman in the late 1990s, and by Jenny and Homa, as 
well as Desya and Barnes more recently. See Beilis, J.F. (1997) ‘The Treatment o f Dumping, Subsidies and Anticompetitive 
Practices in Regional Trade Agreements’ in Demaret, P., J.-F. Beilis and G. Garcia Jiménez (eds). Regionalism and Multilateralism 
after the Uruguay Round: Convergence, Divergence and Interaction. (European Interuniversity Press, Brussels); Hoekman, B. 
(1998) ‘Free Trade and Deep Integration. Anti-Dumping and Antitrust in Regional Agreements’ World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, No. 1950; Jenny, F. and P. Homa (2005) ‘Modernization o f the European System o f the Competition Law 
Enforcement: Lessons for Other Regional Groupings’, in Brusick, Alvarez and Cemat (eds) Competition Provisions in Regional 
Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains (UNCTAD, Geneva and New York); Desta, M.G., and N. J. Barnes (2006) 
‘Competition Law and Regional Trade Agreements’ in Lorand Bartels and Federico Ortino (eds.) Regional Trade Agreements and 
the WTO Legal System (Oxford University Press), p. 239.
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geopolitical factors that occur in the particular regions where these agreements operate 
is carried out, a task that cannot be undertaken in the context of this study.
To this end, and in view of the working question of the thesis, i.e. what is the 
role of the EU competition rules in the formation of international agreements on 
competition, the remainder of this chapter provides a brief review of the EU competition 
regime, and then moves onto the presentation of the competition regimes of a number of 
other regional blocs. Finally, the chapter attempts to identify common characteristics of 
these regimes, and some of their features which may be attributed to the influence of the 
EU.
5.2 Competition law and policy in the EU
Competition law and policy has been of primary importance in the development 
of the European Union. As early commentators on the political developments in the 
Union suggested: \..[C]ompetition has been chosen as the motive force o f  the economic 
revolution that is to promote the interpretation o f several national economies, prisoners 
fo r centuries o f  their different structures, different traditions and habits, and merge 
them in a new economic entity, the European Common Market Against this 
background, competition provisions were inserted into the Treaty of Rome in order to 
ensure, according to Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty, that competition remains undistorted 
in the internal market.
The Treaty further includes both substantive competition rules and general rules 
regarding the institutional structure of the regime. These provisions are found in 
Chapter 1 (Articles 81-89) of Title VI of the Treaty relating to 'common rules on 
competition, taxation, and approximation o f  laws'. Given that it would be impossible -  
in the context of this thesis - to describe in detail the development of competition law in
527 Spaak, F. and J.N. Jaeger (1961) ‘The Rules o f Competition Within the European Common Market’ 26:3 Law and 
Contemporary Problems, 485, at 487.
528 While competition and free competition are included in various other articles o f the EU Treaty. For instance. Article 10 notes 
that Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising 
out o f this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions o f the Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Community's tasks, abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment o f the objectives o f the Treaty, including 
competition law. This article, in conjunction with Articles 81 and 82 have been applied by the ECJ on various occasions. See Whish, 
R. (2003) Competition Law, (Butterworths, 4th edition), at 184-189. Furthermore, Article 27(c) mentions that the Commission 
should take the measures appropriate to ensure undistorted competition with regard to finished goods, and Article 98 of the Treaty 
repeats that ‘...The Member States and the Community shall act in accordance with the principle o f an open market economy with 
free competition, favouring an efficient allocation o f resources.
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the EU, an issue that has been extensively researched , th i s  section only attempts to 
highlight the main substantive provisions of the Treaty. In addition, the section also 
makes reference to the institutional set up of the Union relating to competition, and 
while probably too brief, this discussion is of significance for two reasons: first because 
the EU is the only regional agreement -  if not the only international agreement of any 
kind -  where competition law has been practically applied, and where competition 
policy has been developed. Second, because this discussion may provide us with 
insights when come to evaluate the provisions on the institutional set up of other 
plurilateral regional agreements.
5.2.1 Substantive provisions
i. Articles 81 and 82
The main antitrust provisions of the EU are found in Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty. In particular Article 81 declares as void any horizontal and vertical agreements 
and concerted practices by undertakings which have as an object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the common market, subject to 
certain exemptions that may be granted on the basis of the third paragraph of the 
a r t i c l e . O n  the other hand. Article 82 of the Treaty prohibits the abuse of dominant 
position by one or more undertakings, where such practices have an effect on trade 
between Member States.
As it has been noted in Chapter 2, on the basis of the market integration aim, and 
the infiuence of ordoliberalism, the particular application of Articles 81 and 82 has been 
to a certain extent different from the way that the comparable Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, have been applied in the US, although the extent of this divergence has 
been substantially reduced in recent years.
529 For an introduction to the competition law and policy o f the EU, see Whish, ibid; Jones and Sufrin, supra n. 83; Goyder, B.C. 
(2003) EC Competition Law (Oxford University Press, 4th Edition); Rodger, B. and A. McCulloch (2004), Competition Law and 
Policy in the EC and UK: An Introduction to Practice and Policy (Cavendish Publishing, 3rd edition); Monti, G. (2007) EC 
Competition Law (Cambridge University Press);
530 The wording o f the article has been extensively analysed both by academic commentators and the Courts. On the development 
o f Article 81, see Odudu, O (2006) The Boundaries o f EC Competition Law: The Scope o f Article 81 (Oxford University Press); 
Nazzini, R. (2006) ‘Article 81 EC: Between Time Present and Time Past: A Normative Critique on “Restriction o f Competition” in 
EU Law’ 43:2 Common Market Law Review, 497.
531 See Ehlermann, C-D and J. Rattlif (2005) ‘Mario Monti’s Legacy for Competition Policy in Article 82’ Wilmer Cutler 
Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust Series, Paper No 50; Kallaugher and Sher (2004) supra n. 90.
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ii. State aid and public undertakings
Apart from the provisions on anticompetitive agreements and abuse of 
dominance, of central importance in the development of the EU as a whole have been 
the rules relating to state aids and state monopolies or public undertakings offered 
exclusive rights. In fact, issues relating to subsidies and public undertakings have been 
traditionally considered to lie outside the realm of competition or antitrust rules, since 
these rules regulate the acts of states and not private undertakings. Nonetheless, in the 
EU, the existence of state dominated national markets prior to the creation of the EEC, 
and the fact the governments of these nation states were supporting particular public 
firms, made the inclusion of provisions to regulate particular aid schemes and public 
undertakings a very important tool for the achievement of undistorted competition, in 
accordance to article 3(g) of the EU Treaty.^^^
In a more general context, the inclusion of state measures in the competition 
context was a clear statement of the states that formed the EEC in 1957 that their 
economies would be driven by free market principles, as opposed to the communist 
bloc, which was very powerful at the time, and where the economy was driven by 
governmental interventions in a system based on state monopolies. In its 50 years of 
existence, the EU experiment has shown that the inclusion of these provisions in the 
competition chapter, and most importantly the enforcement of these provisions by the 
institution in charge of the enforcement of competition law and policy, is a very 
successful initiative, and a very important factor for the establishment of the single 
market and the liberalisation process within the Union.
In particular, with regard to state aids,^^  ^Article 87 paragraph of the EU Treaty 
states that, “...any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any 
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production o f certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade 
between Member States, be incompatible with the common market”, while in the second 
and third paragraphs of the article a number of occasions are identified, where aid
532 See Cacciato, C. (1996) ‘Subsidies, Competition Laws, and Politics: A Comparison of the EU and USA', Centre for West 
European Studies, University ofPitt*urgh, Policy Paper No. 2, at 2.
533 See in general Biondi, A, P. Eeckhout, and J. Flynn (eds.) (2004) The Law o f State Aids in the European Union (Oxford 
University Press).
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granted to specific undertakings, or relating to the production of particular goods, are^ "^^  
or may be^^  ^compatible with the Treaty. According to Article 88 paragraph 3, any plans 
of the Member States to grant or alter state aid must be notified to the Commission, 
which decides ^s to whether such aid is compatible with EU law. Furthermore, Article 
89 of the EU Treaty entitles the Council to adopt regulations on state aid, following a 
proposal by the Commission. On the basis of this article the Council has adopted 
Regulations relating to the procedure of review of state aid by Member States.^^^
With regard to state monopolies. Article 86(1) of the Treaty provides that in the 
case of public undertakings or undertakings to which the Member States have granted 
special or exclusive rights, the Member States shall not adopt or maintain measures 
which are in conflict with the Treaty provisions, and in particular with the competition- 
related provisions. Article 86(2) provides that undertakings entrusted with the operation 
of services of economic interest or having the character of revenue-producing monopoly 
are also governed by competition rules, insofar as the application o f  such rules does 
not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, o f  the particular tasks assigned to them'. 
According to the third paragraph of the article, the Commission is the competent body 
to ensure that the provisions of Article 86 are respected by Member States and address 
appropriate directives and decisions to them. The importance of this provision is 
highlighted by the fact that Article 86(3) has been the main legal basis for the
534 These include aid given to recover the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences, and aid having a social 
character.
535 These include, inter alia, aid that promotes economic development in poor regions and promotes culture and heritage 
conservation. In a recent paper, EU Competition officials have pointed out that, with regard to Article 87(3), more economic 
analysis should be used by the Commission. See Friederiszick H.W, L-H. Roller and V. Verouden (2006) ‘European State Aid 
Control: An Economic Framework’, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/esac.pdf>, (last visited on 21 May 2007); see also 
Commission (EC) (2005) ‘State Aid Action Plan: Less and Better Targeted State Aid: A Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005- 
2009’, Brussels, 7.6.2005, COM(2005) 107 final,
536 Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 o f 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application o f Article 93 (now 
Art.88) o f the EC Treaty Official Journal L 83/1, 27.03.1999, p. 1; Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 o f 21 April 2004 
implementing Council Regulation (EC)No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application o f Article 93 of the EC Treaty, 
OJ L 140, 30.4.2004, p. 1. The Council has also adopted a Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 o f 7 May 1998 on the 
application o f Articles 92 and 93 (now 87 and 88 respectively) o f the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain 
categories o f horizontal State aid. Official Journal L 142,14.05.1998, p .l), which offers the competence to the Cbmmission to adopt 
block exemption Regulations. On the basis o f this Regulation, the Commission has adopted a Regulation in 1998 and has also 
adopted Regulations regarding de minimis aid, training aid, employment aid, and aid offered to small and medium size enterprises. 
If the criteria o f these Regulations are met, then the Member States are not obliged to notify the aid in advance. See Commission EC 
(2007) ‘Vademecum Community Rules on State Aid’ <http://ec.europaeu/comm/competition/state_aid/ 
studies_reports/vademecum_on_rules_2007_en.pdf > (last visited on 21 May 2007).
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liberalisation project which has transformed public undertakings across the EU in fields 
such as telecommunications and energy/^^
iii. The control of mergers
As opposed to anticompetitive agreements and unilateral conduct, the Treaty of 
Rome includes no provisions with regard to mergers, and despite the fact that provisions 
on mergers had been included in the Treaty establishing the ECSC (in Article 66). In 
fact, it took 32 years before the EC first introduced merger-related legislation with the 
adoption of its Merger Regulation.^^* A number of factors played a role in this delay 
the most important of which was the hesitation of Member States to expand the 
competence of the Commission to the examination of mergers, which by definition 
encompass important economic and political interests of the Member States.^ "^ ® Until the 
adoption of the Regulation in 1989, the problem of anticompetitive effect that mergers 
could create to the common market was being resolved mainly by the application of 
Article 82 (then 86) of the Treaty.^ "*^
In 2004, a new merger regulation was adopted^"^  ^in order to address a number of 
problems that appeared in the application of the merger control system. The most 
significant amendments were the change of the substantive test,^ "^  ^ the extension of the
537 See the website o f the European Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/ 
liberalisation/legislation/legislatioahtml> (last visited on 21 May 2007). See also Sierra J.L. B. (2000) Exclusive Rights and State 
Monopolies Under EC Law: Article 86 (former Article 90) of the EC Treaty (Oxford University Press).
538 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989, OJ L 395, p. 1.
539 McGowan, L. and M. Cini (1999) ‘Discretion and Politization in EU Competition Policy: The Case o f Merger Control’ 12:2 
Governance, 175, at 178-180
540 See Van Kraay, F.G.A. (1977) ‘Proposed EEC Regulation on the Control o f Mergers’ 26:2 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 468.
541 The first major case examined under Article 82 was the Continental Can case. Case 6/72, Europempballage Corporation & 
Continental Can Co. Inc. v. Commission [1973] ECR -  215. In its 1986 judgment in the Phillip Morris case, the ECJ ruled that 
Article 81 (then 85) could also be used for the control o f concentrations. See Joined Cases 142 and 156/84, British American 
Tobacco Conpany Ltd and R. J. Reynolds Industries Inc. v Commission [1986] E C R - 1899.
542 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 o f 20 January 2004 on the control o f concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24, p. 1.
543 Whereas according to the 4064/1989 regulation (Article 2(3)) a concentration should be prohibited where it ‘creates or 
strengthens a dominant position as a result o f which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or 
a substantial part o f it’, according to the new regulation (139/2004), a concentration should be prohibited where it ‘would 
significantly impede effective competition, in the common maficet or a substantial part o f  it, in particular as a result o f the creation 
or strengthening o f a dominant position’.
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one-stop-shop review m ec h a n i s m, a n d  the right of the merging parties to notify the 
merger before a binding agreement between them is reached.
5.3.2 Institutional set u p : the role of European Courts and the Commission
What differentiates the EU competition regime in relation to any national 
relevant regime is the fact that competition policy in the EU has been applied in a 
transnational rather than a national environment, since to a great extent EU Member 
States retain their sovereignty. That said, in terms of competition the fact that the EU is 
considered as one single polity is by itself an indication of the success this agreement 
has had in the 50 years of its application. Such uniform development is attributed to the 
institutional set up of the Union with regard to competition law. In particular, it may be 
argued that two supranational bodies have played the most significant role in the 
development of competition law in the EU: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the 
Commission.
i. The role of the Court
The ECJ has played a significant role in the development of the competition 
system of the EU in three main ways.^ "^  ^ First, by developing in the 1960s three legal 
doctrines which put into context the relationship between the European Institutions on 
the one hand, most notably the Commission, and the Member States on the other, the 
Court facilitated the operation of the Union. These principles include the doctrine of 
direct effect of EC law, the doctrine of supremacy of EC law and the doctrine of implied 
powers.^"^  ^According to the doctrine of direct effect, EC law creates legally enforceable 
rights for individuals, who can rely on those rights before the courts of the Member 
States. "^^ * The doctrine of the supremacy of EU law is based on the presumption that EC
544 The new regulation offers (in Article 4(5)) the merging parties the right to provide the Commission with a ‘reasoned 
submission’ requesting it to assert jurisdiction over a case where the turnover thresholds are not satisfied but which would otherwise 
require to be notified in three or more Member States.
545 See Article 4(1 )(b) o f Regulation 139/2004. For an analysis o f the main novelties o f  the new Merger Regulations, see Levy 
(2005) supra n.89; Berg, W. (2004) ‘The New EC Merger Regulation: A First Assessment o f it Practical Impact’ 24 Northwestern 
Journal o f International Law and Business, 683.
546 Alter, K.J. (1998) ‘Who Are the ‘Masters o f the Treaty’? European Governments and the European Court o f Justice’ 52:1 
International Organisation, 121, at 128.
547 Weiler J.H.H. (1991) ‘The Transformation o f Europe’ 100:8 Yale Law Journal, 2403, at 2412-2417. The author identifies a 
fourth equally important doctrine, that is the doctrine o f Human Rights.
548 See ECJ decision. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Belastingen, [1963] ECR - I. On the 
development o f  the doctrine, see Craig, P. and Gr. De Burca, (2003) EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press), 
Chapter 5, at 179-229.
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norms are superior to national norms of the Member States, irrespective of whether 
these national norms have been adopted before or after the adoption of the EC norms. 
Finally according to the principle of implied powers, in areas where the EC 
Commission had internal competence, it was implied by the Treaty that the EC 
Commission also had the competence to negotiate and conclude international 
agreements.^^°
The 'intellectual l e a d e r s h i p of the Court in the early years of competition 
law in the EU was further highlighted by two decisions. With the first decision the ECJ 
supported the argument of the Commission that an agreement which segments markets 
of the Member States have as their object the restriction of competition and that 
therefore no further analysis is needed as to their effects, thus highlighting the 
importance of market integration in the development of competition law in the EU.^^  ^
The second related to the expansion of the scope of Article 81, which is applicable to 
agreements that ‘ ...may affect trade between Member States... ’. The Court in its Société 
Technique Minière decision, which was issued on the basis of the preliminary ruling 
system,^^^ opined that Article 81 could be applicable not only to agreements between 
undertakings in different Member States, but also to agreements operating in a single 
Member State that could have a wider effect on the regional trade, such as elimination 
of imports in or exports from a Member State.
549 See Schutze, R. (2006) ‘Supremacy Without Pre-emption? The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine o f Community Pre-Emption’ 
43 Common Market Law Review, 1023. In relation to competition law, the doctrine of supremacy o f EU law over national laws of 
the Member States was confirmed by the ECJ in the Walt Wilhelm case. Case 14-6, Walt Wilhelm and others v Bundeskartellamt, 
[1969JECR-1.
550 See Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, (ERTA)[1971], ECR-263, Cases 3,4, and 6/76, Kramer, [1976], ECR-1279, and 
Opinion 1/76 on the Draft Agreement Establishing a Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels, [1977] ECR-741. Nonetheless, 
it has to be noted here that the principle is not applicable in the field of commercial policy, where the EU has been given by Article 
133 (exl 13) EC external competence. The same applies with regard to associàion agreements with third parties that the Community 
has the power to negotiate aid conclude, on the basis o f Article 310 (ex Article 238) o f the Treaty.
551 See Gerber, supra n. 22, at 352-353.
552 See EtablissementsConsten SA & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission, supra n. 82.
553 According to Article 234 o f the Treaty, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on issues addressed to it by courts 
or tribunals o f  the Member States relating to the interpretation o f the EC Treaty, the validity and interpretation o f acts o f  the 
institutions o f the Community and the European Central Bank, or the interpretation o f the statutes o f bodies established by an act of 
the Council where those statutes so provide. Given the lack o f direct competence of the Court to decide upon the extent to which a 
measure o f  a Member State is compatible with EU law, it encourages national courts to use the preliminary rulings mechanism, with 
which the Court reviews such issues o f compliance. The Treaty of Nice (Article 225(3)) gives also to the CFl the competence to 
give such rulings in specific areas, according to the Statute o f the Court o f Justice. The CFl may refer the case to the ECJ in case it 
considers that the issue under consideration could affect the consistency o f EU law.
554 See Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.) [1966] ECR-235.
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In the following years, as also seen in the next sub-section, the Commission took 
the lead in the development of competition law and policy in the Union, the Courts (the 
ECJ and as from 1989 the Court of First Instance - CFl) developed extensive 
jurisprudence in the field of competition law,^^  ^and in this way they contributed greatly 
to the development of the competition-related rules, but also to the convergence of 
competition laws of the Member States/^^ In addition, the Courts on specific occasions 
have questioned the policy followed by the Commission, and have thus caused 
modifications not only in the way that the Commission applies the rules, but also in the 
internal structure of the Commission itself.
ii. The role of the Commission, and the modernisation of enforcement
While the role of the Court has been of major significance in the development of 
competition law and policy in the EU, the most distinctive feature of EC competition 
law and policy has been the wide competence granted to the Commission, a 
supranational regional body, to apply competition rules. The Treaty itself does not 
contain detailed rules as to the competences of the Commission in the field of 
competition. Article 85 EC only contains a general statement that the Commission is the 
competent body to ensure the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
Furthermore Article 83 provides that the Council is empowered to adopt, on the 
proposal of the Commission with a qualified majority and having consulted the 
European Parliament, the appropriate regulations and directives for the implementation 
of Articles 81 and 82. These two provisions set the general rules on the enforcement of 
competition law in the bloc; nevertheless, the particular institutional set up of the 
competition system was to be detailed in Regulation 17,^^ * which was adopted by the 
Council in 1962, following lively debate between the Member States.^^^
Regulation 17/62 offered the Commission the competence to remove the 
authority from the jurisdiction of the Member States, by initiating its own proceedings.
555 See generally the material cited in footnote 529.
556 See Van Waarden, F. and M. Drahos (2002) ‘Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of Competition
Policies’, 9:6 Journal of European Public Policy. 913.
557 A recent example to be given is the effect of the CPI’s decisions to annul three Commission merger decisions in 2002. See 
supra n. 87. Following these developments, new legislation was put in place (the new Merger Regulation), a Chief Economist was 
appointed by the Commission and the Merger Task Force was abolished.
558 Council Regulation (EEC) Implementing Articles 85 and 86 o f the Treaty, OJ 13, 21.02.1962, p. 204. (hereinafter ‘Regulation
17/62’).
559 See Goyder, supra n. 529, at 30-34.
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since according to Article 9(3), the Member States could apply articles 85(1) and 86 
(currently 81(1) and 82), only if the Commission had not initiated any procedure in the 
case under consideration. The competence of the Commission was further strengthened 
by Article 9(1) of Regulation 17/62, according to which the Commission, subject to 
judicial review by the Court, had the sole right to apply Article 81(3) of the Treaty and 
thus declare inapplicable the provision of Article 81(1) for agreements that met certain 
requirements. Furthermore, according to Articles 2, 3, and 6 of the Regulation, the 
examination of such cases could be carried out by the Commission, either following a 
notification by the Member States, or by the parties involved in the agreement. Thus, 
the system of examination of business agreements that could have an anticompetitive 
effect on the common market was centralised, and until the entrance into force of 
Regulation 1/2003, which replaced Regulation 17/62, the Commission had been offered 
in practice a jurisdictional monopoly to enforce the competition rules of the Treaty.^^®
These extensive jurisdictional powers of the Commission were further 
strengthened in two ways. First, according to Regulation 17, the Commission could 
issue decisions and impose fines which were binding upon the firms that were found to 
be infringing the competition rules of the Treaty. These decisions were subject to 
judicial review by the ECJ and after 1989, by the CFl. Second, with the issuance of 
Regulation 19/65, the Commission was granted the competence to issue block 
exemptions, on the basis of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, without approval by the 
Council.^^^
While a number of experts, including Members of the European Parliament and 
high profile judges of the European Courts, have extensively criticised the broad powers
560 This model o f enforcement, is called ‘the authorisation system’, and was borrowed from German law. The model was based on 
the assumption that all agreements were considered unlawful, until they get negative clearance by the Commission (according to 
Article 2 o f the Regulation 17/62). Despite die fact that notification was not obligatory, the companies involved in such agreements 
had to notify them to Ihe Commission for purposes o f legal certainty. It also has to be noted that when the Regulation was discussed, 
an alternative option, backed by the French government, was the directly applicable exemption system, according to which each 
firm had to considered itself the legality of its agreements, and thus no prior notification to the Commission was needed. As noted, 
finally the authorisation system prevailed in Regulation 17/62. See Goyder, ibid, at 41. It should be also mentioned, nevertheless, 
that the competition authorities o f the Member States could be given the competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 in cases where 
their national legislation allowed them to do so, while at the same time. Articles 81(1) and 82 had direct effect, and therefore 
national courts could apply these provisions
561 Council Regulation (EEC) No 19/65, on application o f Article 85 (3) o f  the Treaty to certain categories o f agreements and 
concerted practices, OJ. 36,06.03.1965, p. 53.
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granted to the C o m m i s s i o n , i t  has been also argued that such centralisation of 
enforcement has been the secret behind the success of the EC competition system, as the 
broad competence granted to the Commission has ensured the uniform development of 
competition law in the EU, and the appropriate use of competition related rules for the 
facilitation of the most important goal of the Treaty, i.e. market integration.^^^ This 
same argument applies to the authorisation model applied to Article 81(3), especially in 
view of the fact that at the time when Regulation 17/62 came into force and for a long 
period after its adoption, there were Member States without a competition law in 
place,^^ "* or with a competition law that was practically inactive.
Nevertheless, this centralised system gradually created a number of problems, 
the most serious of which was the fact that the Commission had to review an enormous 
amount of applications for exemption in the context of Article 81(3), despite the fact 
that since the 1960s the Commission: (i) adopted a number of block-exemptions, which 
applied in various fields;^^^ (ii) developed procedures to review notifications informally 
through the so-called ‘comfort letters’; and (iii) attempted (in the 1990s) to involve the 
Competition Authorities of the Member States in the examination of notifications.^^^
Apart firom these practical problems, and according to commentators of EU law, 
by the late 1990s it was obvious that this centralised system had become obsolete; this
562 Forrester, I S. QC, and A.P. Komninos (2006) ‘EU Administrative Law: Competition Law Adjudication' Sectoral Report on 
Adjudication in the Competition Field, American Bar Association, European Union Administrative Law Project, 
<http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/SectRptAdj-Competition--Komninos_spring2006. pdf > (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 6.
563 See Ehlermann, C-D (1992) ‘The Contribution o f EC Competition Rules to the Single Market’ 29 Common Market law 
Review, 257.
564 Jenny and Homa, supra n. 526, at 327, fii.2.
565 For instance, the competition law in Greece, Law 703/1977 for the Protection o f Free Competition, was first adopted in 1977 
but at least for twenty years it was rarely applied by the competent national enforcing institutions.
566 According to these Regulations, the agreements which met their requirements were automatically exempted from the 
application of Article 81(1), and therefore did not have to be notified. See for instance. Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1983/83 
o f 22 June 1983 on the application o f Article 85(3) to categories o f exclusive distribution agreements, OJ L 173, 30.6.1983, as 
amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No 1582/97 o f 30 July 1997, OJ L 214, 6.8.1997, p. 2. Relevant Regulations were also 
adopted by the Council in the 1980s relation to exclusive purchasing agreements and franchising agreements. All these Regulations 
were replaced in 1999 by Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 o f 22 December 1999 on the application o f Article 81(3) of 
the Treaty to categories o f vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ L 336,29.12.1999, p. 21 Currently there are also Block 
exemptions on the agreements on the motor vehicle sector (Commission Regulation (EC) No 1400/2002 o f 31 July 2002 on the 
application o f Article 81(3) o f the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle sector, OJ 
L 203, 01.08.2002, p. 30, the insurance sector (Commission Regulation (EC) No 358/2003 o f 27 February 2003 on the application 
of Article 81(3) o f  the Treaty to certain categories o f agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector, OJ L 
053 , 28.02.2003. p.8), and on the transfer o f  technology (Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 o f 27 April 2004 on the 
application o f Article 810) of the Treaty to categories o f technology transfer agreements, OJ L 123,27.04.2004, p.l 1).
567 See Monti, G. (2007), supra n. 529, at 398,399.
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was so for three mains reasons. First, it was inadequate to meet the requirements of 
vigorous pro-active enforcement, given that a large amount of resources were dedicated 
to the examination of agreements that were not really significant from a competition 
viewpoint. Second, the system failed to provide companies with legal certainty, in view 
of the fact that it provided no clarification as to the type of agreements that should be 
notified to the Commission.^^* Third, as Giorgio Monti notes, in the mid 1990s 
particular Member States expressed their concern about the lack of transparency in 
Commission’s decisions concerning mergers. In this regard, German commentators 
started demanding institutional restructure and the establishment of an independent 
central competition agency.^^^
It should be taken into account that Regulation 17/62 was adopted to regulate 
competition enforcement in a Community of 6 Member States. By the end of the 1990s 
these Member States had become 15 and were to be further increased to 25 by 2004. 
This led the Commission in 1999 to publish a White Paper on the modernisation of the 
competition enforcement system.^^° It is also notable however that when the Treaty of 
Rome was adopted only Germany had a competition law in place, but that by 1999, all 
of the Member States except Germany had competition law rules which were 
compatible with the EC rules,^^  ^ and that by 2004 the ten new Member States had 
adopted EC-compatible competition law rules on the basis of the Europe Agreements 
referred to in Chapter 4.
As noted in the previous sub-section, convergence of national laws has been 
attributed to the regional courts that have developed detailed jurisprudence. That said, 
such convergence has also been attributed to the development of a community of legal 
experts or ‘epistemic community’ which developed a common understanding as to the 
proper function of competition law; such common understanding was built on the basis 
of EC competition law, which was transposed into national legal systems.^^^ In this 
regard, it may be argued that the centralised application of competition law has had as a
568 Venit, J. (2003) ‘Brave New World: The Modernisation and Decentralisation o f Enforcement under Articles 81 and 82 o f the 
EC Treaty’ 40 Common Market Law Review, 545, at 550.
569 A proposal which nonetheless found no further support. See Monti G. supra n. 529, at 400.
570 See Commission (EC) (1999) ‘White Paper on The Modernisation o f the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 o f the EC 
Treaty’, Brussels, 28.04.99, Commission Programme 99/027. See Ehlermann, C-D (2000) ‘The Modernisation o f EC Antitrust 
Policy: A Legal and Cultural Revolutions’ 37 Common Market Law Review, 537.
571 See Monti, supra n. 529 at 401.
572 See Van Waarde and Drahos, supra n. 556, in particular at 931-932.
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side effect the development of harmonised rules, even in those Member States which 
were not obliged to adopt relevant rules in order to enter the Union.
The public debate triggered by the White Paper finally led to the adoption of 
Regulation 1/2003, which entered into force on the U* of May 2004 (which, 
incidentally, is also the date of accession of the 10 new Member States).^^^ The new 
regulation introduced two major changes. First, it replaced the authorisation system with 
a directly applicable exemption system. Unlike under Regulation 17/62, if the 
agreements meet the criteria of Article 81(3) no negative clearance is required.^^"  ^ The 
second major change is that the competent institutions (national competition authorities 
and national courts) of the Member States have to apply Articles 81 and 82 when they 
review cases that may have an effect on trade between Member States.^^^
These provisions do not preclude the Member States from having and applying 
stricter national rules on unilateral conduct, nor from applying provisions of national 
law that predominantly pursue an objective different from the objectives pursued by 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty,^^^ thus leaving the space open for governmental 
intervention and industrial policy in national markets, as long as trade within the EU is 
not affected. Nevertheless, in cases where intra-state trade may be affected then the 
competent national bodies are bound by Articles 81 and 82, and by the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ and the CFl and the decisional practice of the Commission.^^^
Furthermore, the European Competition Network (ECN) was launched in 2002. 
The ECN is not an administrative body, but a mechanism for cooperation and 
coordination as regards the competition agencies of the Member States.^^* The aim of 
the network is twofold: it attempts to ensure, first, the efficient allocation of cases,^^  ^
and, second, the uniform application of the competition law rules.^^° These important 
issues are also further addressed by the Regulation 1/2003 itself.
573 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 o f 16 December 2002 on the implementation o f  the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty, OJ L 1,04.01.2003, p. 1. (hereinafter Regulation 1/2003).
574 Regulatiffli 1/2003, Article 1(2).
575 Regulation 1/2003, Articles 3,5, and 6.
576 Regulation 1/2003, Article 3(2) and (3).
577 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 16.
578 Council and Commission (EC) (2002) ‘Joint Statement o f the Council and the Commission on the Function of the Network o f 
Competition Authorities’, <http://ec.europaeu/comm/competition/ecn/joint_statement_en.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
579 Ibid, at paras. 11-19.
580 Ibid., at paras 20 -  26.
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As to the former objective, i.e. overcoming overlaps in the application of 
Articles 81 and 82, Regulation 1/2003 also includes provisions on the cooperation of the 
Commission with national competition authorities. Specifically, the Commission still 
has the competence to remove a case that is being reviewed by a national authority 
where it believes that the case may have an effect on the common market, subject to the 
obligation to consult with the Member State.^*  ^ It is also competent to refer to the 
national authorities a complaint submitted to it on the basis of Articles 81 and 82 where 
it considers that the case under examination is not of major interest and it has previously 
made its policy clear through other relevant cases.^*^
As to the latter objective, i.e. the uniform application of law, the Regulation in 
Articles 11(3) and (4) provides that whenever the national authorities decide to initiate 
proceedings relating to a case on which Articles 81 and 82 are to be applied, they have 
to notify the Commission. They are also obliged to notify the Commission at least 30 
days before the adoption of the decision. In practice, when the Commission receives the 
draft decision of the national authority it examines the way that the law is interpreted 
and applied; in those cases where it disagrees with their application of the Treaty 
articles it returns to the authorities with comments. A database has been created in order 
to ensure the efficient supervision of the network. This provides a mechanism - to 
which all the Member States have access - for the Commission and the national 
authorities to notify relevant cases.
The relationship between the Commission and national authorities and courts, 
and important features relating to the application of Community rules, are further 
clarified by a number of Notices, which are soft law instruments^^^ that the Commission 
published on the date of publication of Regulation 1/2003. In particular, the 
Commission has published notices on the cooperation within the ECN,^ *"^  cooperation
581 Regulation 1/2003, Art. 11(6).
582 There is no particular provision on this procedure, apart from the general statement o f Article 11(1) o f the Regulation, which 
states that, ‘The Commission and the competition authorities o f the Member States shall apply the Community competition rules in 
close cooperation.’ Nonetheless, based on this general provision and the non-binding Commission (EC) (2004) Notice on 
cooperation within the Network o f Competition Authorities, OJ C 101, 27.04.2004, p. 43, which provides us with jurisdictional 
criteria, in practice the Commission refers cases to the national authorities.
583 On the use o f soft law instruments, such as notices, recommendations and guidelines in the field o f the EU competition policy, 
see Cosma, H. A. and R. Whish, (2003) ‘Soft Law in the Field o f  EU Competition Policy’ 14:1 European Business Law review, 25.
584 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network o f Competition Authorities, supra n. 582.
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with the C o u r t s , t h e  handling of the c o m p l a i n t s , t h e  effect on trade,^*  ^ the 
application of Article 81(3),^*  ^and on access to the file/^^
5.3.3. Some points on the EU competition regime
While it would be premature to evaluate the effect of Regulation 1/2003, given 
the short period of time that has passed since its adoption, from this brief analysis of the 
EC competition law regime, it would be useful to keep some elements in mind, 
particularly in view of the subsequent presentation of competition regimes of a number 
plurilateral agreements. The first such element is that it takes time until a competition 
regime may be developed at a regional level, and this is an argument that is not much 
different from the one made in Chapter 2 with regard to developing countries. That said, 
the extra factor that has to be taken into account when discussing a regional regime is 
that the diverse political preferences of the various Member States of a bloc may delay 
the adoption of certain regional substantive rules. This is a problem evident in the fact 
that merger rules were adopted in the EU 32 years after the adoption of the Rome 
Treaty.
On the other hand, at the enforcement level, and irrespective of the fact that the 
EC competition system is far from perfect,^^® the European project has demonstrated 
that a centralised enforcement system - where a supranational body and a well 
established regional Court have the competence to apply the regional rules - may be 
adequate for the development of an efficient competition regime, even in cases where 
competition law is scarce or non-existent in the Member States. The EC experience has 
also shown that it was only when (i) the supranational body (i.e. the Commission) has 
gained enough experience in the application of the regional rules, (ii) the Member States 
have adopted EC-compatible competition laws and established competition authorities, 
and (iii) even more importantly, a certain level of common understanding has been 
developed among their competition agencies that the Commission was ready to
585 Commission (EC) (2004) Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts o f the EU Member States in the 
application o f Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ C 101,27.04.2004, p. 54.
586 Commission (EC) (2004) Notice on the handling o f complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 o f the EC Treaty, 
O JC  101,27.04.2004, p. 65.
587 Commission (EC) (2004) Notice - Guidelines on die effect on trade concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty, OJ C 
101,27.04.2004, p. 81.
588 Commission (EC) (2004) Notice - Guidelines on the application o f Article 81(3) o f  the Treaty , OJ C 101,27.04.2004, p. 97.
589 Commission (EC) (2004) Notice on the rules for access to the Commission file in cases pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 o f the 
EC Treaty, Articles 53, 54 and 57 o f the EEA Agreement and Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004, OJ C 325,22.12.2005, p. 7.
590 Something that is proved by the fact that it has been recently amended.
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decentralise the enforcement of the regional rules. These arguments will be revisited in 
Section 4 of the chapter, which provides us with a comparative reading of competition 
provisions found in the various regional agreements, including the EU.
5.3. Competition provisions in other plurilateral regional agreements
Having briefly reviewed the competition regime of the EU - which is
characterised by the existence of detailed substantive competition provisions which are 
to be applied at the regional level and by the fact that such regional rules are enforced 
by supranational and national institutions - in the attempt to evaluate the role of the EU 
on the formation of other plurilateral regional agreements, this section provides us with 
a presentation of the competition regimes established by these agreements. In contrast to 
the analysis of bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements and bilateral trade 
agreements, the comparative reading of the competition regimes of the various 
plurilateral regional agreements is a more complex task, due to the fact that the 
competition-related provisions of these regimes are far less homogenous than the 
relevant provisions found in bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements and the 
bilateral trade agreements of the EU. To this end, the chapter first presents separately 
the competition provisions found in the various plurilateral regional agreements 
reviewed, and then attempts to provide generalisations as to the competition-related 
content of those agreements, as well as comparisons with the EC regime.
5.3.1. Andean Community
Article 93 of the Cartagena Agreement, which is the Treaty establishing the
Andean Community,^^* contains a mandate that "[BJefore December 31, 1971, the 
Commission, shall adopt, at the General Secretariat’s proposal, the rules which are 
needed to guard against or correct practices which may distort competition within the 
Subregion’. It took more than 20 years however before the first regional legislation was 
enacted with aim of establishing a competition law and policy system largely based on 
the EC model: Decision 285 of 1991.^^  ^ Thus, rules prohibiting anticompetitive 
practices and abuse of dominance which could have a regional effect were
591 Andean Subregional Integration Agreement “CARTAGENA AGREEMENT’
<http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/normativa/ande_triel.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
592 Andean Community, Decision 285, Rules and regulations for preventing or correcting distortions in competition caused by 
practices that restrict free competition. <http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/ normativa/d285e.htm> (last visited on 21 May 
2007).
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in t roduced.These  rules would be enforced by a centralised - transnational body, the 
Board of the Commission, which had investigatory and decision-making powers as well 
as the competence to launch investigations following a petition submitted either by a 
Member State or an undertaking.^^"^
The competition system of the Andean Community has not been a successful 
one for a number of reasons relating both to the internal political dynamics of the 
Member States and to the institutional set up of the regioneil enforcing body, i.e. the 
Board of the Commission. As for the former, a lack of political will to apply 
competition laws by some participating countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, has 
been observed. As for the latter, the fact that the Board did not have punitive powers 
that would force firms to implement its decisions; furthermore, the fact that it did not 
have the power to initiate investigations ex officio substantially decreased the 
effectiveness of the Institution’s work.^^^
It was against this background, in 2005, that Decision 608 was introduced, 
amending the competition rules with the aim of improving the operation of the 
competition regime in the bloc. A number of reforms were introduced, which to a 
certain extent show the influence of the EU competition model, while it also has to be 
noted that the EU provided the ANDEAN Community with funding in order to 
harmonise competition rules in the ANDEAN reg i on .F i rs t ,  further competences were 
granted to the Board: it may now initiate its own investigations and can also iitipose 
fines, and, in cases where it finds it appropriate, order interim measures. The Board has 
also been granted the competence to request the cooperation of National Competition 
Authorities. Furthermore, the Decision provides for the creation of an advisory 
committee (the Andean Committee for the Protection of Competition) which consists of
593 See Articles 3-5 o f the Decision 285.
594 See in detail, Ibid, Art. 6-15.
595 In addition, it should be pointed out that with regard to the other three participating countries, even though they have adopted 
competition law have applied the law on an inconsistent basis. See Jenny and Homa, supra n. 526, at 306.
596 See Jatar, A.J. and L. Tineo (1998) ‘Competition Policy in the Andean Countries: Ups and Downs o f A Policy in Search of its 
Place’, in Rodriguez Mendoza, M., P. Correa and B. Kotschwar (eds.) The Andean Community and the United States: Trade and 
Investment Relations in the 1990s, (Organization o f American States) 169, at 183-184, and Decision 285, Art 16-17.
597 See Andean Community Press Release o f  June 8,2001, ‘European Cooperation for Harmonizing Rules on Free Competition in 
the Andean region’ < http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/ press/press/np8-6-0I.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007), 
according to which, ‘The project aim will be pursued through two lines o f measures: I. Definition and implementation of a 
harmonized regional legislative, administrative, and judicial framework; and 2. Support for national and regional institutions 
responsible for overseeing enforcement o f the rules o f free competition. These objectives are expected to be accomplished through 
technical assistance, training and information activities, including visits by Andean technicians to European institutions. These 
measures will make it possible for Europe’s experience and know-how in this area to be made available to the CAN’.
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members of the national authorities. In addition, national competition authorities, 
consumer organisations, and legal entities and individuals may lodge complaints to the 
Board.’’*
According to Article 49 of Decision 608, National Competition Authorities may 
apply regional competition rules to cases which have an effect on the regional trade. In 
this way countries with no national competition law, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, can 
apply the regional rules in such cases.^^^ Finally, Article 5 of the Decision includes an 
extended notion of ‘community effect’ as it provides that such an effect may be 
produced by a practice conducted in the territory of one or more Member States and 
have an effect on the territory of another Member State, or practices that take place in 
the territory of a non-Member State and whose real effects are felt in one or more 
Member States. Room is therefore left for the application of the regional rules in an 
extraterritorial manner. In view of these developments and despite the lack of efficient 
enforcement of a competition regime in the Andean region, the amendments provided 
by Decision 680 may be a starting point for improvements in the application of 
competition law and policy in this particular region.^ ®®
5.3.2. MERCOSUR
Competition-related issues are addressed in MERCOSUR by the Fortaleza 
Protocol for the Defence of Competition, which was signed in December 1996, seven 
years after the establishment of the bloc.^ ®^  The similarity to the EU model can be seen 
in the substantive provisions of the Protocol, although less so in relation to 
enforcement.^®^ In particular. Article 4 of the Protocol prohibits agreements and 
concerted practices whose purpose or final effect is to restrict, limit, falsify or distort
598 Galindo Sanchez, R. (2005) ‘New Antitrust ANDEAN Regulation’, < http;//www.brigardurrutia. 
com.co/figuras/funciones/documento.asp?ruta=/publicaciones/87/NewAntitrustAndean2005_rgs.pdf>, (last visited on 21 may 
2007), at 4.
599 See UNCTAD (2006) ‘COMPAL Global Annual Report 2005’ UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2006/1, at 10.
600 See Marcos, P. (2007) ‘Downloading Competition law from a Regional Trade Agreement: A New Strategy to Introduce 
Competition Law to Bolivia and Ecuador’ Berkeley Program in Law & Economics Latin American and Caribbean Law and 
Economics Association (ALACDE) Annual P ^ ers  (University of California, Berkeley), Paper 050107’8, where the author also 
discusses the problems that Bolivia and Ecuador face in the process of adopting regional- compatible competition rules and 
agencies.
601 Common Market o f the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), Protocol o f the Defense o f Competition (hereinafter ‘the Fortaleza 
Protocol’) < http://www.ftaa-alca.org/WgroupsAVGCP/English/cpa/cpa3_e.asp> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
602 As noted in Appendix II, this is also the case in general regarding MERCOSUR, whose initial aim was to create a customs 
union and a common market based on four freedoms (free movement o f goods, persons, services and capital). Despite the obvious 
similarities with the EU, the institutional set up of the bloc differs from that o f the EU. For more detail, see Appendix 11.
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competition or access to the market, as well as abuse of dominance that affects intra­
regional trade.^®  ^ State monopolies fall within the realm of the competition provisions, 
insofar as the rules of this Protocol do not prevent the regular exercise of their legal 
attributions,^®'* while Article 32 requires Member States, within two years from the 
adoption of the Protocol, to have in place the legislation and mechanisms for the control 
of state aids which may have an effect on common trade. The relevant legislation should 
be in accordance with the WTO rules on subsidies.^®^
As for the institutional set up, the Protocol is to be enforced by two 
intergovernmental bodies, the MERCOSUR Trade Commission (TC), which performs 
adjudicative functions, and the Committee for the Defence of Competition (CDC), 
which consists of representatives of signing countries’ national competition authorities, 
and is responsible for the investigation of cases in cooperation with the national 
authorities of the state in which the defendant is domiciled.^®^ According to the 
Fortaleza Protocol, proceedings are initiated by the competition authorities of the 
Member States either ex officio or following a complaint by an interested party.^®  ^The 
national authorities, after a preliminary determination of whether the practice has 
MERCOSUR implications, may submit the case to the CDC for a second determination, 
and both evaluations must be based on a rule-of-reason analysis in which a definition 
of the relevant market and evidence of the conduct and the economic effects of the 
practice must be provided.^®*
When the investigation is completed, the national agency provides the CDC with 
a conclusive ruling, and the CDC, taking into account the view of the national 
competition agency, and subject to approval by the TC, decides upon the possible 
infringement found, the sanctions to be applied to the infringing parties, and any other 
appropriate measure.^®® On the basis of the Protocol, the MERCOSUR Member States
603 Article 6 o f the Protocol further specifies the types o f practices (agreements and abuses o f  dominance) that are incompatible 
with the Protocol, on the basis o f Article 4.
604Fortaleza Protocol, Art 2(2).
605 Fortaleza Protocol, Article 32(2)
606 Ibid, Articles 8, 9, and 15. See Tavares de Araujo Jr, J. (2000) ‘Competition Policy and the EU-MERCOSUR Trade 
Negotiations’, pqier presented at the Working Group on EU- MERCOSUR Trade Negotiations. Paris, May 12-13, 2000, 
<http://www.sice.oas.org/compol/Articles/cpeumercdoc>, (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 12.
607 Fortaleza Protocol, Art. 10.
608 Fortaleza Protocol, Art. 14, and Tavares de Araujo Jr., supra n. 606, at 12
609 Fortaleza Protocol, Articles 18,19, and 20(1). According to Article 20(2), the measures taken have to be applied by the national 
authority o f  the state which conducted the investigation, while Article 20(3) states that in case o f disagreement between the
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have also signed a Complementary to the Protocol Regulation (not yet ratified) in 2002, 
and a cooperation agreement which focuses on cooperation issues and technical 
assistance programmes in 2003.^^ ®
In sum, more than 10 years after its adoption, and despite the relatively detailed 
substantive and institutional rules that it contains, the Protocol has not been successful. 
This is for a number of reasons. First, as noted in Appendix II with regard to the 
general operation of MERCOSUR, unlike under the EC system, there is no strong 
supranational administrative body in place to enforce the Protocol’s provisions. Second, 
even though Article 7 of the Protocol provides that the signing countries have to adopt 
(Protocol-compatible) competition legislation and ratify the Protocol within two years 
of its adoption, Paraguay does not have competition legislation in place, and the 
Protocol has been ratified by only Brazil and Paraguay.^" Third, there has been strong 
resistance by the Member States, especially with regard to provisions on the regulation 
of state-aids.^^^ Hence, at the moment, there are ongoing negotiations over the possible 
amendment that would enhance the effectiveness of the regional competition system.
5.3.3. NAFTA
Competition policy issues are addressed in Chapter 15 of the NAFTA. In 
particular. Article 1501 of the agreement provides - without providing any further 
specifications as to the required content of such rules - that the signing parties should 
have and enforce competition rules. The agreement also includes provisions on state 
enterprises and monopolies. Articles 1502 and 1503 stipulate that the signing parties are 
allowed to establish public enterprises and monopolies, as long as they have notified 
them to the other parties and have a minimum set of rules in place to ensure that the 
other provisions of the agreement are not infnnged by their operation. In addition. 
Article 1501(2) of the agreement includes a general statement according to which the 
signing parties recognise the importance of cooperation and coordination in the 
enforcement of competition cases and further states that such cooperation should be
competent bodies as to the final decision, the TC has to refer the case to the Common Market Group, which is the main Executive 
body o f Mecosur (see bdow. Appendix II).
610 See UNCTAD (2004) ‘Cooperation and Dispute Mediation Mechanism in MERCOSUR Related to Competition law and 
Policy’, Communication submitted by Brazil Ministry o f Justice, <http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/docs/IGEII04/ 
Brazil_cooperation.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
611 See Schmidt C.A.J. (2002) ‘The Defence o f Competition in the Mercosur’, <http://www.seae. 
fazenda.gov.br/document_center/papers-and-articles/2002-l/3-pdfwin32>, (last visited on 21 May 2007).
612 See Jenny and Homa, supra, n. 526, at 312.
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based on mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation and exchange of information 
relating to the enforcement of laws in the free trade area. On this basis, detailed bilateral 
enforcement cooperation agreements, already reviewed in Chapter 3, have been signed 
between the signing parties.
In general, with regard to competition law and policy, NAFTA includes modest 
substantive rules and excludes the application of competition related provisions from 
the dispute settlement mechanism.^^^ The agreement further operates as a basis for 
cooperation of the signing countries in the enforcement of competition rules. Hence the 
operation of competition in the context of NAFTA resembles the US model of bilateral 
trade agreements referred to in Chapter 4, and differs substantially from the EU model.
5.3.4. CAFTA-DR
CAFTA -  DR, which was adopted in 2004,^^ "^  includes no provisions on 
competition.
5.3.5. FTAA
As noted in more detail in Appendix II, the FTAA has been the most ambitious 
of all the regional initiatives carried out in North and South America.^^^ In terms of 
competition law and policy, the draft Chapter 19 of the proposed FTAA, includes very 
detailed provisions. The provisions of the draft chapter, like the FTAA in general, 
include a combination of rules of other plurilateral trade agreements which operate in 
the region. Hence, like NAFTA, the draft chapter includes a provision according to 
which the signing parties should have and enforce competition provisions. The draft 
chapter also includes provisions which similar to NAFTA on public enterprises and 
state monopolies,^ and provides for enforcement cooperation on competition issues 
between the signing parties.^*^
On the other hand, unlike NAFTA, the draft chapter also includes substantive 
provisions. In particular, it includes a prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and 
abuse of dominance by business firms; it also includes provisions on state aids, and
613 NAFTA, Art. 1501(3).
614 For a brief review o f CAFTA -DR, see Appendix II.
615 Negotiations for a possible FTAA started in 1994. However, due to a number o f  reasons identified in Appendix II, negotiations 
have been stagnant in the last 4 years. See in more detail Appendix II.
616 See FTAA draft.. Chapter 15, Article 9.
617 In particular. Articles 8 o f the draft chapter provides for exchange o f information, which is subject to a confidentiality clause 
(according to Article 4 o f  the chapter). Article 14 provides for consultations and article 16 for technical assistance in the field o f 
competition law and policy.
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therefore follows the precedent set by the The Committee on Competition, an
intergovernmental body which would consist of representatives of the Member States, 
would be the enforcing institution of the agreement.^
5.3.6. CARICOM
A Chapter of the revised Treaty establishing CARICOM^^® is devoted to the 
regulation of anticompetitive practices. Article 169 sets out the objectives of the 
CARICOM Competition Regime: (i) to ensure that the benefits expected from the 
establishment of the CARICOM Single Market Economy (CSME) are not frustrated by 
anti-competitive business conduct; (ii) to promote competition and the enhancement of 
efficiency; and (iii) to promote consumer welfare and consumer interests. With regard 
to substantive provisions. Article 177 paragraph two contains an extensive list of 
agreements that would constitute an infringement of competition law while paragraph 
four of Article 177 exempts the above-mentioned agreements from the application of 
competition rules provided certain conditions are met. Finally, Articles 178 and 179 of 
the Revised Treaty refer to the abuse of dominant position.
Furthermore, Article 170(l)(b) (i) requires Member States to adopt competition 
legislation consistent with the Treaty. Articles 170(1) (b) (iii) and (iv) require Member 
States to establish and maintain institutional arrangements and administrative 
procedures to enforce competition laws and to take effective measures to ensure access 
by nationals of other Member States to competent competition authorities including the 
courts on a transparent and non-discriminatory basis. Nonetheless, only Jamaica and 
Barbados of the CARICOM Member States have adopted competition rules to date.
Competition law is to be applied mainly by a CARICOM Competition 
Commission^^^ and by the Court of Justice. In addition, based on Article 182 of the 
Revised Treaty, the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) published 
a comprehensive CARICOM model law in 2003, which includes not only substantive 
competition law provisions but also addresses procedural issues regarding the 
application of competition at the regional level.
618 See FTAA draft., Chapter 15, Articles 6(2) and 10.
619 Ibid, in Article 12.
620 Revised Treaty o f Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, 
<http://www.caricomlaw.oig/docs/revisedtreaty.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
621 See Articles 171 to 176 of the Revised Treaty.
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In sum, CARICOM has developed a comprehensive competition framework 
similar to the one developed by the EU. The EC authorities have informally shown 
interest in the development of the bloc’s competition regime, by considering possible 
ways of financial assistance, a project that has not been fruitful to date.^^  ^ In addition, 
there are still a number of problems regarding the application of competition law in the 
region. As already noted, only two of CARICOM’s members currently have a 
competition law in place and the Competition Commission has not yet been set up.^^  ^
Moreover, further research should be undertaken in order to evaluate whether 
competition laws are needed in the micro-economies of the CARICOM’s member 
states. In any case technical assistance is needed so as to educate competition officials 
who would be asked to apply the competition rules and also for businesses operating in 
the region. On the other hand, it should be noted that the fact that such a 
comprehensive framework has been developed, not to mention the fact that the Court of 
Justice - which has the competence to apply CARICOM’s competition rules - has 
started operating, may indicate that competition law and policy could rapidly evolve in 
this particular region.
5.3.7. WAEMU
WAEMU is probably the regional agreement in Afnca with the most 
comprehensive set of competition rules. Also, the region’s competition regime is very 
much influenced by the EU competition framework.^^^ In particular. Article 88 of the 
Treaty establishing WAEMU declares as void anticompetitive agreements and abuse of 
dominance that may affect intra-regional trade. Article 88(c) also declares void state aid 
which would limit competition by favouring particular companies. According to Article 
90, the Institution responsible for the application of the Community Competition rules is 
the Commission, while the Council of Ministers, with a 2/3 majority, has the 
competence to adopt further competition rules (Article 89 of the Treaty).
622 Interview with EC Commission official, Brussels, 15/11/2007.
623 The Commission nevertheless should start operating in the near future, as on February 13 2007 an agreement between 
CARICOM and the Government of Suriname was signed, and provides for the establidiment of the Commission in this country. See 
‘Agreement between the Government o f the Republic o f Suriname and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Establishing the 
Seat and the Office o f the Competition Commission’, < http://www.caricomlaw.oig/doc.php?id=2373> (last visited on 21 May 
2007).
624 See Stewart, T. (2001), ‘Challenges o f Developing a Competition Regime in CARICOM’, <http://www.iadb.org/sds/doc/lFM- 
Taimoon_Stewart-E.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
625 As noted in Appendix 11, WAEMU follows the EU model in general. See Appendix n.
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On the basis of this provision, the Council of Ministers, following a study that 
was financed by the EC Conunission,^^^ adopted in 2002 three Regulations and two 
Directives which comprise the competition law of WAEMU.^^^ This secondary 
legislation regulates anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance, state aids, 
transparency of the financial relationship between Members States and public 
enterprises and between public enterprises and international organisations, and 
cooperation between WAEMU’s Commission and national competition authorities.
The institutional set up of the regional competition system also resembles the 
EU model. The WAEMU Commission (in which 2 officials fi-om every Member State 
participate) has the sole responsibility to apply regional competition law,^^* and there is 
cooperation between national competition authorities on cases investigated by the 
Commission. In addition WAEMU is in the process of setting up a network to link 
national authorities with the Commission.^^^
Of the agreements discussed in this chapter which contain substantive regional 
competition rules, WAEMU is the only bloc (with of course the exception of the EU) 
that has applied these rules in practice. In particular the Commission has issued three 
decisions based on the regional competition rules. In two cases of 2004 and 2005 the 
Commission granted a comfort letter to firms in the framework of the West African Gas 
Pipe-line Project between Benin and Togo, and also issued a comfort letter to Benin and 
Tongo regarding harmonized tax law provisions adopted in the framework of this 
particular Project. Also in 2005 the Commission issued a decision imposing an 
injunction which ordered Senegal to stop the state aid it provided to a firm.^ ^®
626 The study was carried out by a Belgian law firm, which was responsible for the legal aspects, and an American consultancy 
firm, which dealt with the economic aspects. According to officials o f WAEMU, ‘...It should be stressed at the outset that, among 
the several dozen technical assistance projects financed by the European Union since 1996, the study on the development of 
community competition law is regarded as one o f the most satisfactory to the WAEMU Commission...’. See OECD Global Forum 
on Competition (2002) ‘Contribution by UEMOA’, CCNM/GF/COMPAVD(2002)30, at pp. 3-4.
627 Règlement 02/2002/CM/UEMGA relatif aux pratiques anticoncurrentielles a I'intuieur de I'UEMOA, Règlement 
03/2002/CM/UEMGA relatif aux procidures applicables aux ententes et abus de positions dominantes a l'intuieur de l'UEMGA, 
Règlement 04/2002/CM/UEMGA relatif aux aides d'itat a l'intuieur de l'UEMGA et aux modalitis d'applications de l'article 88(c) 
du traiti. Directive 0 1/2002/CM/UEMGA relative 0 la transparence des relations financières d'une part entre les états membres et les 
entreprises publiques, et d'autre part entre les Etats membres et les organisations internationales ou itrangeres, and Directive 
02/2002/CM/UEMGA relative a la coopuation entre la commission et les structures nationals de concurrence des Etats membres 
pour l'application des articles 88, 89 et 90 du trait2 de l'UEMGA.
628 Something decided by the Regional Court o f Justice with its opinion 003/2000/CJ/UEMGA.
629 See Jenny and Homa, supra, n. 526, at 315.
630 Bakhoum, M. (2006) ‘Delimitation and Exercise o f  Competence between the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) and its Member States in Competition Policy’ 29:4 World Competition, 653, at 665.
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While a number of issues with regard to the operation of the competition regime 
in this bloc remain unaddressed/^^ the fact that the regional body has already applied 
the regional competition rules is a significant development in the context of the 
discussion about the development of competition regimes in plurilateral regional 
agreements, as it demonstrates that competition law can be applied in the context of a 
relevant agreement. This assumption has not yet been tested in practice, since the EU 
has been the only relevant bloc which has effectively developed and applied regional 
competition legislation over a sustained period of time.
5.3.8. ECOWAS
In contrast to WAEMU, and as noted in Appendix I, competition law is not a 
priority in ECOWAS.^^^ This is reflected in the text of the agreement establishing the 
bloc: it does not contain provisions on competition.
5.3.9. EAC
The Treaty establishing EAC provides^^^ that competition law provisions should 
be included in the protocol establishing the EAC Customs Union. In parallel, in the 
Development Strategy of EAC, a common competition policy is envisaged to promote 
free competition; it should be enforced by a central autonomous institution.^^"  ^ The 
Customs Union protocol, signed in 2004, includes a provision similar to Article 81 EC, 
according to which the Partner States shall prohibit any practices that adversely affect 
free trade including any agreement, understanding or concerted practices which has as 
its objective or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
Community
2004 also saw the drafting of the EAC Competition Bill which is currently under 
discussion at the Assembly.^^^ The Bill is a comprehensive piece of legislation, since it
631 For instance the fact that the Commission is understaffed as it employs two competition experts at the moment (interview with 
EC Competition official, Brussels, 15/11/2007).
632 See Appendix II. See also the discussion carried out in the next chapter on the alternative and sometimes opposing views with 
regard to the need of the operation o f competition rules in developing countries.
633 See EAC Treaty, <http://www.eac.int/documents/EAC%20Treaty.pdf>, (last visited on 21 may 2007), Article 75.
634 See EAC (2001) ‘The Second East Afiican Community Strategy Paper’, 
<http://www.eac.int/documents/Development%20Strategy.pdf>, (lastvisited on 21 May 2007)
635 See EAC, ‘Protocol on the Establishment o f the East African Customs Union’, 
<http://www.eac.int/EAC_CuctomsUnionProtocol.pdfi> (last visited on 21 May 2007), Article 21. The article also includes a 
paragraph similar to Article 81(3) o f the EU, which exempts a number of agreements that have other positive effects.
636 See EAC Secretariat. (2006) ‘Role of EAC in Promoting Competition in the Region’, by Dr Flora Mndeme Musonda, Director 
o f  Trade, EAC, <http://www.cuts-intemationaI.org/7up3/RoIe_EAC.pdf>, (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 12-15.
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includes provisions on anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominance, mergers as 
well as subsidies. It follows in other words the EU model.^^^ The Bill also provides for 
the establishment of the EAC Competition Committee, an intergovernmental institution 
composed of the representatives of the Member States,^^* which is proposed to be the 
institution with the competence to enforce the competition provisions of the 
Competition Act.
5.3.10. COMESA
The COMESA Treaty^^^ includes a number of provisions that regulate anti­
competitive practices. In particular. Article 55 prohibits anticompetitive agreements that 
may have an effect on the common market, and further states that: ‘The Council shall 
make regulations to regulate competition within the Member States. ’ A Regulation on 
competition was published, "^*® and was approved by the Council in 2005.^^ It contains 
extensive provisions on anti-competitive business practices. The Regulation ‘...applies 
to all economic activity whether conducted by private or public entities within, or 
having effect with the common market... It also contains provisions on restrictive 
business practices, '^^^ abuse of dominance by firms,^^ mergers,^"^  ^ and consumer 
protection.^"^  ^ Based on this Regulation, the draft COMESA Competition Rules have
637 The influence of the EU model in the drafting o f competition rules in EAC is also documented by a recent submission o f EAC 
to UNCTAD, where it is stated that ‘...[T]he European Union is arguably the most successful regional integration organization in 
terms o f effectiveness in the enforcement o f Competition Law and Policy. A priori, if  one were to consider best international 
practices, the EU cannot be ignored.’ See Contribution by Kenya to the UNCTAD Group o f Experts, on behalf of the EAC (2006) 
‘Regional Cooperation on Competition Policy and Law -  The Experience o f the East African Community’, 
<http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/ c2clp_ige7p25_en.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
638 WTO (2006) ‘Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat: East African Community’ WT/TPR/S/171, at 25. This has been 
one o f the reasons which have delayed its final ^proval by the Assembly, in view o f the fact Aat a  number o f countries have argued 
that the Committee should be a supranational body with a separate budget and capable o f undertaking competition advocacy through 
the promotion o f public awareness and understanding of competition in EAC. See the website of the East African Business Council, 
<http://www.eabc-online.eom/news/EABC_Newsflash_March05.php #COMPETITION> (last visited on 21 May 2007). 
639COMESA Treaty, <http://www.comesa.int/comesa%20treaty/comesa%20treaty/Multi-language_ content.2005-07-01.3414/en> 
(last visited on 21 May 2007).
640 Draft COMESA Competition Regulaticms, <http://www.tralac.org/pdf/CGMESA_Competition_ Regulations_- 
_21.10.2002.doc> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
641 Muhara, L. (2007) ‘Brief on Progress and Challenges o f the Competition and Fair Trading Commission in Malawi’ Paper 
delivered at the 8th Session o f the Intergovernmental Group o f Experts, UNCTAD, Geneva, 17-19 July 2007, at 9.
642 Article 3, subject to the exemptions set forth in Article 4.
643 Articles 16 and 20 o f the Draft Regulation.
644 Articles 17 and 18 o f the Draft Regulation.
645 Articles 23-26 o f the Draft Regulation.
646 Articles 27-39 o f the Draft Regulation.
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been published.^"^  ^ The draft Rules contain more specific provisions on the function of 
the Competition Commission, a supranational body which, when established, will have 
the competence to apply the regional rules. According to the Treaty, conflicts that may 
arise between COMESA’s Member States regarding the application of regional 
competition rules should be resolved by the Court of Justice. "^^*
The draft Regulations were approved by Ministers of Justice and Attomeys- 
General in their Seventh Meeting in April 2004. Hence COMESA is another example of 
a plurilateral regional bloc with a comprehensive competition regime on paper. In this 
regard it is similar to the competition regime of the EU. Indeed, the EC has financially 
supported the establishment of the competition rules in COMESA.^"^  ^Nevertheless the 
regional competition regime has not been applied to date. Of the 20 Member States of 
COMESA, only 6 have adopted competition rules, and the regional enforcement 
institution, the Competition Commission, is not yet established. As Lipimile and 
Gacguiri observe, this absence of a regional competition system has already had major 
consequences in the region, since a number of global mergers that have been 
individually notified to and reviewed by the competition authorities of the Member 
States.^ °^
5.3.11. SACU
With regard to competition law and policy, even though the promotion of 
conditions of fair competition in the Common Customs Area is a stated objective of 
SACU,^^^ the agreement only includes a general provision according to which the 
member countries shall cooperate on competition issues while developing their own 
national competition policies.^^^ To this end, the agreement follows the US (NAFTA) 
model of agreements, which provides for cooperation on and not harmonisation of the
647 Draft COMESA Competition rules, < http://www.traiac.org/pdftCGMESA_Competition_Rules_-_21.10.2002.rtft> (last visited 
on 21 May 2007)
648 See Khandelwal, supra n. 501, at 10.
649 See Commission (EC) (2003) ‘Technical Assistance Programmes and Projects Provided by the European Community and its 
Member States in the Field o f Trade and Competition Policy’ WT/WGTCP/W/223.
650 Lipimile, G.K. and E. Gachuiri (2005) ‘Allocation o f Cases Between National and Regional Competition Authorities: The Case 
o f COMESA’, in Brusick, Alvarez and Cemat (eds), supra n.3 , at 377-385.
651 Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement, <http://www.sacu.int/ResourceCentre/Legislation/2002SACU 
Agreement/tabid/370/Default.aspx> (last visited on 21 May 2007), Article 2(c).
652 Article 40 of the SACU agreement; for an analysis o f possible options with regard to the development o f competition policy in 
the region, see Mathis, J. (2005) The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Regional Cooperation Framework on Competition 
Policy and Unfair Trade Practices (UNCTAD, Geneva and New York)
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competition rules of the parties. On the other hand, it should be pointed out that of the 
five SACU Member States, currently only South Africa and Namibia have adopted 
competition laws and therefore no particular conclusions may be made drawn with 
regard to the actual application of the competition-related provision of the SACU 
agreement.^^^
5.3.12. SADC
Like SACU, Article 25 of the SADC protocol on trade^ "^^  includes a general 
statement, according to which, “Member States shall implement measures within the 
Community that prohibit unfair business practices and promote competition On this 
basis a group of experts has been convened and has re-expressed the commitment of 
SADC Members to strengthen cooperation on competition matters in the region. The 
SADC Secretariat should play an important role in this regard, by both facilitating such 
cooperation and by providing the Member States with assistance in their attempt to 
establish national competition regimes.^^^
5.3.13. ASEAN
No competition provisions have been adopted in the context of ASEAN, and the 
discussion over the usefulness of competition law for the strengthening of regional 
integration is ongoing. In particular, the Hanoi Action Plan of 1999 referred to the need 
for cooperation in order to explore the merits o f  a common competition policy\^^^ 
Furthermore, in 2003, Indonesia recommended the setting up of the ASEAN 
Consultative Forum for Competition (ACFC) with the aim of serving as a forum for 
exchange of opinions among officials of the participating countries -  members of 
ASEAN - on competition related issues of common interest, as well as to exchange such 
ideas with other international organisation.^^^ The ACFC was finally established in 
2004.
653 See Homa, P.M., and BO Kayali (2007) ‘National Implementation o f Competition -  Related Provisions in Bilateral and 
Regional Trade Agreements’, in Alvarez, A-M and L. Wilse Samson (eds) Implementing Competition -Related Provisions in 
Regional Trade Agreements: is it possible to obtain development gains? (UNCTAD, Geneva and New York), 21, at 46.
654 Adopted on the basis o f Article 22 o f the amended Treaty.
655 SADC Secretariat (2007) ‘SADC Expert Group Meeting on Competition Law and Policy’ 
<http://www.sadc.int/attachments/calendar/25 l/1892_Expert%20Group%20Meeting%20on%20Competition%20Law%20&%20Pol 
icy%20Record%20(Draft).pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), Appendix II.
656 Lloyd, P.J. (2002) ‘Competition Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region’ 14:2 Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, 1, at 8.
657 There is no secretariat established in the context o f the ACFC, and in this regard the network resembles the ICN. From 2005, 
the members o f the ACFC meet once a year. See Yong, O.K. (2006) ‘Opening Remarks at the 2nd ASEAN Conference on
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5.3.14. APEC
In the context of APEC, a Competition Policy and Deregulation Group (CPDG) 
was established and has been in operation since 1996. It has the task of discussing 
competition issues in the Member States and possible influence that competition policy 
has on the investment in the region.^^* The Group convenes on an annual basis and has 
been particularly active after 1999, when the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition 
and Regulatory Reform were endorsed by the Ministers of the Member States. These 
Principles expressed a number of competition related aims, including the promotion of 
advocacy of competition policy and regulatory reform, the building of expertise in 
competition and regulatory authorities, the courts and the private sector, and the 
attainment of adequate resources for regulatory institutions, including competition 
institutions.^^^ On this basis, the CPDG has set up a series of training courses and has 
framed a four year action plan (2005-2009) with the aim of, among others, gathering 
information on the development of competition law and policy in the Member States, 
encouraging cooperation among national authorities, and undertaking capacity building 
programs to assist economies in implementing the ‘APEC Principles to Enhance 
Competition and Regulatory Reform’.
5.4 Competition provisions in plurilateral agreements; A comparative reading
The brief presentation of the competition regimes of the various agreements to a 
certain extent validates what has been argued in an earlier part of the chapter, viz. that 
there is wide acceptance by regional blocs that some sort of competition rules are 
needed, since most of the regional blocs discussed here have adopted relevant 
provisions. Only four of these agreements, namely CAFTA-DR, ECOWAS, ASEAN 
and APEC, contain no competition provisions at all, and of those four agreements only 
in two (CAFTA-DR and ECOWAS) have there been no attempts to date to adopt
Competition Policy and Law, Bali, Indonesia, 14-16 June 2006’, < http://www.aseansec.org/18507.htm> (Last visited on 21 May 
2007), where the author also notes that as o f to date Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam have enacted specific competition 
law, while currently, Malaysia md the Philippines are considering the enactment o f a competition law.
658 See the website o f the Committee, at <htQ)://www.apec.org/apec/hpec_groups/ 
committees/committee_on_trade/competition_policy.html> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
659 See APEC (1999) ‘APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform’, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/52/2371601.doc> (last visited on 21 May 2007), Implementation, paragraph 6.
660 See APEC Committee on Trade and Development (2006) ‘Annual Report to the Ministers’ APEC#206-CT-01.6, at 110 
(Appendix 7).
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competition rules.^^  ^ As opposed to these two, both ASEAN and APEC have 
established mechanisms for the exchange of ideas and experiences of the Member States 
on competition matters, and this is a process referred to in various parts of the thesis as 
a mechanism for the development of common understandings and the final formation of 
rules.
On the other hand the presentation of these blocs’ competition regimes show 
that while the content of these regimes varies there are also certain common 
characteristics among the agreements. This section attempts to expose such common 
characteristics in two broad areas: substantive competition provisions provided by the 
agreements, and the institutional set up of these agreements.
5.4.1. Substantive competition provisions in plurilateral regional agreements 
Table 5.2. Substantive provisions
AGREEMENT Prohibition of 
anticompetitive 
practices
Prohibition of 
abuse of 
dominance
Mergers
State aid rules 
included in the 
competition context
Rules on public 
/state monopolies
EU V V V V V
ANDEAN
COMMUNITY V V
MERCOSUR V V V V
NAFTA V
FTAA V V V V
CAFTA-DR
CARICOM V V
WAEMU V V V V
EAC V V V V
COMESA V V V V
SACU
SADC
ECOWAS
ASEAN
In terms of substantive competition law provisions, as in the case of bilateral 
free trade agreements, there are two main competition related models followed by 
plurilateral agreements. The first model is the one first adopted by NAFTA, according 
to which countries undertake a general obligation to have an operational domestic 
competition regime and a commitment to cooperate on competition matters of common 
interest. This model is also followed by SACU and SADC. SADC has only adopted a
661 It should be pointed out nevertheless that CAFTA -DR is an agreement that has only been very recently adopted and in this 
regard it is probably too early to judge whether regional competition has been totally overlooked by the participating countries.
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single provision that requires the Member States to have and promote domestic 
competition rules; SACU also includes a provision according to which the Member 
States have to cooperate with each other on competition matters. Hence, no particular 
substantive regional competition rules are provided by these agreements.^^^
The second model includes a number of substantive competition provisions and 
is the one followed by the EU. This model has been followed by most of the regional 
blocs discussed here. A common characteristic of these agreements is that they prohibit 
specific anticompetitive business practices, and, in particular, they include provisions 
that aim to address anticompetitive agreements and the abuse of a dominant position 
which have an effect on the regional market. Nonetheless, the extent to which the EU 
model is further followed varies considerably among the different regional blocs, as 
only some of the blocs include substantive rules on mergers, public undertakings, and 
state aids.
This variety may be attributed to the fact that the more extended the scope of 
competition rules the more direct the intervention to the sovereign national systems of 
the Member States. An indicative example may be found in the field of mergers. As 
noted in the context of the analysis of the EU competition regime, merger rules were 
introduced in the EU 32 years after the adoption of the founding Treaty, and this has 
been primarily attributed to the hesitance of the Member States to grant authority to a 
regional body to apply rules that relate to the performance of the most important 
companies of the Member States (and therefore rules that indirectly impact upon some 
of the most important economic and political interests of these states). Hence, it comes 
as no surprise that only two of the agreements discussed in this chapter, namely EAC 
and COMESA, have adopted rules for the control of mergers, and such rules have yet to 
be applied.
Similarly, only EAC, WAEMU, have included the examination of aid granted to 
undertakings by the state within the realm of competition law, while three of the 
agreements discussed in this chapter, namely MERCOSUR, WAEMU and COMESA, 
have also included competition law provisions that regulate practices conducted by 
public enterprises and/or state monopolies, thus following the EU model.^^^ 
Nevertheless, the relevant provisions also vary. While COMESA’s competition
662 A similar set o f provisions are found in the proposed FTAA, which also contains substantive competition provisions that are to 
be applied to cases where the regional market is affected.
663 See Table 5.2.
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provisions clearly apply (or are to be applied) equally to private and public firms, 
WAEMU’s competition regime includes provisions which aim at securing transparency 
of the financial relationship between Members States and public enterprises. 
MERCOSUR’S competition law includes state monopolies within the realm of the 
regional competition rules only in those cases where these rules do not prevent the 
regular exercise of their legal rights; it is similar therefore to the EU relevant provision 
of Article 86(2) EC.
At least in terms of drafted rules, the inclusion of state aid rules and rules 
relating to public undertakings are indications of the tendency to include the public 
sector within the scope of the competition rules contained in particular regional 
agreements. As mentioned in the context of the presentation of the EC competition 
regime, such rules have been viewed as being essential in view of the fact that prior to 
their existence, national markets of the Member States of the Union were state 
dominated, and these rules to a certain extent ensured that the regional markets would 
be framed on principles of free markets. In this regard these rules can help protect 
private initiative against the actions of the state. However it should be also pointed out 
that, with the exemption of WAEMU - where two cases on state aid have been decided 
by the Commission - and the EU, in which the competent institutions (the Commission 
and the Court of Justice) have developed detailed jurisprudence, in none of the other 
agreements discussed in this chapter these rules have been operational.
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5.4.2. Institutional set up and implementation of the rules 
Table 5.3. Institutional set up
AGREEMENT
E U
Obligation of 
M. states to
their rules to 
those of the 
Regional 
agreement
General 
^  obligation of 
Merhber States 
to have a 
*  national 
competition 
law
Number of 
Member States 
with national 
Comp^ition 
laws in place 
(as o f 2005)
2 7 /27
Type of regional 
institution competent 
 ^to  apply competition 
rules;
A, Supm Ëim W  
B. Intergovernmental
Court competent 
to review the  ^
decisions of # e  t  
regional % 
authority
Provisions on 
■/ cooperation 
% between the 
^  M. states' 
national 
authorities
ANDEAN
COMMUNITY 2 /4
MERCOSUR 3 /4 B
NAFTA 3 /3
FTAA B
CAFTA-DR 2 /6
CARICOM 2/15
WAEMU 5 /7
EAC 2 /3 B
COMESA 6 / 2 0
SACU 2 /5
SADC 7/14
ECOWAS 5/15
ASEAN 4 /10
APEC 16/21
As noted in the context of the presentation of the EC competition regime, of 
equal or even major importance to the substantive rules included in the plurilateral- 
regional agreements are the provisions which organise the institutional structure of these 
blocs. As a general observation it could be noted that there are also two broad types of 
institutional structures provided by the agreements which include competition rules. The 
first is the one adopted by NAFTA, and followed by SACU and SADC, in which no 
regional institution is provided and all the competition-related issues are to be resolved 
by the national competition authorities of the participating countries. In this regard, both 
NAFTA and SACU specifically provide that the participating states should cooperate in 
competition matters, and as has been seen in Chapter 3, in the case of NAFTA the 
signing parties have also concluded non-binding bilateral enforcement cooperation 
agreements.
The second type of institutional structure follows the EU approach and provides 
for the creation of a centralised body that has the competence to enforce competition 
law in the region. With this model, however, the type of the regional body established to 
apply the rules varies. In particular, the Andean Community, CARICOM, WAEMU,
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and COMESA are blocs that have opted for the creation of a supranational body 
equivalent of the EC Commission. On the other hand, it should be noted that, to date, of 
these institutions only the Andean Community Board of Commissioners and the 
WAEMU Competition Commission have been established in practice, and only the 
latter has recently started operating by issuing its first three decisions.
In contrast to the EU precedent, two of the regional blocs, EAC and 
MERCOSUR, have opted for the establishment of an intergovernmental institution 
competent to apply the regional rules. In EAC, competition law is to be applied by an 
intergovernmental body; and in MERCOSUR, the competence to apply regional 
competition rules has been granted to two relevant bodies. In these cases it is obvious 
that the contracting parties were not ready to offer the competence to a non national 
institution to review cases that may have an effect on their national markets.
In a broader context, what also becomes obvious from this data is that even with 
regard to the agreements which have opted for the adoption of substantive regional 
competition laws, i.e. those that by-and-large follow the EU model, there is no 
agreement as to what type of centralised enforcement body is appropriate to enforce the 
competition rules, and more particularly, whether such a body should be supranational 
or intergovernmental. This debate over the positive and negative features of 
supranationalism vis-à-vis intergovemmentalism is a vivid one, in the context of the 
EU’s institutional set up itself,^ "^^  and the extent to which either of these institutional 
designs is appropriate for a regional competition regime can only be examined by 
conducting research on every particular agreement, a task that cannot possibly be 
undertaken in the context of this study; indeed, with the exception of the EU and lately 
WAEMU,^^^ it is an issue that is under-researched in the relevant literature. On the other 
hand, as noted above, the EU experiment has shown that in terms of competition law 
and policy, where to date the EU regime has been the only successful and operative 
regional regime in the world, the delegation of powers to a supranational institution (the 
Commission) is of major importance if a credible regional regime is to be achieved.^^^
664 See Tsebelis, G and G Garett (2001) ‘The Institutional Foundations o f Inteigovemmentalism and Supranationalism in the 
European Union’ 55:2 International Organization, 357; Tallberg, J. (2002) ‘Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, 
and with What Consequences?’ 25:1 West European Politics, 23.
665 See Bakhoum, M. (2006) supra n. 630, at 125.
666 See McGowan, L. (2007) ‘Theorising European Integration: Revisiting Neofunctionalism and Testing its Suitability for 
Explaining the Development of EC Competition Policy?’ 11:3 European Integration online papers, 1, at 4-5.
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As also argued in this chapter, in the case of the EU, the regional courts have 
been of equal significance in the development of competition; they have extensively 
interpreted and applied the regional competition rules, and have also developed 
principles which delineate the relationship between the supranational body and the 
national authorities. To this end, the fact that some of the agreements (namely the 
Andean Community, CARICOM, WAEMU, EAC, COMESA, and SADC) also provide 
for the establishment of regional Courts which have the competence to review cases 
relating to the regional competition rules may be considered as a choice that should 
normally lead to the more efficient application of competition rules. Nevertheless this 
hypothesis cannot yet be tested as, with the exception of the WAEMU Court of Justice, 
none of these courts have to date applied the competition rules: in practice the 
competition regimes have not been operational in these other blocs.
On the other hand, the brief presentation of the EC competition system has also 
shown that the system is a dynamic one, in the sense that it changes over time. For 
instance, with regard to the institutional set up of the EU, it has been noted that while 
until recently the European Commission had sole competence to apply the competition- 
related provisions. Regulation 1/2003 has provided for decentralisation of enforcement, 
requiring Member States to apply regional rules in cases that have an effect on 
intraregional trade. In this regard, and while the adoption of competition rules is not a 
clear legal prerequisite for the EU Member States,^^^ this development in the 
competition system practically requires Member States to have national competition 
institutions in place, and apply the regional rules in particular instances.
Furthermore, in a broader context, the EU experience has shown that in the long 
term the development of an effective regional competition regime may lead to the 
adoption and development of the national competition regimes which are equivalent to 
the regional one.^^* If the EU hypothesis is to be applicable to these other agreements, 
then it should be expected that the development of the regional regime should precede 
the relevant development of national competition regimes, particularly with regard to
667 This argument does not apply to the Member States that joined the EU from 2004 onwards, where the adoption o f a competition 
law compatible to the EU was among the obligations that these Member States had to fulfil in order to secure EU accession. See 
chapter 4.
668 This argument has been already made with regard to competition law and policy in Greece. It should not however be 
overlooked that certain Member States have only relatively recently adopted national competition rules. For instance. The 
Netherlands in 1994.
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regional agreements which include developing countries, where the adoption and more 
importantly the development of effective competition regimes is a very difficult task.^^^
To this end, and in view of the fact that to date almost none of the reviewed 
competition regimes have been operational, it comes as no surprise that despite the fact 
that certain agreements require their Member States to have competition law in place,^^® 
while others go a step further and require adoption of national competition rules 
compatible with the substantive regional rules,^^  ^ in most of these blocs a number of 
Member States have not even adopted a competition law.^^^
5.5. The role of the EU in the formation of competition rules in plurilateral 
regional agreements.
The previous section has attempted to highlight some of the common 
characteristics of the competition regimes that have been set up, or that are in the 
process of being set up, by various competition agreements. While this comparative 
reading of the agreements has probably raised more questions than it has answered, and 
while further research needs to be undertaken to examine the particular features of the 
regional markets where competition law is to be applied, to suggest the appropriate 
substantive and procedural rules that should be adopted by these regional blocs, and to 
evaluate in more general the development of competition regimes of these blocs,^^^ 
some interesting observations may still be put forward as to the role of the EU in the 
formation of competition regimes in other plurilateral -  regional agreements.
The main such observation, and the starting point for the discussion carried out 
in this section, is that the competition regime of the EU has been the model followed by 
a number of other regional blocs, both in terms of substance and in terms of institutional 
set up. Indeed, the EU model has been followed by much more agreements of this kind 
than the NAFTA model. While it has also been suggested in the previous section that 
the extent to which the EU model of competition has been followed varies considerably 
among the various blocs which have opted this model, this observation is still of some
669 On the problems faced by developing countries in the process o f adoption and application of competition rules, see Chapter 6.
670 These agreements include NAFTA, FTAA, SADC and SACU.
671 Including MERCOSUR, CARICOM and WAEMU.
672 See Table 5.3.
673 A task, that at this stage has to be limited to the negotiations for the adoption o f competition regimes in these blocs as well as to 
the analysis o f the adopted rules, and cannot be extended on issues o f enforcement o f the rules, since with the exceptions of the EU 
and WAEMU, such rules have not been operational to date.
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significance, as it suggests that a model of sorts for a regional competition regime may 
be arising in the field of international competition. This model encompasses substantive 
competition provisions, at least regarding the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements 
and abuses of dominance which have an effect on the common -  regional market, and is 
also based on the creation of regional institutions, either supranational or 
intergovernmental, that will apply these rules.
In an attempt to evaluate this phenomenon, and on the basis of the analysis 
carried out in this chapter, two main reasons may be put forward as to why the EC 
competition model was chosen by a number of other blocs. First, it might be argued that 
the EU itself has encouraged other regional blocs to adopt competition rules similar to 
those of the EU. As noted in sub-section 5.1.3., the EU in a broader context has 
supported the creation and operation of regional blocs, and has expressed its position in 
this regard through policy statements, aid granted to regional agreements and the 
negotiation of trade agreements with other regional organisations.
In the absence of inter-regional agreements, it is clear that no proof has been 
offered by the chapter regarding possible attempts by the EU to impose its own 
competition rules to other regional blocs through the adoption of inter-regional 
agreements, a practice that, as exposed in chapter 4, has been the main strategic tool of 
the EU in the field of bilateral trade agreements. On the other hand, this chapter has 
shown that on several occasions, support for regional initiatives, and in particular for the 
establishment of regional competition regimes, has been expressed by the EU through 
the funding of competition-related projects in regional blocs, such as the Andean 
Community, COMESA, and WAEMU. While the exact conditions upon which such 
assistance has been granted have not been made publicly available, it is noted in the 
context of the discussion that the general aim of the financial aid was to assist these 
regional blocs in their attempts to adopt competition law, and therefore it would be 
rather safe to argue that such assistance has been based on the experience gained 
through the application of the EC competition regime. Thus in view of the fact that it 
has been offered to other regional blocs which are comparable with the EU, it might be 
argued that such projects have been a vehicle through which the EU has attempted to 
export its own competition model.
That said, it has also became clear from the chapter’s analysis that the EU in 
encouraging the adoption of competition rules by other plurilateral-regional agreements 
has not been as active as in the case of bilateral free trade agreements with neighbouring
190
countries and selected trade partners. In addition, it should be noted that at least up to 4 
years ago, as demonstrated in the next chapter, in the field of international competition, 
much of the resources of the Commission have been devoted to the talks on competition 
at the WTO, while, as noted in chapter 4, the Commission has also focused on the 
application of competition provisions included in bilateral agreements, and particularly 
in agreements vdth candidate and acceding countries.^^"*
So to what main reason may the influence of the EU observed in the context of 
the discussion above be attributed? By induction, it could be argued that the EU model 
of competition has to a certain extent been copied due to the fact that it has been 
considered by other regional blocs as a benchmark and a tool for the achievement of 
regional integration. This phenomenon -  countries or group of countries copying the 
legal regime of another country or group of countries -  has been explained by economic 
theory, which suggests that competitors imitate successful strategies over a given period 
of time.^^^ This assumption may be applied by analogy to the field of plurilateral 
regional agreements, where the successful application of the EU regime in general and 
its competition regime in particular has been to a certain extent imitated - at least on 
paper - by a number of other plurilateral agreements.
Similarly, in the international relations literature, the concepts of mimetic and 
normative isomorphism have been advanced in order to explain the reasons that lead to 
the adoption of similar competition regimes by different regional agreements.^^^ 
According to mimetic isomorphism, certain organisations mimic other organisations 
due to uncertainty. The more frequent the practice, the more likely it is that other 
organisations imitate such a practice. On the other hand, according to normative 
isomorphism, an organisation imitates another organisation in cases where the 
approaches and procedures of the latter on a given issue is considered to be superior and
674 It is interesting to note, that none o f the last two Commissioners for Competition (former Commissioner Monti and 
Commissioner Kroes), has publicly expressed the position that the EU actively supports the formation of competition rules in other 
regional blocs. This should not lead us to the opposite end and argue that the EC Commission has not been eager to support such 
initiatives, nevertheless, is indicative o f the fact that such support has not been o f primary importance at least as far as DG for 
Competition is concerned.
675 Sokol, D. D. (2007) ‘Why is this Chapter Different From all the Others? An Examination of Why Countries Enter Into Non- 
Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research P ^ e r  No. 
2007-13, at 50.
676 Ibid, where the author refers to the work o f DiMaggio and Powell who first developed the context o f institutional isomorphism, 
a concept already mentioned in the thesis in the context o f the analysis o f bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements (Chapter 3). 
See DiMaggio P. J. and W.W. Powell (1983) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields’ 48 American Society Review, 147.
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based on prevailing thought. While mimetic and normative isomorphism are based on 
different causal grounds (mimetic on uncertainty and lack of information and normative 
on the assumption of superiority), the outcome of both is the imitation of the most 
successful approaches. To this end, the adoption by a number of agreements of the EC 
competition model is a consequence of the fact that the EC model is a tested one and 
whatsmore is considered to be as a very successful one. Therefore it comes as no 
surprise that the model has been used as a template to be followed by other competition 
regimes (WAEMU, CARICOM, and COMESA being the prime examples) which, 
having accepted the argument that the operation of an effective competition law could 
have a positive effect in the bloc, have followed the EC competition regime.
5.6. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the competition regimes of a number of plurilateral 
regional agreements around the world. It first presented the historical development of 
regional agreements, and identified the factors that lead to the establishment of the 
various regional blocs. Geographic proximity, the aim of the signing states to achieve 
peace and increased welfare in the region, and their aim of counter-balancing the 
bargaining powers of other formed regional blocs and strong states at the international 
level are all important factors.
In terms of competition, the chapter argued that the role of competition law and 
policy in these arrangements is to ensure that regional trade liberalisation, a goal 
pursued by all the agreements discussed, is not.hampered by anticompetitive business 
practices with an effect on the regional markets. From a different viewpoint, it has also 
been noted that the examination of the competition law provisions of these agreements 
is significant in view of the fact that these agreements, with their wide membership, 
may be considered as a miniature of a possible multilateral agreement. However this is 
an assumption that one cannot yet test, since to date, with the exception of the EU and 
lately WAEMU, none of the other regional competition regimes have been operational.
This lack of application of the competition rules may be attributed to various 
factors, including the fact that, as the EU experiment has shown, it takes time for the 
regional competition regime to develop. The hesitation of particular Member States to 
accept a regional body to apply rules that may have an effect on companies supported 
by the governments of these states is another factor, as is the lack of sufficient resources 
regarding the enforcement of competition rules. On the other hand, what can be safely
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supported is that there is wide recognition that some sort of regional competition law is 
important for the. effective operation of the regional trade agreements. This assumption 
is based on the fact that most of these blocs have adopted or are in the process of 
adopting competition rules.
In the context of the brief examination of the competition regime of the EU, 
which is the focal point of study in this thesis, it has been argued that EU competition 
law and policy has been built around two main elements: detailed substantive 
competition rules, and effective enforcement of these rules, which in the case of the EU 
has been carried out by two regional - supranational institutions, i.e. the Commission 
and the Courts. Hence, the EU model - as opposed to the NAFTA model which is 
limited to a commitment undertaken by the Member States to have national rules in 
place and provides with mechanisms for voluntary cooperation - requires the adoption 
of detailed substantive regional rules and centralised enforcement of such rules.
On the other hand, as noted above, while all the agreements that follow the EU 
model include provisions on the prohibition of anticompetitive practices and abuse of 
dominance, there is great variation as to both the remaining substantive provisions 
included in the other agreements and the institutional set up they provide for. In 
particular, it has been noted that only some of them include provisions relating to 
mergers, state aids, and abuse of dominance. In terms of institutional set up, of the 
agreements that have granted the competence to enforce the competition rules to 
regional bodies, two of them, namely EAC and MERCOSUR, have granted it to 
intergovernmental bodies, thus departing from the EU model of institutional set up, 
which is greatly based to a supranational body, i.e. the Commission.
This variation in the provisions found in regional agreements reveals that there 
is a long way to go before reaching some sort of agreement as to the optimum operation 
of competition in these blocs. In view of this argument, further research has to be 
undertaken to analyse the competition framework of individual regional plurilateral 
agreements. Such research should (i) focus on the examination of the particular regional 
markets created by these agreements, (ii) evaluate the particular needs of these markets, 
and (iii) propose substantive rules appropriate for their effective operation, as well as 
the rules that would better support the effective enforcement of these rules. To this end, 
major international organisations such as UNCTAD, OECD and the IMF have recently 
started looking at this issue.
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Finally with regard to the influence of the EU in the formation of regional 
competition rules in other blocs, the chapter has indicated that while there have been 
instances where the EU has financed projects relating to the adoption of competition 
rules by regional blocs, the EU administration has not been as active in this field as in 
the case of bilateral trade agreements, and at least until 4 years ago, as in the 
negotiations over a possible competition agreement at the WTO. In this regard, the 
chapter has argued that the fact that a number of plurilateral regional agreements have 
even partially followed the competition regime of the EU may be mainly attributed to 
the fact that to a certain extent, the EU model is considered as a benchmark, and is 
therefore followed by a number of other agreements which have adopted substantive 
competition rules and have granted the competence for the application of the rules to 
centralised enforcement bodies. As argued in the chapter, the theoretical basis of this 
phenomenon relates to the fact that there is a tendency among organisations to imitate 
tested and successful strategies and practices of other organisations. Given that the EU 
in general and the EC competition regime in particular have been major successes, it 
comes as no surprise that a number of other regional blocs have to a certain extent 
imitated the EU precedent.
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Chapter 6: The Role of the Competition Law and Policy of the EU in Multilateral 
Negotiations on Competition
Abstract
This chapter examines the development of the negotiations on competition at the 
multilateral level so as to understand the policy followed by the EU in the context of 
these negotiations. A large part of the chapter is devoted to the WTO talks on the issue, 
which has been the most recent attempt to conclude a binding multilateral agreement on 
competition; it also observes the developments that have taken place in the last four 
years at the ICN. As is argued in subsequent discussion - itself informed by elements 
identified in previous chapters of the thesis - and in contrast to the formation of 
competition rules in the context of bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements where the 
influence of the EU has been important, at the multilateral level the role of the EU has 
been less influential. In reaching this conclusion nonetheless, the chapter also attempts 
to highlight the various parameters which play a role on multilateral negotiations on 
competition law and policy.
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 1 briefly reviews the 
discussions concerning a possible multilateral agreement that have taken place from the 
beginning of the 20^ century until relatively recently. Section 2 focuses on the process 
of negotiations at the WTO. This section reviews the position taken by the EU on the 
issue and further examines the relevant positions taken by the US and a number of 
developing countries. Finally, Section 3 discusses the work carried out by the 
International Competition Network.
6.1 Historical development of the negotiations on the adoption of a multilateral 
agreement on competition
6.1.1. Attempts under the aegis of the League of Nations, and the proposed International 
Trade Organization flTO)
The history of the attempts to adopt a multilateral agreement on competition law 
goes back to 1925 when the first international competition code was proposed in a study 
conducted under the aegis of the League of Nations.^^^ The proposal was finally rejected 
by the League on the basis of arguments not much different than those developed to
677 Furnish, A (1970) ‘A Transnational Approach to Restrictive Business Practices’, 4 International Lawyer, 317, at 317-319.
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explain the lack of success of subsequent attempts for the adoption of a multilateral 
competition agreement: that divergent national attitudes towards restrictive business 
practises precluded the creation of an international code; and that an international 
regime would heavily infringe upon state sovereignty.^^*
Almost 20 years later, a second significant attempt to include competition law in 
the international trading system was made. In particular, Chapter of the proposed 
Havana Charter was dedicated to the regulation of restrictive business practices. 
According to the provisions of this charter, the Member States of the proposed 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) would have been obliged to adopt appropriate 
legislation and to co-operate with the ITO in order to prevent private and public 
commercial enterprises from getting engaged in practices that would restrain 
competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control whenever such 
practices would have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade and would 
interfere with the achievement of any of the other objectives listed in Article 1 of the 
Charter.^*^ An extensive list of such practices was included in the proposed code.^**
Member States would have been entitled to complain about prohibited restraints 
of competition to the ITO,^*  ^which according to the proposed Charter would have been 
empowered to investigate and demand information during its investigation.^*^ If the ITO 
were to find that the alleged practice would have a restrictive effect on competition, it 
would have been empowered to request each member involved to ‘take every possible 
remedial action’.^ *"^  Moreover Article 48 (8) would have entitled the ITO to request 
from the offending Member Nation full reports in relation to the progress of its remedial 
measures.
Although most of the countries that participated in the discussions favoured the 
adoption of the Havana Charter, the proposed Charter failed to get favour in the US 
Congress which, as documented, was essentially motivated by the traditional concerns 
over international incursions into US domestic political sovereignty and by the feeling
678 Ibid.
679 See Havana Charter, Chapter V, Articles 46 to 54.
680 Ibid, in Art. 46 (I).
681 Ibid in Art. 46 (3); The list included price fixing, sales or purchase quotas, excluding enterprises from business activities, 
dividing territorial markets or fields of business, and limiting production or fixing production quotas.
6 8 2 Ib id in A rt4 8 (l).
683 Ibid in Art 46(2) and 48 (3).
684 Ibid in Art 48 (7).
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that the competition rules of Chapter V were not adequate for the Thus the
Congress withdrew its support for the Charter and the negotiations failed to produce an 
agreement.
6.1.2. UNCTAD: The Restrictive Business Practices Code
No significant initiative for a multilateral competition agreement was to be taken 
until the 1970s.^*  ^ At that time, the desire for discussions concerning a multinational 
agreement came from less developed countries. These countries were concerned about 
the increasing expansion of multinational enterprises, which from their point of view 
were powerful and abusive.^*^ Under the developing countries’ pressure the issue of 
negotiating a multilateral competition agreement was once again raised. The discussions 
were held under the aegis of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), and the result of these negotiations was the adoption of a Restrictive 
Business Practices Code (RBP Code)^** which, contrary to the initial proposal of the 
developing countries, is a recommendation and thus not legally binding.^*^
In terms of substance, the Code includes provisions addressing horizontal 
restraints of competition (price-fixing, boycotts, and market and consumer 
allocation).^^® In relation to vertical restraints, the Code declares that such restraints 
should be condemned only when they are conducted by a dominant firm and they are 
abusive in character.C oncern ing  abuse of a dominant position by a firm, the Code 
states that each practice should be examined on its own merits (purpose and effect).^^^
685 See Timberg, S. (1973) ‘An International Antitrust Convention: A Proposal to Harmonise Conflicting National Policies 
Towards the Multinational Corporation’ 8 Journal o f International Law and Economics, 157.
686 In the period between 1950 and 1970, two initiatives are noteworthy; First, the UNESCO’s committee endorsement of a second 
draft o f the Havana Charter’s Competition Principles, which failed due to the withdrawal o f the US support (See Furnish, supra n. 
677, at 323). Second, the work o f a group o f experts that was appointed in 1958 to discuss the possible inclusion o f competition 
provisions in GATT. The decision was again negative, notwithstanding that the contracting parties recognised the problems that 
restrictive business practices create in international trade. See Malagud, M-C. (1998) ‘Restrictive Business Practices in International 
Trade and the Role o f the World Trade Organisdion’ 32:3 Journal o f  World Trade, 117, at 120.
687 Fox, E.M. (1995) ‘Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links o f Competition and Trade’ 4 Pacific Rim 
& Law Policy, 1, at 4.
688 The Set o f  Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control o f Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. Doc. 
TD/RBP/CONF 10/Rev. 1 (1980), endorsed by G.A. Res. 63, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/63 (1980), reprinted in 19 l.L.M. 813 (1980).
689 The Code is not a Treaty but a Resolution o f the General Assembly. Article 10 o f the U.N. Charter defines such Resolutions as 
‘Recommendation to States’.
690 RBP Code, supra n. 688 , sec. D-3.
691 ibid in sec. D-4.
692 Ibid in sec D-4 & note accompanying the word “abuse”.
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Generally it could be said that the RBP Code has been noteworthy since it is the 
only multinational competition agreement that has been adopted and it represents the 
only time that the US has supported the adoption of such an agreement. Probably it 
comes as no surprise that, in the relatively long story of multilateral negotiations 
concerning a competition agreement, the only time when consensus was reached on 
substantive competition provisions it was for a non-binding agreement. On the basis of 
the analysis about soft-law that has been carried out in earlier chapters, this may be 
considered as a first step towards further and formal (in the form of a binding 
agreement) multilateral cooperation on competition. Such a position is also revisited in 
the context of the discussion on the work of the ICN,^^  ^itself a body that has also issued 
a number of soft law instruments. In view of the fact that no binding agreement has 
been reached to date on this issue, it may also be an indication that with regard to an 
issue such as competition law, where there is no common approach as to its optimum 
operation, semi-formal arrangements in the form of soft law are the second best, but yet 
the only, solution regarding the treatment of anticompetitive business practices with an 
international effect.
On the other hand, it has been argued that as the code is a soft law instrument 
many of its provisions are vague, and that many of the rules that developing countries 
wished to be included into the Code did not survive the negotiation process (due to the 
opposition of the developed countries that participated in the negotiations).^^'* Both of 
these points render the Code a legislative text of relatively limited value. That said, as 
examined in the following section of the chapter, the work of UNCTAD in this field has 
been very important, as it is the organisation that most actively supports the interests of 
developing countries.
6.1.3. The re-opening of the debate on a multilateral agreement on competition in the 
1990s
The debate over the adoption of a multilateral agreement on competition law and 
policy was revived in the mid 1990s within the Auspices of the WTO, which was
693 See below. Section 6.3.
694 Miller, D.L. and J. Davidow (1982) ‘Antitrust in the United Nations: A Tale o f Two Codes’ 18:2 Stanford Journal of 
International Law, 347, at 354-355.
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established in Marrakech in 1994.^^  ^ The WTO is the product of the 8^ Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the Uruguay Round) which was held between 1986 
and 1994 under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and integrates 
approximately 30 Uruguay Round Agreements and 200 previous GATT Agreements 
into one single legal framework.^^^
As already noted, by the time that the WTO was established no binding 
multilateral agreement on competition had been adopted. Non etheless, at the time, 
especially in Europe, there were voices that enthusiastically supported the adoption of 
such a multilateral agreement. With the European Union being at the forefront of a 
group of WTO Members that promoted the issue before the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference in 1996, the possible inclusion of competition within the WTO was finally 
discussed in the Conference. The Ministerial Declaration provided no consensus among 
the state representatives on possible substantive actions that should be taken,^^^ 
nonetheless Member States agreed on the creation of a working group to study the 
interaction between trade and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, 
and to identify the areas that may merit further consideration in the WTO framework.^^* 
Thus competition was included in the WTO agenda, along with another three topics: 
investment, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation. These four 
new topics are referred to in WTO jargon as the ‘Singapore Issues’.
The establishment of the working group on trade and competition at the WTO 
triggered a lively debate over the usefulness of competition law and policy in the 
international trade system. Hundreds of papers from Member States were submitted to 
the working group, expressing these states’ positions on the issue.^^^ In this regard, the
695 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Final Act Embodying the Results o f the Uruguay Round of 
Negotiations, Marrakech, 15 April 1994 (hereinafter WTO Agreement),
<http://www.wto.0 rg/english/docs_e/legal_e/f1nal_e.htm#TRIPs> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
696 Petersmann, E-U. (1994) ‘Proposals For Negotiating International Competition Rules In The GATT-WTO World Trade And 
Legal System’ 49 Swiss Review of International Economic Relations, 231, at 264.
697 Cocuzza, C. and M. Montini (1998) ‘International Antitrust Co-operation in a Global Economy’ 19 European Competition Law 
Review, 156, at 161.
698 WTO (1996) 1996 Sing^ore Ministerial Conference o f the Parties to the WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration 
WT/MIN(96)/DEC.
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consultations at the WTO level have proved to be a reality-check regarding the status of 
competition law and policy from an international trade perspective.
Most of the issues raised in the context of this study were discussed at the WTO. 
These include the optimum operation of competition law at the national level; the 
optimum operation of competition law at the international level, and more particularly 
the types of anticompetitive practices that should be dealt with by international 
competition rules; the relationship between competition law and WTO law including the 
application of general principles of the WTO law, such as transparency, non­
discrimination and the principle of the most favoured nation on competition; the 
examination of restrictive business practices that have an effect on the markets of 
multiple states; and the analysis of methods of cooperation between Member States on 
competition issues, including issues of technical assistance and capacity building.
On the basis of these consultations, in Doha in November 2001, the WTO 
Members decided to include competition law and policy in the next round of the WTO 
negotiations. According to paragraph 25 of the Ministerial Declaration,
“In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy will focus on the clarification of: 
core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, 
and provisions on hard-core cartels: modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support 
fo r progressive reinforcement o f competition institutions in developing countries 
through capacity building. Full account shall be taken o f  the needs o f  developing and 
least developed country participants and appropriate flexibility provided to address 
them".'”^
Nonetheless, once more, as in Havana in 1947, the Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun in 2003 provided no results, and the negotiations on competition were wound 
up. °^  ^ The Singapore issues were finally withdrawn from the agenda in the so-called 
‘July package’, i.e. the decision adopted by the WTO General Council a few months 
after the Cancun conference that aimed to reactivate the negotiations, with the exception 
of trade facilitation. The Council noted that it:
‘agrees that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration ..., will 
not form part o f  the Work Programme set out in that Declaration and therefore no work
700 WTO (2001) 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 at paras 23-25.
701 WTO Ministerial Statement, WT/(min)03/20, where it is stated that further work should be carried out in the context o f the 
Doha Declaration without any reference to particular tasks and deadlines.
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towards negotiations on any o f  these issues will take place within the WTO during the 
Doha Round.
The next sections of the chapter attempt to understand the debate about the 
possible inclusion of competition law within the WTO framework as has been 
developed during the negotiations in the context of the Working Group on Trade and 
Competition. In view of the central question that the thesis tries to address, the focus of 
subsequent analysis is the policy followed by the EU in this particular field. Thus, the 
next section discusses the reasons that led the EU to the initial proposal for adoption of 
a WTO competition agreement, observes the way that the US and developing countries 
have received and reacted to this proposal, and attempts to identify the factors that led to 
the final collapse of negotiations at Cancun.
6.2 Factors that led to the EU proposal for inclusion of competition within the 
WTO framework
As noted above, the EU was the most enthusiastic supporter of the inclusion of 
competition law in the WTO framework. The section attempts to identify the reasons 
that initially led to the EC support for the idea to conclude a binding agreement on 
competition and the reasons that led to the withdrawal of the EU proposal in 2004.
6.2.1 The leadership of Lord Brittan and the creation of a network of academics and 
politicians who supported the adoption of a multilateral agreement on the WTO
One of the most significant factors that played a role in the re-launch of 
discussions over a possible WTO agreement on competition was the development in 
Europe in the early 1990s of a network of academics and officials who supported the 
adoption of such an agreement. As most of the experts interviewed in the context of this 
study have stressed. Lord Brittan was the leader of this group and the most influential 
individual in the development of the EU position.^®  ^In fact he was the first to launch the 
issue within the European Commission, and the first to express the belief that 
competition law and policy should find a place in the WTO nexus of agreements.
702 WTO (2004) ‘Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004’, WT/L/579, at 3.
703 These interviewees include four officials from the EC Commission, as well as an EU and a US competition practitioners 
(Interviews conducted in Brussels, 20and 21/7/2003. The importance o f the role o f particular individuals in the development o f new 
policies in the international arena has been extensively discussed in the political science literature. See for instance Young, O.R. 
(1991) ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development o f Institutions in International Society’ 45 International 
Organisation, 281.
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Brittan was the Commissioner for Competition from 1989 until 1993, when he 
undertook the position of Commissioner for the Union’s external affairs and became the 
EU’s chief negotiator at the Uruguay Round. He was a major supporter of free trade in 
general and a strong opponent of the use of anti-dumping measures. According to one of 
the interviewees, he once stated that ‘anti-dumping is chemotherapy which kills the 
patient
He first publicly expressed his belief that competition rules should be included 
in the GATT/WTO framework in 1992, when he was still the Commissioner for 
Competition.^®^ When he became the EU chief negotiator at the WTO, he found in 
Karel Van Miert, the new Commissioner for Competition, a strong ally in his attempt to 
incorporate competition within the WTO framework. For both Commissioners, the issue 
became a priority and being in leading positions at the Commission they had a major 
impact in the process of the negotiations.
In parallel, a network of academics was being developed in Europe, and 
supported the idea of a binding multilateral agreement on competition. In particular, in 
1993 a group of competition and trade experts, the so-called ‘Munich Group’, which 
consisted of nine German, one Japanese and two US academics, all lawyers,^®  ^proposed 
a Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC).^®  ^ According to its drafters, the Munich 
Code would be introduced in the GATT-MTO (Agreement establishing the Multilateral 
Trade Organisation - as the Munich Group named the WTO) as a Plurilateral 
Competition Agreement.^®^
These experts proposed the adoption of a detailed competition code^ ®® which 
would include provisions for horizontal restraints,^ ^® vertical restraints,^* ^  
concentrations,^*^ abuses of a dominant position,^*^ and a regime for public
704 Interview with EU Competition Practitioner, Brussels 21/7/2003.
705 See Brittan, L. (1992) Competition Policy and International Relations (Brussels: Centre For European Policy Studies).
706 The private International Antitrust Code Working Group was composed by W. Fikentscher, E. Fox, J. DrexI, A. Fuchs, A  
Heinemann, U. Immenga, H P. Kunz-Hallstein, E-U Petersmann, W.R. Schluep, A Shoda, L.A. Sullivan and S. Soltysinski.
707 Draft International Antitrust Code, as a GATT- MTO -  Plurilateral Trade Agreement: Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report 
(BNA) at 126 (Special Supplement No 1628,19 August, 1993), (hereinafter DIAC).
708 See DIAC, ibi, in Art. 1.
709 For an analysis o f the Munich Code see Fikentscher, W. (1994) ‘Competition Rules for Private Agents in the GATT/WTO 
System’ 49 Swiss Review o f International Economic Relations, 281.
710 DIAC in Art.4.
711 Ibid in Art 5.
712 Ibid in Art.8-13.
713 Ibid in Art 14.
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undertakings and state authorisation^*'^ similar to Article 86 of the EU Treaty for public 
undertakings. Moreover, DIAC provided for the establishment of an international 
competition agency which would operate within the institutional framework of the 
MTO (WTO)^*^ and which would have the right to bring individual cases to the national 
courts, or to the International Antitrust Panel which would be established.^*^
As is obvious, DIAC had many similarities vrith Chapter V of the Havana 
Charter, and, since it included proposed provisions on almost every aspect of 
competition law, was a very ambitious plan for the creation of a multilateral code. 
Nonetheless it was almost immediately felt that such a proposal was too optimistic, and 
to a certain extent not realistic, since it was a very detailed piece of legislation that was 
proposed at a time when not more than 30 states had competition law in place.^*^
Two years after the publication of the proposal, another group of academics and 
EU officials,^** which was convened by Karel Van Miert, came up with a report,^*^ in 
which it argued that a pluriliteral agreement under Annex IV of the WTO would be the 
most realistic option with regard to the possible adoption of a multilateral agreement on 
competition.^^** According to the report the agreement would be adopted at a first stage 
by countries with a mature competition system.^^* It would include elements that were 
included in bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements such as procedural 
notification, cooperation, negative and positive comity obligations, and some minimum 
substantive principles for cross-border cases, such as the prohibition of horizontal 
agreements (cartels, including export cartels), vertical restraints (for which a rule-of- 
reason test was provided), abuse of a dominant position, and national monopolies with 
exclusive or special privileges.^^^ These principles would be incorporated into the 
national laws of the Member countries in much the same way as EC Directives: each
714 Ibid in Art 16.
715 Ibid in Art. 19.
716 Ibid, in Art. 20.
717 It is characteristic that even some members of the Munich Group had expressed their concerns in relation to a full-competidon 
code and supported a more limited approach and for a code embodying ony 15 principles. See E. Fox, supra n. 687, at 10.
718 The group o f experts was composed by the Commission officials Claus Dieter Ehlermman, Roderick Abbott, Jean-Francois 
Marchipont, Francois Lamoureux, Alexis Jacquemin and Francois Pons; and as external experts, Frederic Jenny, Ulrich Immenga 
and Ernst- Ulrich Petersmann.
719 See Commission (EC) (1995) ‘Report o f the Group of Experts, “Competition Policy in The New Trade Order: Strengthening 
International Competition and Rules’, COM(95) 359 final (Hereinafter, Report o f  EU Experts).
720 This approach has been named ‘the building block ^p roach’ or the ‘instalments approach’.
721 Report of EU Experts, at 16-17. For a first stage, the report suggest that the signatories should be all the Member Countries of 
the OECD, the Central and Eastern European Countries, and Hong Kong, Korea, S ing^ore, Taiwan.
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country would have to incorporate the principles in its national legislation, but would 
not be obliged to amend its legislation in cases where the legislation already contained 
the principles or was open to similar interpretation/^^
In terms of enforcement, the report proposed that the WTO Dispute Settlement 
should review competition cases envisaging four distinct types of possible disputes: 
disputes over international procedural obligations, disputes over per-se prohibitions, 
disputes over rule-of-reason violations and disputes over impediment to market 
access/^"^ Such a plurilateral agreement would develop and expand its coverage 
progressively through a "domino effecf,  both in terms of its geographic scope, 
substantive coverage and surveillance/^^
It is clear that by advocating an "instalment approach', the proposal of this 
group of experts was far more realistic than the one proposed by the Munich Group. 
Irrespective of the substance of the proposal, what is of importance is the fact that in the 
mid-1990s a network of academics and EU officials had emerged and clearly expressed 
the belief that competition law should be included in an international, binding 
agreement. It should be noted that Professors Petersmann and Immenga, both 
participated in the Munich Group and the Group of Experts appointed by the 
Commissioner Van Miert, an indication of the intellectual links between the two 
groups.^^^ It is also important to note that no business representatives participated in the 
preparation of these reports. On the contrary, major business confederations, such as 
UNICE (currently Business Europe), repeatedly expressed their concerns over a 
possible binding agreement within the WTO framework. For instance, in 1999, UNICE 
clearly stated its concern ‘...about a binding multilateral agreement on specific 
competition rules concluded in the WTO as opposed to clear objectives or guidance for  
a voluntary set o f rules. WTO is not intended or equipped to operate at the private-to- 
private level UNICE fears that a binding agreement cannot but result in binding review
723 Ibid, at 17; see also Petersmann, E-U. (1996) ‘International Competition Rules For Governments and for Private Business: The 
Case for Linking Future WTO Negotiations on Investment, Competition and Environmental Rules to Reforms o f Anti-Dumping 
Laws’ 30:3 Journal o f World Trade, 5, at 26.
724 See Report o f EU experts at 18-19.
725 Ibid at 20.
726 It should be pointed out that in the second half o f the 1990s a number o f alternative proposals emerged with regard to the 
insertion o f competition policy in tie WTO. Such proposals included the insertion o f minimum substantive standards o f competition 
law, the expansion o f the scope o f current WTO agreements in order to bring non-violation complains, the introduction o f 
competition criteria in anti-dumping, the prohibition of export cartels and the adoption o f procedural and due process norms. For a 
review of these proposals from a developing country perspective, see Hoekman, B and P Holmes (1999) ‘Competition Policy, 
Developing countries and the WTO’ 22:6 The World Economy, 875.
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o f  specific essentially private cases by bodies that are inappropriate and ill-equipped 
fo r that task This will greatly slow down commerce and escalate private disputes to 
international problems.
Given the hesitance of EU business to support a competition agreement in the 
WTO, it follows that the network that re-activated the debate over an international 
binding agreement on competition encompassed academics and, most importantly, EU 
officials - primarily from the Directorate General for Competition. The issue was a 
creature of the EU bureaucracy, and it was initially put forward for two main reasons.: 
(i) due to the belief that the EU model regarding the regulation of competition should be 
expanded and applied on a global basis; and (ii) so as to open up international markets 
for EU companies (market access goal). Another two possible driving forces behind the 
persistence of the EU as regards the adoption of a WTO competition agreement may be 
put forward: the attempt of the EU at the time to limit the expansion of competition 
rules by the US in an extraterritorial manner; and the desire of the EU bureaucracy to 
slow down agricultural reform at the WTO, an issue of major importance for developing 
countries. All these arguments are further discussed in the remaining part of this section.
6.2.2 Expansion of the EU model on a global scale
The most profound reason behind EU support for the adoption of an 
international binding agreement on competition is the fact that the EU itself had 
successfully met the challenge of creating an effective competition framework that was 
applied in all its Member States. In the context of the EU, competition law and policy 
has been used to facilitate the development of EU intra-regional trade. Thus, given this 
experience it is no surprise that the EU was the leading proponent of the idea to adopt a 
multilateral competition agreement.
The aim of expanding the EU approach to multilateral agreements on 
competition is also reflected in the Communication that the former Commissioners 
Brittan and Van Miert addressed to the Council in 1996, in the context of the 
negotiations on the issue at the WTO. The Commissioners noted that, ‘...[EJnhanced 
commitment to competition policy enforcement would strengthen the trading system
727 See UNICE (1999) ‘Preliminary UNICE Comments on the Commission Discussion Paper: Trade and Competition: WTO 
Framework on Conpetition Rules’, UNICE Paper No m O/I.
728 See Fox, E.M. (1997) ‘Towards World Antitrust and Market Access’ 91:1 The American Journal o f International Law, I, at 4- 
10, where the author discusses the analogy between the EU experience in the use o f competition rules in a wider trade context and 
the possible operation of competition rules in an international context.
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along the lines o f our legal systems and market economies, o f  which competition law is 
a basic feature. Along the same lines, it has been argued in the political science 
literature that, in view of its own experience with the successful development of a 
common market composed of a number of sovereign states, the EU has been far more 
pro-multilateralist than other countries, and especially the US. According to Higgot, 
'Europe, in theory i f  not always in practice, exhibits a stronger normative, some would 
say ‘post-modern' attitude towards multilateral governance structures developing 
constitutional and regulatory frameworks that increasingly transcend the nation 
state
6.2.3 EU pursued inclusion of competition agreement within the WTO in order to 
secure market access for its firms to other national markets
Apart from the ideal of a single universal market where competition would be 
used as a way of avoiding distortions in the market caused by private firms, another 
clear motive behind the EU’s persistence in the mid 1990s to include competition 
provisions in a multilateral agreement was its desire to secure market access for 
European business in third coimtries. Market access was a priority for the Commission 
at the time and this is clearly expressed in a Memo issued by the Commission in 1996:
‘Much o f the prosperity and job creation in Europe depends on foreign trade 
and investment. The European Commission is therefore determined to pursue a more 
active market opening strategy for the benefit o f the European exporters, who face a 
huge number o f  trade barriers on foreign markets. We are entitled to demand that our 
trading partners respect their international commitments: a deal is a deal. Our market 
is open and we expect others to open theirs also
Lack of competition law in general, or lack of effective enforcement of 
competition law in national markets where European firms wanted to do business, was 
considered to be one of the trade barriers that could obstruct EU firms. Hence, the 
attempts to adopt a multilateral agreement on competition was part of the Community's
729 See Commission (EC) (1996) Communication to the Council ‘An Internatimal Framework o f Competition Rules’, COM (96) 
284.
730 Higgott, R. (2005) ‘The Theory and Practice o f Global and Regional Governance: Accommodating American Exceptionalism 
and European Pluralism’ GARNET Working Paper No 01/05, at 10.
731 See Commission (EC) (1996) ‘How a Unified Stategy Can Help European Business. Background Note on the Market Access 
Strategy’, MEMO/96/108. In order to implement this goal, the Commission created a database which includes the trade barriers in 
different regions and states o f the world, available at <http://mkaccdb.eu.int/mkaccdb2/indexPubli.htm> (last visited on 21 May 
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strategy on market access: ‘...anticompetitive practices are keeping our firms out o f  
third country markets but they cannot, in the absence o f  proper enforcement measures 
in those third markets, be tackled effectively without international rules
It follows that, behind the apparent ‘romantic’ motivation of the EU to expand 
its successful EU model on a global level, lies a major strategic goal of the EU 
bureaucracy, namely offering EU business the opportunity to expand their operation to 
new markets/^^
6.2.4 A multilateral agreement in order to avoid conflicts in the enforcement of 
competition law and weaken the effect of extraterritorial application of US laws
Another reason put forward by the Commission in support of the inclusion of 
competition within the WTO framework was the avoidance of conflicts in the 
enforcement of competition rules by multiple states. According to the Commission,
'...[CJonvergence and conflict avoidance would also increase the legal security o f firms 
operating in different jurisdictions, as well as reduce their costs o f  compliance with 
competition laws
This is obviously a rational argument, particularly when one considers the 
discussion developed in earlier chapters of the thesis concerning multijurisdictional 
review of mergers and, most importantly, the extraterritorial application of competition 
rules (by the US). It should be pointed out that since the beginning of Clinton’s 
presidency the US was much more aggressive in the pursuit of antitrust violations in 
comparison to the Reagan and Bush administrations.^^^ This was an issue of major 
concern among EU officials, who felt that it could lead to extensive extraterritorial 
application by the US antitrust authorities.
In fact the intentions of US officials to expand the scope of extraterritorial 
application of antitrust rules became apparent with the Pilkington case of 1994, where 
the basis of US intervention was harm to US exporters rather than to US consumers.^^^
732 See Commission Communication, (96) 284, supra n. 729.
733 This argument has been mentioned by two interviewees, an EC Commission Official and an EU practitioner, Brussels, 20 and 
21/7/2003 respectively.
734 See COM (96) 284, supra n. 729.
735 See Litan, RE. and C. Shapiro (2001) ‘Antitrust Policy During the Clinton Administration’ Competition Policy Centre, 
University o f California, Berkeley, Working Paper No CPCOl-22, at 19.
736 The case related to allegations that Pilkington PLC established a network of restrictive distribution agreements impeding market 
access o f US companies to the UK and other national glassware markets. See United States v. Pilkington pic, 1994-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 70842.
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According to an EU official who participated in the WTO competition negotiations on 
competition, by proposing a WTO agreement on competition, the EU attempted to limit 
the extraterritorial enforcement of the competition rules by the US/^^ Officially, this 
concern was also expressed in the Communication of the Commission to the Council, 
where the Commission stated that [EJnhanced international cooperation would limit 
competition authorities' need to resort to extraterritorial action. There are compelling 
advantages to solving problems through cooperation, especially i f  such cooperation 
improves the likelihood that the anticompetitive behaviour can be eliminated'
It follows that the EU at the time preferred cooperation over extraterritoriality. One 
should remember however that, in contrast to the US where extraterritorial application 
of competition rules was already established in the 1940s, and despite the attempts of 
the EC Commission to apply the effects doctrine since the 1980s, the EU’s ability to 
apply competition rules extraterritorially was relatively limited by the ECJ.^^^
6.2.5 The proposal for an agreement on competition as a wav of avoiding reforms on 
agriculture
A final correlated scenario worth mentioning is that the EU sought to add the 
Singapore Issues, and consequently competition in the WTO agenda, in order to slow 
down agricultural reform at the WTG.^ "^ ® This argument is based on the assumption that 
the EU, being aware that developing countries would not agree to the inclusion of these 
issues in the WTO framework, would have an extra bargaining chip in order to satisfy 
the very strong lobby of agricultural producers in several EU states on the one hand,^ "*^
737 In his words, ‘at the time, Joel Klein would enforce Section 1 o f Sherman Act all over the world’. Interview with EC 
Commission officiall, Brussels, 21/7/2003.
738 See COM (96)284, supra, n 729, at 5.
739 See the discussion on extraterritoriality in Chapter 3.
740 See Woolcock, S. (2004) ‘The Singapore Issues in Cancun: A Failed Negotiation Ploy or a Litmus Test for Global 
Governance?’ LSE working paper, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/intemational
TradePolicyUnit/pdFtheSingq)oreIssuesInCancunRevI.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007). This point was also raised by an EU 
practitioner interviewee (Brussels, 21/7/2003). A similar point has been raised by De Bievre, who claims that through its demands 
on regulatory issues, including competition, the EU attempted to balance ftiture market access concessions on agriculture. De 
Bievre, D. (2006) ‘The EU Regulatory Trade Agenda and the Quest for WTO Enforcement’ 13:6 Journal o f European Public Policy, 
851, at 852.
741 See for instance Daugbjerg, C. (1999) ‘Reforming the CAP: Policy Networks and Broader Institutional Structures’ 37:3 Journal 
o f Common Market Studies, 407.
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and resist the pressure of developing countries for extensive liberalisation of the 
agricultural sector on the other/"^^
6.2.6 Development of the EU proposal in the context of the work of the Working Group 
on Trade and Competition
Initially, the position of the EU reflected the ideas contained in the report of the 
Group of Experts and the subsequent communication of the Commission to the Council. 
Thus, in its first submission, the EU proposed that the Working Group should focus on 
the following issues:
- The examination of anticompetitive practices that may have an effect on 
international trade;
The examination of the feasibility of a commitment by all WTO 
Members to adopt competition rules;
- The examination of the way that the WTO could contribute to the 
strengthening of cooperation among its Member States;
- The examination of possible core principles that could be adopted at the 
international level; and
- The examination, in a second stage, of the extent to which the WTO 
dispute settlement rules could be applied in order to ensure compliance 
with the contemplated agreement on competition.^"^^
In subsequent submissions, the EU elaborated on these proposals. In particular, 
with regard to substantive provisions, the EU noted that priority should be given to the 
examination of business practices which have a foreclosure effect - and which would 
therefore negatively affect consumer welfare in the country where the practice is being 
implemented - and which, at the same time, affect the legitimate interests of the country 
whose producers are being denied equality of competitive opportunities. According to 
the EU these practices include horizontal agreements, certain abuses of dominant 
position, vertical restrains, and mergers.
742 See Laird, S., R. Peters and D. Vanzetti (2004) ‘Southern Discomfort: Agricultural Policies, Trade and Poverty’ Centre for 
Research in Economic Development and International Trade, University o f Nottingham, Working Paper No. 04/02.
743 See Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WTGTCP/W/1, o f  11 June 2007, at 4-6.
744 See Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WTGTCP/W/62, o f 5 March 1998.
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By 1999, and in view of the resistance both by the US and developing countries 
to the possible adoption of a comprehensive competition a g r e e m e n t , t h e  EU 
representatives narrowed the scope of their proposal. This is reflected in the statement 
that the use of the dispute settlement mechanism in competition cases would not be 
appropriate, at least for the examination of individual cases. "^^  ^ At this point, it seems 
that the EU representatives started departing from the views of Sir Leon Brittan, who at 
an OECD conference in the same year stated that ‘A WTO Agreement on competition 
would have no added value unless it was binding on governments. Even i f  there was 
consensus on a list o f substantive rules, these would have no teeth or credibility i f  they 
remained purely ‘paper ’ obligations. I  am therefore convinced that the commitments to 
be included in a multilateral competition agreement should be subject to WTO dispute 
settlement’
In 1999 the EU further proposed that a possible WTO agreement on competition 
should include three main elements:
(a) Core principles and rules on competition law and its enforcement which 
would be incorporated in the domestic legislation of WTO Members. With regard to the 
core principles, the EU proposed that the WTO principles of non discrimination and 
transparency should be applied to competition law.^ "*^
(b) A specific focus on anti-competitive practices with a significant impact on 
international trade and investment.^^® According to the EU, priority should be given to 
hard-core cartels. It was also accepted that in cases concerning vertical restraints and 
abuses of a dominant position there is need for a case-specific evaluation, and thus the
745 See below, sections 6.3.1, and 6.3.2.
746According to the EU’s submission, ‘Dispute settlement modalities will need to be further considered once there is greater clarity 
about the scope o f the commitments to be assumed under a WTO agreement so that they are well ad ^ ted  to the specifics o f 
competition law. In any event, there should be no dispute settlement review o f individual decisions. ’ See Communication from the 
European Community and its Member States, WT/WTGTCPAV/130, o f 12 July 1999 (hereinafter WT/130), p. 6, which was 
submitted one month after the speech o f Brittan. See also Communication from the European Community and its Member States, 
WT/WTGTCP/W/115, o f 29 May 1999, (hereinafter WT/115), where the EU, at 11, notes that ‘A WTO agreement could therefore 
establish a basic framework of rules, relating to the adoption and enforcement o f domestic competition law, and provisions on 
cooperation among WTO Members. It would not at all be envisaged that the WTO should develop any powers o f investigation or 
enforcement on anticompetitive practices. The commitments assumed under the multilateral framework will be incorporated in the 
domestic competition law o f WTO Members’.
747 See Brittan, L (1999) ‘The Need for a Multilateral Framework o f Competition Rules’ OECD Conference on Trade and 
Competition, Paris, France, 29-30 June, in OECD (1999) Trade and Competition Policies - Exploring the Ways Forward (Paris, 
OECD), 32, at 36.
748 See WT/130, ibid.
749 See WT/115, supra n. 746, at 11.
750 WT/130, supra n. 746, at 4.
210
adoption of general rules on competition in the context of the WTO would be too rigid. 
The EU took the view that with such practices further cooperation and exchange of 
experience between the WTO Members would be needed. Such cooperation was also 
considered important for the review of multijurisdictional mergers and export cartels.^^  ^
Even though the EU never pursued officially at the WTO the inclusion of vertical 
restraints, abuse of dominance and mergers in a possible WTO competition agreement, 
the inclusion of such practices had been proposed by the Group of Experts back in 
1995, and by 1999 it was clear that inclusion of such practices^^^ could not survive the 
WTO negotiations.
(c) Modalities of international cooperation. Such cooperation should have, 
according to the EU, a dual aim. The first is to provide technical assistance to countries 
that have enacted competition laws recently or were in the process of enacting such 
laws. This position reflects to a certain extent the concerns expressed by a number of 
developing countries about the viability of competition law on the national as well as 
international level when no technical assistance is provided by rich industrialised 
countries. In this context the EU took the view that this could include a framework to 
facilitate the exchange of experiences and information on competition law and its 
enforcement, voluntary peer reviews, and the possibility of periodic reports on global 
trends in competition law and policy.
Second, the EU proposed that cooperation modalities utilised under enforcement 
cooperation agreements should also be included in a WTO competition agreement. 
These modalities, examined in some detail in Chapter 3 of the thesis, include the 
notification of cases, consultations and exchanges of non-confidential information. The 
EU also proposed that positive comity could be included in a possible agreement, but 
noted that on such an occasion the provision on positive comity would be applied in a 
discretionary manner by the Member countries and thus would not be binding.^^^
Hence, by 1999, the EU had submitted a minimal proposal for a competition 
agreement within the WTO framework. Nevertheless the reception of this proposal was 
never tested, as the talks at the Seattle Ministerial Conference were suspended amidst
751 Ibid.
752 See COM(96) 284, supra, n. 729,ANNEX, and WT/62 supra, n. 744, where the EU proposes the examination of the impact of 
such agreements.
753 Ibid.
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very serious protests/^"* Following this development the EU continued to work on the 
competition agenda; however it also acknowledged the difficulties concerning the 
adoption of an agreement that were due to the widespread hesitation expressed by a 
number of industrialised and developing countries. With its submission to the Working 
Group in 2000, the EU clearly expressed these concerns:
'...the decision on whether to launch negotiations on competition is essentially 
political in nature, and as such, does not correspond to this Working Group, whose 
mandate is exploratory and analytical; ...the elements o f  a possible future WTO 
agreement on competition could only be determined as a result o f  multilateral 
negotiations and, on the basis o f  input from all WTO Members. The elements 
mentioned in this paper are, therefore, no more than our current ideas about the 
possible architecture o f a WTO competition agreement. We wish moreover to 
acknowledge that our thinking on many o f  these issues is influenced by the contributions 
made by many countries - both developed and developing - to substantive discussions in 
this Working Group.
In this submission, the EU repeats its support for the adoption of an agreement 
on competition and its position that such an agreement should include the three main 
elements discussed before Seattle: core principles on domestic competition law and 
policy, modalities for international cooperation, and support for the progressive 
reinforcement of competition law and institutions in developing countries.
In another submission in 2000, the EU attempted to highlight the development 
benefits of competition law and policy.^^^ It was clear by now that developing countries 
had to be persuaded that competition law and policy in general and competition 
provisions in the WTO context in particular would benefit or at least would not harm 
these countries. Thus, the concepts of flexibility and progressivity were further 
discussed.^^* It seems that by these concepts the EU returned to the building-block
754 See Economist, December 2nd 1999, ‘The New Trade War’.
755 See Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WTGTCP/W/152, o f 25 September 2000, 
(hereinafter EU, WT/152), where the EU, at 10-12, expresses its support for the establishment o f  enforcement institutions in 
developing countries and relevant technical assistance for capacity building.
756 Ibid. For a synopsis o f the EU proposals, see also Bercero, l.G. and S. Amarasinha (2001) ‘Moving the Trade and Competition 
Debate Forward’ 4:3 Joumal o f International Economic Law, 481.
757 See Communication from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WTGTCP/W/140, o f 8 June 2000, particularly 
at 2-4.
758 The EU first referred to these concepts in 1997. See Communication from the European Community and its Member States, 
WT/WTGTCP/W/45, o f 24 November 1997.
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approach that was first recommended by the group of experts in 1995: it noted in this 
submission that it had not proposed that a prospective agreement should be applied 
equally and instantly to all WTO Members. Instead, the EU suggested that, in particular 
with regard to developing and least developed countries, the adoption and enforcement 
of competition rules and the subsequent participation in a future agreement ''should be 
o f  a progressive and flexible nature'J^^
6.2.7. From Doha to Cancun
The Doha Declaration, issued at the conclusion of the Doha Ministerial 
Conference in 2001, put the discussions into context. According to the Declaration, 
Member States ‘agree that negotiations will take place ...on the basis o f  a decision to 
be taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities o f  negotiations Hence, 
despite the contrary opinion of the EU representatives, it was agreed that the issue was 
not mature enough to be negotiated immediately. On the other hand, it left the issue 
open to be discussed after the next Ministerial Conference in Cancun, if all the members 
would agree on that, and set the particular issues that the working group should further 
discuss.
According to paragraph 23 of the Declaration, the working group should focus 
its work on four main issues: (i) the examination of core principles, with an emphasis on 
non-discrimination, transparency, and procedural fairness; (ii) further examination of 
the types of discretionary cooperation between the Member States, (which is linked to 
the practice of the enforcement cooperation agreements); (iii) further work should be 
carried out in the field of hard core cartels, which was the only anticompetitive practice 
discussed by the working group that was advanced to be part of a possible agreement; 
and (iv), and most importantly, special consideration should be given to developing 
countries. The notion of flexibility was included in the text to make it clear that 
developing countries would be given the time to develop their own competition policies, 
something that was in compliance with the Doha Round, which was the Development 
Round.
759 See WT/140 supra n. 757, at 7. On this matter, see also OECD Joint Group on Trade and Competition (2001) The Role o f  
‘Special and Differential Treatment’ at the Trade, Competition and Development Interface, OECD 
COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(2001)21/FINAL.
760 See Doha Declaration, supra n. 700, para 23.
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The Declaration^^^ also stressed the need for technical assistance that should be 
offered to developing countries in order to evaluate the implications of closer 
cooperation at the multilateral level for their own development policies and objectives, 
and to establish institutions that could effectively enforce competition law. It is also 
noted that, on the basis of this commitment, the working group should cooperate with 
other international institutions, with particular reference to UNCTAD, which is the 
international organisation most closely associated with developing countries. Finally the 
Declaration recognised the importance of regional and bilateral agreements, through 
which technical assistance to developing and least developed states would be provided.
Thus the Declaration stated in a more formal manner that some sort of a minimal 
agreement on competition could be negotiated. It also came as a surprise, that the US, 
which had traditionally opposed the adoption of any binding agreement at the 
multilateral level, gave its consent to the possible inclusion of competition in the agenda 
of the next round of negotiations. On the other hand, the Declaration also reflected the 
serious concerns that had been expressed by developing countries over the possible 
adoption of an agreement on competition.^^^
These concerns were confirmed during the negotiations that took place on the 
way to and during the Cancun Ministerial Conference. Through its submissions to the 
working group, the EU continued to support the inclusion of competition in the WTO 
agreement and elaborated on the topics provided by the Doha Declaration.^^^ A major 
disagreement arose in Cancun however, and the inclusion of the Singapore Issues along 
with the elimination of export agricultural subsidies were the main concerns of 
developing countries. As reported at the time: \..the European Union, ..., denied it had 
ever promised to get rid o f export subsidies. Led by India, many poor countries denied 
that they ever signed up for talks on new rules [on the Singapore I s s u e s ] Thus no 
agreement was reached and finally, as already noted, discussions on competition were 
withdrawn from the agenda in July of 2004. Since then competition law and policy is 
not an issue (formally) discussed at the WTO.
761 Ibid, para. 24.
762 See below, section 6.3.2.
763 See Communications from the European Community and its Member States, WT/WTGTCP/W/184, on international 
cooperation;WT/WTGTCP/W/193, o f 1 July 2002 on hard core cartels; WT/WTGTCP/W/222, o f 19 November 2002, on core 
principles, and WT/WTGTCP/W/234, o f 26 June 2003, on progressivity and flexibility.
764 ‘New rules’ relates to the Singapore Issues, including competition. See Economist, September 18th 2003, ‘The WTO under 
Fire’.
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6.3 Reasons that led to the failure of the EU proposal
The main reason behind the failure of the EU proposal for the adoption of a 
competition agreement within the WTO context was the opposition of the US and a 
number of developing countries on this issue.
6.3.1. Resistance bv the US
The first major reason for to the failure of the EU proposal for a WTO
agreement on competition is the traditional opposition of the US to the adoption of a 
multilateral competition agreement. As already noted above, both the talks in 1925 at 
the League of Nations and in 1947 on the Havana Charter were, in the final analysis, a 
failure due to US opposition, and to a certain extent, this was repeated in the context of 
the WTO talks in the mid 1990s and early 2000s. As noted in the first submission of the 
US to the WTO working group, [AJlthough the United States has stated on other 
occasions, and continues to believe, that there is not the degree o f  consensus today that 
would support negotiation in the WTO o f  constructive competition policy disciplines, 
the proposed work programme is intended to foster among Member countries a 
common understanding o f  the relationship o f competition matters to the WTO 
framework and to be neutral regarding any conclusions that may be reached’
The reasons behind this position were restated a couple of years later by Joel 
Klein. During a speech at the OECD, Klein made it clear that a WTO agreement on 
competition could not be concluded, since there was still a lack of experience on the 
part of developing countries concerning competition law and policy. He also re­
emphasised the US concern that the possibility of using the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism to review competition cases would entail the danger of politicising the 
application of competition rules, as it '...would necessarily involve the WTO in second- 
guessing prosecutorial decision making in complex evidentiary contexts -  a task in 
which the WTO has no experience and for which it is not suited’. Instead, the US 
would support the adoption of bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, a strategy
765 See Communication o f the US, WT/WGTCP/W/6, o f  19 June 1997, at 4.
766 See Klein, J.L.(1999) ‘A Reality Check on Antitrust Rules in the World Trade Organization, and a Practical Way Forward on 
International Antitrust’, speech at OECD Conference on Trade and Competition, Paris, 29-30 June 1999, in Trade and Competition 
Rules: Exploring the Ways Forward. (OECD, Paris), 37, at 41-42.
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discussed in Chapter 3, while attempting to provide developing countries with technical 
assistance in this field/^^
The US approach was to a large extent realistic, at least in view of the fact that a 
competition culture has not been reached at the international level. In fact, as noted in 
earlier chapters of the thesis, there are still a number of elements that may have an 
influence on the particular application of competition law at the domestic level and such 
elements may vary considerably from state to state. It has also been pointed out that in 
most countries a competition law has only been adopted in the last 10 years or so, and 
this obviously means that there is little experience in the application of the rules in these 
countries.
That said, it should also been pointed out that the main reason behind the US 
opposition to the possibility of adopting a binding multilateral agreement on 
competition is the so-called hegemonic stance that has characterised the country’s 
external policy in various fields of international law, competition law included.^^* 
Indeed, as it has been seen in earlier chapters, the US has been the most regular user of 
extraterritoriality in the enforcement of its antitrust laws. Such extraterritorial 
application of US law is complemented by the application of Section 301 of the 1994 
Trade Act, according to which the US has the right to retaliate in cases where foreign 
countries follow policies which, among others, lead to ‘toleration o f systematic 
anticompetitive practices ’ by a firm in the market of this foreign country, and which 
have as an effect the inability of US firms to enter this particular m a r k e t . P u t  
differently and with regard to the current debate, this position reflects the traditional 
perception in the US that US antitrust law is superior to other national laws and thus, 
until other countries reach the US level of competition enforcement, national US 
competition law should be applied to resolve situations where US firms are harmed due 
to inefficient enforcement of national competition laws by other countries. This 
hypothesis is also examined in the next sub-section.
767 Ibid. See also the Communication from the US, WTAVGTCPAV/116, o f 25 May 1999, where cooperation through regional 
settings like NAFTA and non-biding multilateral cooperation through the OECD are also mentioned.
768 See Byers, M. and G. Nolte (2003) United States Hegemony and the Foundations o f International Law (Cambridge University 
Press).
769 For an analysis o f Section 301, see Dabbah, M. (2003) ‘The Internationalisation o f Antitrust Policy’ (Cambridge University 
Press) at 225-227. The author notes nonetheless that the US has never used Section 301 in competition cases and points out that the 
US uses this legal instrument as a medium to negotiate the removal o f unfair trade practice with the authorities o f  other countries. 
See ibid at 226
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i. The establishment of ICPAC and the introduction of a ‘new global initiative’
It was against this background that the International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee (ICPAC) was set up in November 1997 by the (then) Attorney 
General Janet Reno and Joel Klein. The Committee consisted of politicians, academics 
and business representatives with legal and economic backgrounds.^^® In comparison to 
the composition of the relevant group of experts that emerged in Europe in the 1990s 
which introduced the idea of a multilateral regime, the Committee was more inclusive 
as it included business representatives and economists. The aim of the Committee was 
threefold: to review the effect of multijurisdictional mergers; to examine the 
relationship between trade law and competition law; and to evaluate the prospects of 
further international cooperation on competition.^^*
ICPAC came up with a very comprehensive report in 2000 that contributed 
significantly to the current debate on multilateralism in the field of competition; indeed, 
it was an important factor leading to the establishment of the International Competition 
Network.^^^ With regard to the possible inclusion of competition within the WTO 
context the report simply repeated the traditional US concerns on the necessity of such 
an agreement. It expressed the opinion that the WTO should not develop competition 
rules under its umbrella, and concluded that \..[W]hile recognizing that in some 
instances it may not be a fully satisfactory result, the Advisory Committee believes that 
national authorities are best suited to address anticompetitive practices o f private firms 
that are occurring on their territory. I f  anticompetitive and market blocking practices 
are occurring in a jurisdiction that does not have a competition authority or that 
authority is unable or unwilling to remedy the problem, then the harmed nation may be 
able to apply its own laws in an extraterritorial fashion
The report also summarised the reasons which lead to the US rejection of the 
proposal for a competition agreement at the WTO. According to its drafters, such an 
agreement would lead to the potential intrusion of WTO dispute settlement panels into 
domestic regulatory practices, a concern regularly asserted by US officials. It
770 International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (2000), ICPAC Final Report to the Attorney General and the Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust (hereinafter ICPAC Report) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ati/icpac/fmalreport.htm> (last visited on 21 May 
2007), Annex 1-B.
771 See Janow, M.E. and C. R. Lewis (2001) ‘International Antitrust and the Global Economy: Perspectives on The Final Report 
and Recommendations o f the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General and the Assistant 
Attorney General for Antitrust’ 24:1 World Competition, 3, at 3
772 See below, section 6.4.
773 See ICPAC Report, at 278-9.
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nonetheless went on to note that a WTO competition agreement would be inappropriate 
for another two reasons: first, because of the inappropriateness of obliging countries to 
adopt competition laws, and second, because such an agreement could also lead to the 
distortion of competition standards due to the quid pro quo nature of the WTO 
negotiations/^'^
As to the former, it could be argued that such an argument is, at first sight, rather 
puzzling since the US has been the leader in the development of international economic 
laws at the GATT and WTO system and the subsequent obligations created for the 
participating countries. In addition, it has been noted in the context of the discussion on 
bilateral trade agreements that some of the US agreements include a commitment 
undertaken by the signing countries that they will have a competition law in place. On 
the other hand, it has to be noted that this position of the US also reflects the position of 
a number of developing countries which by the end of the 1990s questioned not only the 
value of such an agreement, but also the necessity of domestic competition rules.^^  ^
Thus for different reasons both the US and developing countries seemed to be pursuing 
the same aim.^^^
As to the latter, it could be argued that along with concerns over the operation of 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the assertion that a possible WTO agreement could 
lead to the distortion of antitrust standards lies at the heart of the debate on competition 
in the WTO context. As seen in Chapter 2, an operational US competition regime has 
been in place for more than 110 years. This regime is probably the most comprehensive 
in the world. US competition analysis is predominantly based on efficiency concerns 
and still differs to a certain degree from competition enforcement within the EU.^^  ^ In 
relation to developing countries which have just embarked on the adoption and 
application of competition law and policy, such differences are chaotic.
In this connection, Calvani notes that the reluctance of the US to accept the 
inclusion of competition law in a binding multilateral agreement, also expressed in the
774 The exact text is : ‘Various concerns animate the Advisory Committee's scepticism toward competition rules at the WTO, 
including the possible distortion o f competition standards through the quid pro quo nature o f WTO negotiations; the potential 
intrusion o f WTO dispute settlement panels into domestic regulatory practices; and the inappropriateness o f obliging countries to 
adopt competition laws ' See ICPAC Report, at 278.
775 See below section 6.3.1.
776 It is noteworthy that one o f fie EC Commission officials -  interviewees, (Brussels 15/11/2007) argued that in fact in the process 
o f the negotiations the US ‘was hiding behind the position o f developing countries’.
777 For a recent review o f the current debate on the remaining differences between the US and EU competition laws see also 
Kolasky, W. (2004) ‘What is Competition? A Comparison of US and Europe Perspectives’ 49:1/2 Antitrust Bulletin, 29.
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ICPAC Report, reflects the concern of politicians and certain academics in the US that 
conciliations at the WTO could lead to ‘populist antitrust divorced from economic 
underpinnings in the sense that the quid pro quo nature of the negotiations at the 
WTO entailed the risk of accepting principles not directly related to the ‘proper 
function’ of competition law, in the way that the US considers the notion of ‘proper 
function’.
To this end, the ICPAC proposed the creation of a ‘a new global initiative’ to act 
as a forum where developed and developing countries as well as non-governmental 
organisations and business representatives could exchange their views and experiences 
on anti-cartel enforcement, merger review, analytical tools, enforcement cooperation, 
technical assistance, and any other relevant issue.^^^ This proposal was instrumental in 
the establishment of the ICN discussed in section three of the chapter.
ii. The paradox in Doha
US policy has been consistent in its opposition to the inclusion of competition 
law within the WTO framework. It has also been observed that towards the end of the 
1990s this position remained unchanged among competition officials in the US. That 
said, in Doha, the US trade representatives signed the Conference Declaration, which 
provided for negotiations on particular competition issues, and this decision has been 
one of the most fascinating and at the same time unexpected incidents in the 
development of the negotiations on competition at the WTO.
In fact, the first signs of a shift of the US trade administration on this issue 
became apparent in July of 2001 when Robert Zoellick, the US chief negotiator, 
suggested that the US would be ready to support the application of core principles of 
transparency, non-discrimination, and procedural fairness to competition; he also 
emphasised that the US supports further technical assistance and capacity building 
projects in developing countries.^*® Nonetheless he also noted that the US was working 
to understand more clearly the EU proposal and was in discussions with the EU about
778 See Calvani, T. (2005) ‘Conflict, Cooperation, and Convergence in International Competition’ 72 Antitrust Law Joumal, 1127, 
at 1133.
779 See ICPAC Report, at 224.
780 See Statement o f U S Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick on U.S.-E.U. Efforts to Laundi a Global Round o f Trade 
Negotiations, 07/17/2001, <http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2001/July/Statement_of_US_Trade_ 
Representative_Robert_B_Zoellick_on_US-EU_Efiforts_to_Launch_a_Global_Round_of_Trade_Negoti2tions.html.> (last visited 
on 21 May 2007).
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possible ways in which the EU could accommodate concerns of the US and other WTO 
Members .Zoe l l i ck  went on to express his concerns about the way that obligations 
stemming from the application of core principles on competition law would be 
addressed, and noted that it was not clear whether the EU was also proposing the use of 
the dispute settlement mechanism in antitrust cases.^*^
Four months later in Doha, the US gave its consent not only to the inclusion of 
the core principles in the final Declaration, but also to the inclusion of hard core cartels. 
The US community of experts was considerably surprised with this development, as 
reflected in the comments that the Antitrust Division of the American Bar Association 
(ABA) submitted to the US Trade Representative, where on the basis of the reasons 
already expressed by Klein and the ICPAC report, the ABA urged the US Trade 
Representative to express strong reservations regarding the proposals for a WTO 
competition framework.^*^
It is difficult to interpret the reasons that led the US to accept competition policy 
as a possible issue for negotiations in Doha. Following the Doha Declaration, Zoellick 
made clear in a letter to the Congress that the aim of the US strategy in this field was 
just to develop, through the Working Group on Trade and Competition, a common 
culture on competition among the Members of the WTO, for instance through a peer 
review mechanism. He further noted that the US aimed to ensure that the work at the 
WTO would not undermine US antitrust laws and enforcement, and that the decisions of 
the US authorities would not be subject to the WTO Dispute Settlement.^*"  ^ This 
however does not explain why and how paragraphs 23-25 of the Doha Declaration were 
accepted by the US representatives.
Various suggestions may be put forward in relation to this development. It may 
be argued for instance that the US accepted the competition-related part of the 
Declaration in the context of the broader negotiations at the WTO, in view of the fact 
that by the time it had become obvious that developing countries would not support the 
inclusion of competition in the list of WTO agreements. In particular, it could be
781 Ibid.
782 Ibid.
783 See ABA, Antitrust Division (2003) ‘Comments and Recommendations on the Competition Elements of the Doha Declaration’, 
<http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2003/05-03/doha.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 16.
784 See ‘Zoellick Notifies Congress o f Progress on Global Trade Talks’, 11/05/2002, 
<http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Letters_to_Congress/2002/ZoelIick_Notifies_Congress_of_Progress_on_Global_Trade_T 
alks.html> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
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suggested that the US supported the prospect of a minimal agreement on competition in 
order to withdraw such support later on in the context of the negotiations on a more 
important to the US issue. This channel of argument would practically prove right the 
concern of competition experts in the US that the WTO is not the right forum for 
competition policy as competition is only one of the many "bargaining chips" on the 
table of discussions.^*^
On the other hand, it should be kept in mind that the Doha Round took place 
only two months after September 11 and as has been documented Robert Zoellick used 
this occasion in order to propose further liberalisation at the WTO, with the inclusion of 
the new issues in the agenda of negotiations, and thus went on to even accept the 
prospect of a possible minimal agreement on competition.^*^
In any event the fact that competition was included in the Doha Declaration is an 
indication that in the US the trade administration is more sympathetic to the possibility 
of adopting competition rules in the WTO than the antitrust administration (which has 
opposed it consistently). Nonetheless, there has been no tension as of yet from this 
apparent divergence, since competition policy was finally withdrawn from the 
negotiations after the collapse of the talks in Cancun.
6.3.2. Coordinated resistance bv developing countries
When Lord Brittan introduced his proposal for inclusion of competition law and 
policy in the global trading system, the position of developing countries was not much 
of a concern. In fact, as it has been reported by Peter Carl Mogens, former Director 
General of the Commission’s DO Trade, during the Punta Del Este Conference of 1986, 
which launched the Uruguay Round, it was the (participating) developing countries that 
suggested multilateral negotiations on competition; nevertheless this proposal was 
rejected by industrialised countries.^*^
785 This was also expressed during an interview with a US Practitioner (Bmssels21/7/2003).
786 Zedillo, E. (2006) ‘The WTO’s Biggest Problem at 10: Surviving the Doha Round’, Speech delivered at conference “WTO at 
10: Governance, Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries’, Columbia University, April 7, 2006,
<http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/center/fbrms/doha.pdf^ (last visited on 21/3/2007), at 3, where the author notes that following the 9/11 
events, Zoellick kept repeating that ‘The international market economy -  o f which trade and the WTO are vital parts - offers an 
antidote to this violent lejectionism. Trade is about more than economic efficiency; it reflects a system of values: openness, peaceful 
exchange, opportunity, inclusiveness and integration, mutual gains through interchange, freedom of choice, appreciation of 
differences, governance through agreed rules, and a hope for betterment forall peoples and lands’.
787 See Mogens, P C. (2001) ‘Towards Basic Rules on Trade Related Competition Policy’, Speech delivered in Brussels, 2 March 
2001, <http://trade.ec.europaeu/doclib/docs/2004/november/tradoc_120130.pdfî> (last visited on 21/3/2007).
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This position was reversed ten years later at the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference when the first signs of opposition from developing coimtries to the possible 
adoption of a competition agreement became apparent. Since then, developing countries 
have successfully held a common line against a number of the issues of the trade 
agenda, including competition policy, and resisted negotiating on these issues not only 
in Seattle but also during the Ministerial Conferences in Doha and Cancun.
In fact, until the late 1990s only a handful of developing countries had actively 
participated at the GATT and WTO talks, while, as has been documented, the more 
delicate negotiations were largely dominated by the QUAD.^*^ This situation started 
changing at the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996, and became apparent in a 
dramatic way in the 1999 WTO Ministerial in Seattle where developing countries 
demonstrated co-ordinated and concerted negotiating leverage through the formation of 
a number of groups of countries that dealt with particular policy issues.
One such example is the so-called Like Minded Group, initially consisting of 
eight countries, that aimed to block the inclusion of the Singapore issues in the WTO 
agenda. Other examples include a number of coalition groups that appeared in Doha 
and Cancun, such as the African Group, the African Carribean Pacific (Carrebean) 
Group, the Group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and the group of Small and 
Vulnerable Economies.^^* These groups pursued a variety of aims at the negotiations, 
on issues such as agriculture, special and differential treatment, development, and 
opposition to the inclusion of the Singapore issues in the table of negotiations.^^^ 
Another such example is a coalition called the Core Group, which consisted of Latin
788 Young, A.R. and J. Peterson (2006) ‘The EU and the New Trade Pditics’ 13:6 Joumal o f  European Public Policy, 795, at 803.
789 See Metzer, J-M. (2000) ‘Seattle: Failure or New Departure?’ OECD Observer, July 2000, where the author notes that 
‘Countries such as India, Brazil, Egypt and Morocco, as well as Bangladesh, El Salvador, Tanzania and Jamaica, to name a few, 
have a lw ^s participated actively in the work o f the GATT and its successor, the WTO’.
790 The initial members o f the coalition were Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Tanzania, and Uganda. These 
countries were later joined by Dominican Republic, Honduras, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe, while Jamaica and Kenya also attended 
the meetings of the Group. For an analysis o f the way that the Group operated in the context o f the WTO negotiations from 1998 
until the Doha Ministerial Conference, see Narlikar, A. and J. Odell (2003) ‘The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining 
Coalition: The Like Minded Group in the World Trade Organization’, Paper Presented at a Conference on Developing Countries 
and the Trade Negotiation Process, UNCTAD, Gneva, 6-7 November 2003.
791 See Narlikar, A. and D. Tussie, (2004) ‘The G 20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and Their Evolving 
Coalitions in the WTO’ 27:7 The Worid Economy, 947, at 948-951.
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American and African countries which emerged during the period between Doha and 
Canciln^^^ with the aim of blocking negotiations on the Singapore issues.
With regard to competition in particular, the groups of developing countries 
which opposed the adoption of a competition law agreement at the WTO was led by 
India, which expressed its disagreement regarding the adoption of a multilateral 
competition agreement on various occasions.^^"  ^ For instance, in Doha, where 
competition was included in the final Declaration which provided that negotiations on 
these issues would start in the next Round of negotiations only if all the WTO Members 
would give consent, Yussuf Hussain Kamal, the Conference chair, issued at the request 
of India a statement where he clarified that, \..[In] my view, this would give each 
Member the right to take a position on modalities that would prevent negotiations from  
proceeding after the fifth Session o f the Ministerial Conference until that Member is 
prepared to join in an explicit consensus
In Cancun, once more developing countries opposed the possible inclusion of 
competition in the negotiations, and to a certain extent this was the main reason that led 
to the collapse of the talks. The Core Group gained support from a number of countries, 
and, on the last day of the meeting, a group of 29 developing countries including India 
and China, and with Bangladesh signing on behalf of the Least Developed Countries, 
sent a letter to Pierre Pettigrew, the Facilitator for the Singapore Issues at the Cancun 
Ministerial Conference, where they claimed that the Singapore Issues should not 
proceed forward for negotiation.^^^ As Nurlikar and Tussie informs us, on the final day 
of the Cancun conference, Botswana, speaking on behalf of the African Union, stated 
that the Union would not agree to any deal regarding the Singapore Issues. Following 
this statement. South Korea retaliated and stated that it would not accept any deal 
without an agreement on all the four Singapore Issues, which therefore became the main 
reason behind the failure of the talks.^^^
793 The countries which joined this group were Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
794 For an extensive review o f the position o f India on this matter in relation to the relevant EU position. See Holmes, P., J. Mathis, 
T.C.A. Anant, and S. J. Evenett (2003) ‘EU -  India Study Report on Competition Policy’, 
<ht^;//www.evenett.com/chapters/compfinaljune.pdf> (last visited on 21/3/2007).
795 Cited in Singh, A. (2003) ‘Competition and Competition Policy Development in Emerging Markets; International and 
Developmental Dimensions’ ESRC Working Paper No246, at 2.
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It is thus obvious that developing countries used their bargaining power^^* and 
managed to block the adoption of even a minimal agreement on competition at the 
WTO; they did this against the will of (primarily) the EU. In this regard, it has been 
suggested in the political science literature that agreements which are adopted on the 
basis of the principle of sovereign equality of states enjoy the highest degree of 
l eg i t imacy .The  logic of the GATT/WTO is that in the negotiations each member is 
sovereign to determine for itself whether a proposed agreement is to its advantage, to 
decide the criteria by which to identify the relevant advantages and disadvantages, and 
to apply those criteria by the formula that the member considers appropriate.*®^
The more balanced allocation of power in international organisations has been 
already asserted in earlier chapters of the thesis, in the context of the discussion about 
the characteristic of bilateral agreements to increase the power of strong industrialised 
states. As seen in this section, it has been this balance of powers at the WTO which has 
led to a certain extent to the failure of talks on competition, in view of the opposition of 
a number of developing countries on the issue. What is more important at this stage 
however is to identify the reasons that led to the opposition by most of the developing 
countries to the EU proposal for a multilateral agreement on competition within the 
auspices of the WTO.
For instance, as already noted in Chapter 2, there have been divergent positions 
as to the necessity of adopting competition rules by developing countries, and this is 
despite the fact that international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
and states with mature competition regimes, such as the US and the EU, have 
encouraged developing countries to adopt such laws. Similarly, there are various and 
divergent approaches as to the usefulness of an international agreement on competition 
for developing countries, as well as the desirable context of such an agreement from a 
developing country perspective.*®^ Among the various arguments developed in relation
798 On the discussion of the “veto power” o f the developing countries, which comprise more than 50% of the WTO, see Matoo, A. 
and A. Subramanian (2004) ‘The WTO and the Poorest Countries: The Stark Reality’ 3:3 World Trade Review, 385, at 391-2.
799 See Steinberg, R.H. (2002) ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus -  Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the 
GATT/WTO’ 56:2 International Organisation, 339, at 361. At the other end o f the spectrum, it has also been suggested that 
powerful states have preferred sovereign equality rules to weighted-voting at the GATT/WTO, because they provide incentives and 
opportunities for collecting the information necessary for a successful agenda-setting process. See Steinberg (2002) ibid.
800 See Finger, M. and A, Winters (2002), ‘Reciprocity in the WTO’, in Hoekman, B., A. Mattoo, and P. English (eds) 
Development, Trade and The WTO (World Bank), 50, at 51.
801 See for instance, Singh, A. (2003), supra n. 795; Bhattacharjea, A. (2006), ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on 
Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective’ 9:2 Journal of International Economic Law, 293; Aubert, C. (2003)
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to this debate, this section focuses on four main factors that led to the rejection by 
developing countries of the EU proposal to include a competition agreement within the 
WTO context.
i. Developing countries, competition law, and industrial policy
The first relevant argument put forward by developing countries against a WTO 
competition agreement is based on the assumption that competition law and policy in 
developing countries should include broad industrial policy exceptions. This point was 
raised by India in the context of the discussions at the Working Group on Trade and 
Competition. In one of its communications India noted that, \..[D]eveloping countries 
do not yet have the kind o f well-developed safety nets that exist in industrial countries to 
provide for those displaced by import competition. There is thus a greater need to 
cushion its impact by suitable industrial restructuring measures ..., which would also 
enable developing countries to embrace greater trade liberalization...
This concern has also been pointed out by various scholars. For instance, Singh, 
looking at the development of East Asian countries, China, as well as Italy and other 
European countries, has suggested that a combination of competition with co-operation 
between firms is more likely to increase societal welfare rather than competition 
a l o n e . A l o n g  the same lines, Bhattachaijee notes that with the exception of the US, all 
other industrialised countries have used for long periods extensive exemptions from the 
application of competition rules in order to promote social and political objectives, and 
only progressively have they moved towards more efficiency-related objectives.*^
In fact, the Doha Declaration takes these arguments into account by including 
the notion of flexibility, and the EU would accept exemptions as far as such exemptions 
would be clearly set. Nonetheless, this channel of argument was never finally put into a 
more specific context, due to the withdrawal of the issue from the agenda in 2004. 
Given the importance of the issue for developing countries, more work would be needed 
on this issue in the context of any future multilateral talks on competition, as the recent
‘Competition Policy for Countries with Different Development Levels’, p ^ e r  presented at the CEPR ‘Competition Policy in 
International Markets’ Workshop, 17/18 October 2003, <ht^://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/6/6613/papers/Aubert.pdf> (lat visited on 
21 May 2007); Hertel, T.W., B. M. Hoekman and W. Martin (2002) ‘Developing Countries and a New Round o f WTO 
Negotiations’ 17:1 The World Bank Research Observer, 113; Hoekman and Holmes supra n. 726.
802 See Communication from India, WT/WGTCP/W/216,26 September 2002.
803 See Singh (2003), supra n. 795, at 14.
804 See Bhattachaijee (2006), supra n. 801, at 316-8.
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experience of the negotiations has highlighted that certain developing countries are still 
not acquainted with the notion of competition law or more particularly with the optimal 
application of competition law.
Along the same lines, the Representative of Kenya stressed in Cancun, \..[We] 
believe that this Ministerial Conference should therefore focus on how to expand the 
space o f  understanding the Singapore Issues and launch a process o f  improving that 
understanding. Kenya cannot accept the launching o f  negotiations on issues that we do 
not clearly understand and whose implication on our economies have not been 
assessed. Moreover, although Kenya attaches a lot o f  importance to Technical 
Assistance and Capacity Building, we are fully convinced this should be provided to 
enhance understanding o f issues involved before negotiations are launched.
ii. Implementation issues: lack of institutional capacity and need of technical assistance 
The last statement by the Kenyan representative, i.e. concerning the need for 
technical assistance, is another issue raised by a number of developing countries, and 
relates to the costs that they would have to bear in order to develop efficient 
enforcement of competition law. This is an issue that has been raised with regard to a 
number of agreements adopted in the context of the Uruguay Round, such as the 
agreements on customs valuation, technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, and intellectual property rights. Implementation of all these norms by 
developing countries requires the purchasing of equipment, the training of people, the 
establishment of systems of checks and balances etc.^ ®^
Finger and Winters have pointed out that even though these agreements do not 
go so far as to regulate domestically the issues they regulate at the international level, 
their content is binding and thus they have significant influence on the behaviour of the 
contracting parties, which have to frame their national legislation in accordance with the 
international rules included in the agreements.*®^ On the other hand, all these
805 See ‘Comments by Kenya on the second revision of the Draft Cancun Ministerial text’ o f 14 September 2003, 
WT/MIN(03)/W/21; See also ‘the Declaration o f the Group of 77 and China on the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, Cancun, 
Mexico, 10-14 September 2003’, <http://www.g77.org/main/docs/FinalG77Decl-22aug-5thWTO.pdf>, (last visited on 21 May 
2007) at 15.
806 For an evaluation o f the costs that developing countries have to bear in order to set up domestic institutions that would apply the 
measures adopted under the various agreements, see Finger, J.M, and Ph. Schuler (2000) ‘Implementation o f  Uruguay Round 
Commitments: The Devdopment Challenge’ 23:4 The World Economy, 511.
807 See Finger and Winters, supra n. 800, at 51.
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agreements contain technical assistance clauses,*®  ^ according to which industrialised 
countries should help developing countries with the institutional set up needed in order 
to apply the rules that stem from the agreements. Nonetheless, these provisions are not 
binding, something that has caused complaints by developing countries that 
industrialised countries have not done much to assist them.*®  ^ In fact, in the field of 
competition law a number of developing countries raised their concern that 
industrialised countries have not practically offered enough technical assistance, and 
therefore they are not able to establish institutions that would efficiently enforce 
competition rules.*
In the same context, Hertel et al. make a reference to similar issues raised with 
regard to intellectual property rights discussed during the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations. The authors note that even though there was a final agreement on the issue 
(the TRIPS agreement), poor countries have not yet created intellectual property 
regimes, and most importantly they have not identified the alternative options that could 
be used to upgrade and enforce their national product, health and safety standards, or to 
regulate sectors which are subject to market failure.*^ ^  The authors conclude that on 
such issues the WTO rules should allow for experimentation and learning and must be 
coupled with technical assistance to help these countries establish efficient enforcement 
bodies.**^
Given that there are still unaddressed issues with regard to the enforcement of 
rules provided by agreements that have been already adopted in the context of the 
WTO, further commitments by developing countries on competition enforcement would 
create more extensive financial costs for them. Nonetheless, competition law is not a 
major priority for a number of developing countries which suffer from poverty and a 
number of significant co-related financial and social problems. Thus, it comes as no 
surprise that the governments of many of these countries have not been eager to spend 
part of their limited budget on the enforcement of competition law, and have been 
therefore extremely reluctant to accept binding WTO provisions on competition.
808 See for instance Art 9 o f the WTO Agreement on the Application o f Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Art 67 o f the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects o f Intellectual Property Riglts (TRIPS), and Art 20(3) o f the Agreement on Implementation of 
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810 Interview with EC Commission official (Brussels 20/7/2003).
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iii. Export Cartels
Apart from the institutional difficulties faced by these countries and the need for 
technical assistance, of major concern among the representatives of developing 
countries has been the fact that export cartels are very often exempted from the 
application of competition la^vs of industrialised countries. In a recent study, Levenstein 
and Suslow have found that out of the fifty five countries that they examined thirty four 
have explicit export cartel exemptions, seventeen have implicit exemptions, while only 
four of them have no statutory exemptions.*^^
In the case of export cartels, producers from a country agree to cooperate in 
order to fix prices or allocate market shares only in a foreign market and not the market 
where they are based. On an economic basis, there may be instances where export 
cartels increase the domestic total welfare of the exporting country; nevertheless, at the 
same time they also decrease international total welfare.**^ This happens since due to 
the existence of an export cartel, domestic firms become more efficient than they would 
be if the operation of the cartel had not been exempted from the application of 
competition law. At the same time the creation of the cartel may increase prices on an 
international level, and thus decrease total welfare internationally.
As Fox and Ordover have pointed out, export cartels and the negative impact 
they have on international trade could be easily nullified if nations would agree to 
prohibit this particular practice;**^ this is recognised in a 1996 Commission 
Communication, where Brittan and Van Miert noted that ‘...[AJlthough such cartels are 
covered by the legislation o f  most importing countries, they are hard to tackle due to a 
lack o f information in the importing country. An international agreement to outlaw 
export cartels would put an end to these "beggar thy neighbour" policies
813 See Levenstein, M.C. and V. Suslow (2005) ‘The Changing International Status o f Export Cartel Exemptions’ 20 American 
University International Law Review, 785, at 806.
814 See Crampton, P S. and C.L. Witterick (1997) ‘Trade Distorting Private Restraints and Market Access; Learning to Walk 
Before We Run’ 24 Empirica, 53, at 56.
815 See Fox, E M. and J. A. Ordover (1995) ‘The Harmonisation o f Trade Law and Competition Law: The Case for Modest 
Linkages o f Law and Limits to Parochial State Action’ 19:2 World Competition Law and Economics, 5, at 18-19. Eleanor Fox has 
also argued in a later paper, that export cartels could be also prohibited under Article 11.1 (b) o f the Safeguard Agreement, under 
which states “ ...shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other 
similar measures on the export or the import side’’, and in Article 11.3 this prohibition is extended to the “ ...adoption or 
maintenance by public and private enterprises o f non governmental measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph 1”. See 
Fox, E (1999) ‘Competition Law and the Millennium Round.’ 2:4 Journal of International Ecomomic Law, 665, at 675.
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At the WTO the issue of export cartels arose as one of the most contradictory 
ones. Several developing countries expressed their concern with regard to the negative 
effects that cartels originating from other (industrialised) countries had on their 
economies, while other developing countries argued that export cartels should be 
exempted from the competition rules of developing countries in the context of 
flexibility and progressivity that should be offered to them.*^^
The opposition to the possible inclusion of export cartels in a WTO agreement 
came mainly from the US, which has been the oldest and most prominent supporter of 
this type of business practice.*^* In its submissions to the working group, the US on the 
one hand argued that '...laws o f  most countries do not reach outbound joint export 
activities that do not have anti-competitive spillover effects in their home markets - i.e., 
the kind o f  effects at which antitrust laws are aimed... ", and went on to suggest that the 
OECD Recommendation on Hard Core Cartels, excludes export cartels from its 
application, as far as such exclusions are transparent and no broader than necessary to 
achieve their overriding policy perspectives.**^
In view of its earlier commitment to include export cartels in a possible WTO 
agreement on competition, the EU did not deny that some sort of international 
mechanism was needed in order to address these practices. Nevertheless given the 
consistent US opposition to such a prospect and the fact that in the EU export cartels are 
in practice excluded from the application of competition rules, since EU competition 
rules apply only to practices that have an effect on the trade between the Member States, 
the EU offered only voluntary international cooperation with regard to export cartels.*^ ** 
As expected, these positions were not welcomed by developing countries. India 
again, through a submission at the WTO Working Group on Trade and Competition, 
noted that, \..[U ]ntil such time as developed countries are willing to consider the 
impact o f mergers on consumers in foreign countries, to rescind the exemption o f export 
cartels in their competition laws, to give serious consideration to enforcing the 
UNCTAD Set o f measures to control RBPs, and to extend the benefits o f  "positive
817 For a review o f the relevant positions taken at the Working Group on Trade and Competition, see Bhattachaijea, A. (2004) 
‘Export Cartels -  A Developing Country Perspective’ 382 Journal o f  World Trade, 331, at 334-6
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comity” in competition law enforcement to developing countries, the latter will have to 
retain the right to challenge foreign mergers and RBPs that have an effect on domestic 
consumers.
This position, especially with regard to export cartels, was confirmed by an EU 
official that was interviewed in the context of this study, who noted that ‘it has been 
made clear that developing countries would not accept a WTO agreement on 
competition i f  such an agreement would not include a clear ban on export cartels. On 
the other hand, the EU as well as the US and a number o f  other countries are not ready 
to accept such a commitment
It is quite a paradox that both the US and the EU, with the arguably the most 
mature competition systems, major enthusiasm for competition law and expressed 
antipathy towards cartels did not seem ready to accept a commitment on the prohibition 
of export cartels. On the other hand, this observation is a clear indication that what is of 
utmost importance in the context of the negotiations of competition at the international 
level is the reassurance that national interests are satisfied before any sort of 
commitments may be taken.
iv. Developing countries and concerns relating to agriculture
All the issues so far discussed that have led developing countries to the 
opposition of a WTO competition agreement are directly related to competition law and 
policy. Nonetheless, it was also mentioned in the context of the discussion about the 
possible inclusion of competition rules in the WTO, that the negotiations at the WTO 
include a number of other co-related issues. One of them is the regulation of agriculture, 
which has been an issue of major concern among developing countries, and is linked to 
the debate on competition.
In fact, a great amount of academic text has been dedicated to the discussions on 
agriculture at the WTO, and estimations of the effects of further liberalisation of 
agriculture on developing countries vary.*^  ^ What is beyond doubt is that developing
821 See Communication from India, WT/WTGTCP/W/1, o f 26 September 2002, at para 3.
822 Interview with EC Commission official (BrusseIs20/7/2003).
823 On the complex issue o f agriculture in the WTO and its effects on developing countries, see Anderson, K. and W. Martin eds 
(2005) Agricultural Trade Reform and the Doha Development Agenda (World Bank and Palgrave McMillan); Anderson, K. (2003) 
‘How Can Agricultural Reform Reduce Poverty?’ Discussion Paper, Centre for International Economic Studies, No 0321; Beghin, 
J.C. and A. Aksoy (2003) ‘Agricultural Trade and the Doha Round: Lessons from Commodity Studies’, Centre for Agricultural and 
Rural Development, Iowa State University, Briefing Paper 03-BP 42; Fabiosam, J., J. Beghin, S. de Cara, A. Elobeid, C. Fang, M.
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countries have repeatedly expressed their disapproval of agricultural policies followed 
primarily by the EU, but also by rich countries such as the US and Japan. For instance 
in Cancun, in a letter to the WTO regarding the draft Ministerial Declaration, Mauritius, 
on behalf of the African Union, the African Caribbean and Pacific, and the Least 
Developed Economies, made clear that these countries were not satisfied with the 
progress made during the discussions on agricultural reform at the WTO level, and 
requested a number amendments of the Draft Declaration.*^"  ^These changes would not 
be accepted by developed countries and thus the talks reached a dead end.
Two general observations may be made with regard to the indirect importance of 
agriculture to the development of the talks on competition. The first is that the WTO is a 
forum where differentiated and conflicting aims are pursued by the Member States. It is 
also an indication that at the multilateral level, progress of one issue may depend upon 
the relevant progress on another not directly related issue. Thus apart from analysis on 
the extent to which competition law is important to developing countries, any future 
attempts to include competition law in the WTO should take into serious consideration 
these related policies.
The second observation is similar but relates to the EU. As mentioned above, it 
has been suggested in the relevant literature that the EU initially proposed the inclusion 
of competition policy in the WTO framework in order to slow down agricultural reform. 
This argument is not proven here; nonetheless, the persistence of the EU on the 
Singapore Issues had profound effects on the development of the negotiations on 
agriculture.
6.3.3. Back to the European Commission: did evervbodv in the Commission reallv want 
an agreement at the WTO?
As shown, only hard core cartels qualified for possible further negotiations at the 
WTO in Doha. In contrast, the inclusion of vertical restraints and of types of abuse of 
dominance by firms within a competition agreement, something that was initially
Isik, H. Matthey, A. Saak, P. Westhoflf, D. Scott Brown, B. Willot, D. Madison. S. Meyer and J. Kruse (2005) ‘The Doha Round o f 
the World Trade Organisation and Agricultural Markets Liberalisation; Impacts on Developing Economies’ 27:3 Review o f 
Agricultural Economics, 317.
824 See Communication from Mauritius, WT/MIN(03)AV/17, o f 12 September 2003. It has to be noted that the fact that the 
Communication was sent on behalf two regional organisations, i.e. the African Union and CARICOM is a clear indication o f the 
coordinated action o f developing countries at the WTO. In addition this position may frirther strengthen the argument made in 
Chapter S that the proliferation o f regional plurilateral agreements, may lead to a situation that international negotiations are 
conducted by the representatives o f those organisations.
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proposed by the European Commission, did not find any favour at the WTO. 
Furthermore, the Commission, even though it initially insisted that the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism should be included in a possible agreement on competition, it 
had by this time limited this proposal by accepting the much softer peer review system, 
due to the opposition expressed by the US.
On the other hand, it became clear in Cancun that not even the minimal proposal 
of the EU, which included core principles like non-discrimination, transparency and due 
process, a provision on hard core cartels and modalities for cooperation and technical 
assistance, could survive the negotiations, due mainly to the opposition expressed by 
developing countries.
The additional argument made in this section is that, in parallel with the 
realisation that exogenous factors (i.e. the opposition expressed by the US and 
developing countries) would block the EU proposal for the adoption of a competition 
agreement at the WTO, there have also been endogenous factors that have had an effect 
on the development of the EU position. In particular, it is argued that the EU proposal 
for a competition agreement at the WTO has mainly been a product of DG Trade, while 
DG Competition, which is responsible for competition law and policy, was much more 
reluctant about the inclusion of competition in the WTO.
In fact, this argument has been recently raised by Chad Damro, who in 
discussing the theory of venue shopping, according to which "actors will choose the 
venue, depending on its institutional features, through which it may expect to achieve 
the best r e s u l t s notes that the Directorate General (DG) for Trade may have 
different interests in the field of competition law and policy than those of DG 
Competition. He further argues that Ht should he noted that Brittan and DG Trade were 
the primary advocates o f this position. DG Competition had little interest in promoting 
such a competition measure in the WTO \ He also notes that DG Trade promotes the
inclusion of competition within the WTO in the context of the broader attempt to pursue 
non-trade goals within the organisation. On the other hand, DG Competition prefers 
avoiding such issue linkages (between trade and non-trade goals and consequently trade 
and competition), since such linkages increase the likelihood of political intervention in 
the performance of its mandate, which is the optimal application of the EU competition
825 Damro, C. (2006) ‘The New Trade Politics and EU Competition Policy: Shopping for Convergence and Co-operation’ 13:6 
Journal o f European Public Policy, 867, at 868.
826 Ibid, at 878.
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rules.*^^ The research undertaken in the context of this work builds upon Damro’s 
argument by analysing the position of the EC Commission, which represents the EU at 
the WTO.
As an EU official noted when interviewed, the whole idea of proposing a 
binding agreement at the WTO was a creature of DG Trade and from the beginning of 
the talks at the WTO there were voices within DG Competition opposing such a 
p r o s p e c t . S u c h  voices became more persistent as the negotiations proceeded. As 
already noted, the proposal for a competition WTO agreement came from Sir Leon 
Brittan, who was at the time the Commissioner in charge of external trade. It has also 
been noted that Karel Van Miert at least officially supported the promotion of the issue 
at the WTO. Nonetheless, during the next four to five years or so the dynamics changed, 
at least vdth regard to DG Competition. In 1999 both Commissioners Brittan and Van 
Miert had to resign because of the resignation of the entire Santer Commission. Pascal 
Lamy became in the same year the Commissioner for Trade and Mario Monti became 
the Commissioner for Competition.
Throughout his tenure, the main aim of Mario Monti, who is an economist, was 
to introduce more efficiency-centred economic analysis on the cases reviewed by the 
Commission, bringing therefore the EU competition regime closer to the one developed 
in the US. Monti never appeared to be against the inclusion of competition in the WTO, 
but also expressed the view that the Commission should be realistic as to what could be 
achieved at this level. In 2002 he clearly expressed this position by stating that \..w e  
have to be pragmatic and focus initially on what can be achieved" As noted by an 
interviewee, from a strategic point of view, and in view of the continuous opposition 
both by the US and a large number of developing countries, at a certain point in the 
negotiations, Monti and his staff realised that by insisting on the inclusion of 
competition in the WTO the Commission was ^betting its money on a lost horse 
Thus it appeared that follovvdng the resignation of Brittan and Miert from the
827 Id, at 873.
828 In particular, the Commission negotiates in consultation with the so-called 133 Committee, which consists of representatives 
from the 27 EU Member States on the basis o f Article 133(3) EC.
829 Interview with EC Commission Official (Brussels 20/7/2003).
830.See Monti, M. (2002) ‘A Global Competition Policy?’ European Competition Day, Copenhagen 17 September 2002, < 
http://europaeu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/02/399&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage 
=en> (last visited on 21 May 2007), where former Commissioner Monti expressed nevertheless his belief that a WTO Agreement 
should be adopted by 2005.
831 Two EC Commission officials confirmed this suggestion (Brussels, 20 and 21/7/2003).
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Commission, DG Competition started taking the position that competition law and 
policy should be pursued in every possible forum (international organisation), and not 
only at the WTO.
On the opposite side of the spectrum, DG Trade remained committed to the 
WTO. It has to be pointed out that in terms of competence, the possibility of including 
competition at the WTO was an ‘all- or- nothing’ situation for DG Trade, as the WTO 
is the only international organisation where the EU is represented on competition 
matters exclusively by this Directorate General. On the other hand, and in line with 
Damro’s argument, DG Trade considers the WTO as an expanded version of the EU 
model. This argument has been recently re-confirmed by an EU trade official, who has 
noted that: ‘WTO ‘feels European ’ in its mission and even its politics: starting from the 
opening o f  trade between members on a largely voluntary basis, arriving at binding 
rules (with consequences), and the pooling o f sovereignty, but this time on a global 
scale
The divergence of approaches has been described by an EU official interviewee 
who noted that: ‘International Organisations in a sense lead their own life. They try to 
develop their own arguments in order to justify their own existence, and this is the case 
with the EC Commission as well. WTO would be good for the Commissioner fo r  Trade, 
while i f  the ICN will take the lead then the merit goes to Monti
6.4 The future of competition at the WTO and alternative options
As the chapter has argued, both external and internal factors have played a major 
role in the way that the EU, which put the issue on the table of negotiations, first had to 
limit its proposal, and then withdraw the proposal altogether. Despite this development, 
it would be far from accurate to state that competition law in the WTO is a finished 
story, and a number of factors lead to this conclusion.
First, the WTO as an institution has developed its own dynamics with regard to 
the possible inclusion of competition law and policy. At the moment, the talks in 
general at the WTO have slowed down dramatically, but in view of the globalisation of 
markets, and the ongoing aim of more developed countries to further liberalise world 
markets, it would be realistic to expect that at some time in the near future the 
negotiations will be launched again.
832 See Baldwin, M. (2006) ‘EU Trade Politics -  Heaven or Hell? 13:6 Journal o f European Public Policy, 526, at 533.
833 Interview with EC Commission Official (Brussels 20/7/2003).
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Second, there is no doubt that, even in the absence of a WTO competition 
agreement, the organisation will still deal with competition issues since a number of 
WTO agreements contain competition-related provisions. Such provisions are found in 
GATT, as well as in TRIPS, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and 
the ‘Reference Paper’ which complements the WTO Telecommunications 
Agreement. The existence of these provisions may lead to the examination of 
particular cases on the basis of competition law. In fact, the WTO Dispute Settlement 
has already reviewed two cases on this basis. The first was the Kodak/Fuji case,*^  ^ and 
the second the Telmex case.*^  ^Quite surprisingly, in view of the consistent opposition of 
the US regarding the adoption of a multilateral agreement on competition, both cases 
were examined on the basis of complaints submitted by the US government.
The Kodak/Fuji case related to a complaint by the US government that the 
Japanese Fuji Film company with the assistance of the Japanese government, which, 
according to the US, by not properly enforcing the relevant antitrust legislation, had 
prevented all the major Japanese distributors from distributing the products of foreign 
competitive firms, and thus had excluded Eastman Kodak, a US company, from the 
Japanese M a r k e t . T h e  complain was beised on Article XXIII: 1(b) of the GATT, 
according to which ‘[I] f any contracting party should consider that any benefit 
accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired 
or that the attainment o f  any objective o f  the Agreement is being impeded as the result 
o f ...(b) the application by another contracting party o f  any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions o f  this Agreement... \  The WTO Panel which examined the 
case found that there was no infringement by the Japanese Government, mainly due to 
the fact that there was no proof that Japanese law was applied in a discriminatory 
manner to US firms, on the basis of the historical existence of Keiretsu in the Japanese 
markets.*^ *
834 See OECD (1999) ‘Trade and Competition Policies for Tomorrow’ (OECD, Paris) at 59-75 (Chapter 4).
835 See Panel Report, Japan: Measure Affecting Consumer Photograpdiic Film and Paper, WT/DS44/R.
836See Panel Report, Mexico: Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R.
837 It has to be noted that when the dispute arose. Sir Leon Brittan expressed the view that ‘...Europe has important expcxt 
interests in this area. The European market o f photographic film and paper is open to competition. Our industry would like the same 
conditions to prevail in other markets as well. We therefore welcome the critical analysis o f market conditions in Japan, which this 
panel will conduct’. See Commission (EC) ‘Kodak-Fuji Case -  EU to Join the WTO/GATT Panel: Statement by the European 
Commission’, IP/96/931.
838 See Furse, M. (1999) supra n. 125.
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On the other hand, the Telmex case related to the privilege granted by Mexican 
legislation to the dominant company, Telmex, to fix the rate to be paid by all foreign 
carriers terminating calls in Mexico. In this case, the WTO panel found that Mexico 
infringed its obligations under the Reference Paper as it failed to maintain appropriate 
measures to prevent anti-competitive practices by firms that are a ‘major supplier’, it 
failed to ensure interconnection at cost-oriented rates, and it also failed to ensure 
reasonable and non-discriminatory access and use of telecommunications networks.
Thus, irrespective of whether competition law and policy as such will return to 
the WTO agenda of negotiations, it is quite logical to suggest that more competition- 
related cases will reach the Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the future, in view of the 
fact that competition provisions are found in a number of WTO agreements. 
Nevertheless, as it has been argued, this case-specific analysis based on sector- specific 
competition provisions cannot replace a multilateral competition agreement, as such an 
application of the law might lead to an inconsistent competition policy across sectors.*"^ ® 
In parallel, the problems identified in Chapter 2 with regard to the international aspects 
of competition law and policy still exist, which means that international solutions are 
still needed in order to face these international problems. Bilateral and plurilateral 
agreements may provide solutions, but such solutions are by definition limited.
In any case, both of the two major international institutions which carried out 
work in this field before the launch of competition talks at the WTO have consistently 
continued their work: UNCTAD being the institution mainly dealing with the relevant 
problems faced by developing countries; and OECD being considered as the group 
dominated by rich industrialised countries. In addition, in 2001 the ICN was launched, 
and has probably become the most important forum for discussions on the multilateral 
aspects of competition law and policy. The next section attempts to expose the main 
features of this ‘virtual’ institution, and evaluate the reaction of the EU regarding its 
operation.
839 The legal basis o f the decision was Articles 1.1 and 2.2(b) o f the Reference Paper, and 5(a)and (b) of the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunications. For an analysis o f the Panel Report, see Fox, E.M. (2006) ‘The WTO’s First Antitrust Case -  Mexican 
Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition’ 9 Journal of International Economic Law, 271; Lee, K.Y. (2005) ‘The 
WTO Dispute Settlement and Anti-competitive Practices: Lessons Learnt from Trade Disputes’, The University o f Oxford Centre 
for Competition Law and Policy, Working Paper (L) 10/05; Marsden, P. (2004) ‘WTO Decides First Competition Case With 
Disappointing Results’ Competition Law Insight, May, 3.
840 Shelton, J R. (1999) ‘Competition Policy: What Chance For International Rules?’ 1:2 OECD Journal of Competition Law and 
Policy, 51, at 56.
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6.4.1 The genesis and operation of the ICN
As noted above, the establishment of the ICN was first proposed by the ICPAC 
Report in 2000, and was the palpable US response to the EU proposal for a binding 
competition agreement under the auspices of the WTO. In fact, this kind of behaviour 
from powerful states, i.e. proposing the creation of new organisations in cases where 
they do not intend to support the adoption of binding international rules, or where they 
feel that the negotiations under the auspices of an international organisation has reached 
a dead end, has been analysed in the political science literature.
In particular, as Steinberg notes: ‘[W]hen aimed at a group o f  states—and in its 
most potent form—coercion takes the form o f a threat to exit the organization that is 
unable to achieve consensus... In other cases, the exit tactic may involve simply 
ignoring the deadlocked organization and creating a new organization that will become 
a source offuture legal benefits in the issue area'}^^ Similarly, Krisch, discussing the 
relationship between hegemony and international law, notes that dominant states have 
two major options with regard to their position towards international law. The first is to 
support the adoption of international agreements where there is the belief that 
international commitments would have a positive effect on the domestic markets, as in 
the case of the WTO where the US has pushed for increased legalisation. The second 
alternative is to withdraw from international law and to turn to other strategies which do 
not necessarily involve violations of existing law; but it 'will certainly include shifts 
away from legal mechanisms in areas central to the dominant state’s interests, and in 
particular attempts to reduce the legal constraints on the tools of dominance, such as 
those on the use of force.*"^ ^
Amidst the various problems identified and objections raised with regard to the 
possible inclusion of competition law in the WTO, the US proposal found considerable 
support within the community of competition experts. In September 2000, Joel Klein 
reaffirmed the ICPAC’s proposal for the creation of a Global Competition Initiative, 
comparable to the work carried out by the OECD Competition Law and Policy (CLP) 
Committee, and in particular by the OECD Global Forum of Competition, which would 
encompass a larger number of participating countries, since the OECD’s membership 
was too limited and consequently it could not serve as the organisation to address itself
841 See Steinberg (2002), supra n. 799, at 349.
842 Krisch, N. (2005) ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping o f the International Legal Order’ 
16:3 The European Journal o f International Law, 369, at 379.
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competition issues of a global scale.Commissioner  Monti, who has been considered 
as one of the strongest proponents of the work undertaken by the welcomed the
proposal of Joel Klein.
A few months later, in February 2001, forty representatives of competition 
authorities and experts met in Ditchley Park in the UK and examined the possible way 
forward with regard to the establishment and operation of this new organisation. The 
ICN was finally launched only one and a half years after the ICPAC proposal at the 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute's annual international antitrust conference by officials 
from 14 junsdictions.*"^^ Since then the development and work of the ICN has been 
significant. More than 80 states participate in the Network, which, according to its 
website, is the 'only international body devoted exclusively to competition law 
enforcement
The ICN is a virtual organisation without a permanent secretariat. It is led by a 
steering Group of 15 experts-representatives of competition authorities, and holds an 
annual Conference where representatives of all Member States, along with a limited 
number of invited business representatives and academics, participate. Most of its work 
is carried out by the various working groups set up to examine particular issues,*"^ * and 
in particular issues relating to merger notifications and procedures, capacity building, 
technical assistance, cooperation on cartels, the relationship between sectoral regulation 
and competition, the role of competition in the telecommunications sector, and recently 
the analysis of unilateral conduct. Thus, it may be argued that, to a certain extent, the 
issues covered by the ICN working groups are similar to the topics discussed at the 
WTO. The major differences with regard to the operation of these institutions are the 
following two.
843 See Klein, J. (2000) ‘Time for a Global Competition Initiative?’, Speech Delivered at the EC Merger Control 10th Anniversary 
Conference, Brussels, Belgium, <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speechesf'6486.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007) at 7. As noted 
in Chapter 3, the OECD encompasses 31 Members. The CLP includes representatives from these states as well as particular 
observers from other non-OECD countries. In addition in the context o f the Global Forum on Competition (GCF), which was 
created in parallel with the ICN in 2001, business and consumer representatives participate in some o f the CLP and GCF meetings.
844 See Kolasky, W. (2005) ‘Mario Monti’s Legacy: A US Perspective’ 1:1 Wilmer Cutler Hale and Dorr LLP, 159, at 176.
845 See Monti, M. (2000) ‘The Main Challenges of a New Decade of EC Merger Control’, Speech delivered at the EC Merger 
Control 10th Armiversary Conference, Brussels, Belgium, 14-15 September 2000, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/00/311&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguag 
e=en> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
846 See US DoJ ‘US and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch International Competition Network: New International Venue Will 
Assist In Global Convergence On Inportant Antitrust Enforcement Issues’ Press Release o f 25 October 2001.
847 See the ICN webpage at http://www.interaationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/about-icn
848 The members o f the Working Groups mainly work by internet, telephone, 6 x  machine and videoconference. See ibid.
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First, no trade officials are invited at the ICN Conferences, despite the fact that 
for a decade or so, the negotiations for a multilateral agreement at the WTO were 
carried out by trade and not competition o f f i c i a l s . I t  should be noted that vdth regard 
to the EU participation at the ICN, and based on the arguments raised above regarding 
the different preferences between the Commission’s trade and competition officials at 
the WTO, it comes as no surprise that EU competition officials have been rather 
satisfied with this development, as the work of the ICN is carried out by competition 
experts, while trade experts are actually excluded. As Janow has noted, the informal but 
often repeated motto for the ICN has become ‘...all competition all o f  the time
This is something that has created criticism within trade officials. For instance, 
Bernard Hoekman from the World Bank, who has been one of the most influential 
commentators of the role of competition in the international trade system, has noted that 
‘...[T]he ICN is an inter-agency entity, not an inter-governmental body, reflecting a 
desire on the part o f the “competition community” not to have to engage with trade and 
other officials on modalities o f  international cooperation (disciplines) in “their” 
area\^^^
Second, the ICN does not exercise a rule making function. According to the ICN 
website, ‘ ...fWJhere the ICN reaches consensus on recommendations, or “best 
practices ”, arising from the projects, it is left to the individual competition authorities 
to decide whether and how to implement the recommendations, through unilateral, 
bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as appropriate Thus, the ICN only produces 
soft law instruments in the way that such instruments are being produced by bilateral 
enforcement cooperation agreements, discussed in Chapter 3, and similar to the OECD 
recommendations on hard core cartels and enforcement cooperation. In practice, the
849 To give a characteristic example; at the last Conference o f the ICN in Cape Town, a UK official from the Department o f Trade 
and Industry flew to Cape Town for just one day to attend a regional woricshop organised by a local NGO, TRALAC, which took 
place one day before the ICN annual Conference. The official did not attend the ICN Conference as he was not invited.
850 See Janow, M.E. (2003) ‘Observations on Two Multilateral Venues: the International Competition Network (ICN) and the 
WTO’ In Hawk, Barry E. (Ed ), Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Conference on International Antitrust 
Law & Policy (New York: Juris), 47, at 53
851 See Hoekman, B. and K. Saggi (2005) ‘International Cooperation on Domestic Policies: Lessons from the WTO Competition 
Policy Debate’, in S. Evenett and B. Hoekman (eds). Economic Development and Multilateral Trade Cooperation. (Palgrave 
McMillan and World Bank), at 456.
852 ibid.
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various working groups have already issued a number of soft law instruments such as 
recommended practices and guiding principles in the fields that they cover.
The ICN is one of the most characteristic examples of the 
transgovemmentalism, also discussed in earlier chapters of the thesis.* "^  ^ Cooperation 
under transgovemmentalism involves specialised domestic officials cooperating with 
minimal supervision by foreign ministers, and is also based on networks since 
cooperation is based on ‘loosely-structured, peer -to-peer ties developed through 
frequent interaction rather than formal negotiation As Raustiala notes, the result of
such networks is the diffusion of regulatory mles. Power still plays a role in these
' )
organisations; nonetheless, on such occasions power is ‘soft power, which is defined as 
power to attract, which is different from traditional hard power, defined as the power to 
c o e r c e It would be rational to expect that the work of the ICN is led by 
industrialised countries like the US, the EU and Canada. In fact, of the 15 members of 
the ICN’s steering group, which led the cooperation on the way to the last meeting of 
the ICN in Moscow in May 2007, only David Levds for the South African Competition 
Tribunal, Eduardo Perez Motta from the Mexican Competition Commission, and Igor 
Artemiev from the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia, are not representatives 
from wealthy industrialised countries.
That said, in the absence of a multilateral agreement on competition and in view 
of the need for multilateral cooperation, forums such as the ICN and the OECD Global 
Forum on Competition definitely play an important role in the development of 
international competition norms. These forums develop mechanisms of cooperation and 
interaction between experts from competition authorities, academia and business 
worldwide, through which ideas and experiences are exchanged with the aim of 
reaching common understandings; they use soft law instruments without threatening a
853 See in detail ICN (2006) ‘A Statement ofMission and Achievements, Up Until May 2006’.
854 Chapter 3. See also Slaughter, A-M. (2004) ‘Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order’ 40 Stamford Journal of 
International Law, 283.
855Raustiala, K. (2002) ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation; Transgovemmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law’ 43 Virginia Journal of International Law, I, at 5.
856 Ibid, at 51.
857 The other members o f the Steering Group are representatives from Germany, Canada, Australia, the EU, France, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Korea, Japan, Switzerland, while the US is the only state with two participants, Thomas Barnett, the DoJ Antitrust Division 
Assistant Attorney General, and Deborah Majoras, the Chairman o f the FTC, reflecting the institutional framework o f the 
competition enforcement in the US. See the ICN website, at
http://www.intemationaIcompetitionnetwork.org/media/Iibrary/icn_steering_group.pdf. (last visited on 2 Mat 2007)
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country’s sovereignty.*^* Thus, the major development at the multilateral level in the 
last five years has been a shift from attempts to include competition law in a binding 
agreement to the creation of mechanisms (the OECD CLF and particularly the ICN) 
which contribute to the achievement of convergence on particular issues. Given the 
complexities of the operation of competition rules at the national level, discussed in 
Chapter 2, this shift is to a certain extent reasonable, since only where such convergence 
is achieved may firmer international rules be adopted.
The recent history of multilateral cooperation/negotiations on competition shows 
that officially the EU shares this opinion. Having in fact to withdraw support for a WTO 
competition agreement, since it became clear that no consensus could be reached, the 
EU seems to have realised that at the multilateral level it had to follow the second best 
scenario, i.e. participation in alternative multilateral fora, such as the ICN, which 
produce soft law instruments. As noted above, Mario Monti was from the very 
beginning a major proponent of the ICN, and since then the Commission, and in 
particular DG Competition as DG Trade does not participate in the ICN, has been very 
active in the context of the works of this virtual organisation. The Commission co­
chairs the Cartels Working Group, and also has co-chaired the Working Group on 
Competition Advocacy.*^^ In addition, representation of the EU at the annual meetings 
of the ICN is of the highest level. For instance both Nelie Kroes and Philip Lowe (the 
Commissioner for Competition and the Director General of DG Comp respectively) 
attended the last annual meeting of the ICN in Moscow, and this is indicative of the 
importance that the EU top competition bureaucracy places on the ICN.*^ ®
6.5 Conclusion and evaluation of the role of the EU
This chapter has attempted to observe the development of multilateral talks on 
competition law and policy. It started by briefly discussing the debate initiated under the 
auspices of a number of international organisations, such as the League of Nations, 
where the issue was discussed in 1925, the proposed International Trade Organisation,
858 See Bode, M. and O. Budzinski (2005) ‘Competing Ways Towards International Antitrust: the WTO versus the ICN’, at 14.
859 See the website of the ICN at www.intenrationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
860 On the other hand, and as is relevant to the argument raised above that the trade experts’ community questions the legitimacy of 
the operation o f the ICN, it should be argued that within the EC Commission there is divergence in approaches as to the function of 
the ICN. As opposed to competition officials, trade officials o f the EU at least informally have expressed their dissatisfaction 
regarding their obligatory absence of the ICN meetings and in general the work o f the ICN. Interview with EC Commission 
Official, (Brussels 22/7/2003).
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where discussions took place in 1947, and UNCTAD, under the auspices of which the 
RBP Code was adopted in 1980. The major part of the chapter has been devoted to the 
talks on the adoption of a multilateral agreement at the WTO, with a focus on the 
development of the EU position, and the way that the US and developing countries 
reacted to this proposal. Finally, and in view of the failure of the WTO talks, the chapter 
has discussed the operation of the ICN, which is currently the most active organisation 
in this field.
As seen, the debate over the possible adoption of a multilateral agreement on 
competition law is now almost a century old. Even though no agreement has been 
concluded to date, the long history of negotiations is a clear indication that this debate is 
an active one, and that some sort of multilateral agreement should be achieved some 
time in the near future. On the other hand, the examination of the development of the 
WTO negotiations has exposed the difficult problems that have to be addressed before 
such an agreement is concluded, as well as the various exogenous and endogenous 
dynamics that develop and have an influence on the position of particular countries in 
the context of the negotiations.
For instance, it has been suggested that in the EU a network of influential 
academics and officials emerged in the early 1990s which, under the leadership of Lord 
Brittan, expressed the position that the time has come for the conclusion of a binding 
international competition agreement. On the other hand, as argued in the chapter, 
variant and sometime diverse factors led to the development of this position, and 
include the idea that the EU model of international governance should be expanded at 
an international level, the belief that a multilateral agreement on competition would 
open up foreign markets to EU firms, and finally, that the negotiations on competition 
would slow dovm the relevant talks on agriculture.
On the other side, the chapter has argued that the US and a large number of 
developing countries opposed the EU position for various and diverse reasons. For the 
US, mainly because of its traditional position that a binding agreement on competition 
would be a threat to its sovereignty and because of the belief of the superiority of the 
US competition law in relation to any other national law, a multilateral agreement on 
competition could lead to the distortion of competition standards.
Developing countries also opposed the EU proposal, first because of the wide­
spread concern that the adoption of such an agreement would undermine their need to 
foster industrial policy in order to face their dramatic economic problems, and more
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importantly develop strong enterprises that would be able to compete at the 
international level. From a similar perspective, it has been argued that the adoption and 
application of competition law is not a priority for developing and least developed 
countries, since the enforcement of such law would require the establishment of new 
institutions and the employment of qualified experts - a project arguably too expensive 
for states that suffer from poverty and a number of other socio-economic problems.
On the other hand, it has been argued that the reluctance of these states to 
proceed with the adoption of a WTO competition agreement is also linked to the 
hesitation of major industrialised countries to accept a prohibition of export cartels, 
which are exempted from their competition laws and harm the producers and consumers 
of the importing countries. In a more demanding way, the view was also expressed that 
a multilateral competition agreement should include a relevant prohibition for 
industrialised countries, while excluding from its application developing countries on 
the basis of flexibility, a notion which, along with progressivity, technical assistance, 
and capacity building, was extensively discussed in the context of negotiations at the 
WTO.
Finally, it has been suggested that the negotiations on competition law and 
policy have been influenced by the parallel negotiations on other trade issues, 
agriculture being the most directly linked. As observed, developing countries expressed 
the position that in case no further commitments would be undertaken by industrialised 
states, and in particular by the EU, on agricultural subsidies, then they would not offer 
their consent for the adoption of an agreement on competition. In fact, this quid pro quo 
nature of the WTO negotiations is an issue raised by the US with regard to the 
inappropriateness of this institution to accommodate competition provisions. It has also 
been argued that the EU put the issue of competition on the table of negotiations in 
order to slow down the talks on agriculture, in view of the demand of developing 
countries for rapid reforms. Irrespective of the validity of these arguments, the fact that 
the controversy developed in the context of the negotiations on agriculture is a clear 
indication that the extent to which competition law could be formally incorporated in 
the broader international trade system in the future will to a certain extent depend on 
agreement on various other issues.
With regard to the content of such a possible agreement, among the various 
issues that were negotiated at the WTO, only hard-core cartels were finally promoted as 
a competition-related problem that may have an effect on the operation of international
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trade. Nonetheless the notion of hard-core cartels, as in the case of the OECD 
recommendation on this issue, does not include export cartels, at least in the view of 
industrialised countries. In fact, this development reflects the concern developed mainly 
in the US and expressed by the ICPAC Report that the real effects of anticompetitive 
practices on international trade have not been properly quantified yet. According to the 
report:
\.,the level o f quantitative and empirical economic analysis concerning private 
and government anticompetitive restraints that inhibit market access still remains quite 
limited... The uneven quality o f the evidence in many specific instances is also reflected 
in the corresponding absence o f empirical analyses that determine or estimate the 
magnitude o f  the effects o f  these competition policy problems on global trade flows or 
the global economy. This very issue is itself a matter o f  debate
Apart from hard-core cartels, all the other issues that were included in the Doha 
Declaration, which as noted has been the peak of the negotiations at the WTO, relate to 
the application of core principles such as transparency, non-discrimination and 
procedural fairness in the application of competition law, the need for voluntary 
cooperation, and, most importantly, the support that has to be offered to developing 
countries in order to develop efficient competition policies. Nevertheless, even this 
minimum version of the competition agenda could not survive the negotiations, as in 
Cancun the negotiations reached a dead end.
Apart from the reasons that led to the collapse of the WTO talks, the chapter has 
also discussed the alternative multilateral solutions, and in particular the ICN. As noted 
in various parts of the chapter, the ICN is the outcome of a proposal first expressed by 
the US and supported mostly by the competition officials of a number of countries, 
including the EU. On the other hand, trade experts have been opposed to the work 
carried out by this virtual organisation. In this regard, it has been suggested that the 
interests of the particular groups that are developed in the context of multilateral talks 
on a given issue may vary considerably. This is for instance the case within the EC 
Commission, where as already noted, the preferences of DG Trade and DG Competition 
officials as to the most appropriate international organisation to host competition law 
provisions are not identical and are in fact sometimes conflicting. Trade officials are 
keen on the adoption of competition law within the WTO context, while the competition
861 See ICPAC Report, at 224-225.
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officials support the ICN and the OECD. A similar situation has been identified with 
regard to the US, where despite the long-lasting opposition by the competition officials 
to the possible adoption of WTO competition agreement, the US trade representatives 
agreed to include competition law in the Doha Declaration.
Irrespective of this development of different lobbies that have emerged in the 
process of the negotiations for a multilateral agreement on competition, the chapter has 
also identified some of the main characteristics of the ICN as a form of international 
cooperation. In particular, it has been argued that even though the issues discussed at 
the ICN are similar to these discussed at the WTO, the major difference between the 
two institutions is that while the aim of the WTO talks was (is) the adoption of a 
binding agreement, the relevant aim of the ICN is the publication of best practices and 
recommendations which do not bind the participating countries. Thus, the ICN has been 
a more expanded version of transgovemmental cooperation as this has been described in 
the context of the discussion of bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements.
In view of its non-binding nature, the amount of the work that has been carried 
out at the ICN is significant, as a great number of reports, best practices and 
recommendations have been published on issues (such as mergers and the relationship 
between competition and sectoral regulation) which did not survive the relevant 
negotiations at the WTO. Hence, a lesson that has been learnt in the context of the 
analysis of multilateral talks on competition is that there may be no formal binding 
agreement on the issue before a common understanding has been reached on the issues 
that are to be included in such an agreement. In this regard, organisations such as the 
ICN, the OECD and UNCTAD are very important for the development of a competition 
culture.
Reverting to the role that the EU has played in the field of multilateral talks on 
competition law and policy, it may be argued that recent history of these talks has 
showed that the influence of the EU - which as exposed in Chapters 4 and 5 has been 
significant in the formation and to a certain extent the application of competition law in 
the context of bilateral and plurilateral-regional trade agreements - has not been as 
influential at the international level. The EU supported for more than 10 years the 
inclusion of competition law and policy in the WTO. Nonetheless, its proposal faced 
opposition both by the US and developing countries for a number of reasons discussed 
in the chapter. Even though the official position of the EU - until the collapse of the 
negotiations in Cancun - held that the proposal for a WTO competition agreement was
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among its main aims, as the chapter has argued, in view of the opposition by a number 
of countries to the possible adoption of the agreement, the dynamics within the 
Commission changed over time with DG Competition questioning the extent to which a 
competition agreement at the WTO was a feasible project.
In parallel, it has been argued that the US came up with a more realistic proposal 
which supported the creation of a multilateral institution to serve as a forum for 
discussions on competition issues, a proposal which led to the establishment of the ICN. 
To this end, and in view of the fact that DG Competition supported the establishment of 
the ICN and actively participates in its work, it could be argued that the EU has been a 
follower rather than the leader in the development of international competition law at 
the multilateral level, the US being the clear leader.
At the same time, as observed mainly in Chapter 4, the EU, in the context of its 
enlargement strategy, has mainly shifted its interest to the adoption of bilateral trade 
agreements which in practice demands the co-signing parties to adopt and/or harmonise 
their competition regimes with its own regime. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 5, the 
EU has focused on the development of its own plurilateral system of competition, which 
has been the model followed by most of the other plurilateral agreements in the world.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion -  Main findings o f the study
7.1 General observations
This thesis has examined the process of internationalisation of competition rules 
through the analysis of different types of international agreements that include 
competition provisions. The thesis initially pointed out that competition law and policy 
co-exists with a number of other national policies which may also have an influence on 
the application of competition rules. Despite the identification of numerous factors upon 
which the particular application of competition law is dependent at national level, this 
thesis has not attempted to question the usefulness and validity of competition law and 
policy. In fact, statistics compiled for the purposes of the study show that competition 
law is a legal instrument adopted by more than half of the countries in the world, while 
most of them have adopted competition law in the last 15 years. These statistics may 
themselves answer the question regarding whether competition law is considered an 
important instrument for the regulation of business practices in economies that become 
increasingly liberalised.
On the other hand, the discussion developed in the second chapter of the thesis 
reminds us that competition rules are not a panacea, a solution for all the problems that 
may arise from the activities of private firms in the markets. In contrast, other public 
policies and sectoral regulations co-exist with competition laws on a national level and 
are employed to address the various issues related to the activity of such firms.
Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that competition policy and the co-related 
policies which deal with business activity encompass very important interests of the 
states which apply these policies, as, in view of the liberalisation of national markets, 
the role of private undertakings registered in particular states is very important for the 
economies of these states. In fact, in liberalised economies these firms have on many 
occasions replaced state monopolies in the markets previously dominated by the state. 
In turn, in view of the liberalisation of international markets, and the fact that these 
national firms have to compete in these markets, the governments of particular states 
often apply competition rules in such a fashion as to give these firms enough strength to 
be able to survive in the international competitive environment. This observation is 
particularly relevant to developing countries, which as shown in various parts of the 
thesis have questioned the need for competition policy and in any event they have 
demanded preferential application of competition rules in order to have the opportunity
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to support their domestic firms to such an extent that these firms may become 
competitive in the international markets.
The argument that competition law deals with very sensitive aspects of national 
economies is also validated by the observation made in the context of this thesis that 
extraterritorial application of competition rules is a regular phenomenon in the field of 
competition. As also noted, the most frequent user of competition rules in an 
extraterritorial manner is the US, which is the country with the most sophisticated 
competition regime in the world. Following the US example, the EU is also eager to 
use its competition rules extraterritorially, and this example has recently been followed 
by other countries.
Nonetheless, as also noted in various parts of the thesis, international problems 
need international solutions. Hence, the unilateral application of competition rules may 
temporarily provide solutions to business practices that have an anticompetitive effect 
on multiple national markets; however the increasing appearance of such practices 
dictates that some sort of international cooperation is needed in order to overcome the 
problems that stem from these practices. In addition, it has also been stressed that, in 
view of the internationalisation of business activity, the variant and sometimes 
divergent characteristics of national competition rules may create problems in the future 
if no agreement is reached as to their optimum application, or at the least as to certain 
common standards on the application of competition rules.
In this regard, it has been suggested that international law is needed in order to 
put into context the cooperation of nation states on competition law and policy. To this 
end, the thesis has examined four types of agreements: bilateral and tripartite 
enforcement cooperation agreements on competition; bilateral trade agreements that 
include competition provisions; plurilateral trade agreements which include competition 
law; and finally, it has attempted to analyse the process of negotiations that have taken 
place to date for the adoption of a multilateral agreement on competition. The following 
section briefly sums up the main arguments developed in the process of the detailed 
analysis of these agreements.
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7.2 Main findings of the study with regard to the operation of international 
agreements which are devoted to or include competition provisions
The first type of agreements discussed in the context of the present study is 
enforcement cooperation agreements. As mentioned, these agreements follow the 
relevant recommendation of the OECD, whose work has been substantial in the field of 
international competition law. The agreements do not harmonise the competition rules 
of the signing states, but do provide a number of cooperative mechanisms that aim at 
helping the signing countries to overcome problems that may arise where both 
jurisdictions review a particular business practice. As noted in the context of the 
detailed analysis of the agreements, mainly based on the agreements signed between the 
EU and the US, this type of agreement may provide valuable solutions regarding the 
cooperation of the signing countries; they nonetheless have certain limitations. These 
limitations mainly refer to the fact that they do not provide for the exchange of 
confidential information, and more importantly the fact that they are soft law 
instruments that the signing parties apply on a discretionary basis. In this regard, it has 
been suggested that the second generation of agreements, which are agreements that are 
binding on the parties and provide for exchange of confidential information, are 
welcomed.
On the other hand, in the context of the examination of the agreements, it has 
been argued that soft law is a necessity in various regulatory fields where no consensus 
has been reached as to the optimum application of the legal instrument that it regulates. 
In view of the observation made in Chapter 2 that there is not a universal common 
understanding about the optimum application of competition law and policy, the 
existence of soft law cooperation agreements, as well as other soft law instruments, such 
as the recommendations and best practices issued by the OECD and the ICN, are 
important instruments towards the development of a common understanding of these 
concepts.
Following the examination of enforcement cooperation agreements, the thesis 
moved onto the examination of bilateral trade agreements that include competition 
provisions. The main characteristic of these agreements is that they have included 
competition provisions in a very broad context of provisions that relate to trade 
liberalisation, peace and security and a number of other issues related and not related to 
competition law and policy.
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Further to this general observation, as argued in Chapter 4, there are two 
different models of such agreements. The first model, followed by agreements signed 
by the US and Canada, provide for cooperation of the signing parties on cases of mutual 
interest. In contrast to this model, bilateral trade agreements signed by the EU provide 
for the harmonisation of competition laws of the signing parties. In addition it has been 
argued that, even though no dispute settlement is provided by these agreements in case a 
conflict arises as to the application of competition rules by the signing parties, bilateral 
free trade agreements are much closer to hard law than the enforcement cooperation 
agreements.
Another important issue that has been raised in the context of the examination of 
bilateral agreements - both enforcement cooperation agreements and trade agreements 
that include competition law provisions - is that these agreements increase national 
power, in the sense that it is easier for the economically and politically stronger party to 
control and impose its preferences to their co-signing parties. As noted in various parts 
of Chapters 3 and 4, this is the reason why the US has been the prominent user of 
bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, and this is also why the EU has pursued 
the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements, mainly with neighbouring countries, that 
include competition provisions.
As opposed to bilateral agreements, plurilateral regional agreements secure a 
more balanced distribution of powers among the participating countries. As noted in 
Chapter 5 which discussed these agreements, plurilateral regional trade agreements have 
certain similarities vdth the bilateral trade agreements that include competition law 
provisions, in the sense that they include competition law and policy in the context of a 
far broader nexus of regulations.
In addition, it has been shown that, as with the relevant bilateral agreements, 
there are two main models followed by plurilateral agreements concerning competition 
law and policy. The first is the model followed by NAFTA and one agreement 
concluded by African states (SACU, and partly by SADC) which provides for 
enforcement cooperation of the contracting parties. In contrast to this model, and 
following the example of the EU, most of the other agreements reviewed in this study 
include substantive competition provisions that apply to cases where the business 
practices under consideration have an effect on the regional trade.
Further to this general observation, it has also been noted that in terms of 
institutional set up there are also two main models followed by regional agreements.
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The first model is the one developed by the EU and followed by a number of other 
similar agreements, and provides for the establishment of a supranational body to apply 
the competition rules of the trading block. Some of those agreements also have a 
regional Judicial Body established to review the decisions issued by the supranational 
body. As opposed to this institutional setting, the regional competition rules in 
MERCOSUR are applied by two intergovernmental bodies that consist of 
representatives of the governments of the states that participate in the bloc. EAC is 
another such example, as an intergovernmental body has the competence to apply the 
rules.
What nevertheless should be taken into account is that the level of development 
of competition regimes in these trading blocs varies considerably. The EU is by far the 
most developed regional bloc in the world, while most of the other regional blocs have 
only recently adopted competition rules, and most of them have not yet applied these 
rules in practice, or have not even established the institutions that should apply these 
rules.
That said, as argued in the context of the examination of plurilateral regional 
agreements, the proliferation of such agreements, and especially in view of the fact that 
the attempts to adopt a multilateral agreement on competition law have not been fruitful, 
these agreements may become of primary importance in the near future. This 
assumption is based on the argument that, following the example of the EU, a handful 
of regional blocs and not particular nation states may participate in future multilateral 
negotiations.
In fact this argument has been to a certain extent validated in the context of the 
discussion about the attempts to conclude a multilateral agreement on competition under 
the auspices of the WTO which has been developed in Chapter 6. As the chapter has 
shown, developing countries have coordinated their actions and on particular occasions 
they expressed a common position at the negotiations, representing not only particular 
groups of states, but also regional blocs such as the African Union and CARICOM.
Apart from this general observation the chapter has reviewed the history of 
negotiations at the multilateral level with regard to the adoption of a competition 
agreement. The major part of the chapter has been devoted to the examination of the 
negotiations that took place for almost 10 years under the auspices of the WTO. In 
particular the chapter has reviewed the development of the proposal put forward by the
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EU for a WTO competition agreement, and the reactions that this proposal met both by 
the US and the vast majority of developing countries.
This discussion brought to the surface a number of arguments developed in the 
context of the observations made in previous parts of the thesis. For instance, it exposed 
the traditional position of the US that the unilateral application of competition rules is 
preferable in cases where an anticompetitive practice takes place in the territory of a 
state which has no competition law in place or is unwilling to apply the law. It also 
exposed the perception prevailing among the US competition community that US law is 
superior to other national competition laws, and therefore a multilateral agreement 
would not be desirable as such an agreement could lead to the distortion of competition 
standards due to the quid pro quo nature of the WTO negotiations.
This last assumption, Avith regard to the nature of the negotiations at the WTO, 
simply restates the argument raised in various parts of the thesis that competition law 
and policy is not an end in itself. As repeatedly noted, the particular application of 
competition law and policy at a national level takes into account other important 
policies and in view of the absence of a multilateral agreement, this phenomenon is 
magnified at the international level where policies not directly linked to competition 
law, as well as the divergent policies of various countries, are found.
This has been exposed vividly in the context of the presentation of the reasons 
that led a number of developing countries to oppose the EU proposal for the adoption of 
a multilateral competition agreement at the WTO. In particular, it has been noted that 
the proposal was rejected on the basis of the fact that these countries consider industrial 
policy to be a far more important policy than competition policy, since the application 
of industrial policy may assist them in creating firms strong enough to compete in the 
international markets. In addition, it has been noted that the opposition of developing 
countries to the inclusion of competition and the other Singapore Issues in the list of the 
WTO agreements have been due to the fact that these countries have been dissatisfied 
with the process of negotiations on agriculture, which is another indication that in 
general multilateral negotiations on competition may depend upon the negotiations on 
issues not directly related to competition.
Irrespective of these arguments, the discussion on the WTO negotiations on 
competition also revealed that at least two policy networks have been developed in the 
process of the negotiations. In particular, it has been suggested that both in the EU and 
the US trade officials have been more sympathetic to the possible adoption of a
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competition agreement under the auspices of the WTO than their competition 
colleagues. This divergence in preferences has been more evident in the context of the 
work carried out at the ICN, which is dominated by competition experts and which 
excludes trade experts.
The analysis of the ICN’s work has also validated the arguments made in the 
context of the argument that in cases where there is no clear common understanding as 
to the optimum application of a legal instrument on a national level, soft law is 
employed to overcome the various problems that emerge with regard to this legal 
instrument at the international level. As regards competition law and policy in 
particular, the fact that a ‘culture o f competition ’ - that is a common understanding on 
how competition operates, what the proper economic approach is, and to what extent the 
operation of competition law and policy may have an influence on international trade - 
has not been reached has made the contribution of the ICN to the fleld of international 
competition law, through a number of recommendation and best practices, of major 
signiflcance.
7.3 The role of the EU
On the other hand, the examination of the various types of international 
agreements and the negotiations on the adoption of a multilateral competition agreement 
has provided some useful insights with regard to the central question that this thesis has 
attempted to address, i.e. the role of the competition law and policy of the EU in the 
formation and application of international agreements on competition. The main finding 
of the thesis is that, depending on each particular type of agreement, the role of the EU 
varies.
In particular, the thesis has argued that the EU policy with regard to bilateral and 
tripartite enforcement cooperation agreements is rather neutral, in the sense that the EU 
has signed agreements only with its most important partners, and has not seemed eager 
to extend this nexus of cooperation to other states. This lack of enthusiasm of the EU as 
regards signing more agreements of this kind may be attributed to the fact that the EU 
bureaucracy considers this type of semi-formal cooperation as not particularly effective, 
due to the discretionary nature of enforcement cooperation agreements. On the other 
hand, as noted, the EU tries to find ways which would allow it to conclude a second 
generation enforcement cooperation agreement with the US, and this could open up the 
way for the adoption of further agreements in the future. That said, as things stand now.
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it seems unlikely that the EU would proceed to the conclusion of more agreements of 
this type.
As opposed to enforcement cooperation agreements, the EU has invested a lot of 
resources on the negotiation and application of bilateral trade agreements which include 
competition provisions. In particular, it has been pointed out that it has used this type of 
agreement in order to expand its legal regime, including competition, to a large number 
of neighbouring countries, and to prepare the field of accession of some of these 
countries to the EU. The first such agreements have already led to the accession of 12 
countries, while in the way that the EU has been expanded in the last 50 years it would 
not be risky to argue that more countries should join the EU in the future. In addition, as 
mentioned in the context of the discussion, the EU has actively pursued the smooth 
operation of these agreements by providing significant funding to its co-signing 
countries in order to draft the laws and set up enforcement institutions.
On the other hand, it has been noted that the closer the relationship of the EU 
with its co-signing parties, the more detailed bilateral trade agreements are. This 
argument is also valid with regard to the competition provisions found in these 
agreements. As observed, the agreements signed with acceding and candidate countries, 
as well as -  to a certain extent- with Mediterranean countries, imposed the 
harmonisation of these countries’ competition rules with those of the EU. In contrast, in 
the agreements with certain ex-USSR states, the relevant wording is far looser. 
Irrespective of this observation, it is beyond doubt that the EU has played a major role 
both with the formation and application of bilateral trade agreements which include 
competition provisions.
The EU has also had an influential role with regard to the establishment (or 
drafting) of competition regimes in other plurilateral regional blocs. This thesis has 
argued that such influence, at least in terms of competition, may be attributed primarily 
to the fact that a number of blocs have to a certain extent followed the EU competition 
regime, and less so to the attempts of the EU itself to impose its regime on these blocs. 
In fact, when the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957 nobody could have expected the 
degree of influence that the newly established regional bloc would have in the field of 
international relations and international law. One of the fields where the EU has had 
such a spectacular influence is competition law and policy. The relevant chapter of this 
thesis that discussed plurilateral regional trade agreements briefly reviewed the 
competition regime of the EU and argued that this regime has to a certain extent become
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the model for the development of the competition regimes of various other regional 
blocs across the globe.
On the contrary, the discussion developed in Chapter 6 has revealed that in the 
field of multilateral competition negotiations the EU has been the follower, and the US 
the clear leader. This has been observed primarily in the context of the negotiations for a 
competition agreement in the WTO, where in the mid 1990s it took the initiative to 
pursue the inclusion of a competition agreement within the international trade system, 
but faced fierce opposition both by the US and a number of developing countries and 
eventually the collapse of the talks in Cancun. In addition the secondary role of the EU 
has also been observed with regard to the formation of the ICN, which at the moment is 
the most active international (virtual) organisation in the field of competition law and 
policy. As argued, the idea about the establishment of the ICN was in fact a creature of 
the US bureaucracy, which, when it felt that the EU was very actively pursuing the 
inclusion of competition at the WTO, proposed the creation of the ICN as a way, among 
other things, to escape a binding multilateral agreement. The EU having realised that its 
proposal for a WTO competition agreement could not survive the difficult negotiations, 
just had to follow the proposal of the US and support the, admittedly very important, 
work of the ICN.
7.4 Final remarks
Marie-Laure Djelic very accurately pictured the process of internationalisation 
of competition law:
‘The case o f  antitrust is an illustration that something we can call 
‘globalization ’ is indeed happening. But it also shows that this globalization is very 
much a process in the making, partly open ended, quite complex and messy. 
Globalization is not, far from it, a state o f things or a reality. Globalization is not ‘the 
end o f history ' -  rather it is our history in the making.
This study has attempted to observe through the lens of the EU the 
internationalisation of competition rules, mainly by analysing international norms, 
which even though not unproblematic attempt to put into context this complex and 
messy process. The major finding of the thesis with regard to the role of the EU in the 
formation and application of international competition agreements confirms Djelic’s
862 See Djelic, M-L. (2005) ‘From Local Legislation to Global Structuring Frame: The Story o f Antitrust’ 5:1 Global Social 
Policy, 55, at 71
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argument in the sense that, depending on the particular type of agreements, the 
influence of the EU varies.
The other main argument of the thesis is that, in view of the fact that 
competition law is a relatively new legal instrument, there is a considerable way to go 
before consensus is reached as to the optimum operation of competition law and policy, 
and probably even a longer way before countries agree to adopt a binding multilateral 
agreement on competition. Because as Gerber has very convincingly opined ‘only when 
international obligations created an explicit alignment o f  the interests o f  the decision­
makers did convergence achieve notable success \
863 Gerber, D. J. (1999) ‘The U.S. -  European Conflict Over the Globalisation o f Antitrust Law: A Legal Experience Perspective’ 
34:1 New England Law Review, 123, at 133.
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APPENDIX I: Economic theories applied to competition law
i. Classic theory
It was in the late 17^ century when Adam Smith published his seminal work, 
‘The Wealth of Nations’, w h e r e  the theory of the market economy was invented. 
Smith, influenced by other major scholars of this era, like Cantillon, Turgot, and Hume, 
who had already tried to explain why competition appears in markets, or put simply, 
why for instance an individual buyer wants to outbid his rivals,*^^ was the first one to 
use the concept of competition as a ‘^ general organising principle o f  the economic 
analysis and economic society”
He considered individuals as egoistic creatures with no knowledge about 
common interest or socially benefiting solutions, and described competition as a race by 
individuals which would make these individuals improve their production and force the 
price of the traded products to its 'natural level’, or to the lowering of profits to a 
minimum.*^^ It follows that Smith saw competition as a process which would restrain 
individuals from colluding on prices at the expense of society.*^* Against this natural 
tendency of individuals. Smith did not propose the establishment of a competition or 
antimonopoly policy, since on a theoretical level he actually paid no attention to 
monopolies.^^^ Nonetheless it has been suggested in the literature that Smith advocated 
for some kind of competition policy, since he proposed that in order to maintain the 
process of competition the state had to make sure that (i) external institutional 
arrangements that define property rights, would guarantee legal protection for market 
transactions, protect the freedom of choice and prohibit unfair behaviours, (ii) internal 
institutional arrangements which reduce unfair behaviour by moral rules, and (iii) he
864 Smith A. (1776) An Inquiry into flie Nature and Causes o f the Wealth ofNations (Dublin, Whitestone).
865 Budzinski O. (2003) ‘Pluralism o f Competition Policy Paradigms and the Call for Regulatory Diversity’ Philipps-University of 
Marburg Volkswirtschaftliche Beitraege No. 14/2003 <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=452900> (Last visited on 
21 May 2007).
866 McNulty P.J. (1968) ‘Economic Theory and the Meaning o f Competition’ 82:4 Quarterly o f Economics, 639, at 646-647.
867 Ibid, at 643.
868 According to one o f his most cited expressions: ‘People o f the same trade seldom meet together (...) but the conversation ends 
in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.’ See Smith, supra n 864, at 183.
869 The concept o f monopoly and its effects was first challenged somewhat 75 years after the publication o f The Wealth ofNations 
by Dionysius Lardner. See Stigler, supran. 65 , at 1
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recommended that politicians should not follow any suggestions made by 
entrepreneurs.*^®
ii. Neoclassical economics
Almost a hundred and fifty years after the emergence of the classical economic 
theory, another team of economists, including Coumot, Dupuit, Jevons, Edgeworth, 
Clark and Knight, added to Smith’s theory by attempting to incorporate scientific 
methods, and in particular mathematics, in the analysis of markets. These new scientific 
tools offered them the opportunity to observe that market prices depend on the 
subjective relative value of goods (the marginal utility) rather than on objective values 
of the factors of production included in the goods (which was the classical 
understanding).*^*
What clearly makes this theory different from the classic theory is that it 
attempts to analyse the effects of competition, rather than considering competition as the 
ordering force. In doing so, neo-classical economists created price theory and developed 
the standard models of monopoly, oligopoly, and polypoly.*^^ They further developed 
this analysis by creating the notion of perfect competition, which is the equilibrium of a 
polypolistic market. *^  ^This model is built upon two major theorems. The first indicates 
that under a situation of perfect competition, the market itself vvdll generate a Pareto- 
efficient allocation of resources. The second states that if a king plans to achieve a 
certain distribution among his subjects, this distribution may be equally achieved by the 
market mechanism, provided that he is unimpaired in distributing initial resource 
endowment.*^"*
The concept of perfect competition assumes that a large number of firms 
operate in a specific market, they produce identical products, there is lack of innovation, 
both buyers and sellers have complete information about prices, and no firm is able to 
control prices. Should perfect competition prevail, then allocative and productive 
efficiency *^  ^ will be achieved and this will bring an overall public welfare.*^^ The
870 Budzinski, supra n. 865, at 4.
871 Ibid, at pp4-5.
872 McNulty, supra n. 866, at 641.
873 Furse, M. (1996) ‘The Role of Competition Policy: A Survey’ 17:4 European Competition Law Review, 250, at 251.
874 Liesner, J. and D. Glynn (1987) ‘Does Anti-trust Make Economic Sense?’, 8:4 European Competition Law Review, 344, at 348.
875 According to one o f the most influential proponents o f the neo-classical theory, Frank Knight, allocative efficiency is : ‘the 
assignment or allocation o f the available productive forces and materials among the various lines o f  industry’, and productive
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opposite situation from perfect competition is a monopoly, where in its extreme form, 
there is a single seller in the market and many buyers. The assumption in a monopoly 
situation is that it is not impossible for other firms to enter the market and the single 
seller is therefore able to control the prices (the monopolist is a price setter).^^^ This 
model, even though it encompasses certain limitations, has been to a great extent the 
basis of most of the subsequent competition theories.
iii. Alternatives of the perfect competition model
It has been pointed out above that the model of perfect competition has certain 
limitations. A number of economists in the beginning at the 20* century found it 
impossible to explain a number of phenomena in the market which could not be 
explained under the perfect competition model. Such phenomena included the impact 
of advertising strategies in the choice of consumers, the fact that associations had 
institutionalised at the time, information exchange and other forms of cooperation in the 
market, and also the fact that there was continual industry concentration in some 
markets.*^* Edward H. Chamberlain, in his book ‘The Theory o f  Monopolistic 
Competition ’, developed two main alternatives to the neo-classical model (perfect 
competition vs. monopoly).
Monopolistic competition
The first alternative is the concept of monopolistic competition. Monopolistic 
competition indicates a market where each seller chooses the best strategy, knowing the 
strategies followed by other sellers.**® What the model of monopolistic competition 
added to the neo-classical model is the following: Whereas according to the neo­
classical model sellers have two options (either to sell at the market price or withdraw 
from it), and take industry demand as a fact, according to the monopolistic competition 
model, sellers do not take demand as a fact but they try to alter it by distinguishing their
efficiency is ‘the effective coordination of the various means o f production in each industry into such groupings as will produce the 
greatest result’. Knight F. (1933) The Economic Organisation (University of Chicago Press), at 9.
876 For a comprehensive analysis of these notions, see Scherer, F.M. and D.R. Ross (1990) Industrial Market Structure and 
Economic Performance (Houghton Mifflin, 3rd edition). Chapters 1,2.
877 Mehta, K., (1999) ‘The Economics o f Competition’, in Faull and Nikpay (eds), “ The EC Competition Law o f Competition”, 
(Oxford University Press), at paras 1.58-1.61.
878 Peritz, supra n. 4 2 , at 106.
879 Chamberlain, E.H. (1933) The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Harvard University Press), pp 55-69.
880 Smith, P. and D. Begg, (2000) Economics ( McGrow, Hill Publishing, 6th edition). C h u ter 10.
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product from other sellers’ similar products, either by offering something better for the 
same price, or by changing the buyer’s impression about the product through 
advertisement.*^*
Oligopoly
The second, and, in terms of the evolution of economic theory relevant to 
competition, more important invention of Chamberlain, is the concept of oligopoly. 
Oligopoly is a market with few sellers, selling identical products, and each recognising 
that its own price depends not only on its own output, but also on the actions and 
strategies of other important competitors.**^ Chamberlain observed that in an 
oligopolistic market, if rivals act logically, the result is the same as it would be if there 
was a monopolistic agreement between them.**  ^ His theory was based on the ability of 
firms which operate in concentrated markets to react quickly to the strategies of the 
other firms in the same market. He therefore introduced an economic logic of 
cooperation between firms to explain the lack of price competition in markets with few 
firms and by that he produced a model alternative to price competition in markets with 
many firms.**"*
iv. Workable competition and the Harvard School.
Given the shortcomings of the theory of perfect competition, and based on the 
findings of Chamberlain, J. M. Clark introduced the concept of workable competition^^^ 
According to this concept, since perfect competition is unattainable, governments 
should try to achieve the results which are closest to the perfect competition ideal.**  ^In 
order to achieve this goal, a number of factors, relating to the structure of the markets, 
conduct and performance of firms should be analysed to quantify the deviations of a 
particular industry from perfect competition.
Despite the fact that the concept of workable competition has certain limitations, 
and notably it is both difficult to select the particular criteria by which the workability 
of competition may be assessed and to weigh up whether these criteria have been
881 Peritz, supra n. 42, at 108.
882 Smith and B egg , supra n. 880, Chapter 10.
883 Stigler, G. (1964) ‘A Theory o f Oligopoly’ 72; 1 Journal o f Political Economy, 44.
884 Peritz, supra n.42, at 108.
885 Clark J.M. (1940) ‘Toward a Concept of Workable Competition’ 30:2 The American Economic Review, 241.
886 In Clark’s words, ‘.. .one may hope that government need not assume the burden of doing something about every departure 
from the model o f perfect competition’. See Clark, ibid, at. 256.
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fulfilled**^ it was the central theoretical basis in the establishment of the principles of
the Harvard Law School, which dominated the competition policy applied in the US for
more than thirty years. Despite its certain limitations, the European Court of Justice has
made explicit reference to this theory and defined the notion of workable competition. 
888
Based on the static model -  i.e. the one that examines markets using an absolute 
distinction between monopoly and perfect competition - researchers of the Harvard 
School were the first to use data gathered in relation to different markets and apply them 
to specific industries.*^^ According to their theory, market structure is the one that 
determines the conduct of the firms and consequently the performance of the market. 
Thus, the major outcome of this thinking was the creation of the Structure -  Conduct - 
Performance paradigm. Based on this paradigm, proponents of the Harvard school of 
thought suggested that high concentration in a specific market is the main, if not the 
only, determinant of barriers to e n t r y . Thé aim of any competition policy should be to 
avoid concentrated markets and high entry barriers.*^* Hence competition enforcement 
should be focused on structural remedies. As a consequence, the role of competition 
authorities and subsequently governments is very important. The theory of the Harvard 
school suggests that where the structure is wrong, then the government must intervene 
in order to change this structure. If the conduct is wrong, then the government should 
intervene by, for instance, making sure that restrictive practices must be registered.
887 Jones, A. and B. Sufrin (2004) EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press), at 14. For an early 
comment on the concept, see Sosnidc, S.H. (1958) ‘A Critique of Concepts o f Workable Competition’ 72:3 The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 380.
888 Moreover the notion o f workable competition has been used by the European Court o f Justice in the Metro case: “The powers 
conferred upon the Commission under Article [81(3)] show that the requirements for the maintenance o f workable competition may 
be reconciled with the safeguarding of objectives o f a different nature and to this certain restrictions on competition are permissible, 
provided that they are essential to the attainment o f those objectives and they do not result in the elimination o f competition for a 
substantial part o f the Common Market” . See Case 26/76 Metro SB v. Commission [1977] E.C.R. 1875, para 20.
889 Furse, supran. 873 , a t253.
890For instance, Carl Kaysan and Donald Turner, suggested that “ ...an unreasonable degree o f market power as such must be 
illegal...”: Kaysen, C. and D. Turner, (1959) Antitrust Policy (Cambridge University Press), at i l l ;  Joe Bain defined barriers to 
entry as “ ...the advantages o f established sellers in an industry over potential entrant sellers, these advantages being reflected in the 
extent to which established sellers can persistently raise prices above a competitive level without attracting new firms to enter the 
market”: Bain, J.S. (1956) Barriers to New Competition (Harvard University Press), at .3.
891 Mehta, supra n. 877, at paras 1.09-1.11.
892 Liesner and Glynn, supra n 874, at .356.
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V. The Chicago School
The proponents of the Chicago school of thought came to question the Structure 
-  Conduct - Performance paradigm by showing that the causal link between 
concentration, entry barriers and monopoly profits was not so strong and at times even 
non-existent.^^^ They thus gave a different definition of entry barriers. According to 
Stigler, entry barriers are costs that the new entrants have but the incumbents did not 
suffer, a definition obviously different from the one given by Bain.*^ "^  According to 
Chicagoans, barriers to entry could exist either because of economies of scale and 
scope, or by the intervention of governments in the market, in the form of intellectual 
property laws, state aid, import tariffs etc.*^^
Utilising the concepts of economies of scale and scope they showed that the 
causal link is not between market concentration and high profit but between firm size 
leading to increased efficiency and sometimes to increased profits. The outlining 
argument of this theoretical school was that governments should intervene in the 
markets only in cases of hard-core cartels and horizontal mergers that could either 
create monopoly directly or facilitate cartelisation by drastically reducing the number of 
remaining sellers in the market.
vi. Game theory models
These arguments by the proponents of Chicago school altered the Harvard 
Structure -  Conduct - Performance paradigm. That said, a new string of economic 
thinking, also known as new industrial economics, has returned to the basic paradigm 
but also considers the conduct and performance of the market as important in the 
evaluation of competitiveness of a market. By using game theory it is mostly focused on 
the conduct or strategic behaviour of firms in oligopolistic situations and tries to find 
whether the possibility of collusion is likely or not.^^^
893Mehta, supra n. 877, para 1.12.
894 Stigler, G. (1968) ‘Barriers to Entry, Economies of Scale and Firm Size’, in Irwin R.D. (ed) The Organisation o f Industry 
(Homewood), pp 67-70.
895 Mehta, supra n. 877, at para 1.47.
896 Posner, R. (1979) ‘The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis’ 127 University o f Pennsylvania Law Review, 925, at 928.
897 Werden, G. (2004) ‘Economic Evidence on the Existence o f Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law With Oligopoly Theory’ 71 
Antitrust Law Journal, 719; Schmalense R. (1982) ‘Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics’ 72:2 Papers and Proceedings o f  the 
Ninety-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 24; for a comment, see Jacquemin, A. (2000) ‘Theories o f 
Industrial Organisation and Competition Policy: What are the Links?’ European Commission Forward Studies Unit, Working Paper, 
2000 <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/cdp/working-paper/industrial-organisation_en.pdf> (Last visited on 21 May 2007).
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vii. Contestable markets
Another variant to perfect competition is the theory of contestable markets, 
developed in the last twenty-five years. According to William Baumol, who first 
developed the theory, a market is contestable if ^^entry is absolutely free, and exit is 
absolutely costless” The theory of contestable markets is based on the distinction 
between fixed and sunk costs that a firm has to face in its attempt to enter the market. 
Fixed cost is a cost that cannot be recouped by a firm. To give a practical example, in 
the case of an airline, a fixed cost is the amount of money paid for the advertisement of 
the routes it provides. On the other hand, an aircraft is not necessarily a fixed cost, since 
it can be sold at the second-hand market. If there is no second-hand market for 
aircrafts, an airline which wants to terminate its operations would not be able to sell the 
aircrafts, and would thus suffer, according to the contestability theory, sunk costs. The 
theory holds that if there were no sunk costs the firm would be able to enter and exit the 
market at anytime.
What the theory of contestability adds to economic thinking is that it no longer 
matters whether there are many firms in the market (as the model of perfect competition 
would suggest) in order for the market to be competitive. What matters, is the existence 
of potential competition, that is the ability of a firm to freely (i.e. without sunk costs) 
enter or exit the market. Thus, competition law and policy should not be focused on 
issues relating to price, profits and behaviour of market players, but rather examine 
whether there are sunk costs in a market and, furthermore, whether these costs can be 
eliminated or recovered. This distinction is crucial since it shifts the interest of 
Governments from the market itself to the perimeters of the market.^ ®®
Two points must be stressed with regard to the theory of contestability. The first 
is that it has been suggested in the literature that the theory lacks consistent assumptions 
and cannot be applied in real world situations.^^^ Secondly, the theory has been very 
rarely applied in competition cases.^®^
898 Baumol W.J. (1982) ‘Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure’ 72:1 The American Economic 
Review, 1.
899 Liesner and Glynn, supra n. 874, at 353
900 Ibid, at 354.
901 For a comprehensive criticism o f the theory, see Shepherd W.G. (1984) ‘Contestability vs. Competition’ 74:4 The American 
Economic Review, 572.
902 Oldale, A. (2000) ‘Contestability: The Competition Commission Decision on North Sea Helicopter Services’ 21:8 European 
Competition Law Review, 345.
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viii. Dynamic competition, innovation, and technological efficiency
Joseph Schumpeter was the first economist to systematically study the 
relationship between competition and irmovation.^®  ^ Not satisfied with the static model 
of perfect competition/^"* Schumpeter emphasised dynamic technological efficiency, as 
opposed to the Pareto or allocative efficiency of the static analysis. He argued that what 
really matters in markets is not a price mechanism, which according to neo-classical 
economists would lead to static allocative and productive efficiency, but rather the pace 
of innovation.^®^ Thus what competition policy should be aiming at is to create the 
conditions in which technological innovation could reach a maximum.
Based on this observation, he further argued that in highly competitive markets 
where many firms operate, these firms do not have the resources needed to innovate 
seriously. Instead, according to his theory a monopolist has the resources and he can 
also afford the risk of investing these resources in research and development projects. 
Thus, Schumpeter’s contribution to economic analysis of competition has been a 
breakthrough, since it opened up a new debate on the importance of innovation in 
estimating the level of competition in a market.
ix. The Austrian School
Another influential school of thought regarding the evolution of economic 
thinking on competition matters has been the Austrian School of thought.^^^ The School 
challenged neo-classical economics both in the methodological and political contexts 
and developed their theory about competition around two main arguments. The first is 
that markets should be analysed in dynamic terms. Like Schumpeter, they held that
903 Schumpeter J. (1943) Capitalism, Socialicm and Democracy (London, G. Allen & Unwin).
904 The static analysis totally ignores the time dimension, as it is looking at an equilibrium situation. It is totally concerned about 
the allocation o f resources, in the context o f fixed technology and perfect information, and therefore does not take into account the 
effect that the dissemination o f information and the product and process innovation may have in the markets. See Mehta, supra n. 
877, at paras. 1.118-1.127. These assumptions have led commentators to argue that static analysis leads to a conceptually dubious 
“Nirvana approach”. See Desmetz H. (1969) ‘Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint’ 12 The Journal o f  Law and 
Economics, 1, at .3
905 In his words, ‘The fundamental impulse that keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the 
new methods o f production and transportation, the new markets, the new forms o f  industrial organization that capitalist enterprise 
creates.’ See Schumpeter, siqira n. 903, at 82.
906 Menger is considered the father o f the Austrian School in the late 19th century. Nonetheless Fredrich Hayek has been its most 
prominent advocate.
264
what really matters is the market process and not the notion of competitive equilibrium 
on which neo-classical economics were built upon. The second central element of 
Austrian analysis is that of entrepreneurship, which was defined as the alertness of 
traders to spot opportunities in the markets, not yet spotted by rivals.^®^
Austrians and mainly Hayek developed a theory based on the process of 
discovery and thus analysed competition from a behavioural point of view.^®* The main 
question of Hayek's research was about the ‘division of knowledge’, which according to 
his work was the central aspect of economics as a social science.^^^ Hayek came to the 
conclusion that all aspects of knowledge division may be addressed by the markets 
themselves, where competition as a competitive process is the driving force of a system 
for information exchange.^*®
In sum, the Austrian School thought of competition as an active process centring 
at least as much on innovation as around price, and believed that the entrepreneurial 
quest for profits lay at the heart of the economy. Market process not only reveals 
information and knowledge about scarcities, but also it satisfies them in the best 
possible way. As a result, the role of the government should be twofold. First, to make 
sure that entrepreneurship, the market’s most important driving force, is not hampered. 
Secondly, to abstain from intervening directly in the market, as the market itself can 
create solutions that no human brain can invent.^
X. Ordoliberalism
The notion of Ordoliberalism (constitutional liberalism) played a major part in 
the development of German competition law and subsequently of EU competition 
law.^^  ^ It was developed at the University of Freiburg in the 1920s, initially by an
907 See Liesner and Glynn, supra n. 874, at 362. See also Kirzner I.M. (1997) ‘Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive 
Market Process: An Austrian Approach’ 35:1 Journal o f Economic Literature, 60.
908 On this point there is a similarity between the Austrian and the Chicago Schools.
909 Three subsequent questions have to be addressed: a) how individuals acquire knowledge that may be useful to them?; b) how is 
subjective knowledge disseminated?; and c) how is knowledge controled in order to reveal possible errors? Streit, M E. and M. 
Wohlgemuth, (1997) ‘The Market Economy and the State Hayekian and Ordoliberal Conceptions’, Max-Planck-Institut zur 
Erfoschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Diskussionbeitrag 06-97, <http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/5oumal/assets/images/Streit- 
onHayek97.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007) at 9.
910 For a detailed analysis o f these ideas see Hayek, F A. (1978) New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of 
Ideas (London, Routledge).
911 See Liesner and Glynn, supra n. 874, at 362.
912 Ibid; See also Horton T.J. and S. Schmit (2002) ‘A Tale o f Two Continents: The Coming Clash o f the Conflicting Economic 
Viewpoints in Europe and the United States’, <http://www.orrick.eom/flleupload/205.htm#_flnl> (last visited on 21 May 2007). It
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economist, Walter Eucken, and two lawyers: Franz Bohn and Hanns Grossmann- 
Doerth.^ ^^
Ordoliberals brought together law and economics in order to overcome what has 
been described by Eucken as the “great antinomy” in the history of economic 
knowledge. In the past, economists were either examining economic phenomena from a 
theoretical point of view totally ignoring facts (theoretical economics), or, on the 
opposite side, their studies were solely based on facts, totally ignoring theory (this latter 
method was used by the historical school, which dominated German academia in the 
early twentieth century).^^"* To overcome this intellectual gap Eucken called for the 
integration of legal and economic knowledge. Ordoliberals considered economic 
freedom as part of political freedom and they sought an economy composed, to the 
extent possible, of small and medium-sized companies.^^^
Several characteristics differentiate Ordoliberalism from any other economic 
school that attempted to analyse the concept of competition. The most significant of 
these characteristics is the fact that it is based on humanist values rather than efficiency 
or other purely economic concerns. The aim of the ordoliberal society as this was 
envisaged by its inventors was to search for a ‘third way’ between democracy and 
socialism, between the US “west” model and the Soviet “east” one. This model 
would create a social system where individuals would be as free as possible not only 
from political interference, but also from economic power. Competition would be the 
driving force which would secure sustained economic development and stability and 
would further control economic power, which allows infringements on the liberty of 
other people. Freedom of people in turn is regarded as the most significant precondition 
of moral behaviour.^^^ Hence, ordoliberals argued that the crucial point with regard to 
competition law is not the market itself but the existence and acts of the largest firms in 
the market. They saw the existence of such firms as a threat to economic and
is interesting to note that until the appointment of Philip Lowe, all the other General Directors o f the Directorate General for
Competition since the establishment of the EC Commission came from Germany.
913 This team was soon joined by a larger group o f (mainly) younger legal and economic scholars. See Gerber, D.J. (1994)
‘Constitutionalising the Economy; German Neo-Liberalism, Competition Law and the ‘New’ Europe’ 42 American Journal of
Comparative Law, 25, at 28-29.
914 Ibid, at 40-41.
915 Ibid, at 37.
916 Ibid, at 36.
917 Streit and Wohlgemuth, supra n. 909, at 7.
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subsequently political freedom of people and thus proposed that the actions of such 
large firms should be controlled by the state.^^*
918 Thomas and Horton, supra n. 87; See UNCATD (2005) ‘Exclusionary Anti-competitive Practices: Their Effects on Competition 
and Development’. Sipran. 1, at 101.
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APPENDIX II: General information about plurilateral re2ional asreements 
discussed in Chapter 5
This appendix is supplementary to Chapter 5 of the thesis. The appendix is 
organised geographically and sets out some general information relating to key dates, 
membership and institutions for each of the agreements discussed.
A. Europe
i. The EU
The establishment of the EU goes back to 1951, when six countries^ decided to 
enter the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In 1957 these same states 
created the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM). The aim of the EEC was the creation of a common market 
which would be achieved with the adoption of a common external tariff, the attainment 
of undistorted competition, the gradual co-ordination of the participating states’ 
economic and monetary policies, and gradual harmonisation of their fiscal and social 
policies.^^® The EEC and ERATOM Treaties were merged in 1965, when the European 
Community was created.
The bloc has been built around four main institutions,^^^ Two bodies have 
predominantly legislative functions: the Council of Ministers, which consists of 
governmental representatives of the Member States, and the European Parliament, 
which consists of members elected by the citizens of the Member States. The other 
institutions are: the European Court of Justice, which is the judicial body with the 
competence to decide upon cases based on EU law,^^  ^ and the European Commission, 
which is the administrative body of the EU, with some quasi-judicial and legislative 
powers.
919 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands.
920 See Articles A2 and A3 EC.
921 On the complex legislative procedure in the EU as it stands today, see Craig and De Burca supra n. 548, at 139-149. See also 
Tsebelis, G. and G. Garrett (2001) ‘The Institutional Foundations o f Intergovemmentalism and Supranational ism in the European 
Union’, 55:2 International Organisation, 357. The structure o f the Union, the competences o f its Institutions, the decision 
procedures, and the relationship between the EU and its Member-States, will be discussed in this study only to the extent that these 
arrangements directly relate to competition law and policy.
922 Since 1989 various competences of the ECJ have been transferred to the Court o f First Instance (CFl), while in 2004, the Civil 
Service Tribunal was established, with the competence to examhe case relating to the civil service. See Article 225» EC.
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In the early years of its existence, the pace of cooperation and coordination in 
the EU was slow. In particular, the 1960s were characterised by tensions between the 
European Commission and the French Government, led by the French President, 
Charles De Gaulle, which advocated that all the decisions at the European level should 
be taken following a unanimous decision by the Member States,^^^ thus slowing down 
law-making and heading to what is called  ^euroschlerosis'
In the 1970s and 1980s the EU was significantly enlarged. The 6 initial Member 
States had become 10 by 1986, with the gradual accession of Denmark, Ireland, the UK, 
Greece, Spain and Portugal. In 1986 the Single European Act (SEA), the first major 
amendment of the Treaty of Rome, was signed. The SEA provided for a number of 
important substantive and institutional changes in the EU system.^^^ It reactivated the 
original ambition of creating a single internal market, where the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital should be ensured, by the end of 1992.
The second major amendment of the initial EC Treaty was the Treaty of 
Maastricht, signed in 1992, which established the European Union, and thus is called 
the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). The TEU provided for the establishment of an 
economic and monetary union (EMU), and also introduced the three-pillar structure of 
the Union. Apart from the Economic Communities Pillar, which was included in the 
strategy of the EU since its conception, the Common Foreign and Security Policy Pillar 
and the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar were set up.^^^
The Treaties of Amsterdam of 1997 and Nice of 2000, further expanded and 
deepened the cooperation between the Member States in the fields of security and 
defence, and judicial affairs, and also provided for changes in the judicial system and 
decision making.^^^ In parallel, in the last 20 years, the number of member States of the 
EU has been more than doubled. The first and small waive of enlargement occurred in 
1995, when Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU. In addition, on May 1 of 2004,
923 Known as the Luxembourg accords See Craig and De Burca, supra n. 548, atppl3-14.
924 See Sloot, T., and P. Verschuren (1990) ‘Decision -  Making Speed in the European Community’ 29:1 Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, 75.
925 For a brief review o f the amendments, see Campbell, A. (1986) ‘The Single European Act and its Implications’ 35:4 The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 932.
926 As to the former it included issues o f foreign and security policy and enabled the Council to define common positions that 
should be followed by the Member States. As to the later, it provided for cooperation on judicial and police issues as well as on 
international criminal matters. See Craig and De Burca, supra n. 548, at pp. 25-26
927 For a brief review, see Ibid, at 28-52.
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another 10 countries joined the and on January 1®^ of 2007, Bulgaria and
Romania finally entered the Union, increasing the number of the EU states to 27, thus 
creating a Union with a population of more than 450 million habitants. 15 of the 
Member States use the euro as their common currency,^^^ and in view of all these 
developments, the European Union has become a phenomenon unique in history.
B. South America
i. The Andean Communitv
In 1969, five of the LAFTA members, namely Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru 
and Chile, signed the Cartagena Agreement, which set up the Andean Pact, a sub­
regional organisation with its own distinct legal identity^^® with the aim of creating a 
customs union.^^^ Venezuela entered the group in 1973, while Chile withdrew in 
\916P^ While the institutions provided by the agreement were established,^^^ 
developments over the creation of a customs union in this region were very slow in the 
1970s, while in the 1980 negotiations were totally stagnant.^^"^
The institutional set up of the Andean Community was restructured in 1987 with 
the Protocol of Quito, which largely followed the structure of the European Union.^^^ 
Economic integration gained momentum in the 1990’s when intraregional trade was 
substantially increased, partly due to the achievement in 1993 of a free trade area for the
928 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
929 These include the states that entered the EU before 2000, with the exemption of Denmark, Sweden and the UK. Slovenia uses 
the common currency as from January 1st o f 2007, and Cyprus and Malta as from 1st January 2008.
930 As stated in article 48 o f the Cartagena Agreement.
931 See Avory, W.P. (1972) ‘Sub-Regional Integration in Latin America: The Andean Common Market’, 11:2 Journal o f Common 
Market Studies, 85.
932 For a brief history o f the Andean Community, see the Community’s website at
<http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/quienes/brief.htm>.
933 These institutions are the following: the General Secretariat, which is the executive body o f the Andean Community and has the 
competence to initiate the legislative process, by formulating legislative proposals; legislation is adopted by the Council of 
Ministers, whose membership varies, in accordance with the subject; and finally the Andean Community Court o f Justice (set up in 
1969) is the regional judicial institution of the agreement. See Ferreira R.M. (2005) ‘Regional Cooperation Agreement and 
Competition Policy -  The Case o f Andean Community’, in M. Mashayekhi, and T. Ito (eds) Multilateralism and Regionalism: The 
New Interface (UNCTAD, Geneva and New York), chapter 11, at 145.
934 See the website o f Andean comminity, supra n. 932.
935 Two supranational bodies, the General Secretariat and the Commission, were offered executive and rule making powers 
(respectively), while on the top of the administrative hierarchy are the Presidential Council and the Council o f Foreign Ministers. 
The Andean Court o f Justice is the competent Court to review cases relating to the regional legislation. See Malamud, A. (2001) 
‘Spillover in European and South American Integration: An Assessment.’ LAS A 2001 Meeting Paper, Latin American Studies 
Association, <http://136.142.158.105/Lasa2001/MalamudAndres.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 11-13.
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four out of five Member States (excepting Peru), the establishment of a common 
external tariff in 1995,^^  ^but also because of a number of pieces of common legislation 
that ’was adopted at the time in a number of fields, such as agriculture, investment, 
intellectual property and competition.^^^
Regional integration was slowed down in 2000 due to political and economic problems 
faced by the Member States, but it regained momentum in 2003.^^^ The free trade area 
was completed in January 2006, when Peru fulfilled the relevant obligations. Bolivia 
and Peru have not yet implemented the common external tariff; nonetheless, 
considerable recent attempts to strengthen further integration have been made. That 
said, in June 2006 Venezuela left the agreement and joined the rival regional grouping, 
MERCOSUR.
ii. MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR was established in 1989 by the Treaty of Asuncion.^^^ The driving 
force behind the adoption of the MERCOSUR agreement was similar to that of the 
establishment of the EU: the hope of limiting the possibilities of traditional military 
hostility between the major regional powers, Brazil and Argentina.^"^® The founding 
members of the agreement were Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. As noted, 
Venezuela also entered MERCOSUR recently, while in the 1990s, Bolivia and Chile 
became associate members. MERCOSUR’s initial aim was to create a customs union 
and a common market based on four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital).
In terms of institutional set up, MERCOSUR is an intergovernmental and not a 
supranational organisation, in the sense that it has an administrative secretariat but its 
competences are limited in comparison to the competences of the EC institutions. The 
Council of the Common Market^ "^  ^ resembles to the Council of Ministers and the
936 Bacquero Herrera, M. (2004) ‘The Andean Community: Finding her Feet within Changing and Challenging Multidimensional 
Conditions’ 10 Law and Business Review o f the Americas, 577, at 583.
937 See Commission (EC) (2007) ‘Andean Community Regional Strategy Paper 2007-1013’, 12.04.2007 (E/2007/678), at 3-4.
938 Ibid.
939 Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic o f  Brazil, the Republic of 
Paraguay and the Eastern Republic o f Uruguay, <http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
940 World Bank (2005) Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism and Development (Wodd Bank), at p. 36
941 Which consist o f the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Economy and the Meetings o f the Heads o f States. In addition there are 
Meeting of the Ministers o f Agriculture and Industry, Justice, and Internal and Social Affairs.
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European Council of the EU T r e a t y a n d  the Common Market Group, which consists 
of four officials (and four deputies) from each member state Ministry of Foreign 
Relations, Ministry of the Economy and Central Bank, is the main executive body of the 
institution, and also has the competence to conduct international negotiations based on 
the guidelines provided by the Council.^"^^
The initial seven years of the operation of MERCOSUR were a great success, as 
trade and investment between Brazil and Argentina was quadrupled, and MERCOSUR 
became the third largest trade-bloc in the world, after the EU and NAFTA.^ "^ "^  
Nonetheless, subsequent crises in the economies of Brazil and Argentina had an impact 
on the smaller and dependent economies of Paraguay and Uruguay, and thus created 
major problems for the successful operation of MERCOSUR. This period was 
characterised by the regular use of trade protectionist measures by the participating 
countries, whose main aim was to resolve their domestic problems, and thus the 
negotiations were postponed for further regional integration.^"^^
In general MERCOSUR has achieved many of its initial objectives, but is still 
quite far from achieving the common market goal. The CU currently applies to 90% of 
products; nevertheless MERCOSUR members still use the safety clause and temporarily 
impose high customs tariffs on selected products like cars, electronic equipment and 
chemicals.^"^  ^ In addition, there are no common market regulations in the agricultural 
sector, and regarding the four freedoms, improvement has been achieved only in 
relation to the free movement of goods.^ "^  ^ Finally, it should be pointed out that the 
dispute settlement system of the bloc has not proved to be effective.^"**
942 See Vervaele, J. AE (2005) ‘MERCOSUR and Regional Integration in Latin America’ 54 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 387, at 391. For a detailed analysis o f the institutional set up o f MERCOSUR, see Porrata Doria R.A. Jr. (2004) 
‘MERCOSUR; The Common Market o f the Twenty First Century?’ 32 Georgia Journal o f International and Comparative Law, I, at 
pp. 14-24.
943 See in detail, Bouzas, R. and H. Soltz (2001) ‘Institutions and Regional Integrations: The Case o f MERCOSUR’ in Bulmer- 
Thomas, V. (ed.). Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean (London, Institute o f Latin American Studies, 
University of London).
944 See Porrata Doria, supra n. 942, at 48.
945 Ibid, at 57.
946 See Vervaele supran. 942, at 396.
947 See Vervaele supran. 942, at 398
948 See Porrate Doria, supra n. 942, at 61-64.
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c .  North America
i. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
NAFTA, which was concluded by Canada, Mexico and the US, entered into 
force in It has been argued that two main developments led to the formation of
NAFTA. First, the decision by the US Government in the mid-1980s to pursue the 
adoption of preferential trading agreements as a complementary mechanism to the 
multilateral trade liberalisation, and second the decision of the Mexican government at 
the same time to liberalise Mexican external trade by removing quantitative restrictions, 
and gradually eliminating tariffs.^^®
According to NAFTA, within a period of 14 years the signing parties have to 
gradually eliminate tariffs imposed on goods imported from another signing party. The 
agreement includes detailed provisions relating to agricultural products, which are 
excluded from the provisions on tariff elimination. It also provides for the WTO 
compatible use of anti dumping and countervailing duty measures.^^* NAFTA 
furthermore includes rules relating to investment, labour, intellectual property rights, 
financial services, telecommunications and public procurement and detailed rules of 
origin. The agreement has been complemented by the North American Agreement for 
Environmental Cooperation,^^^ and the North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation.^^^
It should be noted that none of the contracting parties entered the negotiations 
with the intention to create a political and social union. A political union would be in 
conflict with traditional belief in the US that such a union would considerably 
undermine the country’s political autonomy. Canadian and Mexican governments were 
also concerned with the possible imbalances that could occur due to the bargaining 
power of the Such considerations had various implications. First they had an
impact on the type of the agreement, which took the form of a free trade agreement and
949 North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 December 1992, Canada-Mexico-United States, 3 2 1.L.M. 289.
950 See Krueger (2000), supra n. 507, 761-763.
951 Canada unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the possible abolishment o f antidumping measures. See Hoekman, B. (1998) 
‘Free Trade and Deep Integration: Antidumping and Antitrust in Regional Agreements’ World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 1950, at pp. 27-28.
952 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 8 September 1993, Canada-Mexico-United States, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
953 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 14 September 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499.
954 Abbott, F.M. (2000) ‘NAFTA and the Legalisation o f World Politics: A Case Study’ 54:3 International Organization, 519, at 
522.
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not a customs union. Second, they had an impact on the institutional set up provided by 
the Agreement, since NAFTA does not provide for a supranational body to enforce its 
provisions. This role has been granted to the Free Trade Commission, which consists of 
government representatives'^^ whose role is nevertheless strictly supervisory as it does 
not have the competence to adopt secondary legislation. Third, despite the fact that 
NAFTA’s provisions are characterised by a high degree of precision and obligation, the 
parties were not willing to create a strong regional judicial institution similar to the ECJ. 
Instead, a moderate level of authority was granted to a dispute settlement mechanism.^^^
ii. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA)
Of the various regional projects in South and North America, the most ambitious 
one has been the negotiations over a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTTA), 
launched in 1994. With the exception of Cuba, all countries in the Americas participated 
in the negotiations whose initial aim was the adoption of a very detailed free trade 
agreement and a free trade area by January 2005. Nine FTAA Negotiating Groups were 
created in the following areas: market access; investment; services; government 
procurement; dispute settlement; agriculture; intellectual property rights; subsidies, 
antidumping and countervailing duties; and competition policy. The aim of the FTAA 
project is to integrate the countries which participate in smaller regional blocs in North 
and South America (such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, and 
CARICOM), and in this regard it includes elements from all these blocs.^^^
That said, and despite the early optimism regarding the progress of the 
negotiations, a number of concerns raised primarily by Brazil^^* and other members of 
MERCOSUR,^^^ relating mainly to agricultural liberalisation, the use of anti-dumping
955 The Commission is assisted by a Secretariat See NAFTA, article 2002.
956 See Mestral A.L.C. de (2006) ‘NAFTA Dispute Settlement; Creative Experiment or Confusion?’, in Bartels, L and Ortino, F. 
(eds.) Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal system (Oxford University Press), and Abbot, supra n. 954.
957 Smith, S.C. (2006) ‘The Free Trade Agreement o f the Americas: Is There Still a Place for the World Trade Organisation’ 13 
Tulsa Journal o f Intematicnal and Comparative Law, 321, at 334.
958 See De Moura, A. Borges (2004) ‘The Brazilian Perspective o f flie FTAA’ 10 Law and Business Review o f the Americas, 695.
959 In Particular, in El Salvador in June 2003, these countries announced their decision to follow a three-track approach with regard 
to the issues under negotiation in the context o f the FTAA. According to this view, certain issues would be dealt with at the 
multilateral level (agricultural subsidies, trade remedy disciplines, and a number o f other issues that MERCOSUR was not eager to 
negotiate such as investment, aspects o f services, intellectual property rights, competition policy and government procurement), the 
remaining issues at the FTAA level, and the market access negotiations on tariffs, agriculture and services would be addressed 
through a bilateral track. See Stephenson, S.M. and G.C. Hufbauer (2004) ‘The Free Trade Area o f the Americas: How Deep an
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measures, and intellectual property r i g h t s , l e d  to the Ministerial Declaration, issued in 
November 2003 in Miami,^^^ according to which particular countries may opt out from 
a number of areas, such as intellectual property, anti-dumping, agricultural subsidies, 
investment, and competition.^^^ Aside from this development, negotiations have slowed 
down and the goal of free trade area in 2005 has been postponed, and in general the 
future of the FTAA is in serious jeopardy, especially in view of the undergoing 
negotiations between the Member States of Mercosur and the Andean Community on 
the establishment of a new free trade agreement, the South American Community of 
Nations.^ ^^
iii. Central American Free Trade Agreement, plus Dominican Republic (CAFTA -DR)
The most recent free trade agreement in the region is the Central American Free 
Trade Agreement, signed in 2004,^ "^^  is designed to eliminate tariffs between the US and 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, plus the Dominican 
Republic. It is argued that the major proponents of the agreements were US clothing 
manufacturers, many of whom have been shifting their factories to Central America.^^^ 
At the same time. Central American States were eager to enter such an agreement in 
order to ensure preferential treatment from the US on the trade in textiles, compared to 
textiles from China.^^^ The agreement also includes provisions on government 
procurement, services, investments and intellectual property rights, and has been 
implemented by the US on a rolling basis, as countries make sufficient progress to meet
Integration in the Western Hemisphere?’ <http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2005/0107_I015_1402.pdC>, (last visited on 
21 May 2007), at 34.
960 See Rivas-Campo, J.A. and R. Tiago Juk Benke (2003) ‘FTAA Negotiations: Short Overview’ 6:3 Journal o f International 
Economic Law, 661, especially in pp. 667-669.
961 FTAA (2003) ‘Free Trade Area o f the Americas Eighth Ministerial Meeting Miami, USA, November 20, 2003, Ministerial 
Declaration’, <http://www.ftaa-alca.org/Ministerials/Miami/Miami_e.asp> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
962 Ibid, in para 10.
963 See the Presidential Declaration and Priority Agenda, issued at the First Meeting of Heads o f State of the South American 
Community o f  Nations, Brasilia, 30 September 2005, <http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/documentos/documents/ 
casa_2005_4.htm> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
964 The Dominican Republic -  Central America -  United States Free Trade Agreement, Signed in August 5, 2004, 
<http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_ lndex.html> (last visited on 21 May 
2007)
965 Dimon, D. (2006) ‘EU and US Regionalism: The Case o f Latin America’ XX:2 The International Trade Journal, 185, at 207- 
208.
966 ibid
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the commitments imposed by the agreement.^^^ On the other hand, it should be pointed 
out that the conclusion of CAFTA -D R has created major concerns both in the US, 
where the agreement was passed by the Congress on a two vote margin,^^* as well as in
Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador.^^^
D. Caribbean
i. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
CARICOM, was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, signed on 4 July 
1973, and revised in 2001. It consists of 15 Member States,^^® most of which are small 
islands, and with the exception of Haiti and Suriname, former British colonies.^^* The 
objectives of CARICOM, identified in Article 6 of the Revised Treaty, are wide 
raging,^^^ while the Revised Treaty also provides for the right of establishment, free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital. In terms of trade, the aim of the 
contracting Parties was to create a CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) by 
December 2005. The Single Market was finally established in 2006, and is based on 
freedom of movement of goods, services, capital, business enterprise and labour within 
an area bounded by a customs union.^^^ Currently 12 Member States participate in the 
Single Market, which is expected to be fully implemented in 2008.
967 See analytically the export portal o f the US Government, at <http://www.export.gov/fta/complete/CAFTA/ 
index.asp?dName=CAFTA> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
968 The major concerns were raised by organised labour, the sugar industry and certain textile associations. See Balsanek, K.L., R. 
E. DePrancesco, M. A. Frank, D. T. Hardin, and M. R. Nicely (2006) ‘International Legal Development in Review: 2005 Business 
Regulation’ 40 International Lawyer, 217, at 244.
969 In fact there have been public protests in these countries, while Costa Rica has not yet ratified the Treaty. See Malkin, E. (2006) 
‘Central American Trade Deal Is Being D elved by Partners’, New York Tines, March 2,2006.
970 The Members are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
971 The total population o f the Member States is 14 millions, while most o f the CARICOM Member States have a population that 
does not exceed three hundred thousand inhabitants.
972 And include, improvement of standards o f living and work, achievement o f full employment o f labour and other factors of 
production, acceleration, and coordination of sustained economic development and convergence, expansion of trade and economic 
relations with third States, achievement o f enhanced levels o f international competitiveness, organisation for increased production 
and productivity, achievement of a greater measure o f economic leverage and effectiveness o f Member States in dealing with third 
States, groups o f States and entities o f any description, and the enhanced co-ordination o f Member States’ foreign and foreign 
economic policies and enhanced functional co-operation.
973 See Girvan, N. (2007) ‘Towards a Single Development Vision and the Role o f the Single Economy’ 
<http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/single_econonty_^irvan.pdC> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 8.
974 See SICE (2007) ‘Establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy: Summary o f  Status o f Key Elements’. 
<http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CAR/csme_summary_key_elements_e.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2008).
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In terms of institutional set up, the revised Treaty of Ghaguaramas, provides for 
the operation of a plethora of institutions, mainly intergovernmental.^^^ According to the 
Treaty, the principal organs of CARICOM are the Conference of Heads of Government 
and the Community Council of Ministers.^^^ The former, which consists of the Member 
States’ Heads of Governments, is the legislative organ of the organisation with the 
competence to provide policy direction, enter into treaties, establish the institutions of 
CARICOM, and take decisions regarding the financial affairs of the C o m m u n i t y T h e  
Community Council of Ministers is responsible for the Community’s strategy planning 
and the coordination of the three pillars of the Community -  economic integration, 
functional cooperation and external relations.^^* These two institutions are assisted by 
four functional organs, provided by Article 10(2) of the Revised Treaty. These include 
the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAD), the Council for Trade and Economic 
Development (COTED), the Council for Foreign and Community Relations 
(COFCOR), and the Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD),^^^ and 
several other bodies.
The main supranational administrative institution of CARICOM is the 
Secretariat, which has powers similar, but not equal, to the European Commission, as it 
does not have the competence to propose or adopt legislation, and it operates as a 
resource rather than an enforcing organisation.^*® Finally, in April 2005 the Caribbean 
Court of Justice was set up to serve both as the Court with competence to decide upon 
issues relating to the provisions of the Revised Treaty,®*  ^and as the court of final appeal 
for the Member States’ domestic, civil and criminal matters. These extended 
competences of the Court are expected to lead to a harmonious development of 
jurisprudence in the region and thus assist the accomplishment of CARICOM’s goals.^*^
975 See in detail, Bravo, K.E. (2005) ‘CARICOM, The Myth o f Sovereignty, and Inspirational Economic Integration’, 31 North 
Carolina Journal o f International Law and Commercial Regulatiai, 145, at 178-192.
976 See the Revised Treaty o f Chuagmamas, in Art 10(1).
977Ibid, art. 11 and 12.
978 Ibid, art. 13.
979 See also id. art. 14-17.
980 Bravo, supra n. 975, at 187.
981 Article 211 of the Revised Treaty.
982 For recent analysis o f the function and possible problems that the newly established Court may face, see McDonald, S.A.
(2004) ‘The Caribbean Court o f Justice: Enhancing the Role of International Organisations’, 27 Fordham International Law Journal, 
930; Birbsong, L. (2005) ‘The Formation of The Caribbean Court o f Justice: The Sunset o f the British Colonial Rule in the English 
Speaking Caribbean’, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, 197.
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E. Africa
i. The West African Economic and Monetary Union TWAEMU)
The Treaty establishing WAEMU was signed in January 1994 by seven 
countries^*^ which shared the same currency, the CFA Franc since 1960, through the 
West African Monetary Union (WAMU).^^"  ^ It has been suggested that the underlying 
reason for the creation and strengthening of the regional bloc was the devaluation of the 
CFA franc by 50 percent in 1994. The contracting parties felt that they had to 
supplement the monetary union with a customs union and a common market.^*^
The EU model has been followed by WAEMU. In particular, the aim of the bloc 
is to achieve a single market based on the free movement of goods, persons, services, 
and capital. The similarities of the WAEMU system with the EU is further exposed by 
the fact that there are four main regional institutions established, in accordance with the 
EU system: a Conference of Heads of States, a Council of Ministers, a Commission, a 
Court of Justice and an inter-parliamentary Committee.^*^ As a general statement 
regarding the development of WAEMU, it could be argued that it has succeeded in the 
elimination of internal tariffs and its Member States apply a common external tariff 
since 2000. Nonetheless, there are still substantial obstacles both regarding internal 
trade and deviations from the common external tariffs.^*^
ii. The East Afncan Community fEAC)
The East African Community encompasses three African States, namely Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanzania. Initially, the EAC agreement was signed in 1967, but it collapsed
983 Traite de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) < http://www.uemoa.int/actes/traite/TraiteUEMOA.pdf> (last 
visited : 21 May 2007). The Member States o f WAEMU are ; Benin, Buricina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. 
984See Claeys, A S. and A. Sindzingre (2003), ‘Regional Integration as a Transfer of Rules: ‘The Case o f the Relationship between 
the European Union and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)’, paper presented at the Development Studies 
Association Annual Conference, Glasgow, University o f Strathclyde, 10-12 September 2003, 
<http://www.devstud.org.uk/publications/pq)ers/conf03/dsaconf03claeys.pdfr>, (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 7-8. In 1997, 
Guinea Bissau joined the Union. All the eight members o f WAEMU are also members o f a larger group o f 15 countries called the 
Economic Community o f West African States (ECOWAS), discussed below.
985 Van de Boogaerde, P. and C. Tsangarides (2005) ‘Ten Years After the CFA Franc Devaluation: Progress Toward Regional 
Integration in the WAEMU’, IMF Working Paper, WP/05/145, at 3-5.
986 Clayes and Sindzingre (2003), supra n. 984, at p 10.
987 Hinkle, L.E. and M. Schiff (2004) ‘Economic Partnership Agreements Between Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU: A 
Development Perspective.’ 27:9 The World Economy, 1321, at 1325.
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ten years later.^^* It was revived in 1999 under the Treaty of East African Co-operation, 
which was signed in Arusha. Since January 2005, the Community operates as a 
customs union,^*^ and currently Burundi and Rwanda are negotiating their accession in 
EAC. According to the Treaty establishing EAC, the Member States further aim to 
create a common market and a monetary Union. The general aims of the Treaty are 
further specified by a five-year Development Strategy, which identifies twelve areas of 
cooperation, including social and trade policy.^^®
With regard to trade remedies, and on the basis of Article 75 of the Treaty, the 
protocol which establishes the Customs Union, adopted in 2004, contains a number of 
provisions addressing issues related to antidumping, countervailing duties and safeguard 
measures.^^^ These provisions do not abolish these trade measures; nonetheless, they 
provide that the Member States will cooperate with other Member States and the 
regional institutions in the process of investigation relating to these measures.^^^
In terms of institutional set up, the basic structure of EAC is very similar to the 
structure of the EU. The main institutions provided by the Treaty are the Assembly, 
which is the legislative organ of the Community, the Council of Ministers, which has 
the competence to take the political decisions as to the development of the Community 
and to adopt secondary legislation (regulations, directives and decisions), the EAC 
Court of Justice, and the Secretariat, a supranational organisation which has the 
responsibility to implement the articles of the Treaty, as well as regulations and 
directives adopted by the Council.^^^
988 See Mugomba, A T. (1978) ‘Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The Collapse o f the East African 
Community’ 16:2 The Journal o f Modem African Studies, 261; Kirkpatrick, C. and M. Watanabe (2005) ‘Regional Trade in Sub- 
Saharan Africa: An Analysis o f East African Trade Cooperation 1970-2001’ 73:2 The Manchester Sdiool, 141.
989 See Me Intyre, M.A. (2005) ‘Trade Integration in East African Community: An Assessment for Kenya’, IMF Working Paper, 
05/143, at 9-12.
990 See EAC (2001) ‘The Second East African Community Strategy Paper’, <http://www.eac.int/documents/Development% 
20Strategy.pdf>, (last visited on 21 May 2007), paragraph (ix).
991 See Articles 16-19 o f the Protocol on the Establishment o f the East African Customs Union.
992 The protocol also provides for the establishment of an intergovernmental Committee on trade remedies (in Article 24) and 
relevant Dispute Settlement procedure (Article 41) to resolve disputes that may arise relevant to these trade remedies, the See 
Mullei, A.K. (2005) ‘Integration Experience of East African Countries’, Presentation delivered at the Symposium Marking the 30th 
Anniversary o f Banco de Mozambique, Maputo, Mozambique, May 17 2005, 
<http://www.centralbank.go.ke/downloads/gov_speeches/Mozambique-paper.pdP> (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 10-14.
993 See the website o f EAC, athtq)://www.eac.inl/institutions.htm.
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iii. The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)
The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was 
established by a Treaty signed on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda and ratified a 
year later in Lilongwe, Malawi. COMESA was formed in order to replace the former 
Preferential Trade Area (FTA) which had been in existence since 1982,^ "^^  and is one of 
the largest regional blocs in Africa, as it includes 20 Member States,^^^ covers 42.6% of 
total African surface, and accounts for 44.6% of the total population of the continent 
and 32% of the total GDP.^^^At the same time COMESA’s Member States are 
characterised by strong differences in their economic and social backgrounds, while the 
region in general is characterised by low growth rates, political instability and is 
severely economically affected by the spread of HIV, as well as by volatile international 
agricultural prices.^^^
The Treaty provides for the creation of a free trade area, a customs union, and 
the gradual creation of a monetary Union. On the other hand, antidumping measures and 
countervailing duties are not abolished by the Treaty. Nonetheless, it is provided that in 
cases of investigation about dumping and subsidies, the Member States have to 
cooperate.^^^ The Free Trade Area was launched in 2000, with 11 out of the 20 Member 
States participating while the other nine trade on preferential terms. The aim of 
COMESA’s Member States is to form a fully fledged customs union by 2008.^^^
With regard to the institutional set up of the group, the Treaty provides for the 
operation of four organs with decisions making powers. These include the COMESA 
Authority, which consists of the Heads of Governments of the Member States, the 
COMESA Council of Ministers, the Committee of Governors of Central Banks, and the 
regional Court of Justice (operational since 1998).^^®° Hence, as in the case of a number 
of Afncan regional blocs, the institutional set up of COMESA is similar to the EU one.
994 See P. Khandelwal, supra n. 501, at 8.
995 COMESA’s member countries are: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, D.R.Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
996 See Carmignani, F. (2005) ‘The Road to Regional Integration in Africa: Macroeconomic Convergence and Performance in 
COMESA’ 15:2 Joumal o f African Economies, 212, at 213.
997 Ibid, at 213-218.
998 See Articles 51-54 o f the COMESA Treaty.
999 See COMESA’s website at http://www.comesa.int/about/Overview/view.
1000 See Chapters 4 and 5 o f the COMESA Treaty, Articles 7-44.
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iv. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
The Southern African Customs Union includes five Member States: South 
Africa, which is economically, and politically the major force in the region; Botswana; 
Lesotho; Namibia; and Swaziland (called the BLNS countries). The agreement was first 
signed in 1910, and provided for free movement of manufactured goods, a common 
external tariff and a revenue sharing formula. Since then, the agreement has been 
amended twice, first in 1969, and more recently in 2002. Today, SACU operates as a 
full customs union.
In terms of institutional set up, the main institutions of SACU are the Council of 
Ministers, which has legislative powers, and the Commission, which is a supranational 
body responsible for the implementation of the provisions of the agreement, as well as 
the decisions of the C o u n c i l . T h e  new SACU agreement also provides for the 
creation of an ad hoc tribunal to decide upon any dispute that may arise with regard to 
the application of the agreements’ provisions. The tribunal is to be set at the request of 
the Council and will be composed of three m e m b e r s . T h e  Tribunal is not yet 
operational, and efforts are under way currently to bring it into operation by August 
2008.^ ®^"^
SACU is characterised by the high level of dependence of the smaller SACU 
member countries on South Africa, which accounts for 90% of total SACU GDP. In 
addition, as a result of the most recent amendment of the agreement, it has assumed 
absolute discretion over external trade policy, and in particular decisions on anti­
dumping, safeguard measures and countervailing duties that should be applied to non­
members of the agreement. Compared to the 1969 agreement, the new SACU 
agreement provides for the establishment of supranational bodies to review the 
application of such trade measures.
1001 Gibb, R. (1997) ‘Regional Integration in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: The Case o f Renegotiating the Southern African 
Customs Union’, 23:1, Joumal o f Southern African Studies, 67, at 73-75.
1002 On the operation and problems faced in SACU, see Kirk, R. and M. Stem (2005) ‘The New Southern African Customs Union 
Agreement’ 28:2 The World Economy, 169.
1003 See Article 13 o f the SACU agreement.
1004See Mandigora, G. (2007) ‘Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Bilateral and Regional Trade Arrangements’, Tralac discussion 
paper, <http://rta.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=6130> (last visited on 21 May 2007).
1005 See Kirk and Stem, supra n. 1002, at 169-175.
1006 See Joubert, N. (2004) ‘The Reform of South Africa’s Anti-Dumping Regime’ WTO, managing the Challenges o f WTO 
Participation, Case Study No 38.
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V . The Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC)
The Southern African Development Cooperation was created in 1992, when 
eleven countries signed the Declaration and Treaty establishing the SADC, in 
Windhoek, Namibia (amended in 2001), ^vith the aim of promoting peace and 
development in the r e g i o n / T h e  origins of SADC go back to 1980, when the 
Frontline States signed the Treaty of Arusha, with the aim of resisting the influence 
of South Africa in the r e g i o n / T o  date, SADC includes fourteen Member States,^°^° 
and is a good example of the overlapping membership that characterises African 
regional trade agreements. All the five SACU members are also members of SADC, 
while nine of SADC's members are members of COMESA,^®^  ^ and one of SADC’s 
members (Tanzania) is also a member of EAC.
With regard to trade, a protocol was signed in 1996, which led to the 
establishment of a free trade area in 2000, in which all the Member States participate, 
except Angola and the D.R. Co n g o . Cu r r e n t l y  the aim of SADC’s Member States is 
liberalise 85 percent of all intra-SADC trade by 2008 and fully liberalise trade by 2012. 
In addition, SADC has announced its intention to have a common external tariff, and 
thus become a customs union by 2010, and to establish a central bank by 2016.*®’^
In terms of the institutional set up of the bloc, the supreme policy making and 
legislative organ is the Summit, which consists of the Heads of State of All the Member 
S t a t e s . T h e  Council of Ministers is another important institution provided by the 
Treaty, which has the competence to oversee the functioning and development of SADC 
and to recommend to the Summit the establishment of other institutions and organs.*®*  ^
The Council is assisted by another two intergovernmental organs, the Committee of
1007 On the objectives o f SADC, see Article 5 o f the Amended Declaration and Treaty Establishing the Southern Africa 
Development Community. Done and entered into force on August 14, 2001 in Blantyre, Malawi, 
<http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/treaties/amended_declaration_and_ treaty_of_sadc.php> (last visited on 21 May 
2007).
1008 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
1009 Following the collapse o f Apartheid South Africa eventually joined SADC in 1994. See Khandelwal, supra n. 501, at 12.
1010 Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic o f Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic o f Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
1011 Angola, D.R.Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
1012 See Khandelwal, supra n. 501, at 12.
1013 See Khandelwal, ibid, at 12 -13; see also Kalenga, P. (2004) ‘Implementation o f  the SADC Trade Protocol; Some Reflections’ 
Trade Brief. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa.
1014 See Article 10 o f the Amended Declaration and Treaty Establishing the Southern Africa Development Community, supra n. 
1007.
1015 See Article 11 o f the Amended Treaty.
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Ministers and the Committee of Of f i c i a l s , w h i l e  the Secretariat is a centralised 
supranational organ that has the competence to apply the Decisions of the Summit.^®^  ^
Finally, Article 16 of the SADC Treaty provides for the creation of a regional Tribunal, 
which has been operational since November of 2005.^®^ ^
vi. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established 
in 1975, with the adoption of the Treaty of Lagos (amended by the Treaty of Cotonou in 
1993) with the aim of economically integrating the countries of this particular region. 
ECOWAS contains 15 Member S t a t e s ; none t he l e s s ,  unlike WAEMU, whose 
members participate in ECOWAS, the process of integration has been particularly slow, 
due to the lack of political commitment in a region devastated by poverty and wars. To 
give a practical example, the GDP of the 15 Member States is half of that of Norway, 
while the average price for electricity is 4.5 times the average charges of OECD 
countries, and international calls are four times the average prices charged in OECD 
countries.
In terms of institutional set up. Article 6(1) of the Treaty provides for the 
establishment of a number of intergovernmental and supranational institutions. In 
particular, the article provides for the creation of ‘...a)the Authority of Heads of State 
and Government; b) the Council of Ministers; c) the Community Parliament; d) the 
Economic and Social Council; e) the Community Court of Justice; f) the Executive 
Secretariat; g) the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development; h) 
Specialised Technical Commissions; and i) Any other institutions that may be 
established by the Authority.’ Thus the institutional set up provided by the ECOWAS 
Treaty is similar to the one provided by the EU Treaty.
1016 See Articles 12 and 13 o f the Amended Treaty.
1017 See Articles 14 and 15 o f the Amended Treaty.
1018 See Articles 16 and 32 o f the Amended Treaty, and the website o f the African International Courts and Tribunals, at 
<http://www.aict-ctia.org/courts_subreg/sadc/sadc_home.html.> (last visited on 21 May 2007)
1019 The Members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Mauritania was also a member o f ECOWAS until 1999, when it withdrew from
the agreement.
1020 Kaplan, S. (2006) ‘West African Integration: A New Development Paradigm?’29:4 The Washington Quarterly, 81, at 84.
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F. Asia
i. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was first established in 
1967, when the five original member countries signed the Bangkok Declaration, 
with the aim of pursuing peace and political stability in the region. Following a 
Preferential Trading Agreement, signed in 1977, members of ASEAN finally signed a 
Free Trade Agreement in 1995.^°^  ^ The expressed aim of the ASEAN members is to 
have a fully integrated area by 2010 for the five original Member States plus Brunei 
(ASEAN-6), and by 2015 for the remaining four m e m b e r s . I n  addition, ASEAN 
members have agreed to have an economic community by 2020.
In terms of institutional set up, ASEAN is an intergovernmental organisation, 
whose highest decision making institution is the ASEAN summit, which consists of the 
heads of governments and convenes on an annual basis. The body responsible for the 
application of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) is the Council of Ministers, 
which includes ministerial level representatives from each member state, plus the 
Secretary General of ASEAN. Thus the role of ASEAN Secretariat, which is an 
independent supranational body, is limited -  as expected - mainly due to concerns that it 
would threaten the sovereignty of the Member States.
J. Cross-regional
i. Asia -  Pacific Economic Cooperation fAPECl
The second noteworthy example of regional agreement is the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), set up in 1989, which is an informal forum that
1021 Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, 
Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
1022 For an analytical overview o f the ASEAN project until the conclusion o f the FT A, see Tan, L.H. (2005) ‘Will ASEAN 
Economic Integration Progress Beyond a Free Trade Area?’ 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 935, at 936-939.
1023 Nonetheless, it has to be noted, that a sensitive list o f products, primarily agricultural products, is excluded from the inclusion 
list. In addition, recent research has shown that tariffs have been eliminated by the ASEAN-6 countries only for 65% o f the products 
o f the inclusion list. Thus the 2010 and 2015 deadlines should be extended. See Cuyvers, L., P. De Lombaerde and S. Verhestraeten
(2005) ‘From AFTA towards and ASEAN Economic Community ...and Beyond.’ Centre for ASEAN Studies Working Paper, 
January 2005, pp. 5, 7.
1024 Ibid, pp. 9 onwards.
1025 See Hunt, M. (2002), ‘From “Neighbourhood Watch Group” to Community? The Case o f ASEAN Institutions and the Pooling 
of Sovereignty’. 56:1 Australian Joumal o f  International Affairs, 99.
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promotes economic liberalisation and contains 21 countries. As already mentioned, 
APEC is a cross-regional organisation, as it includes Member States from four 
continents. The aim of APEC’s founding Members at the time of its establishment was 
to bring the WTO Uruguay Round negotiations to a successful end. In particular, it has 
been argued that the US has used the adoption of this cross-regional arrangement as 
leverage for the difficult negotiations with the EU.^ ®^  ^ The official aim of APEC’s 
participating countries is freer trade for the industrialised countries by 2010 and for 
developing member countries by 2020.
1026 The Members o f APEC are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, the People’s Republic o f China, Hong Kong, China, 
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, the Russian 
Federation, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States o f America, and Vietnam.
1027 See Park S-H (2005) ‘Increasing Sub-regionalism within APEC and the Bogor Goals: Stumbling Block or Building Block?’, 
<www.apec.org.au^docs/koreapapers2/SX-SHP-P^er.pdC>, (last visited on 21 May 2007), at 3.
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Trading in the United Kingdom regarding the application of their Competition and Consumer 
Laws. (October 20Q3)
EU-Japan (2003) Agreement between the Government of Japan and the European Community 
concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities.
US-Canada pos. com. (2004) Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Canada on the application of positive comity principles to the 
enforcement of their competition laws.
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2. Bilateral trade agreements of the EU
Agreements with (former) candidate countries
BULGARIA: Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Bulgaria, of the other part {OJ L 
358, 31/12/1994p.3).
CROATIA: Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and 
their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, of the other part (OJ L 26,
28/1/2005, p.3)
ROMANIA: Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Economic 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Romania, of the other part {OJ L 
357, 31/12/1994p.2).
TURKEY: Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community 
and Turkey and the Additional Protocol (OJ C l13, 24/12/1973, pi)
Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995, on 
implementing the final phase of the Customs Union {OJ L35, 13/2/96, p. 1).
Euro-Mediterranean Agreements
ALGERIA: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the People's Democratic Republic of 
Algeria, of the other part
EGYPT: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Arab Republic of Egypt, of the other 
part
ISRAEL: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part (OJ 
LI47, 21/6/2000, p.3) '
JORDAN: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of 
the other part (OJLI29, 15/2/2002, p.3)
LEBANON: Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters between the European 
Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Lebanon, of the other part {OJ L262, 
30/9/2002, p.2)
MOROCCO: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of 
the other part (OJL70,18/3/2000p.2)
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: Euro-Mediterranean Interim Association Agreement on trade 
and cooperation between the European Community, of the one part, and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) for the benefit of the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, of the other part {OJL 187, 16/07/1997p.3)
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TUNISIA: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other 
part (OJL97, 30/3/1998, p2)
Agreements with Eastern European and Central Asian Countries
ARMENIA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of 
the other part (OJL239, 9/9/1999p.3)
AZERBAIJAN: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Azerbaijan, 
of the other part (OJ L 246, 17/9/1999, p.3)
GEORGIA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part (OJ
1205,4/8/1999, p.3)
KAZAKHSTAN: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, of the other part (OJL 196, 28/7/1999, p.3)
KYRGYZSTAN: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of 
the other part (OJL 196, 28/7/1999, p.48)
MOLDOVA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Moldova, of 
the other part (OJL 181, 24/6/1998, p.3)
RUSSIA: Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation establishing a partnership between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Russian Federation, of the 
other part (OJL 327, 28/11/1997, p.3)
UKRAINE: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Ukraine, of the other part 
(OJL 49, 19/2/1998, p.3).
UZBEKISTAN: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a partnership between the 
European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
of the other part (OJ L 229, 31/8/1999, p.3).
Agreements with Mexico. Chile and South Africa
MEXICO: Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement between 
the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the United Mexican 
States, of the other part (OJL276, 28/10/2000, p. 45)
Decision No 2/2000 of the EC-Mexico Joint Council of 23 March 2000 (OJL 157, 30/6/2000,
p. 10).
CHILE: Agreement establishing an association between the European Community and its 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Chile, of the other part - Final act {OJ L 
352, 30/12/2002, p.3)
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SOUTH AFRICA: Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation between the European 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the 
other part {OJL 311, 4/12/1999, p.3).
3. Plurilateral-Regional Agreements (founding Treaties)
Andean Community: Andean Subregional Integration Agreement "CARTAGENA
AGREEMENT" <http://www.comunidadandina,org/INGLES/normativa/ande_triel .htm> (last 
visited on 21 May 2007)
MERCOSUR: Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the 
Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay, 
<http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp> (last visited on 21 May 2007)
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 December 1992, Canada-Mexico-United 
States, 321.L.M. 289
CAFTA -  DR: The Dominican Republic -  Central America -  United States Free Trade 
Agreement, Signed in August 5, 2004, <http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/ 
CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_ Index.htm>  (last visited on 21 May 2007)
CARICOM: Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community including 
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, < http://www.caricomlaw.org/docs/ 
revisedtreaty.pdf> (last visited on 21 May 2007)
EAC: EAC Treaty, <http://www.eac.int/documents/EAC%20Treaty.pdf>, (last visited on 21 
may 2007)
COMESA: COMESA Treaty, <http://www.comesa.int/comesa%20treaty/comesa%20treaty/ 
Multi-language_ content.2005-07-01.3414/en> (last visited on 21 May 2007)
SACU: Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement,
<http://www.sacu.int/ResourceCentre/Legislation/2002SACUAgreement/tabid/370/Default.asp 
x> (last visited on 21 May 2007)
SADC: Amended Declaration and Treaty Establishing the Southern Afnca Development 
Community. Done and entered into force on August 14, 2001 in Blantyre, Malawi, 
<http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/legal/treaties/amended_declaration_and_treaty_of_sad 
c.php> (last visited on 21 May 2007)
WAEMU: Traite de l’Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) < 
http://www.uemoa.int/actes/traite/TraiteUEMOA.pdf> (last visited : 21 May 2007)
Databases
World Bank, Country Classification <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ 
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0„contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:641 
33150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html>
UNCTAD database on FDI, <http://stats.unctad.org/FDI/TableViewer/tableView. aspx>
University of Halle, ‘Competition Policy Foundations for Trade Reform, Regulatory Reform, 
and Sustainable Development’ <http://www.iwh-halle.de/projects/competition_policy/db/ 
index.asp>
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